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Foreword 
It is a pleasure to introduce this thought-provoking and innovative 
book that challenges present models and analytical perspectives on 
agricultural development, particularly as it comes from the Wageningen 
stable of rural and development sociology, where for the past few years 
a group of us have been struggling with some of the same theoretical 
and empirical problems. Its pedigree, however, goes back to the founding 
fathers of Wageningen sociology: to Rudie van Lier, who—though deeply 
skeptical of man's ability to steer the course of social change—thought 
that a major task of development sociology was to develop a critical 
and reflexive theory of intervention processes, and to E. W Hofstee, 
whose contribution to the understanding of differential farming and 
cultural patterns in the Netherlands represents an important foundation 
for contemporary rural studies. The book also builds upon the stimu-
lating work of Bruno Benvenuti (until recently also based at Wagen-
ingen), who developed an analytical approach to the study of institu-
tional incorporation in agricultural contexts in Europe. 
Yet, at the same time, the work is very much a product of the 
author's own distinctive background, field experience, and personal 
involvement with farmers and farmers' organizations in the Netherlands, 
Peru, and Italy. Unlike many practicing rural sociologists, Jan Douwe 
van der Ploeg is a countryman born and bred who early in life came 
to know the meaning of agrarian struggle. He comes from Friesland, 
from a family with strong farming and farmers' union connections, and 
although he now spends much of his time in mental labor, with pen 
rather than pitchfork in hand, he is never happier (as this book clearly 
reveals) than when discussing the concept of the "good cow" or the 
social significance of manure or varieties of potatoes. He also delights 
in being where the action is, whether this be with members of a 
Peruvian cooperative defending their right to work and to treat land 
as a collective asset and not simply as a commodity or with Italian 
dairy farmers seeking to combat the negative effects of market incor-
poration by devising strategies aimed at retaining control over the 
organization of their own labor processes. 
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Woven throughout the analysis are three crucial issues central to 
developing a critique of existing theoretical approaches to agricultural 
development: the significance of heterogeneity in farming practice and 
farm organization; the analysis and importance of commoditization and 
institutional incorporation for shaping farm labor processes and farmer 
strategies; and the importance of farmer organization and political 
struggle for the outcomes of incorporative processes. 
While previous research has recognized diversity in farming, it has 
frequently been assumed that this diversity is especially characteristic 
of "backward" or "low-output" forms of agriculture that will eventually 
give way to "modern," "high-output," and technologically more stan-
dardized types. Diversity is reduced, therefore, to what van der Ploeg 
calls "a secondary characteristic of agricultural systems," representing 
either the survival of previous (and now less appropriate) forms of 
production that one day will wither away altogether or minority patterns 
that deviate from the central tendencies. Either way, of course, heter-
ogeneity is side-tracked theoretically, leaving us with theories (whether 
couched in modernization or political economy terms) that concentrate 
upon explaining general statistical tendencies and assume normatively 
that empirical diversity is an expression of varying degrees of entre-
preneurial success or of the uneven pattern of capitalist development. 
Van der Ploeg counters this rather warped type of reasoning by doc-
umenting the significance of variability in both so-called peripheral and 
central economies. He argues that heterogeneity in farming practice and 
farm organization is a structural feature of agricultural production 
everywhere and that it requires analysis and theorization. 
The way forward, he suggests, is through recognizing that farmers 
themselves play a critical role in the construction and reorganization 
of farm practice. That is, they are, as Giddens succinctly put it, 
"knowledgeable and capable" social actors who set about resolving their 
own problematic situations through mobilizing resources and relation-
ships and through attempting to impose their own normative definitions 
on the physical and social world around them. Differences in farm 
practice, then, are the result of differences in farmer strategy, rationality, 
and access to internal and external resources. A crucial point in his 
argument, however, is that there are likely to be several equally viable 
and profitable solutions that entail different degrees of market and 
institutional integration, different time perspectives, and different cul-
tural commitments. Hence, we find among dairy farmers in Italy two 
contrasting types of farming logic that underpin the difference between 
strategies based upon "intensification" and those based upon scale 
enlargement and relative "extensification." Similar contrasts are evident 
among potato producers in highland Peru. Somewhat paradoxically, 
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however, the technological and credit package introduced by government 
agencies designed to intensify production has led to strategies that are 
characterized by short-term planning, high costs and risks, dependence 
upon limited input and output markets, and generally lower benefits; 
in short, the strategies are characterized by several negative features 
associated with extensification. Improved technology and credit have 
also resulted in the destruction of various relatively "cheap" forms of 
non-wage labor. 
These findings prompt van der Ploeg, at various points in his 
analysis, to embark upon a theoretical reappraisal of commoditization, 
giving attention to the ways in which "the means and objects of labor 
increasingly enter the process of production as commodities." Building 
upon an earlier critique of certain commoditization models (see Long 
et al., 1986; and Long and van der Ploeg, 1988), he argues that 
commoditization is a highly variable historical process that takes many 
forms and is inherently contradictory in its outcomes. The chapters 
devoted to the Italian and Peruvian cases provide a detailed picture 
of the many mechanisms by which commoditization penetrates the 
farm production process. But they also advance his central theoretical 
position that despite the pressures of the market and the state, farmers 
nevertheless possess the capability of containing or resisting commodity 
relations. They can, that is, adjust their farming strategies in order to 
benefit from non-commodity forms and from local agricultural knowl-
edge and practice, thus creating some degree of autonomy vis-à-vis 
external institutions. This process is illustrated by van der Ploeg's finely 
honed comparison of "I-" and "E"-type Italian farmers who adopt 
different strategies with regard to cattle breeding, fodder provision, and 
mechanization. It is also shown in his account of how some Peruvian 
peasant producers draw upon their extensive knowledge {art de la 
localité) of different phenotypical conditions and genotypical varieties 
to select and exchange seed potatoes rather than purchasing "improved" 
varieties developed and promoted by scientific research establishments. 
Certain other types of farmers internalize the normative standards and 
follow the procedures of "modern" scientific farming in order to actively 
seek what they see as the benefits of commoditization. 
Yet, whichever strategy predominates, agricultural decision making 
and the organization of the social relations of production in agriculture 
rest firmly in the hands of the farmer himself, even if he chooses to 
submit himself to the vicissitudes of the market and of price mecha-
nisms. Therefore, farmers are active strategists who attempt to come 
to grips, both cognitively and organizationally, with the problems they 
face, rather than merely cogs in the wheels of change. 
x Foreword 
This line of argument rejects linear and externalist interpretations of 
agrarian development by according human agency a central role in the 
drama of agrarian development, but it also carries the implication that 
commoditization and institutionalization become real in their conse-
quences only when introduced and translated by specific actors. The 
latter, of course, include not only farmers but also others—such as 
government bureaucrats and technicians, traders, agribusiness personnel, 
and development workers—who intervene directly or indirectly in farm-
ing practice and farmer decision making. Van der Ploeg's analysis also 
lays the essential groundwork for a detailed examination of the strategic 
action and ideologies of intervening parties who seek to establish 
economic, political, or ideological hegemony over the rural producer. 
Van der Ploeg considers in depth the struggle "from below." He 
explores this topic through a fascinating and gripping portrayal of the 
long and militant struggle against the state by a Peruvian farming 
cooperative that was founded as part of the Velasco land reform of the 
early 1970s. Here he aims to characterize the nature, benefits, and 
internal dynamics of peasant-managed agricultural development and to 
document the continuous struggle that takes place in an effort to protect 
jobs and to secure local control over land utilization and the manage-
ment of the production process. Van der Ploeg concludes that the general 
success of the cooperative in fending off the advances of the state, as 
well as in resisting the more subtle encroachment of commodity rela-
tions, rested principally upon two factors. First, when faced by govern-
ment and bank pressure to reduce and rationalize labor power, the 
cooperative was able to develop a broad-based pattern of popular 
support (which at critical confrontations stretched even beyond the 
formal membership of the cooperative) for a strategy of maintaining 
all individuals in employment. Second, the type of intensified agricul-
tural regime that it implemented facilitated a degree of autonomy from 
markets and external institutions. 
This final element in van der Ploeg's argument reveals the "populist" 
strand in his thinking. Sustainable agricultural development, he believes, 
depends fundamentally upon the ability of local producer groups to 
maintain or secure control over the organization of their own labor 
processes and over other critical resources. Only by empowering them-
selves in this way through the development of their organizational 
capacities can they, in the face of the increasing threats of commodi-
tization and scientification of agriculture, effectively protect their own 
life-worlds and interests, shape their future life chances, and guarantee 
the continuation of adaptive variety in the art and craft of farming. 
While this message may seem to belong to the optimism of the late 
1970s when "participation" and "participatory research" were the catch-
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words, van der Ploeg's deep and genuine concerns for the future of 
small-scale producers and for the survival of diversified forms of agri-
culture are founded upon meticulous field research and a thorough 
theoretical grasp of the nature and analysis of agrarian change. His 
point of view is not based upon empty slogans but is grounded in a 
systematic understanding of the contradictory tendencies of intervention 
and farmer organization. Furthermore, he is sensitive to the need to 
analyze closely the room for maneuver or the space for change that 
pertains to particular political contexts. He does not therefore rule out 
the strategic importance of piecemeal change and relatively small gains. 
In the end, his theoretical emphasis on actor strategy and rationality 
joins forces with a political standpoint that recognizes the crucial role 
of "everyday forms of resistance" and the many ways in which the 
struggles between different agrarian actors "make history." 
This book, then, takes us into the battleground of agrarian problems 
where theory and practice confront each other. It is of great credit to 
Jan Douwe van der Ploeg that he is in the forefront of present debates 
and that he is so articulate analytically in presenting his point of view. 
This work, I believe, merits serious attention not only from researchers 
and students of agrarian development but also from development prac-
titioners, planners, and politicians, whose actions shape, though do not 
determine, the course of agricultural development. 
Norman Long 
The Agricultural University 
Wageningen 
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1 
Heterogeneity 
and Styles of Farming 
There are a great many ways to farm, greater even, if that's possible, 
than the number of erudite models that have been devised for under-
standing, managing, and possibly neutralizing such diversity. Such models 
include Grigg's "agricultural systems" (1974), Dumont's "types d'agri-
culture" (1970), the "ecosystems" of Geertz (1963), the "bedrijfstypen" 
of the Dutch Agro-Economic Institute, the "aziende tipiche" of Italian 
research from Medici (1934) to de Benedictis and Cosentino (1979) 
and Brusco (1979), the "land-labor institutions" of South America 
described by Pearse (1976), and the "styles of farming" identified by 
Hofstee (1985). And the list could be greatly extended. 
The intricacies and implications of the different classifications are 
equally diverse. Large geographical units, ranging from zones, provinces 
and states, to countries and even subcontinents, are generally the start-
ing point for comparison and further elaboration. Some research tra-
ditions depict the differences between various systems by assuming a 
certain homogeneity within given geographical areas. Others highlight 
the heterogeneity found within different production zones. Table 1.1 
presents a tentative overview of this heterogeneity. The table is based 
on one of the most obvious forms that diversity can take within what 
are otherwise relatively homogeneous agricultural areas, i.e., on the 
highly differing production results per object of labor (where object of 
labor can refer to a unit of land, herd of cattle, etc.). Under similar 
conditions (of an ecological, economic and technical kind), such different 
physical levels of productivity imply a varying input of production 
factors and non-factor inputs per object of labor and highly different 
levels of technical efficiency.1 A greater insertion of production factors 
and inputs per labor object is often associated with higher technical 
efficiency. This is an argument which I shall take up later. In such a 
case, we speak of an intensive style of agricultural practice. When a 
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Table 1.1. Hectare Yields for Different Styles of Agriculture 
Agricultural System Ha. Yields with 
Extensive Style of 
Agriculture 
Ha. Yield with 
Intensive Style of 
Agriculture 
Rice in S. of Guinea-
Bissau 
Groundnuts in Guinea-
Bissau 
Cotton around Bagoue 
Ivory Coast 
Food prod. Senoufozone 
Ivory Coast 
Food prod, in thinly pop. 
Ignamezone, Ivory Coast 
Cocoa, Nigeria 
Potatoes, Anta Pampa, 
Peru 
Cotton, coop, & communal, 
Bajo Piura, Peru 
- on good land 
- on poor land 
Minifundia agriculture, 
Antioquia, Colombia 
Mixed agriculture, 
Campania, Italy 
Dairy farming, 
Po plain, Italy 
820 kg/ha 
1,500 kg/ha 
unpeeled 
878 kg/ha 
28 mil F/ha 
2,850 Kcal/ha 
300 lbs/acre 
1,820 kg/topo 
10.7 cargas/ha 
7.1 cargas/ha 
100 (index) 
3.08 milj.l/ha 
4.16 milj.l/ha 
1,410 kg/ha 
2,200 kg/ha 
unpeeled 
1,364 kg/ha 
31 mil F/ha 
3,240 Kcal/ha 
550 lbs/acre 
3,180 kg/topo 
12.1 cargas/ha 
8.4 cargas/ha 
153 (index) 
5.46 milj.l/ha 
6.43 milj.l/ha 
Source : Based on Cabrai, 1956; van der Ploeg, 1981; Peltre-Wurtz and Steck, 
1979; SEDES, 1965; Leroy, 1979; Galletti et al., 1956; van de Ploeg, 1977; 
CEC, 1976 and 1977; Bolhuis and van der Ploeg, 1985; this study Chapters 2 
and 3. Average input of production factors per hectare as well as average 
technical efficiency were calculated for each agricultural system. When 
both were high then the farm was classified as belonging to the intensive 
style, and when both were low, as belonging to the extensive style. In all 
sets of data at least 74X of the farms could be classified as belonging to 
one or the other style. 
relatively low input of production factors is combined with a relatively 
low level of technical efficiency, we speak of an extensive style of 
agricultural practice.2 
It is customary in comparative research to present an agricultural 
system's level of development in terms of the average production of 
grain equivalents per hectare. At present, in most West African coun-
tries, this figure amounts to 1.5 ton gr.eq./ha. In The Netherlands, it 
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is 10 ton gr.eq./ha. This last figure is even more impressive when 
compared to the 4.5 ton gr.eq/ha. obtained eighty years ago. In Italy, 
where higher temperatures slow down the conversion of energy and 
nutrients in biomass, a lower level is achieved, namely, an average 
production of 7 ton gr.eq/ha. While not disputing the significance of 
average differences, the data summarized in Table 1.1 demonstrate 
unequivocally that at each level of development a degree of diversity 
can be identified. The key question, however, is whether such diversity 
is structurally meaningful, or whether the distribution is simply random. 
This question is not new: indeed, one might even postulate that agri-
cultural science advances through the repeated reconceptualization of 
such differences. Some theories maintain that they are essential as a 
starting point for analysis, while others, theoretically at least, see them 
as somewhat irrelevant. 
Until the 1950s, diversity between, and especially within, agricultural 
areas was classified and understood in terms of intensive and extensive 
styles of agriculture practice. Thus the concept of "intensification" meant 
the ongoing development of intensive styles of farming; it referred to 
the progressive raising of intensity levels. The term "extensification" 
referred to the opposite tendency. 
But these terms were anything but neutral. Intensive agriculture 
stood for better agriculture. It was not only desirable; it equaled prog-
ress. "Good farming," wrote Graham Brade-Birks (1950:XVI), "means 
farming so carried out as to produce the maximum economic output 
from the land." He described this "good farming" as "intensive farm-
ing," directed to "those practices designed to produce a very high 
output." Technical efficiency and economic results followed logically 
from each other. In contrast, extensive farming, "the practice of using 
the minimum amounts of labor, cultivation and manure," was referred 
to as "a low standard of farming." An authoritative Dutch author of 
the time, Minderhoud, wrote "intensification is rooted in the rule of 
raising the net yield, while extensification lies in saving labor and 
capital: thus one has to take a reduction of yield in kind for love" 
(1948:45). 
Also interesting, in retrospect, is the debate which was then taking 
place over the farm economy ratio behind both processes of develop-
ment. Minderhoud criticized those who "calculate at which intensity 
total production costs per kg are the lowest and give the impression 
that the farmer must strive for that." Contained in this whole issue is 
the question of which of the concepts corresponds most accurately to 
actual relations in agriculture and can thus be used as normative, as 
goals at the enterprise level. In short, what we now know as an 
established theory, namely, neoclassical agricultural economics, was then 
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still subject to fundamental differences of opinion. Thus, according to 
Minderhoud, the proposition that the farmer must strive for the lowest 
price per unit of end product, "the problem is incorrectly posed." 
Situations vary and thus "the manner in which the soil can be rationally 
exploited" also varies. His comment that "many American writers, 
. . . take the circumstance of sufficient ground, but insufficient labor 
and capital as a starting point for consideration, with the consequence 
that West European readers find them difficult to follow," is a telling 
one (1948:52). 
Minderhoud and Brade-Birks are exponents of a tradition which is 
difficult to reconstruct in retrospect and therefore may provoke surprise. 
There existed a broad consensus in which the bipolar dimensions just 
noted were taken as obvious, for the most part as an undisputed 
parameter for the ordering of diversity and as an analytical starting 
point for developing an understanding of the differential processes which 
such diversity brought about. Contained in such ideas was the un-
questioned norm about the nature and direction of further agrarian 
development—namely, progressive intensification. 
The 1950s marked a gradual but definitive turning point: a new 
paradigm became dominant. The core of the new tendency was neo-
classical agricultural economics, a model for examining, describing and, 
if necessary, reorganizing the adjustment of agrarian enterprise behavior 
to market and price relations. In essence, this model comes down to 
projecting current price relations on the farm enterprise in order to 
specify precisely the "optimum" solution. The model implies a situation 
that is both thoroughly atomized and completely static. Development 
at farm enterprise level (a shifting "optimum") is only possible within 
this model by the grace of changing market relations and technical 
progress, mostly understood as the taking up of externally-developed 
innovations. It is striking that, with the emergence of this neoclassical 
model, concern for a dynamic that could be produced within the farm 
itself disappears from the literature. Agriculture appears increasingly as 
"the text-book paradigm of neoclassical perfect competition" (Lipton, 
1968), and so the concept of intensification logically loses its meaning. 
Intensity level becomes a derivative of the enterprise as an economic 
organization orientated to the market. Indeed, particular agrarian sub-
sectors can then be defined as "too intensive" (Galletti et al., 1956:308). 
Finally, categories such as intensive and extensive completely disappear 
from applied agricultural science. New parameters rule. 
The agro-economic definition of the optimum—given a series of 
assumptions, such as the same economic and institutional conditions 
for all enterprises, the same technological level, and a striving for profit 
maximization by each and every producer—means that "only one point 
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would be observable on the production surface" (Yotopoulos, 1974:265). 
Empirical diversity, from being the first tenet for theoretical construc-
tion, now becomes a residual factor, or worse still, an "anomaly." 
In the recent literature, insofar as diversity and its implications get 
any attention, one or more of the following factors are usually referred 
to: 
1. Diversity in hectare yields between otherwise "identical" enter-
prises would primarily point to variation in micro-ecological con-
ditions: the vagaries of climate and soil are to be understood, as 
one Peruvian author expressed it, as "Satan and Messiah"; as 
prosperity for some, adversity for others. 
2. A more elaborated view (which often rests on tautological argu-
mentation) reduces differences in hectare yields to differences in 
price and cost levels. 
One encounters a clear description of both viewpoints in Mellor 
(1968:259): "Studies that demonstrate peasant farmers to be, on the 
average, in good economic adjustment with their environment normally 
include considerable variability around that average. It is usually not 
clear to what extent such variability arises because some peasant farm-
ers are not in optimal economic adjustment and to what extent the 
environment itself differs significantly from one farmer to another. 
Certainly the latter is true in part. Soils and other physical features 
differ widely even within small areas. . . . Perhaps even more important, 
costs of labor and capital differ substantially from one farm to another." 
With a different relation between available land and family size, farmers 
feel either more or less pressure, thus goes the reasoning, "to squeeze 
the last bit out of the farm (so that hectare yields rise rather than fall), 
and thus they in effect act as though labor were more (or less) expensive 
to them than to other farmers" (italics added). 
3. In the most recent literature, besides assumptions over the sub-
jective evaluation of factor costs, a risk factor is also introduced 
(in principle differing from farmer to farmer) in order to reconcile 
the assumption of an optimum to the actual distribution around 
that optimum. Later I shall examine this reasoning more closely. 
4. A fourth, more instrumental explanation, links differences in hec-
tare yield to different rhythms for adopting external innovations 
(more productive varieties, fertilizer, etc.)—a problem localized 
primarily in the psyche of the individual farmer. 
5. Differences are also related to imperfections in the institutional 
environment—to inadequate commercialization structures, to a 
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lack of transport facilities, and to extension and credit mechanisms 
which reach only a part of the potential number of clients. These 
factors would explain the poor performance of some farmers and 
thus some of the differences between them. 
6. Finally, there is a simplistic but often used argument in the NW 
European research tradition that "good" and "bad" hectare yields 
can be reduced to differences in craftsmanship. "Satan and Mes-
siah" speak here not through soil and climate but through the 
(randomly bestowed) distribution of individual talents among 
farmers. 
Without going into each of these arguments separately, we can 
observe that they have one characteristic in common. They are, in 
essence, all factors which are exogenous to the model; i.e., they are 
residual factors. Rather than seeing such factors as a possible falsification 
of the model itself, they are redefined, at least theoretically, as a question 
of extraneous conditions, such as those listed above. 
The pioneering work of Hayami and Ruttan (1971) represents, in 
certain respects, a break with this agro-economic paradigm. They take 
diversity, so clearly evident in international comparative research, to 
be the starting point for their analysis. Their model also makes diver-
sity—as being the product of different agrarian development patterns— 
acceptable. The parameters within which this diversity is investigated 
and exposed are reduced, in principle, to two: production per unit of 
land and the input of labor per unit of land. A combination of both 
terms specifies production per labor force—an approximation of income. 
Production per labor unit can be raised within their model in 
different ways. First, by intensification, i.e., by raising production per 
unit of land. Such intensification, particularly if it forms a systematic 
pattern over time, is referred to in the literature as the "Japanese 
model." A second, an opposite strategy, is by scale enlargement, i.e., 
raising the land/man ratio or lowering the labor input per unit of land, 
referred to as the "American model." All kinds of in-between forms 
are, of course, possible. 
Taking individual countries as the units of research, Hayami and 
Ruttan made a number of international comparisons, the assumption 
being that the pattern constructed for a country as a whole is a 
meaningful average. The explanation for the occurrence of one or 
another of the above patterns is, as Hayami and Ruttan assumed, to 
be sought in relative factor prices: i.e., the price of labor, capital, and 
land in relation to each other. If land is cheap and labor relatively 
expensive then agricultural development will follow the path of scale 
enlargement, especially if labor-saving technology is available. If land 
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is scarce and labor overabundant, then intensification is to be expected. 
This explanation, theoretically speaking, is a repetition of the neoclass-
ical model, in this case applied to countries, each country representing 
a specific constellation of relative factor prices. Beyond that, the model 
implicitly assumes that relative factor prices are "always and every-
where" translated in the same unilinear way in terms of the direction 
and rhythm of agrarian development. 
The meaning and scope of these assumptions can be examined by 
applying Ruttan and Hayami's analytical model to a homogeneous 
agricultural area and seeing to what extent divergent development 
patterns can be identified within such an area. Such an experiment 
demands first a more precise definition of the term "homogeneity." 
Homogeneity in economic terms means that the relative factor prices, 
to which Ruttan and Hayami attached such importance, will be vir-
tually the same for all units of research, which implies that the research 
units will have the same internal structure and dimensions. Homoge-
neity in the institutional and technological sense means that all enter-
prises have the same access to credit and marketing facilities as well 
as to whatever technology is available. Homogeneity in the ecological 
sense speaks for itself. It implies that differences in agricultural style 
and development will not be due to differences of soil type, micro 
climate, etc. "Satan and Messiah" would thus be the same for everyone, 
certainly in the longer term. 
If homogeneity in the above sense is satisfied but differences in 
enterprise patterns are still, nevertheless, observable (hypothetically and 
schematically represented in Figure 1.1), then several things may be 
concluded: 
1. Diversity (symbolized by the cross-sectional analyses, Figure 1.1 
at moment t=5 and t=10) will not be so much a chance phe-
nomenon but a product of different development patterns that can 
be logically explained. 
2. Other relations and processes besides relative factor prices play 
an important role in the emergence of a particular development 
pattern. Perhaps there are structural patterns which account for 
factor prices weighing heavily in some enterprises and being of 
less or no importance in others. 
3. Finally, "induced technological change," the strategy for speeding 
up agrarian growth proposed by Ruttan (1973; 1977), would be 
incomplete. Besides the availability and diffusion of innovations 
as such, the specific demand for and selection of particular in-
novations would also emerge as essential factors. 
Heterogeneity and Styles of Farming 
inten-
• i ty 
seal« 
Figure 1.1 Hypothetical sketch of different enterprise development patterns in 
a homogeneous setting 
These hypothetical conclusions suggest that there are differences in the 
dynamics and rationalities within enterprises, which lead one to ques-
tion what kind of relations might lead to such differentiation. 
In the several districts where we carried out our research, differences 
in development patterns do indeed appear. In this book three different 
agricultural systems are discussed: dairy farming in Emilia Romagna, 
Italy; potato cultivation in the southern highlands of Peru; and coop-
eratively organized agriculture on the northern coast of Peru, where 
the cultivation of export crops is prominent. In each of these three 
areas, a great heterogeneity can be observed, both in the technical 
production structure of the farms as well as in hectare yields. Some 
production cooperatives, for example, achieve a gross value of produc-
tion per hectare (GVP/ha) 30% or 40% higher than the "average" 
cooperative under what are otherwise similar circumstances. Such dif-
ferences are not coincidental. They are, as we shall see later, the result 
of the way in which such cooperatives are linked into their economic 
environment and of the social struggle that some cooperatives pursue: 
a struggle for the right to work, which in present day agriculture is 
becoming increasingly marginalized. Likewise, substantial heterogeneity 
is to be found in potato production, as practiced on the smallholdings 
in southern Peru. Some farmers harvest 5 tons per hectare, while others 
achieve a production of more than 15 tons. This variance is significant. 
For the farmers in the highlands, this is not due to a blind Satan or 
Messiah or to the unpredictability of the rains, frosts or diseases. As 
they themselves say, "It is the rich farmers who can bring home a fine 
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Tabic 1.2. Diversity of Dairy Farming in Emilia Romagna. ERSA data, plain and 
mountain (n-75, n-59 resp.) 
Labor input/ha (man/ha) 
Depreciation/ha (in 1.000 lire 
Variable costs/ha (ditto) 
(lab+cap+inputs)/ha (ditto) 
GVP/ha (ditto) 
Herd value/ha (ditto) 
Machine value/ha (ditto) 
Cow value per AA (ditto) 
Fodder per AA (ditto) 
GVP/per AA (ditto) 
Yield/cow (in ql) 
Food prod./ha food crop 
(in 1.000 lire) 
Animal prod./ha food crop 
(in 1,000 lire) 
Plain 
Mean 
0.23 
) 319.52 
2584.79 
5244.54 
5464.04 
2577.89 
1305.45 
958.55 
775.81 
1369.15 
44.10 
1046.53 
5134.17 
SD as % 
of mean 
48 
71 
39 
34 
42 
51 
113 
16 
32 
25 
23 
64 
87 
Mountains 
Mean 
0.16 
141.00 
891.54 
2589.64 
1611.13 
983.89 
648.48 
953.47 
706.25 
1055.33 
31.71 
520.48 
1230.10 
SD 
of 
as % 
mean 
50 
70 
64 
45 
48 
44 
85 
17 
61 
32 
27 
81 
52 
AA - Adult Animal, a statistical category that allows for a classification of 
different kinds of animals to the same quantitative unit. 
harvest. They are the ones who can work the land as it should be 
worked." 
If one should turn one's thoughts from the micro to the macro level, 
then again particular trends can be observed which show the strategic 
meaning of yields. Sugarcane and cotton, typical crops for the large 
production cooperatives in Peru, showed an absolute drop in hectare 
yields in the 1970s, while the opposite trend, i.e., a sustained increase, 
can be seen for a crop such as beans, produced mostly by the small-
scale farming sector. 
Marked differences in hectare yields do not only manifest themselves 
in the Third World. One can see them just as well in the so-called 
"modern" agricultural areas of the European Community. One such 
region, Emilia Romagna, discussed in more detail later in this study, 
is composed of the provinces of Parma and Reggio Emilia, Italy, a 
dairying area noted for its highly productive form of agriculture. For 
the specialized family farms located on the plain there, all operating 
under the same ecological conditions, one finds considerable variance 
over a whole range of relevant farm characteristics. 
Thus, one finds for the average labor input per hectare (see Table 
1.2) a standard deviation of 48%; for depreciation per hectare (an 
indication of the capital input) we find a standard deviation as high as 
71%. Inputs (measured as variable costs per hectare) also vary notice-
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ably, with a standard deviation of 39%. It should therefore be no 
surprise that gross production value per hectare should also strongly 
vary (i.e., 42%). Such variance does not disappear when the research 
area is narrowed (for example, to the level of a single province, where 
one might expect ecological levels to be less varied), but instead becomes 
even greater. Also, within groups of farms of the same size, variance 
appears to be large. In other words, between what are almost identical 
enterprises, enormous differences in intensity are visible. 
Analysis of constant samples relating to these dairy farms in northern 
Italy shows that, during the period researched (1970-1980), diversity 
actually increased. There are two clearly diverging development patterns 
to be seen. There is a group of farms which intensified substantially 
over time—i.e., production per unit of land rose substantially—while 
"scale" (the relation between land worked and available labor) remained 
relatively stable, and a second group which developed to a large extent 
in terms of scale—and hectare yields rose to a lesser extent than those 
of the first group. For this reason, I refer to the latter as scale-
enlargement combined with relative extensification. 
These development patterns, which may be seen as opposite poles 
between which a whole gamut of development patterns might fit, will 
be illustrated through an analysis of twenty four dairy farms located 
in the Pianura Parmense (an outstanding example of a homogeneous 
agricultural area). In 1970, at the beginning of the research period, 
these farms were relatively homogeneous. They were all roughly the 
same size, about 25 hectares, and they could all be considered as 
dynamic, well-functioning family farms. 
In the following ten-year period many changes took place, changes 
which as usual can be excellently described in terms of average trends. 
The average size of the farm grew, average production per farm rose, 
average input of labor fell, and mechanization increased. In other words, 
the Parma data are pars pro toto par excellence of what appears to be 
the universal image of western agriculture.3 During this same period, 
six farms closed their dairies, a fact which is also congruent with the 
general development of Italian agriculture. However, for the remaining 
eighteen farms, there was certainly no uniform pattern of development. 
The average rise in gross value of production per hectare during the 
research period amounted to 2.53 million lire (current rates). Some 
farms, however, achieved a noticeably higher increase while others 
remained clearly behind. Table 1.3 charts these differences. The farms 
are divided into three subgroups according to their GVP/ha: those with 
a less than average rise, those with an average rise, and those with a 
much higher than average rise in GVP/ha. A clear difference in de-
velopment patterns is observable. The differences in GVP/ha, which 
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Table 1.3. Divergent Patterns of Development, Parma Data 
Intensity Scale 
delta GVP/ha GVP/ha 70/71 GVP/ha ha/man ha/man 
79/80 70/71 79/80 
Intensifying >3.00 mil.lire 0.90 4.76 4.92 6.02 
subgroup (n-6) (0.26) (0.27) 
Middle group 2.15-3.00 0.79 3.34 6.84 7.8 
(n-6) (0.20) (0.42) 
Relatively 
extensifying <2.15 0.67 2.47 7.66 10.59 
group (n-6) (0.10) (0.29) 
were minor in 1970/71, were substantial in 1978/79. The range observ-
able in 1979/80 is the result of diverging patterns of farm development.4 
The third subgroup is intriguing. Already relatively extensive, these 
farms achieved a rise in GVP/ha which, judged by the intensive group, 
remained far behind what the real potential could be. This relatively 
extensive group, however, raised scale the most (taken here to be the 
relation between area and labor force: ha/man): from 7.66 ha/man to 
10.59! 
Compared to the middle group, intensity in the third subgroup 
dropped from 85% in 1970/71 to 74% in 1979/80. In contrast, scale 
rose (as a percentage for the group) from 112% to 135%! Among the 
intensive group intensity rose from 114% to 143%, while scale remained 
relatively constant, 72% in 1970/71, and to 77% in 1979/80. If one 
presented these different patterns of development in graph form, the 
picture hypothesized in Figure 1.1 would emerge. 
Each pattern is economically viable in the sense that it provides a 
reasonable income per labor force: 18.39 million lire in 1979/80 for 
relatively extensive, large scale enterprises, and 16.28 million lire for 
the intensive group.5 The middle group earned the least, 15.10 million 
lire. Historical trend analysis shows that the middle group also achieved 
the lowest increase in income. 
An important part of the heterogeneity identified in various agri-
cultural systems can be analyzed in terms of different styles of farming. 
These styles, as the previous analysis shows, are to a large extent the 
result of different patterns of farm development reproduced through 
time. Style of farming (or soil use), can be defined as a valid structure 
of relations between producers, objects of labor, and means. "Valid" 
means that at least those directly concerned consider the structure as 
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an adequate means for making a living. Characteristic of each farming 
style are its productive results per object of labor as realized through 
the specific interrelations between the direct producer, his objects of 
labor, and means. We shall conceptualize the physical production levels 
achieved as both characteristic of, and the structural outcome of, the 
way in which farming is organized (subject to a series of conditions to 
be specified later, among which is a degree of continuity through time).6 
Thus we speak of an intensive style of agriculture if the production 
level per object of labor is high, and of a relatively extensive style 
when the production level per object of labor is relatively low.7 
How many styles of farming there are, the degree to which they 
explain variance, and the extent to which they are linked to structural 
differences in agricultural development patterns, are questions which a 
priori are not easily answered. They are themes for further research. 
The interaction between direct producer, his objects of labor, and 
means can also be defined in an immediate sense as farm labor. This 
might appear confusing, but it is not. Farm labor and styles of farming, 
though not to be separated, are nonetheless distinguishable. One can 
consider farm labor as the continuous reproduction (and sometimes the 
gradually produced change) of a style of farming, and a style of farming 
as the material result of farm labor—a result of the antecedent practices 
and decisions laid down in the setting up of and the operating and 
developing of any particular farm. In summary, a particular style of 
farming is the product of a specific structuring of farm labor. A style 
of farming can rightly be defined as a "social construction," at least if 
its construction (the "construing moment") is located within the farm 
labor process. Farm labor as a conscious activity assumes the formation 
and use of goals towards which organization and development of pro-
duction will be oriented; it assumes also the development of the means 
or qualities to effectively pursue such goals. Ends and means will 
together form a rational pattern. 
Following Weber, Mannheim and others, different forms of rationality 
can be distinguished, with substantial and functional rationalities being 
the two classical opposite poles. Different ends can thus be combined, 
through different ratios, with different means. Applied to the notion of 
farm labor, a whole gamut of theoretically possible structurations and 
thus styles of farming, can arise, each noticeably different, with its own 
characteristic development pattern. 
Reproduction, Incorporation, 
and Differential Commoditization 
In this book I will develop the thesis that different development 
patterns each assume a specific pattern of reproduction. I shall discuss 
Heterogeneity and Styles of Farming 13 
two such patterns, that of relatively autonomous, historically guaranteed 
reproduction, and that of market-dependent reproduction. 
Farm labor cannot be reduced to the production of certain end 
products such as milk, meat, potatoes, and grain, for it is also inter-
woven, in a variety of different ways, with reproduction. To produce 
milk, the necessary labor power, objects of labor, and means all have 
to be reproduced. One can even go a step further and say that the 
social relations of production themselves, i.e., the relations under which 
production takes place and which give the production process its con-
crete form,8 must also be reproduced in the production process. 
The unity of production and reproduction in farming can be sym-
bolized in all kinds of ways. A cow must be pregnant to produce milk. 
Only then can there be any talk of (potentially high) milk yields. And 
in reverse, the calf that is to be born will take care of future milk 
production provided that she in her turn is pregnant. The same goes 
for a more mundane affair—potato cultivation. A potato variety can 
only yield a "fine production" on fields that are well cared for. And in 
reverse, only through a "fine production" can a better seed potato be 
selected. 
Relatively Autonomous, Historically Guaranteed Reproduction 
In the apparently most simple reproduction pattern, that of relatively 
autonomous historically guaranteed reproduction, the labor force, ob-
jects of labor, and the means necessary for each production cycle are 
the material result of the preceding cycle. Each cycle assumes the 
availability of land, labor, capital and all kinds of inputs produced in 
the preceding cycle. Production then depends on reproduction in the 
previous cycle, just as production in the present cycle lays the basis 
for future cycles. The reproduction process (and thus the production 
cycle) is thus said to be historically guaranteed. 
This process is not difficult to imagine. Take, for example, a dairy 
farm. The hay barn is full of the hay that was collected from the fields 
in the last cycle. In the present cycle, the fields will be sufficiently 
fertilized to harvest enough feed and fodder for the coming cycle. The 
family houses enough labor—farmer, wife, children and maybe others. 
Their knowledge and skills have been picked up in the experience of 
other cycles, and in the coming cycle their labor power both materially 
and qualitatively will again be reproduced. The means for taking care 
of the replacements that are sometimes necessary are found on the 
farm. Finally the patriarch keeps somewhere the proverbial sock with 
savings to take care of the unexpected emergency. The coming harvest 
can likewise reproduce or add to such reserve funds. In summary, at 
the beginning of a production cycle, the farmer has at his disposal all 
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Figure 1.2 Pattern of autonomous, historically guaranteed reproduction 
the necessary prerequisites to produce. Production and reproduction 
are thus historically guaranteed. 
This can be schematically projected as in Figure 1.2. The figure 
illustrates that the production cycle depends on the production factors 
and non-factor inputs reproduced in the previous cycle. Production is 
realized with the help of these production factors and inputs. Part of 
this production is sold in the various markets, and part serves to 
safeguard the following cycle. In principle, the ratio between the part 
marketed and the part that provides for the following cycle is variable. 
Short- and long-term perspectives and interests must here be balanced 
against each other. Once such a decision is made, it follows that each 
cycle will begin with a given amount of production factors and inputs. 
With this the farmer must work in such a way that a maximum output 
is reached, for in this way both short-term interests and long-term 
needs (the reproduction of production factors and inputs for the benefit 
of future cycles) are optimized. The key for achieving this goal, of 
course, is to raise technical efficiency.9 
Production of a marketable surplus plays a crucial role in this pattern. 
The production process is geared to the creation of commodities, and 
at the same time, to the guaranteeing of future cycles. Production and 
reproduction form a specific unity in this respect. The production 
process is geared to the creation of commodities, and thus to the 
market. Reproduction, however, goes on outside of the market, as it 
does not depend on buying the necessary labor, objects of labor, nor 
the means. The means of production are relatively autonomously pro-
duced. They do not appear as commodities in the production process 
but as use values, their specific value being that they assure production 
(i.e., one's own future and that of the farm). Hence, production depends 
not on the market but on a relatively autonomous and historically 
guaranteed reproduction. 
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The reproduction process may very well interact with markets in 
some respects. However, this is not a question of market dependency. 
With the money gained through the marketing of some commodities, 
those elements which cannot be reproduced in the labor process itself 
are bought. Iron is the cause-célèbre of earlier agrarian historical debates 
of this kind. Iron was practically always needed, but impossible to 
produce oneself. Thus, from ancient times onwards, each agricultural 
system had a culture d'or, as Marc Bloch called it, a crop cultivated 
for exchange—exchange for gold in order to buy iron. 
Orientation towards commodity production certainly cannot be con-
sidered a secondary characteristic of this pattern. Market developments 
were frequently decisive for both progress and misery. A telling example 
is the so-called Intensitätsinsel of early Europe: the proximity to city 
consumption markets gave impulse to a considerable intensifying of 
agriculture around the cities, so creating these "islands of intensive 
agriculture."10 Even today, one hears in the daily speech of farmers 
references to this relationship. Farmers in northern Italy speak of a 
"mercato che tira," of a market which draws farming onward. It is an 
expression which fits perfectly with the pattern of historically guaran-
teed, relatively autonomous reproduction. 
However, it must be stressed that this pattern should not simply be 
identified with the past. An important part of contemporary farming 
can, as I will presently show, be analyzed and understood through this 
pattern. Relatively autonomous historically guaranteed reproduction is 
often to be better understood as the outcome of the far-reaching and 
long-lasting emancipation processes of the farming people themselves 
than as a leftover of earlier relations. 
Take Friesland, for example. There was in Friesland, in what was 
later to become the birthplace of cattle breeding, a period in which 
hundreds of ships left the harbor laden with manure. The soil fertility 
of local fields was not improved because the manure was sold as a 
commodity to Holland. The same happened with cattle. Animals which 
appeared resistant to disease or were especially good stock breeding 
animals were not used for the improvement of local herds. They were 
sold. Hay was also sold and exported. The pattern of historically 
guaranteed relatively autonomous reproduction became established only 
later, between 1860 and 1890. A certain decommoditization then oc-
curred when farmers tried to gradually improve the production process 
and to ensure continuity. Then, hay, manure and good cows were no 
longer sold but kept on the farm to produce more and better milk and 
butter. 
This change came only after intervening social and economic change. 
From the 1830s on there was a profound struggle under way in Friesian 
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farming organizations for complete power: farmers even took the upper 
hand in organizations which were primarily controlled by the city 
bourgeoisie and rural aristocracy." Radical changes were also occurring 
in a cultural sense. As Hofstee (1985) demonstrated for arable farming 
in neighboring Groningen, long-term perspectives began to prevail over 
medium-term interests. The idea that farmers could make progress over 
the longer term through their own means was essential for improving 
stock, for raising soil fertility, and for creating the infrastructure needed 
for irrigation and drainage. It also seemed to be typical that the means 
seized upon for the gradual improvement of the production process (for 
the raising of technical efficiency) fitted closely within the pattern of 
relatively autonomous historically guaranteed reproduction. Van Zanden, 
who investigated the enormous increase in productivity in "peasant 
agriculture" on the sandy soils of the eastern Netherlands, showed clearly 
that this important development, which occurred between 1850 and 
1900, did not proceed via a growing division of labor between farm and 
external institutions nor via exogenously induced technical progress. 
Quite the opposite, "The production packet (of the farms) was earlier 
much more mixed than specialized.... There was no strong specialization 
of farm activities for which they had a relative advantage. On the 
contrary, on the output side we see a de-specialization" (1985:183). 
Growth, in essence, is autonomously generated: "the greatest part of the 
growth was brought by greater production of inputs (manure and fodder) 
within the farm." "Improvement in the quality of production factors 
also played an essential role"; an improvement that "was in the end 
made possible by a sharp increase in labor input" (van Zanden, 1985:184) 
(italics added). 
The pattern of historically guaranteed relatively autonomous repro-
duction can be complex. A growing part of the marketed surplus will 
be used for the purchase of those technical means of production that 
cannot be produced on the farm itself. In itself, this implies no essential 
breach in the system (take the example of iron already mentioned). The 
same can be said for tractors, chemical fertilizers, etc., for the schema 
does not refer to an imaginary autarky but to a specific structuring of 
the reproduction process. Almost all purchases of the various technical 
means of production can fit within this structure if they follow the 
pattern of historically guaranteed reproduction. Buying a tractor, build-
ing a new cow shed, etc., will thus be based on savings and not, for 
example, on loans. In this way the tractor will appear in the production 
process as a "means with which to lighten or improve labor" and not 
as a commodity. A primary example of this phenomenon is formed by 
the proverbial cycle of fat and thin years. It is after a number of "fat" 
years, years in which farmers are able to save, that extensive investment 
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Figure 1.3 The pattern of market-dependent reproduction 
is carried out. Such investments depend on savings, and they thus 
remain within the logic of historically guaranteed relatively autonomous 
reproduction. If such a wave of investment leads to a boom in pro-
duction and a subsequent fall in prices, then "thin" years dawn. 
Market-Dependent Reproduction 
A contrasting pattern or schema to that of historically guaranteed 
reproduction is that of market dependent reproduction. A simplified 
sketch of such a schema is presented in Figure 1.3. First, it is char-
acteristic of this pattern that the necessary production factors and inputs 
are not the result of preceding cycles but are mobilized wholly, or to 
a large extent, through the relevant markets (capital, labor, food, cattle 
markets, etc.). The production factors and inputs used thus appear in 
the production process, in a direct sense, as commodities. The level of 
inputs is by nature variable: it will depend on economic considerations 
in which cost/benefit relations are crucial. Second, the total output is 
considered to be marketable. Farm conduct is no longer so directly 
oriented towards materially assuring the following cycle. The total 
production is sold, and the costs incurred (production factors and inputs 
mobilized on the market) must in the first instance be valorized. 
Reproduction is thus not only market dependent but equally future 
dependent. Harvest prices at the end of the cycle will determine the 
extent to which the production process can be reproduced. Only if the 
costs can be valorized12 can a following cycle be organized. Reproduc-
tion thus indeed becomes in essence, market-dependent. The latter 
implies that in the actual process of production, economic efficiency 
must be optimized: the production process must be organized to comply 
with prevailing market relations and in such a way that the difference 
between costs and benefits is optimal.13 
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In historically guaranteed relatively autonomous reproduction, the 
market is indeed an outlet. The market is not a structuring principle 
that determines farming in a thorough way as it is in market-dependent 
reproduction, where commodity relations penetrate to the heart of the 
production process and exercise a strongly directive effect. 
Market-dependent reproduction can arise for many reasons. After 
several consecutive bad harvests or after extreme exploitation by others, 
the reproduction of a farmer's own resources (of the necessary produc-
tion factors and inputs) may become inadequate, and the required 
resources will then have to be mobilized via the respective markets. 
Other processes can also, however, play a decisive role. I shall discuss 
some of these processes on the basis of a more general exposition of 
the process of externalization in agriculture. 
The Process of Externalization in Agriculture. Farm labor entails an 
extremely wide range of tasks. Let us take again the dairy farm as an 
example, beginning with the production of the green fodder, silage, hay, 
and concentrates needed. For this, all the fields must be fertilized. Thus, 
besides fodder production, reproduction of soil fertility emerges as an 
important task in the labor process. Combined with this is the storage 
and conservation of at least part of the fodder. Then, of course, there 
is the feeding itself. Another series of tasks is related to caring for the 
herd. Cows have to be milked and young cattle reared. The milk will 
be processed into butter and cheese, and the whey, mixed with meal 
from the grain fields, is taken to the pigs. Pigs after slaughter are 
preserved as meat for the family or they can be sold on the consumption 
market. This sketch of tasks can be endlessly lengthened and detailed. 
In grain cultivation alone, 400 decisions are identifiable. Each decision 
has sometimes small, sometimes far-reaching consequences for the level 
of yields and costs incurred. And each decision relates to a specific 
task. In ploughing, for example, decisions must be made concerning 
the depth of the furrow, the direction and manner of ploughing, and 
so on.14 
The first point to be made here is that all these tasks must be closely 
coordinated in farm labor. Choice of seed, of the way to work the land 
(including ploughing), the timing of fertilizing, and the composition of 
manure must all be carefully interrelated. If they are not, excessively 
high costs or wastage can result, as well as disappointing harvests. One 
can go a step further: to an important degree the basis for endogenous 
progress lies in this continuous interrelating and coordinating of tasks. 
The farmer can, through his own labor process, and through continual 
observation, interpretation, evaluation and manipulation, identify pos-
itive and negative consequences and translate the insights gained from 
this process into possible improvements in the coordination of tasks. 
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The need for a close coordination of tasks holds a fortiori if pro-
duction and reproduction are systematically combined in the labor 
process. The farmer can then, through a gradual improvement of his 
objects of labor (land, cattle, plant material, etc.), lay the groundwork 
for higher production levels in cycles to come. The same holds for the 
reproduction of labor and the means of. production. The quantity, and 
above all, the quality of labor can be raised in the reproduction process 
just as the means can be improved. 
The process of externalization means a gradual, or sometimes an 
abrupt, shift of particular farm tasks to external institutions, as sche-
matized in Figure 1.4. The reproduction of soil fertility, for example, 
can be almost wholly delegated to such institutions. Then the means 
will no longer be produced on the farm (in the form of matured and 
mixed animal dung, green manure, specific intercropping schemes, etc.) 
but will have to be bought in the form of fertilizer. The knowledge 
needed to fertilize adequately can also be externalized. Institutions that 
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specialize in this task, will take soil samples and subsequently translate 
these into fertilizing instructions. The task of fertilizing is thus reduced 
to closely following the externally delivered prescriptions. Even the task 
of fertilizing itself can be externalized by employing a contract worker. 
A similar exposition is possible in connection with most other tasks. 
Externalization can be carried to such a degree that, in the end, few 
tasks remain on the farm. 
New relations arise in and through this externalization process. What 
originally was organizationally tied to the labor process on the farm 
becomes divorced from it in the externalization process. As a result a 
new unity must be created via commodity and technical administrative 
relations. 
On 40% of Dutch farms, milk cows will be reared on the farm itself. 
On another 30%, a majority of the cows will be bought. On such farms 
the task of rearing good milk cows is externalized, either to other 
farms which specialize in the breeding and rearing of heifers for calving 
or to specialized institutions which produce high value genetic material. 
Thus on farms where breeding is externalized, animals for milking will 
have to be purchased and will therefore appear in the cow shed as 
commodities. The farm must enter systematically into commodity re-
lations with external institutions. But that is not all. Because bought 
cows are no longer the result of the farmer's own labor, he will lack 
the necessary knowledge about these animals. If tasks are to be coor-
dinated, then feeding, milking, and other tasks must be in tune with 
the genetic potential of the animal. That is, coordination requires 
insights concerning the parentage and ancestry of the animal, how 
earlier generations reacted to particular methods of feeding, etc. Where 
farm labor encompasses a large and coherent scale of tasks, insights 
and procedures flow together in one knowledge system. With the process 
of externalization a break in this system occurs. Insights, experiences 
and methods must now be communicated to the farmer by external 
institutions as "directions for use," which specify exactly how the 
purchased objects of labor and means must be used. It is in this way 
that technical administrative relations arise.15 
It goes without saying that with the advance of the process of 
externalization, market-dependent reproduction (illustrated in Figure 
1.3) becomes dominant. 
The same process also has radical consequences for the farm labor 
process; some qualities will become superfluous or will be subjected to 
a certain dequalification. At the same time, new qualities will become 
necessary (Lacroix, 1981). In historically guaranteed relatively autono-
mous reproduction, the raising of technical efficiency is crucial; in such 
a context, craftsmanship develops, which is fundamental to progress. 
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Figure 1.5 The mobilization of production factors and non-factor inputs 
In market-dependent reproduction, however, economic efficiency be-
comes strategic; i.e., what is important is the degree to which farm 
conduct corresponds to prevailing market relations and results in a 
certain profit. And for this, entrepreneurship is needed. 
Towards an Operationalization. These two patterns of reproduction 
are of course ideal typical models. They represent two opposite poles 
of the farming continuum. There is no question, however, of a unilinear 
movement. The degree to which commodity relations penetrate the 
labor process, and the degree to which markets are thus a coercive 
principle in farm practice, are variable, in terms of both time and 
space. 
In order to operationalize this variability in the relation between 
agriculture and markets, the schémas are combined in Figure 1.5. The 
figure shows that some of the necessary production factors and inputs 
are reproduced on the farm, while others are mobilized through the 
market. The production is thus partly autonomous and partly market-
dependent, and the ratio between them can vary widely. In this study 
the ratio of resources mobilized via the market against the total of 
resources committed in an enterprise is defined and examined as the 
degree of incorporation. 
Degree of incorporation represents the extent to which a farm is 
incorporated into markets on the supply side. A high level of incor-
poration refers to a high degree of market dependency, and a low level 
implies a significant degree of autonomy from such markets. The notion 
of incorporation level can be applied to the totality of resources em-
ployed or to separate production factors and inputs, in which case we 
speak of incorporation into the labor market, for example, or incor-
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poration into the market for fertilizers, genetic material, etc. Degree of 
incorporation is, at the same time, an expression of the extent to which 
the various production factors and inputs (labor, objects of labor, and 
means) appear as commodities in the production process. The higher 
the level of incorporation, the higher the actual commoditization of the 
elements which provide the basis for the labor and production process. 
In order to illustrate this argument, I will once again return to Emilia 
Romagna, one of the regions discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
Dairy farms in the region deal with several supply markets and, 
naturally, with the outlet markets for milk and meat. The farms in the 
provinces of Parma and Reggio Emilia mainly produce milk for pro-
cessing into the famous Parmesan cheese in the small cooperative cheese 
factories. The returns from this cheese (set against the costs of storage 
while maturing and the delivered milk), determine the milk price on 
the market. Prices for meat are set by the cooperative slaughterhouses 
to which superfluous young cattle and old cows for the market, are 
usually delivered. They indirectly follow the movements of the European 
meat market. 
On the input side of dairy farms, a large number of supply markets 
can be identified, although, unlike outlet markets, the degree to which 
supply markets are linked to enterprises varies considerably. There are 
markets for production factors, for land (where a number of different 
mechanisms can be identified, such as buying and selling, tenancy, and 
renting), for labor, and for capital. The capital market, as the various 
"actors" know, can be divided into markets for short-, medium- and 
long-term loans. The commercial houses and consortia operate mainly 
in the short-term loan markets. They supply concentrates, fertilizer, 
diesel oil and veterinary medicines, often on credit to be repaid at the 
end of the agricultural year. Farmers mostly use the market for medium-
term loans for buying machinery, farm implements, vehicles, and some-
times cattle. This form of credit is usually provided by the banks. Such 
loans are frequently given an interest subsidy by the regional govern-
ment service responsible for the administration of EC funds for agri-
cultural development. Long-term loans, often used for the purchase of 
land and the construction of new cow sheds and installations, are 
likewise obtained through the formal bank circuit and almost always 
qualify for an interest subsidy. The conditions which farmers must 
satisfy for such loans, however, are many and far-reaching. 
Besides the above markets there are still several others. The market 
for machine services and contract workers is one of them, supplying 
services such as harvesting, the spreading of fertilizer, deep ploughing 
and others. The extent to which a farmer must call upon this market 
depends on whether he has at his disposal the necessary machines, 
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Table 1.4. Degrees of Incorporation in Dairy Fanning, Emilia Romagna, Italy 
(Averages and Standard Deviations) 
Incorporation 
in the market for: 
Labor 
Contract work 
Credit, short-term 
Credit, medium-term 
Credit, long-term 
Land 
Fodder and feeds 
Cattle 
Overall degree of 
commoditization 26.0 (15.0) 15.1 (8.3) 
farm implements and labor. Historically speaking the labor market has 
been replaced to some extent by the market for machine services. 
A particularly important market is for fodder and concentrates. The 
transport of fodder to Reggio and Parma from the far south of Italy 
and France has become a common sight, as it has elsewhere in Europe. 
An extensive system of labor division has developed around specialized 
dairy farms, with the surrounding zones devoting themselves to sup-
plying them with fodder. The market for concentrates is dominated by 
huge agri-business groups, that maintain a trading machine of global 
proportions for their supplies.The extent to which a farm is dependent 
on the market for roughage and concentrates can, to an important 
degree, be regulated from the farm itself and will vary according to 
the number of cattle, availability of grassland and the farms own 
intensity of food production. 
A last important market is that for genetic material. As in the 
Netherlands, some farms in Emilia Romagna breed their own animals 
while other farms buy replacement stock. 
The wide variation to be found in practice between farms and the 
markets described here is not coincidental, as we shall show later, but 
is to some extent the result of the conscious behavior of the different 
producers. 
An analysis similar to that illustrated in Figure 1.5 was applied to 
relations between farms and markets in Emilia Romagna. For each of 
the 134 farms, the degree of incorporation into the respective markets 
was calculated. Table 1.4 summarizes these data and presents the 
average incorporation level and standard deviation for each market. 
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The data are specified according to whether the farm is in the mountains 
(n = 59) or on the plain (n = 75). 
The range around each average is considerable, suggesting that the 
relation between agriculture and the different supply markets is highly 
differentiated. This differentiation is clearly shown when the different 
forms of incorporation per farm are summed up in a synthetic index. 
Some farms then appear as outstanding examples of incorporation, 
while others appear relatively autonomous. In addition, historical anal-
ysis of the available data shows that the degree of market dependency 
is even less of a constant. On some farms the degree of incorporation 
increased markedly, while on others it decreased. 
The partial and synthetic degree of incorporation investigated in 
Emilia Romagna can be calculated in the same way for other agricul-
tural systems. This subject is discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. Adjust-
ments have to be made, for as agricultural practice varies so do the 
relevant markets. The line that is followed, however, remains the same: 
differential incorporation patterns are related to the degree to which 
reproduction is market-dependent or of the relatively autonomous his-
torically guaranteed type. The analysis that follows is devoted to ex-
amining the influence of increasing incorporation (i.e., of increasing 
commoditization) on the structuring of the labor process in agriculture 
and thus on the enterprise development pattern achieved by the farmer 
through his labor. 
The concept of incorporation and the notion of differential com-
moditization that it entails play a strategic role in the following analysis. 
Before proceeding, some theoretical and methodological observations 
should first be made, particularly as the reasoning that I have followed 
up to now deviates on several points from the usual discourse followed 
in the social and agricultural sciences. 
The reasoning usually followed in relation to the notion of commod-
itization depends heavily on a wholly archaic idea of self-provisioning.16 
Self-provisioning is then the degree to which farming families can supply 
their own consumption needs from what is produced on the farm. The 
concept implies that an important part of production is thus not marketed, 
but directly consumed. Reducing the level of self-provisioning and in-
creasing commoditization are seen as identical. The shortcomings of 
reasoning in such a way speak for themselves. It limits the notion of 
reproduction simply to that of labor power17 and ignores the need for 
the farm to reproduce also itself and the necessary means, relations and 
conditions that go with this. 
Tradition (which implies that in European agriculture, for example, 
commoditization is "complete," while in many parts of Africa and 
South America, commoditization scarcely exists) is replete with strongly 
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deductive reasoning: if production is oriented to the production of 
commodities, then it follows that all the elements used in the production 
of these commodities must themselves be considered as commodities.18 
Some go even further to argue that insofar as agriculture takes place 
in "generalized commodity economies," each product that is the result 
of farm labor and each element that goes into producing that product 
must be considered a commodity, irrespective of the actual exchange 
processes that are involved.19 In the final chapter of this book I go 
deeper into these ideas. I will confront such theoretical constructions 
with empirical findings taken from the analyses that follow, based on 
the notion of differential commoditization, in which the actual level of 
incorporation is shown to be one of the most important indicators. 
Current incorporation theories need some refinement. Such theories 
(see Pearse, 1968, among others) too readily conceptualize the process 
of incorporation as a unilinear and an all-embracing process that is 
strongly deterministic and centralistic in nature (see Long, 1984, for a 
more detailed critique). In the following study I limit myself to those 
forms of market and institutional incorporation (the terms are from 
Pearse, 1968) which have a direct bearing on agriculture. In this I 
consider the incorporation process not as a unilinear pattern of devel-
opment but as a process that waxes and wanes, as a process that 
embraces several dimensions in which the farmers concerned, and their 
wives, play an important, active and conscious role as decision makers. 
In addition to these general theoretical points, some methodological 
details must be discussed. I shall do that with reference to the data 
summarized in Table 1.4. Behind the data lie certain hidden choices. 
Suppose a farmer has too few resources to accomplish a certain task 
satisfactorily (e.g., getting the fodder in). There are usually a number 
of alternatives. He could mobilize extra labor on the market, contract 
out the task concerned, or he could take out a loan and buy a machine 
which would enable him to carry out the task himself. It is clear that 
whatever the choice, a particular pattern of incorporation will always 
occur. The dependency which arises will relate to either the labor, the 
machine services or the capital market. Thus, a specific incorporation 
pattern can never be taken as a simple externally determined given: 
the farmer as a conscious decision maker plays an active and important 
role in the constitution of the specific incorporation pattern. 
A good illustration of this can be taken from farming in Emilia 
Romagna. On the smaller farms, farmers often find themselves short 
of fodder. Buying fodder (i.e., fodder appearing directly as a commodity, 
a fixed cost in the shed), is seen by many farmers, however, as extremely 
undesirable, as we shall see later. Some farmers create a way around 
this problem by using their fields mainly for tomato cultivation. The 
26 Heterogeneity and Styles of Farming 
gross production value and the gross added value achieved in this way 
are extremely high. With the returns, they subsequently purchase the 
necessary fodder. They explain the method by stating that feed thus 
obtained "does not enter the cow shed as a cost; it is already paid for 
through the work in the fields, in the tomato production." So in a 
situation which objectively would appear to lead to a high level of 
dependency on the market for fodder and concentrates (a relatively 
large herd but a restricted area for growing fodder), the structure of 
historically guaranteed relatively autonomous reproduction is again to 
some extent reinstated. In the stall at least, the farmer is able to 
neutralize to a degree the direct impact of commodity relations. The 
other side of the coin, of course, is a sharp rise in the level of 
incorporation into the labor market: tomato cultivation requires a legion 
of temporary workers. Again, the specific form of incorporation can 
and is effectively influenced by the farmers own, conscious participation. 
That they seize upon such a possibility is hardly surprising considering 
the many consequences that go with different forms of incorporation. 
However, farmers are not the only actors who operate in the markets 
and actively try to accomplish certain forms of incorporation. Banks, 
industry, commerce and extension services try equally to effect partic-
ular forms of labor division (and thus particular forms of incorporation 
and institutionalization). 
The Labor Process in Agriculture 
The labor process in agriculture is always characterized by a specific 
and close coordination of technical, economic and organizational pa-
rameters. It would be fundamentally incorrect, however, to say that 
technical and economic parameters are determining. As mentioned 
before, a multitude of tasks can be identified which hold a degree of 
flexibility regarding their implementation. For example, take hay ted-
ding, one of those apparently insignificant tasks whose purpose is to 
homogenize the quality of the hay and speed up its drying. If this step 
is neglected, then the grass that lies underneath will dry less well and 
will form mold or foment. 
The timing of hay tedding is crucial. Also crucial is how quickly it 
occurs (we are assuming the technical parameters as given—i.e, the 
tractor and the implements). If it is done too quickly then there is a 
danger that some of the drying grass (the driest) will be ground to 
powder, which would mean a poorer harvest. The number of workings 
is therefore also of great importance. How much and when, and at 
what speed, are all important decisions to be made, while bearing in 
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mind the particular field and the specific quantity and quality of the 
hay that lies drying there. 
Like hay tedding, each farm task possesses some degree of flexibility 
and can be performed in a variety of ways. Even given the technological 
and economic parameters (price of hay and labor, in the above example), 
a series of decisions are needed to specify how the work should be 
finally done. 
If one puts together all the stages identifiable in a particular labor 
process, an extremely complex matrix containing a complex whole of 
interlinking tasks emerges, each with its own degree of flexibility and 
particular procedure. An exciting complication is that procedures cannot 
be wholly or to any great degree specified in an a priori way. Decisions 
that are crucial for the end result can be made only during the labor 
process itself. Therein lies the craftsmanship of farm labor: the inter-
action between direct producer and labor object; i.e., the continual 
observation, interpretation and evaluation of one's own labor in order 
to be able to re-adapt it. This process is in marked contrast to industrial 
labor, where the labor process can usually be broken down, quantified, 
predicted and therefore planned and controlled. Interaction with living 
objects of labor excludes, to a large extent, such an industrialization of 
the agrarian labor process. The craftsmanlike nature of it and the need 
for a continual interaction, if not unity, of mental and manual labor, 
remain dominant characteristics. Thus, with hay tedding, speed can 
usually only be determined during the performance of the work. Un-
evenness of terrain or a change in the composition of the crop as it 
lies drying will determine whether to speed up or delay. The sight of 
an approaching cloud can again alter the decision. Even if a robot were 
available, a farmer would be unlikely to set it on a tractor to take over 
hay tedding from him. Too much can go wrong; the "damage risk" is 
too high. 
Craftsmanlike organization, a continuous cycle of observation, inter-
pretation, evaluation and reorganization remains indispensable. This 
can often be seen in practice in the labor process and in the division 
of labor that it contains. If a farmer places a high value on "good hay" 
in order to feed cows well, then he will almost certainly undertake the 
tedding himself. He will not readily give the task to inexperienced 
children or outside labor. Maybe he will ask his father to carry out 
the job, since the old man is equally likely to know all the subtleties 
and consequences of method, terrain and weather for this or that 
particular crop. A less experienced labor force could perform the task 
if it was the last mowing and the hay had only minimum nutritive 
value left, or if the farm's primary concern was beef production and 
the hay was to be used for fattening young bullocks. Experience, the 
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unity of head and hand, and the craftsman's ability to use optimally 
the potential per labor object would then be less relevant. Technical 
and economic parameters are no less ambiguous, even if only for the 
fact that they are not equally relevant for all farms. 
The number of tasks that must be coordinated, as well as the 
flexibility attached to each, points to the need for an organizing prin-
ciple. A farmer must be able to define what is important and why and 
at the same time be able to translate his insights into practical pro-
cedures. In other words, goals and the capacity to translate these goals 
into a concrete structuring of the labor process are necessary. 
The goals in question are not simply of a technical nature. Opti-
mization of cost/benefit relations or of yields (as is nowadays increas-
ingly assumed) is naturally never strived for as such. Like the concept 
of the optimum, costs and benefits are social concepts, and it is for 
social actors that these concepts have a specific and guiding meaning. 
Both the coordination of tasks and the specific definition of each 
separate task are always a social process. Even when it is a question 
of purely technical tasks, their coordination will be social. 
Let me illustrate once more with hay tedding. If labor in the family 
is scarce and there are a number of other activities that urgently need 
attention (the care of calving cows, for example), then hay tedding must 
take place as quickly as possible. If there is a surfeit of labor on the 
market and the farmer is inclined to make use of it, then everything 
else being equal, the decision will turn out quite differently. Just as 
important is whether a poor hay harvest can be compensated for by 
buying feed produced elsewhere. 
The Coordination of Domains 
The social coordination of technical management assumes a number 
of domains. The interests and perspectives to be found in these domains 
may also be important in the sphere of production. In the model below, 
four domains (or as Vincent, 1977, calls them, "fields of activity") are 
presented. In addition to the domain of production and reproduction, 
they include the domain of family and community, and the domain of 
economic and institutional relations. The domain of family and com-
munity includes all the relevant social or non-commodity relations. The 
domain of economic and institutional relations includes the relations 
formed between the farm and markets or market agencies. External 
parameters, perspectives and interests of a political and economic na-
ture, for example, can influence the labor process through this domain 
(but again, such an influence will depend on the specific relations which 
prevail in this domain) (see Figure 1.6). 
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Figure 1.6 The domains of farming 
The fact that the different domains of farm labor must be coordinated 
means that the significance of particular interests, relations and param-
eters holding in a particular domain will necessarily be carried over 
to other domains, thus becoming a precondition or guideline for the 
activities to be undertaken there. The coordination of domains and the 
inherent transference of meaning between them has always been one 
of the main themes of agrarian sociology. Chayanov defined the relations 
and processes located in the family (such as the demographic cycle and 
the associated labor-consumer ratios) on the one hand, and the domain 
of production, on the other, as an important theme for research. Chay-
anov argued that relations within the family determine the size, expan-
sion and contraction of the cultivated area (noting that in Western 
Europe where land was scarce, the intensity of agriculture would vary). 
Composition of the family also affects labor input, capital formation 
and the level of production. The family functions, in this sense, as a 
social relation of production par excellence: relations within the family 
were determining factors for both the quantity produced and the way 
of producing. Characteristically enough, Chayanov noted that an anal-
ysis of farm production in terms of the dominant economic pattern (in 
which labor is given a clear price, namely a market price, so that profit 
also becomes a category that can be quantified) is not relevant, precisely 
because the economic relations on which the pattern is based do not 
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penetrate (i.e., are not real) into the agrarian labor process. Though he 
did not make fully explicit this state of affairs, Chayanov argued elo-
quently that "literally before our eyes the world's agriculture, ours 
included, is being more and more drawn into the general circulation of 
the world economy, and the centers of capitalism are more and more 
subordinating it to their leadership" (1966:257). He pointed to the 
"trading links" and "credit conditions" "that convert the natural isolated 
family farm into one of a small commodity producer" (1966:258). Thus 
the domain of family and community gives way to economic and 
institutional relations which become the locus of the principles that 
direct the organization of the labor process. Or as Chayanov himself 
formulated it, "then the trading machine . . . begins to actively interfere 
in the organization of production. It lays down technical conditions, 
issues seed and fertilizers, determines rotation and turns its clients into 
technical executors of its designs and economic plan" (1966:262). 
If interrelations between the family and the domain of production 
stand central in the analysis of Chayanov and many others who followed 
his footsteps, in the work of Bennett (1981) the main focus is upon 
relations between the domain of community and that of reproduction. 
The social definitions prevailing in the community (one farmer is 
defined as a "silver spoon," another as "someone doing a good job") 
reflect the activities undertaken by the farmers concerned in the specific 
domain of reproduction, but they also form the guidelines for the 
behavior of these farmers. To be seen as "a man doing a good job," 
implies that a farmer performs a number of work activities in a 
particular way. The social relations and social definitions implied in 
this, reproduce, as it were, the specific modes of behavior, procedures 
and patterns which are followed in the sphere of reproduction. Ben-
venuti's work (1975a and b, 1982a and b, 1985), on the other hand, 
focuses on the interrelations between the domain of economic and 
institutional relations and production. Benvenuti argues that the labor 
process is increasingly prescribed and sanctioned by what he calls TATE, 
an acronym for "technical administrative task environment." According 
to Benvenuti, this trend brings with it a number of demonstrable 
changes in the various other domains. 
In the domain of production and reproduction (the domains in which 
agriculture in a narrow sense takes place, and in which a specific style 
of agriculture develops) many tasks can be identified. These must not 
only be coordinated with each other but also with the framework or 
context within which they take place, with the relevant social and 
economic parameters. The separate tasks, and in particular the inte-
grated whole, derive meaning from the results they achieve in other 
domains. This is why, in a broader sense, farm labor can be defined 
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as the coordination of domains in relation to each other. Activities in 
one domain are structured via specific goals which represent particular 
interests and perspectives in another domain; that is to say that one 
procedure for performing a task is chosen from the many and related 
in a specific way to other tasks. Such structuring often assumes a 
transfer of meaning. If in the family domain considerable value is 
attached to "keeping the name on the land" (Arensberg and Kimball, 
1948), then such a goal has to be translated into concrete and mean-
ingful action in the domains of production and reproduction. The same 
applies to the domain of economic and institutional relations. Such a 
goal is either made operational in such domains or it remains a 
meaningless dream. One should, for example, specify whether it is valid 
to sell land when the price on the market is high. In contrast to Ireland 
where Arensberg and Kimball did their work, it was usual for the 
Canadian farmers studied by Bennett to change farms once or twice 
every generation. Does such a goal mean that soil fertility must always 
be reproduced, and if so, to what degree and by what means? Finally, 
"keeping the name on the land" can even have all sorts of consequences 
for the way in which hay tedding is organized. 
The way particular goals are translated into practice is investigated 
in this study in terms of patterns of farming logic, as a calculus which 
defines how work must be done in practice for all relevant tasks and 
under all conditions. A calculus enables advantages and disadvantages 
to be weighed against one another and enables alternatives to be thought 
through. A calculus, in other words, makes it possible to operationalize 
general goals into the daily reality and complexity of the labor process. 
Hofstee (1985) argued that a particular style of farming cannot be 
separated from the specific cultural heritage that farmers in a particular 
locality share which defines how farming ought to be done. A calculus, 
or farming logic, is here conceived of as the practical discourse that 
farmers follow in the organization of their labor. A certain way of 
working is then "logical" (as farmers themselves will not hesitate to 
tell you) because it appears as the concrete embodiment of what is 
strived for. 
One of the things for which farmers strive is "progress." Although 
its concrete expression differs widely (from maybe an improvement of 
income or a reduction of labor time to a fine farm to hand over to 
the next generation), "progress" might well be seen as an adequate 
umbrella under which to summarize the diversity of immediate expres-
sions. A strategic question of course is to what degree the potential for 
endogenous development is identifiable in agriculture and under which 
conditions farmers might make effective use of it. 
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A lot of ink is expended in the social sciences depicting agriculture 
as "intrinsically backward." Only intervention from outside can induce 
a certain dynamic.20 The definitive argument here is the well-known 
law of diminishing returns. In the same way that Schultz argued that 
farmers are "efficient but poor," so, within the framework of this law, 
the personal goal-directed activity of farmers is also seen to be irra-
tional. What in essence is ignored is that new "optima" can be created 
within the labor process itself. As already suggested, there is a potential 
for producing progress in an endogenous autonomous way within ag-
ricultural practice. In this connection a number of mechanisms can be 
indicated, of which I consider two. 
To begin with, the objects of labor can be improved through the 
process of continual reproduction: the quality, i.e., the productive po-
tential of the land and of animal and plant material can gradually be 
increased, precisely because this reproduction process is the object of 
goal-directed activities by the direct producer. Lacroix (1981) identified 
three phases in agricultural history related to the reproduction of objects 
of labor. First is agriculture which derives its objects of labor directly 
from the surrounding ecosystem. The savoir faire paysan in this phase 
commanded an extremely detailed knowledge (see also Conklin, 1955) 
of the variety in nature as well as a knowledge of how to optimally 
utilize the available natural elements. At the same time, agriculture 
took place within the narrow confines of given ecosystems. Only in a 
second phase were farmers increasingly able to succeed in shaping the 
objects of labor according to their own insights, thereby often trans-
forming the given ecosystem (Bolhuis and van der Ploeg, 1985). It is 
a phase characterized by substantial and continuous increases of pro-
ductivity. Finally, in a third stage—that of incorporated agriculture— 
the reproduction of labor objects is increasingly externalized, i.e., di-
vorced from the actual labor process. 
Second, lasting progress can be achieved by a close coordination of 
tasks in relation to each other. If the inhibiting factors can be established 
through careful observation and experimentation (which is an important 
task though one often not noticed by outsiders)21 then a degree of 
progress can be achieved through appropriate interventions, i.e., by a 
reorganization of specific tasks. 
This does not mean that endogenous growth potential in the agri-
cultural labor process can be made absolute. It is clearly subject to a 
number of social influences, some with a facilitating, others with an 
inhibiting influence.22 This is taken up as the central theme of the 
following chapters where I shall demonstrate that increasing incorpor-
ation in markets and market agencies lowers the potential to develop 
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agriculture in an endogenous manner and de facto makes way for a 
growing dependence on exogenous technological development. 
Notes 
1. Technical efficiency is the ratio of input of production factors to output 
realized. According to Timmer (1970) an enterprise is technically efficient "if 
the firm produces on the technical production function that yields the greatest 
output for any given set of inputs. A failure in this regard means the firm is 
technically inefficient" (1970:99). And Yotopoulos states that "a firm is consid-
ered more technically efficient than another if, given the same quantities of 
measurable inputs, it consistently produces a larger output" (1974:270). 
2. A greater or lesser number of production factors (labor and means) may 
be used per object of labor, as illustrated by Ishikawa (1981). Technical efficiency 
can vary considerably. Thus a whole gamut of combinations can emerge. 
Limiting ourselves to the most simple case, i.e., high or low input of production 
factors and high or low technical efficiency, already gives four possibilities. In 
this book the discussion is limited to the two most common combinations, i.e., 
a high input of production factors per object of labor combined with high 
technical efficiency (defined as the intensive style of farming) and, second, the 
case of low inputs and relatively low technical efficiency. Throughout the 
following analysis a high or low input of production factors, and high or low 
technical efficiency are identified and discussed only in relation to homogeneous 
agricultural regions. It is evident that these notions only make sense in a 
comparative analysis. Hence, intensive and extensive styles of farming are 
relative concepts, which only make sense when related to each other. As far 
as the "missing" combinations are concerned, one could argue that high and 
rising inputs combined with decreasing technical efficiency provide the analyt-
ical background of "agrarian involution" (Geertz, 1963). The opposite situation, 
i.e., low and decreasing inputs combined with high and rising technical effi-
ciency, is the exceptional case to be found in some parts of modern northwest 
European farming (van der Ploeg, 1987), in parts of the United States (the 
"industrialized farm firms" identified by Gregor, 1982) and in some areas where 
the Green Revolution was highly successful. Chapter 3 discusses a similar intent 
to substitute farm labor as the driving force of continued intensification for 
applied science and technology. 
3. This aspect is highlighted in Cantarelli and Salghetti (1983). They analyzed 
the same sample in terms of average trends. 
4. For a detailed analysis the reader is referred to van der Ploeg and Bolhuis 
(1983). 
5. It is striking that the agro-economic literature pays little attention to 
variation in yields (or GVP/ha levels) as a significant phenomenon. Although 
Heady and Jensen (1954) dedicated a complete chapter to "yields" in their 
classical handbook, they did not go further than interregional differences. 
Variability within a region is only related to the question of risk. Yields are 
not conceptualized as the structural result of a consciously planned and orga-
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nized labor process. This is the more striking since in several empirical studies 
of the time it was concluded that "extensive cultivation gives higher average 
gross and net returns per hour of labour" (Galletti et al., 1956: 346 and table 
138, p. 317). Schultz argued the same way: "In farming, yields are subject to 
much uncertainty. They cannot be controlled fully. Nor can they be foreseen 
accurately." 
6. The problem of continuity of yield levels over time, and hence of the 
sustainability of farming, is amply discussed and illustrated in Bennett (1981). 
7. This goes logically with the definition presented earlier: from an analytical 
point of view high production per object of labor is the result of both (a) a 
high level of production factors and non-factor inputs per labor object and (b) 
high technical efficiency. The same goes for the extensive style of farming where 
low inputs and low technical efficiency lead to relatively low production results 
per object of labor. 
8. I am using here Poulantzas's definition of "social relations of production." 
This point is further elaborated in Chapter 5. 
9. Detailed documentation on mechanisms for raising technical efficiency 
used by different groups of farmers operating under different conditions is to 
be found in Slicher van Bath (1960), especially as far as the seed/harvest ratio 
is concerned; in van Zanden (1985); in Bray (1986), who gives a beautiful 
description of endogenous progress in rice cultivating economies; in Hofstee, 
1985; in Watson (1983); in Hosier (1951); in Fais Borda (1961); and in Barrigazzi 
(1980:43-84). A particularly interesting feature of this specific growth model is 
that increases in labor productivity followed from increases in physical pro-
ductivity: hence intensification of production became the all-embracing goal in 
farming. See for this aspect Reynolds (1983); Ishikawa (1981); and Hayami et 
al. (1979). Within this line of reasoning, Yotopoulos (1977) stressed the need 
to structure agrarian development as "labour intensification." The main prob-
lem, however, is, as Yotopoulos indicates, that the "diseconomies of scale" 
might be smaller than the "financial economies of scale." 
10. This particular concept is derived from the work of Riemann (1953:29). 
For a more general discussion, see Slicher van Bath (1960). 
11. A well-documented description is to be found in the work of Spahr van 
der Hoek (1952, volumes I and II). Similar processes elsewhere are documented 
by Samaniego, in Long and Roberts (1978). 
12. No matter whether the costs made in this cycle still have to be paid or 
the costs of the next cycle have to be pre-financed. 
13. In other words: economic efficiency is to be optimized. As Messori (1984) 
showed in a detailed empirical study on technical and economic efficiency in 
dairy farming in Emilia Romagna in Italy, the two are often at odds with each 
other. Maximizing economic efficiency implies another strategy (and a different 
organization of the farm) than maximizing technical efficiency. A more general 
discussion of this interrelation is discussed in Yotopoulos (1974). 
14. The argument is spelled out at length in van der Ploeg (1985). 
15. For an ample discussion of this concept the reader is referred to the 
work of Benvenuti. See especially Benvenuti (1980, 1982a and b, 1985a and b); 
and Benvenuti and van der Ploeg (1985). 
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16. This is exceptionally clear in Galeski (1972). Even as a concept for the 
analysis of agricultural systems of the past the notion of "self-sufficiency" or 
"autarky" is, as demonstrated by Bloch (1939:7-16) completely inadequate. 
17. In the Marxist tradition then, focus on the reproduction of labor power 
was narrowed to the question of whether labor was reproduced through the 
family (i.e., through non-wage labor) or through wage labor relations. Thus a 
certain "dualism" was repeatedly introduced in the analysis of agrarian for-
mations (for an empirical critique: see the end of Chapter 2 of this book). 
With the gradual disappearance of wage labor in the northwest European 
countryside this particular analytical focus became for evident reasons power-
less. Replacement of wage labor by contract work and a whole new market for 
machinery services largely escaped the attention of these scholars: their analysis 
of farming was so narrowly focused on labor only that they could not come 
to grips with these new empirical tendencies (see, for instance, Koning (1982); 
and Gorgoni (1977). 
18. As argued by Chevalier (1982); Gibbon and Neocosmos (1985); and 
recently by Bernstein (1986). 
19. Gibbon and Neocosmos in particular develop this line of reasoning. 
20. See Bolhuis and van der Ploeg (1985, Chapter 2), for a detailed discus-
sion. Such an assumption is omnipresent in today's "integrated rural devel-
opment programs." 
21. See Box (1982, 1984 and 1985) and also the discussion on peasant 
techniques for potato selection in Chapter 3 of this study. 
22. An interesting discussion of the effects of social organization and the 
organization of time and space on the rhythm of endogenous growth is to be 
found in Hofstee (1985). Herrera many years ago pointed to the function of 
magic for regulating endogenous growth (reprinted 1984). The work of Boserup 
(1965) and Slicher van Bath (1960) is equally relevant. 

2 
Dairy Farming 
in Emilia Romagna, Italy 
The region of Emilia Romagna, located along the river Po in northern 
Italy, is not only one of the most "red" but also one of the most 
prosperous areas of Italy. Its agriculture is commonly described as 
"agricoltura ricca." The term is no exaggeration. Good to very good 
incomes are earned on family farms there, and the dynamism of this 
agricultural sector is striking compared to other areas of Italy. This is 
not to deny that there are also problems, sometimes severe, but these 
occur at a level which is nonetheless one of prosperity. This situation 
contrasts sharply with the impoverishment and poor outlook of several 
other agricultural areas in the European Community, especially within 
Italy itself. 
Agricultural diversity in Emilia Romagna is considerable. Conditions 
for farming change quite dramatically as one descends from the moun-
tains in the west to the plains in the east. On the plains another change 
occurs as one travels from northwest to southeast: dairy farming grad-
ually gives way to intensive fruit cultivation around Modena, and then 
to extensive arable farming around Ravenna and Ferrara. The distri-
bution of cultivation systems over the region has also changed. The 
past ten or fifteen years have seen substantial expansion in extensive 
styles of farming. The interest in dairy cattle has been gradually 
superseded by the keeping of cattle for fattening, which in turn has 
given way to arable farming. Even within arable farming there has 
been a move towards more extensive cropping characterized by crops 
that require little labor. 
In the heart of the region lie the provinces of Parma and Reggio 
nell'Emilia, where dairy farming is most concentrated. Its stability is 
due to the fact that the region produces a highly valued product, 
Parmesan cheese, known locally as "Parmigiano-Reggiano." Thanks to 
this product, produced in small cooperative cheese factories, milk prices 
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in the region are substantially higher than those found elsewhere in the 
EC. The majority of farms in the region are family farms, followed by 
farms organized along capitalistic lines and by production cooperatives. 
With the help of a group of agricultural scientists from different 
disciplines, it has been possible to construct four sets of data on the 
region, all relating to dairy farming. In the following text, reference 
will be made to these data as the Parma, the ERSA, the BOLKAP and 
the COOP sets of data. The four sets refer to the same time periods, 
some covering a four-year and others a ten-year period. This approach 
allowed both synchronic cross-sectional and diachronic historical anal-
yses to be carried out, in order to verify the degree to which intensi-
fication, or scale enlargement and relative extensification, figured as the 
dominant pattern of development. Each set of data consists of economic 
and structural as well as sociological material. The latter was obtained 
by means of questionnaires and informal interviews and the former 
from account books and data obtained from university research insti-
tutes. 
The first set collected, the Parma data, relates to twenty-four dairy 
farms, all of them located on the plain. The period researched covered 
the period 1970-1981, during which time six of the farmers closed their 
dairies in order to specialize in arable farming or market gardening. 
This is consistent with the general trend towards a more extensive type 
of farming. In the analysis that follows, repeated use is made of the 
remaining group of eighteen dairy farms. The detailed economic and 
structural data relating to these farms were collected in a systematic 
way by the University of Parma over a ten-year period and were checked 
each year with the farm head. The sociological, technical and comple-
mentary economic data were collected in 1980 and 1981. Farmers were 
interviewed five or six times, with visits timed to coincide with the 
yearly production cycle. Finally, the farm heads were all interviewed 
again to ensure the standardization of specific data. 
The wealth of reliable sociological and economic data and its his-
torical dimension make this set of Parma data comparatively unique, 
the more so as this was originally a relatively homogeneous group of 
farms. Towards the end of the research period, however, considerable 
variety was noted, suggesting differential patterns of farm development. 
These differential patterns also emerged from the ERSA data.1 In that 
respect both sets form an ideal pars pro toto, and are therefore appro-
priate for research into the dynamics of different developmental pat-
terns.2 
The second set of data, the ERSA data, covers 134 dairy farms over 
a four-year period. The economic data were collected by the Ente 
Regionale di Svilluppo Agricola (ERSA) in Bologna and compiled by 
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the Istituto Nazionale di Economia Agraria (INEA) in Rome. The 
sociological and technical data were obtained from questionnaires ad-
ministered by the technicians of the regional farmers' organizations. 
The ERSA data refer to farms both in the mountains and on the plain 
and are used in the analysis mainly when there is a need to discuss 
the statistical significance of various interrelations. The Parma data, on 
the other hand, are primarily used for the setting out of qualitative 
arguments based on detailed ethnographic material. The questions asked 
in the ERSA questionnaire were based on a selection of questions 
developed from the interviews with farmers. Where relevant the dis-
tribution of answers from the ERSA data is given. 
Both the Parma and ERSA data concern what are generally referred 
to as family farms, where family labor is the mainstay and wage labor 
is secondary or incidental. The remaining sets of data differ on precisely 
these points. The BOLKAP data are economic data relating to twenty-
four farms organized along capitalistic lines, studied over a ten-year 
period by the University of Bologna. The data were supplemented by 
a questionnaire and interviews. The final set of data, the COOP data, 
concerns twenty-six production cooperatives. These last two sets, the 
BOLKAP and the COOP data, will be used primarily to highlight 
tendencies which emerge from the Parma and ERSA data and for 
exploring the implications. Such comparisons are particularly useful for 
looking at different relations of production on which patterns of farm 
development and organization of the labor process are based, for they 
allow one to see to what extent commoditization and institutionalization 
of family farms introduce a type of farming logic that was considered 
until recently to be typical only of capitalistic farming. 
Heterogeneity is perhaps the best term for describing the research 
setting. The connections between farms, markets and market agencies 
vary enormously. There were also substantial differences in styles of 
agricultural practice. It is within such a setting that farm labor is 
examined as a concrete and heterogeneous phenomenon. 
The structure of the following analysis is simple. Starting from the 
assumption that farmers are knowledgeable actors, I examine the extent 
to which they consciously pursue different patterns of farm development. 
The extensive interviews of the Parma data, which are primarily used 
for this purpose, lead to a description of two underlying patterns of 
farming logic, which I refer to as "calculi." These calculi are specific 
sets of interrelated "folk concepts" which play a guiding and legitimizing 
role in organizing the farm labor process and which, at the same time, 
reflect the relations between farms and the markets into which they 
are integrated. Two concepts central to the calculi, entrepreneurship 
and craftsmanship, are discussed in some depth later in the chapter. 
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The analysis then shifts from the labor process itself to its conditions 
and results. The differential degrees of incorporation and institution-
alization of farm labor are analyzed as social relations of production, 
that is to say, as relations which effectively structure the labor process. 
The heterogeneity in dairy farming, and the different styles of farming 
practice and development patterns which such heterogeneity contains, 
are then discussed in relation to the differently structured processes of 
farm labor. 
Goals in Farming: The I- and E-Options 
In order to gain insight into the degree to which farmers consciously 
opt for intensification or for enlargement of scale and extensification, 
two hypothetical examples of farm management were simultaneously 
presented to the respondents of the Parma group: 
Farm 1 Farm 2 
20 cows 30 cows 
50 ql/cow 40 ql/cow 
1,000 ql 1,200 ql 
The idea behind the exercise was as follows. The first farm was meant 
to represent an example of intensive farming. There are fewer cows 
but the production is higher per cow, 50 ql of milk as against 40 ql 
(1 ql=100 liters). In comparison, the second farm symbolizes a more 
extensive style of farming: yield per cow is lower, but the scale is larger 
as he manages more cows. Total production for the first farmer is 1,000 
ql and for the second 1,200 ql. Parma farmers were told that all other 
factors for the two examples were the same. Respondents were then 
asked: 
• who was the best farmer, 
• which of the two would have the highest income, 
• who would have the lowest costs, 
• which farmer would have the best survival chances during a period 
of low prices, 
• whether the examples were thought to be "real," 
• whether examples of both these types were to be found in their 
own environment, 
• why some farmers did it one way and some the other, and 
• which farmer was most like them. 
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The aim of the technique was twofold.3 In the first place, we wished 
to explore whether a conscious choice for intensification or for scale 
enlargement and extensification existed, and if so, how such an option 
was distributed over the sample of respondents. Second we were espe-
cially interested in how farmers would argue for having chosen one or 
the other. What would be the rationale for each option? What means 
would be thought necessary for implementing a particular option, and 
in what terms would the respondents justify their choices? 
One of the interesting experiences of the research was the matter of 
fact way in which each respondent approached this pairing of examples. 
It was as if the examples spoke a clear language to him, as if they 
referred to known and considered realities. This "self-evidence" was 
the more remarkable seen in relation to the reaction of the technicians 
who were sometimes present during the first interviews. For them, the 
examples represented a total absence of meaning ("you can't say any-
thing about that, you need to know the costs, what type of cow sheds 
he has, has he enough fodder," etc.), but for the farmers the examples 
were a symbolic link to the known and meaningful in their experience, 
an invitation to expansive explanation. 
The Parma sample, taken in 1980/81, consisted of eighteen dairy 
farmers, of whom eight promptly opted for the 20/50 example as 
illustrating the "best farmer." They described in full detail their own 
farms in terms of this example. I will presently return to this. Six 
respondents found the 30/40 farmer to be the best, the one with the 
highest earnings, etc., and they were also of the opinion that their own 
farms were like this example. Naturally, complications were not lacking. 
Two farmers pointed to one example as the best, but said that owing 
to specific circumstances, their own farms resembled more the other 
example. Two others hesitated, though through further discussion and 
analysis an assessment of these two cases was also reached. Thus two 
groups could be identified: first, those opting consciously for intensifi-
cation as the main route to farm development, and second, those who 
opted for scale enlargement and relative extensification as the "right 
and best way." In the subsequent analysis these two groups are referred 
to as the I- and E-farmers respectively, and their particular view of 
farm development as an I- or an E-option. 
The central question, of course, is what, if anything, the answers 
signify. Do they refer to the existence of divergent patterns, which lead 
farmers not only to different evaluations of the two examples but which 
have at the same time a guiding influence on action, on the organization 
and planning of labor, on production, and on farm development? I 
shall try to answer these questions step by step, first by validating the 
definitions of "best farmer" and by investigating the "course of action" 
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Table 2.1. Hierarchy and Relative Weighting of Various Elements in the 
Future Planning of Farmers Who Opt for Intensification or for 
Scale Enlargement (Parma, n-18) 
Farmers Opting for Scale Enlargement Farmers Opting for Intensification 
and Relative Extensification (I-option) 
(E-option) 
1. Increase of farm acreage 3.56 1. Raise production per cow....3.90 
2. Cost reduction 3.31 2. Increase of farm acreage.... 2.90 
3. Reduction of labor input. 2.81 3. Cost reduction 2.30 
4. Increase of stock 2.56 4. Increase of stock 2.30 
5. Raise production per cow....2.13 5. Reduction of labor input....1.80 
which accompanies this, and subsequently, by making some links with 
the historical pattern of farm development and the present structure of 
the respondents' farms. 
In order to obtain an impression of the course of action, a simple 
research technique was developed with which it was possible to con-
struct a hierarchy (a relative weighting) of the various elements in the 
future plans farmers had for their farms. For this purpose the following 
list of elements was presented: 
• to raise production per cow 
• to reduce costs 
• to increase stock 
• to lower labor input 
• to increase farm hectarage 
Respondents were asked which of these elements they would consider 
valid for their own farm and which they could not implement. Sub-
sequently they were asked to rank those elements considered valid. In 
analyzing the data, the element thought most important was given the 
highest weighting (5), and that ranked as least important was given the 
lowest (1). In the Table 2.1 the average course of action is represented 
as a function of the option chosen. 
Those who opted for intensification gave the highest weighting to 
"raising production per cow," and those who opted for extensification 
ranked it last, giving the highest weighting to "increased hectarage." 
The picture summarized in Table 2.1 can be analyzed further. Let us 
begin with hectarage expansion. Those who opted for enlargement of 
scale, gave hectarage the highest priority, and none in this subgroup 
considered it invalid for their farms. Farmers who opted for intensifi-
cation put hectarage expansion as second in priority and some 30% 
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Table 2.2. Earlier, Present and Planned Acreage, Differentiated According 
to I- and E-Options 
Farm acreage in 1970 
Farm acreage in 1980 
Necessary acreage as defined 
by farmers 
Historical acreage expansion 
Planned acreage expansion 
25 ha 
31 ha 
54 ha 
6 ha 
23 ha 
E-Option I-Option 
25 ha 
27 ha 
39 ha 
2 ha 
12 ha 
considered it invalid. A difference of degree? Or does it mean more 
than that? 
Each of the respondents was asked how much extra hectarage was 
considered necessary to achieve a reasonable farm size. It should be 
noted that in 1970 most of the farms in the Parma sample were roughly 
the same size, about 25 hectares. By 1980, those who opted for scale 
enlargement had increased the size of their farms to about 31 hectares. 
Growth was less, from 25 to 27 hectares, for those who preferred 
intensification. Asked about their desires concerning further increases, 
those who chose scale enlargement said they would like, on average, 
another 23 hectares, while the I-farmers thought only 12 hectares more 
were needed to provide what they defined as a "reasonable" farm size. 
In other words, those who had expanded most in the past ten years, 
and who now had the largest farms, were those who thought it necessary 
to expand most in the future to reach a reasonable farm size.4 Table 
2.2 summarizes these important differences. 
One may deduce from the table that those who choose the I-option 
have a different perception of hectarage expansion than those who 
choose the E-option. One might say that the whole is more than the 
sum of the parts, that it is the situation thought of as ideal which gives 
meaning to the component parts of the course of action. A closer 
analysis of the interviews corroborates the view that this is true not 
only in a quantitative, but also in a more qualitative sense. In the core 
of the E-option, hectarage expansion takes on an independent meaning 
and is considered decisive for long-term success. In the core of the I-
option, where improvement of rotation schemes or the desire to become 
self-sufficient in fodder might one day entail a need to increase hectar-
age, hectarage expansion is a relative or subordinated notion. It is 
considered important insofar as it is functional for other elements. 
Hectarage expansion is not in itself a norm. This is also true for an 
element such as reducing costs. Its meaning, the way it is achieved and 
the degree to which it is pursued all depend on the context in which 
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the farmer places them. "Yes, of course," said one typical I-farmer, 
"reducing costs is often unavoidable. Then you have to do more work 
in order to spend less." He explained this as follows. 
"Look, if concentrates become expensive, then I grow more maize and 
barley myself. I then grind it and mix it with salt and such like. In this 
way I replace the expensive purchases from outside. Of course that 
involves costs in the sense that it involves much more work. . . . However, 
it solves a problem. The total amount of concentrates for the cows remains 
the same, but I spend less and thus reduce costs. . . . What else can one 
do in such a situation? If I didn't do it I would have to give less feed 
and my production would fall and also my income. . . . What help is 
that to anyone?" 
Those who opted for scale enlargement and relative extensification 
see cost reduction in quite a different light: 
"To begin with you have to cost your own labor like everything else. 
The thing is always to keep the labor time to a minimum, so that you 
can do more. 
"Then you give less feed. Actually what does it finally matter, this 
fantastic production per cow? It's a question of one's pocket, what interests 
me is what I earn, because although it may sound strange, it is never-
theless the case, that by limiting costs, giving less feed, fertilizing less 
and so on, you earn money by it." 
It is as if behind the I- and E-options there are two different ways 
of thinking—thinking which not only gives each apparently similar 
element a different place in farm development but also a different 
meaning, a different content. 
There is a striking concomitance between actual farm situations and 
their historical development and the options and associated courses of 
action. This can be summarized as follows: farmers who opt for inten-
sification are those who have intensified their farms most in the past 
ten years and who give the highest priority to further intensification in 
their plans for the future. On the other hand, farmers who opt for 
extensification and enlargement of scale have farms whose historical 
development, proposed development and present characteristics all fit 
with this option. These options are thematically represented in Figure 
2.1. 
It is not possible on the data given so far to go beyond noting the 
concomitance. The construction of causal relationships requires more 
than can be offered by the observation of a certain correspondence. 
Are the farmers simply "speaking the language of their farm," or is 
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GVP/ha 
farmers opting for 
/ intensification 
-historical trend 
^ ^ present situation 
planned farm 
development 
farmers opting for scale enlargement 
and relative extensification 
acreage per unit of labor force 
Figure 2.1 Options and farm development 
the farm structured according to the options of the farmers concerned? 
This essential question is explored further as more elements for an-
swering it are developed. 
Some of the research techniques described above were also used in 
the ERSA questionnaire. The pattern of answers given by the two 
groups (the plain and the mountain farmers, n=75 and 59, respectively) 
was subsequently explored using factor analysis. 
Table 2.3 summarizes the results of the first such analysis. The first 
and, in particular, the second factor, appear at first sight to confirm 
the correspondence between option and course of action. OPTIONpl is 
characterized by a high loading on the degree to which intensive farming 
is normative, labor reduction is rejected, and high priority is given to 
raising milk yield per cow. OPTIONp2 can be interpreted as the 
dimension representing scale enlargement and relative extensification. 
Priority is given to hectarage expansion and to an increase in stock, 
and none or very little attention is given to raising milk yields. 
In comparison with the Parma data, which showed a striking asso-
ciation between the more normative and the more technical aspects 
(i.e., between the definition of "best farmer" and "course of action"), 
it might be surprising that more than one single dimension emerges 
from the factor-analysis on the ERSA material. There is not one simple 
factor representing the I-option and its course of action on the positive 
side and the E-option on the negative side. In such a case the I- and 
E-options would be mirror reflections of each other. This is definitely 
not the case as Table 2.3 clearly shows. Not one, but three, factors 
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emerge. As far as the first and second are concerned, one could argue 
that the first factor summarizes the more normative aspects of farm 
development while the second expresses itself in more technical terms, 
or in more neutral terms, concerning the course of action. This "sep-
aration" between norm and practice which emerges from the ERSA 
material, although it contrasts with the Parma material, is not a com-
plete surprise. There are some arguments which indeed validate this 
apparent "separation." The farmer working intensively and "the well-
cared-for field" are still very much the norm in the Emilian countryside 
(and certainly in Parma and Reggio). In the cafes, the farmers will 
outbid each other to claim they have the best producing cow or the 
best field of luzerne. Farms are also judged by the same criteria. Riding 
with farmers around their home territory is a learning experience. The 
complexities are then also revealed. As one Parma farmer explained: 
"I take a darned good look around me. My neighbor, for example, he 
wants everything too beautifully done. He mows his field ten times over 
and he even mows the sides of the ditches, by hand. . . . Of course he 
gets beautiful fodder from his land. However he's wasting his time. Then 
there are those who muddle along. Me, I would rather work in a rough 
and ready way. Admittedly I do mow the ditches along the roadside 
where it can be seen, after all you don't want to get yourself a bad name 
in the neighborhood. . . . But really it makes no sense. I would be better 
off leasing one and a half hectares of land than stand wasting my time 
on one square meter." 
In short, the norm is one thing and practice on a particular farm 
another. At most, "along the roadside," and evidently within the pub, 
lip service is paid to the norm, but "out of sight," there can be a 
sharp discrepancy between norm and practice. 
Perhaps the strength of this general norm (shown up in the factor 
analysis as OPTIONpl) was overestimated during the Parma interviews. 
Presumably the longer interviews, taken over several sessions, created 
the trust which allowed the farmers to admit to an outsider (in this 
case a Dutch researcher) what was more difficult to admit to technicians 
of their own farmer organizations who carried out much shorter inter-
views—i.e., that people consciously depart from the prevailing norm 
that assumes that someone who farms intensively is a better farmer. 
This is probably how more than one factor emerged from the ERSA 
questionnaire. At the same time one might assume that the real options 
open to farmers are so complex, and sometimes even so contradictory, 
that they can never be represented by just one factor alone. 
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OPTIONp3, "the option to reduce costs," represents in some respects 
similar complications because again it emerges as an independent di-
mension (even with oblique rotation). Clearly increase in cattle stock 
scores relatively high on this factor, but an interpretation of the factor 
in terms of I- and E-options is not possible at this level. We have 
already seen the double-edged meaning of the term "cost reduction"; 
in a global strategy of intensification cost reduction will mean something 
different and will also be carried out differently from when it is 
functioning in a strategy of scale enlargement and relative extensifica-
tion. 
In short, although each of the three factors refers to clearly identi-
fiable dimensions, the meaning of individual factor scores must always 
be interpreted within the context of the pattern that they form with 
scores on the remaining factors. In an analytical sense this means that 
the interaction and addition of OPTION factors will mean more than 
a factor in isolation. I will return to this point when OPTION factors 
are used in the explanation of other factors. Table 2.4 summarizes the 
results of the factor analysis applied to the mountain sample. 
One sees that the structure of OPTIONm factors ("m" for mountain) 
differs somewhat from OPTIONp factors ("p" for plain). Thus 
OPTIONm 1, a factor which takes up 30% of the variance, combines 
an explicit opting for scale enlargement and relative extensification as 
the norm, with a priority for reducing labor. Thus there is no reason 
to assume an ambiguous meaning here to the concept "cost reduction." 
The second factor, OPTIONm2, combines (just as OPTIONp2) "in-
crease in cattle stock" with no priority for "raising milk yields"; in 
other words, scale enlargement and relative extensification. However, 
whereas on the plain this option was combined with a high priority 
for hectarage expansion, this was not the case in the mountains. This 
seems self-evident in view of the extremely low cattle density in the 
mountains where, in contrast to the plain, hectarage is seldom a prob-
lem. 
The Relation Between Incorporation/Institutionalization 
and Goals 
Having arrived at this point let us ask an important question. Is 
there any relationship between incorporation and institutionalization 
and how certain choices are made? Do commoditization and institu-
tionalization induce such a change in the "contextual whole" or "en-
vironment" of the farm that they coincide with a shift in the goals 
which direct and legitimize farm labor? In other words, do the various 
aims refer to a completely atomized situation in which producers opt 
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for certain goals on purely individual grounds, or do the exposed goals 
reflect structurally anchored patterns which direct and legitimize think-
ing and behavior? 
Incorporation was defined as the degree to which farming becomes 
dependent on markets for supplies. Eight such markets can be identified, 
at least for dairy farming in Emilia Romagna. These markets, together 
with the average degree and standard deviation of incorporation, were 
presented in the first chapter (Table 1.4). 
Institutionalization of agricultural practice was defined as the degree 
to which tasks carried out by farmers are externally prescribed and 
sanctioned, i.e., the degree to which they are influenced by the technical-
administrative task environment (TATE). This general concept may be 
subdivided threefold, i.e., into the influence which the technical-admin-
istrative task environment (TATE) has on: (1) the acquisition and 
processing of information, (2) the making of investment decisions, and 
(3) on the development of craftsmanship. Considerable variance also 
appears on the scales for measuring this threefold influence of TATE. 
One possibility for reducing the large number of variables with which 
incorporation and institutionalization are measured, without too much 
loss of information, is to use a variable cluster analysis. This method 
is a certain combination of "oblique component analysis" and "multiple 
factor analysis" with which a numeric series of variables can be ordered 
in clusters (Harman, 1976). Applied to the plain's data, three clusters 
arise. The first cluster is composed of variables Incl, Inc3, Inc4, and 
Inc7 (INC 1347 standing for incorporation into the markets for labor, 
short-term loans, medium-term loans, and fodder and concentrates). A 
second cluster combines Inc2, Inc5, and Inc8 (INC258, markets for 
machine services, long term-loans, and cows). The third cluster com-
bined the different TATE or institutional variables. 
The series of cross-tables in Figure 2.2 shows the global links between 
incorporation and institutionalization and goals. The first series of three 
tables give the average of OPTIONpl. This factor gives the degree to 
which the farmers on the plain opted for intensification. The overall 
average for factor scores is 0, with a standard deviation of 1.00. The 
dimensions in the cross-tables are formed from the three clusters of 
variables given above: INC1347 and INC258 and TATE. 
With a simultaneous increase in both incorporation dimensions 
(INC258 and INC1347), the degree to which farmers opt for intensi-
fication falls from 0.05 to —0.38. With increasing incorporation, the 
option for intensification loses its normative character. Institutionali-
zation of agricultural practice (TATE) exercises a similar influence, at 
least as it occurs in combination with increasing incorporation. 
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For scale enlargement and relative extensification (OPTIONp2) a 
similar influence of incorporation and institutionalization is present, 
but in the opposite direction. Thus, opting for scale enlargement and 
relative extensification rises with the simultaneous increase of TATE 
and INC1347 from -0.12 to 0.33. 
Later I shall discuss the statistical significance of such relationships 
which also apply to the mountains. It will become clear that they are 
indeed significant. Increasing incorporation and institutionalization lead 
to a shift in the goals which direct and legitimize farm labor from 
intensification to an increasing preference for relative extensification 
and scale enlargement and the course of action that goes along with 
this option. 
Patterns of Farming Logic: The I- and E-Calculus 
When asked why they had chosen the farmers with "20 cows pro-
ducing 50 ql of milk each" to be the "best farmer," farmers always 
referred to production level per cow and not production level per farm. 
For those farmers, milk production per cow and not total milk pro-
duction per farm was the central argument in their discourse. Produc-
tion per cow represents a norm, and the farmers "read" the two 
examples from the standpoint of this norm. 
"Naturally the farmer who milks 50 ql from his cows is the best, he has 
the highest production (produzione), and you should take good note of 
that. Like us, if we visit another farm then the first thing we want to 
know is what the produzione is. It says a great deal about a farmer and 
his work. . . . It's also an important yardstick for one's own business. 
We are proud of our produzione. It is much higher than it used to be 
and we have worked very hard for that. It gives a real feeling of achieve-
ment, of pride in one's work; high produzione means that things are going 
well. . . . Of course prices are sometimes bad but even then you are 
worse off if your produzione is low. And with good prices and low 
produzione you feel awful. For me it's simple. The first rule for a good 
farmer is produzione." 
Produzione plays a cardinal role in this quotation. Taken literally it 
means the same as the English word "production," i.e., in principle it 
is a polyvalent concept; it can be related to the farm as a totality, to 
the labor force, and to the amount of land. One can speak of production 
per farm, production per man, etc. However, those who opted for the 
intensive farmer as being best handled the term in a very specific way. 
For them the term refers unambiguously to production per object of 
labor, in this case, production per cow. This is so self-evident to them 
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that the qualifying noun is simply left out. In the second place, the 
quotation illustrates to what extent produzione is to be understood as 
a normative concept. It is norm and yardstick at the same time, "a 
high produzione is beautiful (e bella)" From this high produzione comes 
"pride in your work." Low produzione is "bad," it refers to "a bad 
farmer," a farmer who "cannot or will not work." 
Given the normative meaning of produzione it is logical that it is 
this concept that is picked up by the typical I-farmer (and not, for 
example, total output) when commenting on the second example, that 
of 30 cows and 40 qls: 
"Forty ql . . . that's not possible, that is already a serious problem with 
20 cows, but with 30 its an absolute disaster. That man has first to learn 
to look after his cows, before he takes more animals. I know, there are 
enough farmers of the kind here in this neighborhood: but in my opinion 
there is something missing in the logic there." 
Perhaps this all seems self-evident. However, this self-evidence arises 
within a specific schema, within a certain logic or calculus (seen as a 
specific ratio linking specific goals with specific means which therefore 
structures the labor process). In the calculus of farmers who opt for 
intensification, produzione is indeed a self-evident element for judging 
farm situations. In their calculus it is equally self-evident not to consider 
scale enlargement as a compensation for the lower production per cow. 
For them, that is illogical ("something missing in the logic"). 
The degree to which this self-evidence is tied to a calculus (explored 
more fully later) becomes more obvious when we let the farmers who 
chose the 30/40 example speak for themselves. A father said, "naturally 
the farmer with 30 cows is better." The son added, 
"Yes, we are like the farmer in that example, more cows and less milk 
per beast. And we still earn, and well too. If we farmed like the man in 
the 20/50 example, well reckon it for yourself, we wouldn't earn a cent 
any more, for it's with greater numbers that the attractive margin comes. 
You have to look for your earnings in numbers. . . . Look, for it's like 
this: you need fifteen cows to keep a family, to live. So every beast 
beyond that is pure profit. We have gone from 30 to 60 beasts but our 
profit has more than doubled, come and look at our books. . . . 
"That second farmer there (30/40 example) has more business in his 
cow sheds. He can negotiate and commercialize much more. By the end 
of the year he will have brought more in than goes out, that's as sure as 
houses, his outgoings will be proportionately much lower than with the 
other more intensive farmer." 
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These are some of the more economically tinged arguments used by E-
farmers for debating and "explaining" the examples. The arguments 
for produzione that we came across from farmers who opted for the 
20/50 farmer are notably absent here. Next to their more economically 
colored arguments, these E-farmers also use an array of more technical 
arguments—arguments which interestingly enough stand at odds with 
the notion of produzione as a norm because they cast doubt on the 
assumptions underlying the concept. 
"And then I would like to see how long these cows will go along with 
that. In my opinion he's milking them to exhaustion, to illness or even 
to death. It might seem fine, 50 ql, but if after a couple of years they 
are milked dry, what will he do then? I would also like to know how 
often such a cow calves." 
"I would like to see the veterinary bills of that first farmer. And you 
know, it can of course be alright, I have also tried it, but it takes a hell 
of a lot of work. And then to get such a high milk yield you need to 
feed them on a lot of concentrates. I reckon such cows would soon get 
mastitis." 
"That isn't a good farmer, he's a tail-washer." 
One can see that for this group of respondents, who consider an 
extensive style of farming to be the "best," produzione is no longer a 
norm in itself, on the contrary a high produzione is suspect and 
ridiculed. Suspect, because they see it as associated with a number of 
technical problems: mastitis, infertility, and too high a degree of re-
placement. Ridiculed, because it is implicitly assumed that a "farmer" 
wouldn't behave like that; only a caricature of a farmer, a "tail-washer" 
would try to get such a milk yield from a cow. 
In summary, presenting the two examples brought out two entirely 
opposite patterns of reaction. What is normative for one is suspect for 
the other. For some, produzione is a yardstick separating the "good" 
from "bad" and a beacon for their own farm development, while for 
others it has no such function. 
In these opposite reactions two specific patterns of farming logic lie 
hidden. These will now be more closely examined. 
The I-Calculus 
Let us first return to those farmers who opted for intensification, 
that is, those who defined the 20/50 example as the "best farmer." 
Why do they think a high produzione is so important? One said, 
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"If your production is higher, your income is also higher. That is logical. 
If it wasn't the case why would we raise produzione?" 
Produzione Income 
Figure 2.3 
In general, of course, this statement is not sufficient, because income 
can and does depend on many more factors than produzione alone. 
However, the relationship as sketched works better for some farms than 
for others. That is, some enterprises are structured in such a way that 
income is basically dependent on production per object of labor, while 
in others this factor matters much less. If we apply this idea to the 
Parma sample it appears that income in the group of intensive farms 
is indeed dependent on the Gross Value of Production per hectare. The 
correlation coefficient between GVP per hectare and income per unit 
of labor force was r=0.41. The same positive correlation was found 
between milk yield per cow and income, r=0.32. 
If we look, on the other hand, at the extensive group of farms, then 
this relationship, de facto, breaks down (r=-0.21 and r=0.07, respec-
tively). In this group, income depends heavily on scale: r=0.90. Agri-
cultural practice, indeed, can be structured in several ways. One of the 
consequences of this is that within identifiable farm realities different 
relations emerge. What applies in one group (for example, the relation 
between produzione and income) is absent or even absurd in another. 
This corresponds with the differences in calculi; what is logical in one 
is to some extent inconceivable in the other. 
Again this appears very clearly in the question of farm income. 
When the two examples were presented, the question "Which of the 
two would have the highest income and why?" was always asked. The 
pattern of answers is telling. 
"That second farmer might as well close his dairy. He must be an old 
farmer who has no interest anymore. From a production of 40 ql you 
would have nothing over, there is no income in that." 
"Only with a secondary source of income can a farmer drop to 40 ql." 
"What he lives on that second farmer I don't know. The man lives from 
day to day, does nothing more than the minimum necessary and that's 
it, goodbye." 
In short, those who see a solid link between produzione and income 
cannot imagine that one can earn anything from a lower production. 
56 Dairy Farming in Emilia Romagna, Italy 
Cura Produz ione Income 
Figure 2.4 
A secondary source of income is the suggestion most frequently offered 
to account for this. However, those who opt for the other example, and 
who, as we shall see later, primarily relate income to cost/benefit ratios 
and scale, are unable, in turn, to understand how a living can be made 
from 20 cows and a milk yield of 50 ql. They also suggested secondary 
income, but to explain precisely the opposite situation! 
"Those farmers who chase after such high production can't be thinking 
of the economics of it, it's a sort of luxury. They can only carry on in 
business because they have a secondary income." 
How is a high produzione and a high income then attainable for 
those opting for intensification? The key to it is cura. Taken literally, 
"cura" means "care." It refers to a specific relation between the objects 
of labor (cows, crops, etc.) and the direct producer. Cura stands for 
craftsmanship. Cura refers to working in such a way that produzione 
is optimal. With this new element arises the chain shown in Figure 
2.4. 
For the farmers concerned the relation of cura to produzione is clear 
and direct. As one older farmer commented, "If your production is low 
then you haven't worked with sufficient care." What does this care 
consist of? The same farmer commented, 
"Everything must be kept well under control. As a farmer you must have 
everything in your head—the age and history of your cows, their weight, 
the fat content of their milk, the feed and fodder rations, fertility, every-
thing. Books won't solve anything for you. There are dozens of factors 
which have to do with each other, which affect each other . . . and as a 
farmer you must take heed of all that and be properly prepared." 
And a younger colleague added, 
"Good care is fundamental for your yields: only by immersing yourself 
thoroughly and by feeling and seeing everything can you recognize and 
prevent mistakes. Only by working continually yourself can you tell what 
grass is best, what must be improved, how cows react to different kinds 
of feed, how you can supplement fodder, in what way a certain animal 
needs special treatment." 
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Asking about the meaning of cura is a starting point for very detailed 
descriptions of particular fields, crops and animals. Production tech-
nique, its development, the decisions contained in it, and the experiences 
on which such decisions are based, are all themes which farmers who 
opt for intensification will happily expand upon. People who are proud 
of their work will gladly talk about it. I will later go further into a 
discussion of craftsmanship, but what is essential here is that the 
concept of cura refers to a specific structuring of one's own labor. The 
relations between the direct producer and his objects of labor and the 
permanent interaction of intellectual and manual labor are crucial to 
this specific labor process. This interaction is geared towards obtaining 
high produzione: a high production per labor object. "Good cura is 
fundamental for your yields." 
What now are the conditions for cura? Why do some farmers work 
with care and others not? Let us look first at the conditions mentioned 
by farmers who opt for intensification and who define their own labor 
as cura. I will quote a young farmer who six years ago finished his 
training at the agricultural university: 
"With many farmers, let's say you have a long way to find any profes-
sionalism, any formal professional knowledge. They are mostly older 
farmers who are no longer so interested in picking up information. That 
brings a problem with it; if they need specific technical advice they have 
to go to the Consorzi, and you can guess the advice they get there. And 
unfortunately they don't experiment enough themselves these old farmers. 
. . . But then, the cura is there with some of these old farmers, and as 
the care is there, they succeed in obtaining the same yields as myself 
even without all the technical help that I have. 
"Their hectarage is mostly somewhat smaller, but they are always out 
among the cows and their plants; they manage, they try. . . . The sad 
thing is that you see people with good technical training from college, 
or like me with the faculty of agriculture behind them, who nevertheless 
work badly, who are very 'extensive.' They have the technical know-how 
but the cura is missing. . . . Generally speaking, you need two things as 
an intensive farmer. You need scientific information, but interpreted in 
a critical manner. You must certainly not swallow hook, line and sinker 
what the experts tell you, and if you don't have technical information at 
your disposal then you should at least have some experience and the will 
to gain experience and put it to use. And secondly your heart must be 
in this sort of work, without a certain passione you won't make it." 
Passione and knowledge—where knowledge is preferably the combi-
nation of personal experience and critically approached scientific infor-
mation—are two important conditions for cura. An equally important 
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condition put forward in pretty well all the interviews is impegno. It 
is again a concept that, as well as having a normative content, also 
comprises a rather exact definition of an essential economic relation. 
"Impegno" means that you must put in not only hard work, but soul 
("chi cura, tiene che impegnarsé"). And why do farmers do the extra? 
Why sometimes work late into the night? Why is it necessary to spend 
day and night in the cowshed? One farmer replied rhetorically, "That's 
very simple. The incentive is to raise production." 
Clearly impegno is a norm. From that comes the "logic" of defining 
those who get low production from their dairy as "men who would 
rather sit drinking in the bar, who will not or cannot work." But 
impegno is more: the term is also a declaration that the relation between 
labor input and the objects of labor is to be a stable relation. Labor 
input per cow is to be high and above all stable. Feeding cattle well 
is also seen as a stable phenomenon. Translated into economic terms, 
what is understood by impegno is that fixed as well as variable costs 
per object of labor are not to be seen as changeable entities, let alone 
as costs that ought to be minimized. Naturally, over the longer term, 
impegno is seen as being flexible. Technical progress—in terms of new 
sheds, mechanization of milking, transporting manure, etc.—always 
creates new opportunities for altering the relationship between labor 
force and objects of labor, without endangering cura. Certain kinds of 
technical progress (automatic manure removers and spreaders, for ex-
ample) even make it possible to raise cura further because less time 
needs to be spent on secondary activities. A number of respondents 
indicated this: 
"Look, if you have a modern cow shed, then reasoning from your 
examples, you are best off keeping 30 cows and looking after them equally 
well so that your production remains up to the mark or is even improved." 
Given the technological level, then the farmer who opts for intensifi-
cation will specify the size of his herd in terms of the desired cura 
and in terms of the necessary impegno. That is a fundamental reason 
for rejecting the 30/40 example: 
"That farmer has more cows than he can cope with." 
Another farmer, who has 120 cows himself, added 
"That goes beyond all logic, He is laying up trouble for himself by 
overstepping what's possible." 
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This last farmer does not care single-handedly for all 120 cows. He 
works with two brothers and his old father. Wives are equally important 
in the overall labor process. When such a farmer touches upon ac-
counting then the strategic implication of the concept of impegno 
becomes even clearer. 
"The first farmer can get through the work on his own, that's possible 
with 2Q cows, but the second with 30, he would need help with the 
milking. The same goes with the fodder, because going from 20 to 30 
cows raises the cost of feed by a half, but the yield improvement is only 
20% (from 1,000 to 1,200 ql). It isn't good from any side what the second 
farmer does. His milking assistant costs so much per cow, the feed will 
bring almost similar costs with it, and the fixed costs will be about the 
same. He has also a bigger stall to depreciate and so on. So, whether 
you have 20 cows or 30 cows the costs per cow are about the same so 
you are better off maximizing the yields per cow. There lies the logic of 
the first farmer and the mistake of the second." 
Thus objects of labor have a central place in their reasoning, and 
furthermore, labor input, input of feed, and the investment per cow 
are not considered manipulable as variable quantities. They are per-
ceived as fixed relations: 
"I cannot give less attention or work to the herd just because the cheese 
price is low, can I? If the price goes up later then I'm left with a ruined 
herd." 
Figure 2.5 presents a model of these relations. Apart from the terms 
already presented, two additional concepts are introduced. These are 
"self-sufficiency," perceived by the farmers as a strategic prerequisite 
for being able to "work with care," and "la bell'azienda," the beautiful 
farm," which is seen as a long-term result of high produzione, just as 
income (guadagno) represents the short-term outcome. On both self-
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sufficiency and the beautiful farm, I will comment later. I consider this 
structure to be the backbone of the calculus as used by farmers who 
opt for intensification. It is the specific ratio binding means with ends. 
It is a well-integrated system of meanings through which a particular 
reality can be interpreted and organized. Within this system occurs the 
already noted "self-evidence" of the reasoning given. Each concept is 
locked into a network that shows where the meaning of that concept 
lies as well as the way in which the desired results are to be achieved. 
This calculus also makes clear why certain respondents pointed 
without hesitation to the 20/50 example as representing the "best 
farmer" who "earned most," as if the reasons for this choice were self-
evident: 
"Naturally the cow shed with the highest produzione is the best; if it 
wasn't the case, what are we talking about?" 
It is because of this self-evidence and the frequent references farmers 
themselves make to the "logic" as they see it that I define Figure 2.5 
as a calculus, or in particular as the I-calculus. All the key concepts 
of this calculus refer to the need and chance to intensify as a conscious 
farming strategy. In this sense it also means a clearly ordered scheme 
which reads from left to right, as a structured whole of conditions, 
means, intermediary goals and end goals: as a goal function. Income 
and reproduction of the farm enterprise is the final goal, intensification 
is the path, and working with cura is the particular means for achieving 
it. Finally, cura entails a number of clearly described prerequisites: 
impegno, passione, knowledge and self-sufficiency. 
The congruence of ends and means in this connection is critical. 
Isolation of any one element makes both that element and the rest of 
the scheme meaningless. That is why I emphasize the calculus as being 
a specific ratio or logic which binds ends and means in a specific way, 
and although it is given here as an ideal-typical construction, such a 
calculus is by no means an abstraction. As will be shown later, for 
farmers who opt for intensification, it forms a practical guideline for 
many farm decisions. Not only does it structure observation and in-
terpretation, but it also provides a beacon for guiding and legitimizing 
affairs. 
Substantive rationality is often described in economics, sociology and 
anthropology as the possessing of insight into and an overview of the 
relevant whole. The I-calculus is a concrete form of such rationality, 
not because it rests on the more genial characteristics of this group of 
farmers, but simply because the relevant whole is so structured that it 
is both surveyable and insightful. The objects of labor stand central in 
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the calculus. Both cura and produzione derive their meaning from this 
centrality. Produzione stands for results per labor object, and cura refers 
to treating objects of labor in such a way as to ensure maximal 
productive results. In short, farm labor itself—understood as the in-
teraction between the direct producer and his objects of labor—is 
central. It forms the core of an insightful, well ordered and developable 
"world." It is a world which can be created and further developed on 
the basis of one's own experience and insight—not in any whimsical 
way—but normatized according to the calculus. 
In the I-calculus explicit references to markets and institutions are 
missing. They are considered as exogenous to the domain of farm labor. 
A number of respondents also named self-sufficiency (autosuficienza) 
as being prerequisite for working with the I-calculus: 
"To be self-sufficient in as many respects as possible, it is essential to be 
able to farm well, because everything that has to be purchased is in a 
manner of speaking too expensive: it's a question of monopoly products; 
those who sell determine the price." 
"Your costs are commensurate with how much you have to buy, especially 
when things are going badly. Independent farms can always withstand 
adversity, they don't go broke so easily. The others are much too vul-
nerable." 
"When getting goods and services outside the farm, you are often unsure 
of their quality. You can counter this uncertainty by putting in more of 
your own labor, even make your own concentrates, keep your own bull 
so as not to be wholly dependent upon artificial insemination, even carry 
out your own maintenance and repairs." 
"I would rather weed myself than use herbicides. You don't know what 
mischief is caused by that rotten stuff." 
In the eyes of these farmers, quality is more doubtful, prices are higher 
and induced market risks greater when market dependency is increased. 
That is why they prefer to be self-sufficient. Rendered in strictly micro-
economic terms, one could say that in such a view, market dependency 
causes marginal costs to be higher and marginal profits to be lower. A 
certain measure of extensification would be the economic result of this 
double movement, and it is precisely that which is unacceptable to I-
farmers. This is why they argue that one does well to be self-sufficient. 
But there is another reason: the micro-economically defined optimum 
will not only shift, but the definition of the optimum itself changes 
with increasing incorporation. "Farming more cheaply" or "more eco-
nomically" then emerges as a definition of the optimum: 
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"I personally buy and pay. I pay immediate cash for everything. I don't 
know if that is the best in economic terms, but that is what I do and I 
have no wish to do otherwise. . . . I was once in debt, but after that 
experience I shall never do it again. If I can't pay for something then I 
damned well don't buy it. I was so deeply in debt that I thought I would 
never get out of it. The worst thing is the enormous insecurity you feel 
because of the debts. One hailstorm is all it takes and who pays? And 
that's it precisely, if you have debts you almost no longer dare to farm 
well. Every cost becomes risky. You are inclined to farm more cheaply, 
to lower impegno, but of course that is madness. . . . No, now I make 
sure that everything that I put in the land is paid for; that way I have 
peace of mind and can farm without worries, can farm well." 
"But why," I asked, "could you not produce more cheaply when you 
were so in debt? The risks would have been smaller." 
"No, you can't do that, you have to farm well and intensively even if 
you have debts. You mustn't let your produzione suffer. It doesn't work. 
Spending less in order to save is not a practice to be advised. The main 
aim of farming is produzione, you can't stray from that. Otherwise you 
play havoc with your income. That goes also for times of crisis. Produ-
zione comes first, and if you have to save then you must save in the 
house not on the farm." 
In short, increasing market dependency (the external financing of work-
ing capital in the case above) leads to a different form of optimization— 
to an optimization of the average cost/benefit ratio which tempts one 
to make a reduction in costs but which also reduces yields. It is precisely 
for this reason that market dependency is rejected: the core of the I-
calculus would suffer and cognitive dissonance result. 
An excursion into micro-economics can highlight this problem. The 
first graph pictured in Figure 2.6 gives a classical production function— 
the relationship between various input levels and the corresponding 
output levels.5 If the price per unit output is known (PY1), then the 
relationship can also be read as "income function" (TR for total 
revenue). The second graph gives the marginal profit (MP), which is 
the extra output obtained by adding an additional input unit. Multiplied 
by the price per unit output, it gives the VMP (value of the marginal 
product). In the same way the average product (AP) can be calculated. 
Multiplied by the price (PY1), it gives the value of the average output 
(VAP). So what will a farmer do if he structures farming operations 
according to the I-calculus? He will strive to raise produzione, i.e., try 
to reach a high output level. A prerequisite for this, given his calculus, 
is the raising of impegno, i.e., input 1 in the graph. To what point will 
63 
1 1 
ô 
1 
? a 
1 
; / 
o- 1 
< 
> 1 o / 
C L / 
- < / * 
N I L / 
1 1 
z 
1 
J 
X 
Q. 
5 
Ô / 
Q- / 
2 / 
1 
/ -
-
-
_ 
-
-
3 
o 
-o 
CL 
x~ 
CO CD TJ- eu 
(lA)mcnno 
CM 
I 
_1_ 
O CD 
CM "~ 
N 00 Tt O 
"sJB||Op'Ud U 
T ^ 
o 
0 ) 
00 
h-
CD 
m 
•«t 
C0 
^^  
T — 
X 
3 
Cl 
c 
_ 
co 
o 
co 
o 
io 
co 
o 
co 
co 
CM 
O 
CM 
CO 
O 
O 
CO 
CO 
CO 
o 
O CO O <fl 
CO CM CM — 
(lA)jndjno 
i i i i o o o o 
co m ^ co 
o 
o 
CM 
CO 
l 
O 
o 
1 
o 
10 
« a ô -s 
•o « 
- > 
X V 
'S 
SJBIIOP U d l A 
3 
•o O 
3 
E 
64 Dairy Farming in Emilia Romagna, Italy 
he raise impegno and therefore produzione? Those who opt for inten-
sification are very outspoken about this. One I-farmer said: 
". . . to a specified point naturally. Because look, you must not allow 
your cost to go higher than your yields. Extra fertilizer, extra feed and 
so on, naturally has to give extra production, otherwise it no longer makes 
sense." 
That is self-evident. Translated in terms of the graph, that means that 
you optimize to the point where the marginal costs (the Pxl line) are 
the same as the marginal yields (the VMP line). But note that farmers 
who use the I-calculus surround the exact determination of this point 
with a number of extra prerequisites which give a special character to 
their optimum. To begin with, they do not use the market prices 
operating at the time, which often fluctuate. They base their calculations 
more on the assumption of long-term trends: 
"There are those farmers who when milk and cheese prices are low, give 
less concentrates and hay to their animals than is proper, but I don't 
hold with that. When prices are low I look after my animals the same 
as usual. Of course I am not going to neglect my cows, because when 
milk prices then rise and become attractive, your cows are in poor shape 
and your production is low. Our cura remains always at the same level, 
though naturally within the limits of the possible, but cura is not deter-
mined by the cyclical movement in milk prices and even less by fluctua-
tions in fodder prices. Last year for example I bought as much hay as 
always despite higher prices. That stable level of cura and impegno means 
indeed that earnings are now lower, but well, as soon as milk prices go 
up, that will compensate for it." 
"You can't base feed on calculations which follow the uncertainties of 
the day." 
In other words the inherent risk of price fluctuation is consciously 
not part of their reasoning. A temporary rise in costs (in the graph 
presented as a development of Pxl to P'xl) is eliminated from the 
calculus: produzione is justifiably central. There is yet another factor 
related to this. It came to our notice when one of the respondents said, 
"Everything that you have to buy is, in a manner of speaking, too 
expensive" and "you must try to be as self-sufficient as possible." If 
this is so (and I come back to this when discussing the phenomena of 
thin and fat cows), then it implies, at least for the farmers who opt for 
intensification, that the cost of provisioning oneself is less than the Pxl 
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line suggested by market prices. Thus the real optimum will lie beyond 
point N. 
This rather hypothetical digression6 is a reasonable starting point for 
answering, at least to a degree, the question of what happens with 
increasing market dependency. Why do farmers who reason according 
to an I-calculus think that this is such a problem? They claim that 
with market dependency they lose their peace of mind. Biological and 
economic risks would be extremely disadvantageous at the optimum 
for the intensive farmer (i.e., where marginal profits equal marginal 
risks). As Heady (1952:515) argued, "they can break him." But the risk 
we are talking about here is a market-induced risk, a risk which arises 
from market dependency. I have already shown that such a risk is 
consciously excluded from the I-calculus. However, with a quantitative 
increase in market dependency, such exclusion is no longer possible, or 
at least is less so. How can this risk be reduced? Not by ignoring it as 
in the I-calculus, but in a material sense by shifting the optimum—a 
shift achieved by defining the optimum differently. In theory, induced 
risk is at its smallest when the cost/benefit ratio is maximized, because 
with a maximal benefit/cost relation (VAP/Pxl) there is maximum 
room for dealing with falling prices, rising costs and loss of production. 
So, through increased market dependency, one is pushed to point Z on 
the production function instead of being able to work towards point 
N. The costs per labor object (impegno), as well as yields, drop. This 
decrease might cause an improvement in the benefit/cost ratio, but 
such a concept is absent in the I-calculus. What remains then is the 
fall of produzione. This is precisely why an increasing market depen-
dency is rejected in the I-calculus. It stands in the way of "good 
farming." 
The relationship between risk factor and a less intensive style of 
agricultural practice has now been mentioned several times. Since the 
classic work of Heady on farm management economics (1954:546), we 
know that "subtracting a safety margin" can lead the farmer to use 
less fertilizer and to opt more for the "bottom curve" (see also Hazell 
et al. 1978:26). To these insights one might add that the relevant risk-
factor can neither be traced back to psychological qualities of the farmer 
or entrepreneur (as in Heady, 1954, and to some extent Ortiz, 1973), 
nor to a general setting of market and price relations (market fluctua-
tions, etc.). This risk factor is primarily rooted in the degree of market 
dependency. It emerges with commoditization. 
Another particular feature of the reasoning of I-farmers is that the 
definition of potential benefits often goes beyond the particular reality 
as defined by the current situation on the markets. This is where the 
crucial importance of a time perspective enters the discussion. The 
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"bell'azienda," the beautiful farm, to be built with one's own labor 
(cura) symbolizes the long-term perspective with which these I-farmers 
work. As one of them clearly expressed: 
"Yes, indeed, there is always this temptation, this endeavor to make 
something out of it; something you can be proud of, a beautiful farm 
you can hand over, God willing, to the children." 
Building a fine farm often implies, as the farmer said, "going against 
this pressure of the market." During our conversation this respondent 
was sowing a bean variety in some of his fields, just to plough them 
under later. The explicit reason for this activity, and for not sowing a 
product with a high market value, was the desire to improve, over the 
long term and through his own means, the fertility of his soil. The 
same goes for so many activities in the cow shed. A lot of the work 
defined as typical of the "tail-washer" is nevertheless done by I-farmers. 
The work dedicated to "good cows" so as to secure a good offspring 
is an outstanding example. A particular cow might cause a lot of trouble 
while being milked (which implies extra work). She might well demand 
special feeding and privileged housing (again extra work), her milk 
yield might be poor, and her age preclude any thought of a good price 
at the slaughterhouse. Nonetheless some farmers will go on caring for 
such an animal, simply because her offspring might be promising. She 
might contribute to the "beautiful farm" he envisages. Hence, use value 
as defined by the farmer (a definition implying often a long time 
perspective) clearly dominates over the immediate exchange value as 
determined by the current market situation. In terms of the graphs 
presented in Figure 2.6, this long-term perspective as symbolized by 
the notion of "la bell'azienda" implies a further shift of point N to the 
right, since benefits are defined in a way that transcends the market 
and the commodity relations that go with it. Further intensification is 
the outcome. 
In the structure of the I-calculus, terms which refer directly to the 
labor process as such are central. What appear to be strikingly absent 
are details of economic relations. Put more forcefully, the I-calculus 
rests, as we saw, on a strong preference for self-sufficiency. Temporary 
price swings are consciously excluded as relevant parameters, and ben-
efits are defined in a way that goes beyond the market. This lack of 
emphasis on economic criteria becomes more striking when compared 
to the calculus of farmers who opt for scale enlargement and relative 
extensification, as described later. Terms which directly relate to market 
and price relations dominate in their calculus. All this does not imply, 
however, that the I-calculus is a-economic. What it implies is a specific 
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interpretation of the economy, an interpretation which is consistent with 
a specific ordering of economic relations, i.e., the structure of historically 
guaranteed autonomous reproduction (see Figure 1.2 in Chapter 1). The 
supply of production factors is given and historically guaranteed. Vari-
ation in their input is not possible in the short term. Therefore the 
planning of an optimum in terms of cost/benefit relations turns out to 
be improbable if not superfluous. Talk of costs is here fictitious insofar 
as it is about monetary cost which per se must be valorized. Instead 
the scheme presupposes, both in the long and short term, an increase 
in the relation between the input of production factors and gross 
production. Hence the structural importance of cura and produzione. 
The marketable surplus and the reproduction of production factors for 
the following cycle can be raised by the degree to which that relationship 
(i.e., the technical efficiency) is high. So income (guadagno) is raised 
and the "bell'azienda" develops. 
The I-calculus then refers to that economic reality embodied in the 
economic relations of autonomous historically guaranteed reproduction. 
That is why the absence of specific economic interpretations in the I-
calculus does not mean that it is a-economic. It is completely economic 
in the sense that it provides a rationale for economic action in a context 
typified by the relative absence of market dependency on the supply 
side of the farm enterprise. 
The E-Calculus 
The E-calculus is the particular rationality used by farmers who opt 
for scale enlargement and relative extensification. A high level of market 
dependency, problematic and therefore rejected in the I-calculus, is no 
problem within the E-calculus; in fact, it is an advantage. The E-
calculus will be reconstructed here in the same way as was the I-
calculus earlier. I will therefore begin with the argument put forward 
by the respondents of the Parma sample, who explained why they think 
that the farmer with the 30 cows which give 40 ql of milk each is to 
be seen as the "best farmer" who "earns the most." 
"That is rather easy, such a choice. What the second farmer does is the 
only way to be able to continue farming. He also earns much more. Of 
course he earns less per cow, but that is alright. To earn less per unit 
isn't important, we no longer live in those times. As long as I produce 
more, have more cows, then that is no problem, because your income 
comes from numbers. From that point of view I think that the second 
farmer's cow shed is still not functioning well. He should have a lot more 
cows to milk, to reduce further the milking time per animal. I would 
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rather see the example with 60 or 80 milk cows, but well, compared with 
the 'tail-washer' one might say he is well on the way." 
Another typical E-farmer expressed the same point of view: 
"Look, the attractive margin emerges with the quantity." 
And yet a third said, 
"The second farmer (30/40) is naturally much better. He scores better 
results on the benefit side. He sells more milk and can sell more calves 
as well. What's more, he has less of a headache in his cow shed. If you 
drive your cows to produce 50 ql then you have a load of problems— 
sickness among the herd and no more rest for yourself, you must be for 
ever in the cow shed. Moreover you milk the cows to death forcing such 
a high milk yield. That first farmer by the end of the year will have only 
ten cows left. The rest will be finished. And you can reckon that in other 
respects, with feed, for example, his cost will be far too high. It is, all 
in all, sunshine clear, more results on the sales side and less cost is what 
makes a better income." 
The difference from the I-calculus is immediately obvious. Production 
per object of labor (produzione) has absolutely no normative meaning 
here. It is instead suspect. It functions even less as a yardstick. This 
function has been replaced by total production which is compared to 
costs. Along with this viewpoint a new term crops up—"scale"— 
because "income comes from numbers." A second decisive difference 
with the I-calculus is that impegno, as a normative interpretation of 
stable relations between labor and other inputs per labor object, is 
entirely missing. Instead the search to reduce labor and costs (the 
opposite of impegno) is offered as normative: 
"Look, the first farmer will lose far too much time and the management 
of his beasts will cost far too much." 
I break this quotation here to point out an interesting detail. A 
farmer who opts for intensification as we saw, mostly uses the term 
"cura" or the verb "curare" to describe the caring for his animals. For 
the farmer who opts for scale enlargement this is not usually the case. 
That is understandable, for neither produzione nor impegno are mean-
ingful terms in the E-calculus. The essential element that binds the 
whole thing together, the cura, is thus superfluous. It is also interesting 
that with this shift in meaningful structure the discourse also partly 
changes. Such farmers do not speak of cura and curare but mostly of 
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Figure 2.7 Structure of the E-calculus 
controlare (to control) or of being able to governare (to manage) the 
herd. To continue with the quotation, 
"I, or better said, the second farmer, we do not need to give such a 
quantity of concentrates. That first farmer has to do that, his feed costs 
must be much higher. He also loses a lot of labor time so again he cannot 
keep so many beasts." 
After many counter-arguments on my side, he said, 
"And even then, at the end of the year this second farmer has more 
income because he spends relatively less. That first farmer, that farm 
doesn't pay its way. They are bewitched by the cow shed and their 
animals and spend money by the bucketful." 
Two terms are central to the E-calculus—cost/benefit ratio and scale. 
Together they determine income. Figure 2.7 schematically summarizes 
this idea. In the core of the E-calculus, improving the cost/benefit ratio 
means largely following the path of extensification. Several studies on 
the area, including that of Messori (1981), and Garoglio and Mosso 
(1986), confirm this tendency.7 Some of the E-farmers are quite explicit 
about this in their own terms: 
"There comes a time when you learn that by lowering costs, even 
sometimes eliminating them, you always earn. Yes, certainly you have to 
reduce your costs continually whether it be concentrates, or roughage or 
whatever, even labor. A higher milk price disputed over in Rome or 
Brussels, that's crazy. The market makes the price. It is useless to go and 
demonstrate. As a farmer it's your job to lower your costs." 
"No, then with my rougher style (// nostro farmale), I may make poorer 
hay, and care for my beasts less well, but I've no time for all that 
nonsense. It costs me too much money. I have to earn, damn it! I haven't 
time for pottering around on one square meter; you must look for it in 
space. Attractive margins arise only through greater quantity. In the cow 
shed that is certainly the case: why should I waste my time and incur 
such high costs for one cow. I have to milk more cows, that's the way 
to farm." 
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Table 2.5. Benefits, Costs and Their Mutual Relations, Derived from Figure 
2.6. 
Inputs 
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14 
14 
13 
12 
11 
10 
9 
8 
7 
Value of 
Marginal 
Product 
dollars 
10 
18 
14 
10 
8 
6 
4 
2 
0 
-2 
P., - $5 
Total 
Cost 
dollars 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
50 
Net 
Revenue 
dollars 
0 
5 
18 
27 
32 
35 
36 
35 
32 
27 
20 
Total 
Revenue/ 
Tot. Cost 
0 
2 
2.8 
2.8 
2.6 
2.4 
2.2 
2.0 
1.8 
1.6 
1.4 
High produzione is rejected: it is too expensive and also too "impeg-
nativo"—it takes too much labor. Too much and too expensive for the 
returns. Too expensive also in terms of the alternative, scale enlarge-
ment. This can be illustrated in a well-structured way by means of the 
production function used earlier. Table 2.5 gives the figures on which 
Bishop and Toussaint (1958) based the previously outlined functions. 
Various levels of inputs (XI) and corresponding production levels (Yl) 
are shown. If one projects onto this prices per input and output unit 
(PX1 and PY1), then gross and net incomes, the value of the average 
product, the value of the marginal product, and the average cost/benefit 
ratio can be calculated. The cost/benefit ratio (given in the last column 
as Total Revenue/Total Cost) is maximal with an input of 2 or 3 units 
XI and a corresponding production level of 14 (or 21). That figure is 
noticeably lower than the level of inputs for the I-calculus, where a 
level of inputs of 6 units and a corresponding production of 33 units 
was arrived at. 
Assuming that other conditions remain equal, then the cost of such 
an operation (maximizing the cost/benefit ratio) would be a decrease 
in the net income per labor object unit. If one reads the table as 
referring to a hectare or a cow, then going from the optimum that 
holds when applying the I-calculus to what holds when applying the 
E-calculus, a halving of net income occurs: from 36 to 18 dollars. 
However, if we couple the second term from the E-calculus (scale 
enlargement) to the first term (improving the cost/benefit ratio), then 
quite a different picture emerges. Suppose that a farmer has 100 dollars 
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available. Reasoning according to the I-calculus that would be sufficient 
to work 3.3 hectares "properly" (or to feed 3.3 cows well, etc.). The 
produzione is optimal then with an input of 36 dollars a unit. Therefore 
with 100 dollars, three units can be worked. The earnings per unit are 
then optimal. The net income is 3.3 X 36 = 118.80 dollars. Passing 
now to the E-calculus, the picture changes. The cost/benefit ratio is 
optimal with an input of two. That "costs" 10 dollars per labor object 
unit. Thus with the 100 dollars available, 10 labor object units can be 
worked. The falling income per unit is amply compensated for by a 
greater number of labor objects: income per unit of labor force rises 
to 10 X 18 = 180 dollars. 
Of course this whole exercise is highly hypothetical and above all 
incomplete. It is a question of whether the technology exists to enable 
one unit of labor force to "work" 10 labor objects. Perhaps with a 
lower input, the quantity of work per labor object would also drop. 
But if substantially increasing objects of labor should lead to using 
extra labor force, then the results of the above calculations could be 
quite different. Even a fall in net income per unit of labor could occur. 
A change in fixed costs could also modify the picture, because going 
from 3.3 to 10 labor objects could bring with it an increase in fixed 
costs (depreciation, etc.). Be that as it may, the example illustrates at 
least the possibility that the combination of relative extensification and 
scale enlargement gives rise to a ratio which is absent when one of the 
terms is modified. It is worth noting that the mention of such a strategy 
is missing in most of the standard works on agrarian economy. 
Take, for example, Farm Management Economics by Heady and 
Jensen (1954). Chapter 15 deals with size of farm or enterprise. The 
chapter gives special attention to the dairy farm. It suggests that given 
the fact that the cost of feed usually forms 75% of total cost, advantages 
of scale are difficult to achieve; "the main economics must come from 
building and labor" (468). Modern milking machines and automatic 
feeding, etc. can be installed with a larger milk herd, and building 
costs per cow will drop. The relevance of all that is, however, rather 
small, for according to Heady and Jensen, "There is little chance for 
economics or dis-economies in feed . . . aside from those due to good 
or poor management." Thus in their view there is only one optimum 
for feed level. Variation of feed input per cow in combination with 
scale enlargement is excluded: "If one is going to have 4000 rather 
than 2000 broilers, one will need twice as much feed . . . 200 beef 
cattle will require four times as much feed . . . as 50 cows. . . . Similar 
statements apply to sheep, beef cattle, laying flocks and dairy cows." 
In short, the possibility that the advantages of scale enlargement lie 
in its combination with relative extensification is not considered. This 
72 Dairy Farming in Emilia Romagna, Italy 
omission is the more remarkable since Heady and Jensen actually 
indicate the occurrence of the phenomenon: "We know of some large-
scale operators who would actually have greater profit if they contracted 
their unit and gave more attention to improved practices for their crops 
and livestock!" 
At first sight it might be surprising that this particular phenomenon 
was not studied as a meaningful reality in itself. However, the char-
acterization of all kinds of phenomena as mere deviations is unavoidable 
if, in a heterogeneous reality, only one schema or calculus is applied 
to the study and understanding of farm management. The adoption of 
more than one calculus allows for a breakthrough in this monolithic 
scheme because it implies that a great variety does not need to be 
reduced anymore to one optimum. On the contrary, heterogeneity can 
then be understood as the ever rational outcome of a variety of models 
of rationality. Later, when the thin and fat cows are discussed, this 
question will be illustrated and analyzed with an empirical example. 
However, before we step into the pastures, it might be useful to give 
some thought to the second term of the E-calculus—the term "scale," 
i.e., the relationship between available manpower, the size of the herd, 
and hectarage. Existing sociopolitical relations in Emilia preclude cer-
tain forms of scale enlargement and encourage other forms. 
• First labor input can be reduced: "more than one person farms" 
(sometimes erroneously referred to as "more than one man farms") 
where part of the family (often extended) is active, are able to 
lower labor input to one or two people; the rest seek positions 
elsewhere. Part-time farming can also be considered in this light. 
• A second possibility is hectarage expansion: although buying land 
is extremely difficult (but not impossible), the leasing and semi-
legal renting of land (sfalcio) give considerable scope to the indi-
vidual farmer interested in expansion. 
• A third form, though more ambiguous to interpret, is the raising 
of cattle density: more cows are kept on a given hectarage, which 
usually entails seeking an increasing amount of fodder on the 
market. In fact, a claim is thus laid on agricultural land elsewhere 
via market mechanisms. 
• A fourth form, which in present-day Emilia still exists, is the 
specialization of the farms: the rotation systems are simplified as 
far as possible. Grain, wine, tomatoes, etc., disappear from the 
cropping plan and luzerne and maize dominate. A certain degree 
of specialization is also possible in the cow shed by limiting, as 
far as possible, the time one spends on rearing young animals, or 
even by a complete externalization of this particular practice, in 
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order to increase the numbers of milking cows per man. Thus 
more remunerative objects of labor appear in the same cow shed. 
The scale is bigger, at least if labor input remains the same. 
This list could in principle be extended and made more complex. 
Likewise, some farmers develop a veritable genius for accomplishing 
scale enlargement where it would appear impossible. 
The point I would now like to move to, however, is something 
different—to the combination of scale enlargement and relative exten-
sification (whereby relative extensification is the vehicle for the im-
provement of the cost/benefit term). To farmers who opt for it, the 
essence of scale enlargement lies precisely in its combination with 
relative extensification and the improvement of cost/benefits which 
accompany it. As they already stated: "It is with greater numbers that 
the attractive margin comes." The point is illustrated more fully in the 
next section. 
Thin and Fat Cows 
It is apparent from both our own and other research projects in the 
area that feed input per cow varies considerably. This phenomenon is 
of course also recognized by the real experts, the farmers themselves. 
They often relate feed input per cow to the degree to which farmers 
are either self-sufficient or market-dependent for food provision. 
"If fodder comes from the farm itself, then you will see that the cattle 
are well-fed. Yes, it's always better to produce your own feed than to 
buy it." 
But why would you feed less if you have to buy it? 
"If you have to buy it then it costs much more and that makes you 
careful, you have to be, so you are less ready to feed them so they have 
enough." 
Another dairy farmer said, in answer to the same question, 
"In my opinion, giving less fodder isn't very smart. If you sell a cow 
you get money for the flesh, not the bones. And your milk yield drops. 
No, it makes no sense to give less feed—your income also drops. Maybe 
you earn something but that is only superficial. You are in fact losing 
by it. And when I think of the farmers in this neighborhood who have 
to buy a lot of hay and silage, you see their cows walking around looking 
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decidedly thin. Of course they obviously give them less. Their reasoning 
is against all logic." 
But the farmers who buy so much raw feed have this to say: 
"Are you mad? I give enough feed to my cattle. The problem that you 
are talking about is actually nonsense because if the farmer who grows 
all his own feed gives more feed than me then he is giving his cows too 
much." 
And after further questioning, 
"You have to look at the economics of it: everything you give beyond 
what is necessary is money wasted. With today's fodder prices you can't 
afford to do silly things. If you have feed over, if you can in a manner 
of speaking give more feed than me, then you shouldn't waste it on the 
cows but sell it, or take more cows." 
What such comments show is that, in practice, two different calculi 
are applied which find different solutions to the same problem. In the 
reasoning of the self-sufficient farmer, high produzione is foremost. The 
norm therefore applied in the cow shed is alimentäre a volonta, "let 
the animals eat what they will." They can work with this norm because 
feed does not represent an immediate expense. Neither roughage nor 
hay nor self-produced concentrates are seen in this case as commodities. 
They are simple use values. For market-dependent farmers this is not 
the case: feed represents a substantial and immediate outlay. It is a 
commodity. You must therefore "not throw money away." If what you 
are striving for is a better cost/benefit ratio, then the E-calculus is 
applicable. The norm is la mangiatoia deve essere pulita, meaning 
literally "the manger should be clean," i.e., empty. The feed you give 
should be sufficient to supply immediate needs; there is no room here 
for a volonta. What remains in the "manger which is not clean" 
represents a waste of money. 
If we ignore the effects of the various degrees of incorporation into 
the market, we may then view self-produced and bought-in feed as 
simple substitutes. Figure 2.8 gives a twofold substitution line: Yn 
represents a high level and Yn-1 a low level of feed. The relation 
between purchased and self-produced feed is projected in segments over 
the substitution lines. With a low degree of incorporation into feed 
markets (segment L) most dairy enterprises on the plain appear to give 
a high level of feed. Some 50% of the enterprises in this segment realize 
a GVP/AA (per adult animal) of more than 1.5 million lire. If one 
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Bought-in 
feed 
inc= L 
Self-produced feed 
Figure 2.8 Feed levels and incorporation 
then goes to the segment which represents a medium degree of incor-
poration into feed markets (M), this percentage drops to 34%. If 
incorporation is high, segment H, then the feed input per cow veers 
more strongly towards the lowest substitution line. Only 16% then 
achieve a GVP/AA higher than 1.5 million lire. 
A higher degree of incorporation into the feed market leads to a 
falling level of feed input per cow. The coefficient of correlation is 0.42 
(p=0.001). This decreasing level of feed input produces an improvement 
in the cost/benefit ratio. The ratio rises from 3.86 to 6.73 as one goes 
from highest to lowest feed levels. At the same time the earnings per 
cow drop. This drop is then compensated for by enlargement of scale. 
The flow diagram in Figure 2.9 corroborates the relationship suggested 
by the E-calculus: a lower level of feed is linked to raising stock density 
per hectare. Therefore the feed saved is distributed to more cows. 
Figure 2.9 illustrates how the underlying calculi work in practice. The 
clockwise flow represents the structure of the I-calculus perfectly—a 
low degree of incorporation through high impegno (seen in kind as a 
high feed level) and high production. The counter-clockwise flow ap-
pears to be the embodiment of the E-calculus. It depends on a high 
degree of incorporation and shows a specific ordering of enterprise 
interrelations—high in terms of scale (seen as cattle density) but with 
a low feed level per cow (producing an improvement in the cost/benefit 
ratio). In short, what in the current view appears only incidental, and 
primarily due to differences in entrepreneurship (Heady and Jensen, 
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Animal production 
per ha of feed crop 
+ 0.40 
Product ion 
per cow 
+ 0.23 + 0.94 
Feed l e v e l 
per cow 
0.40 C a t t l e d e n s i t y 
(cows/ha) 
0.42 + 0.48 
Incorporation into 
feed markets 
Figure 2.9 Relation between cattle density, feed level, production per cow, and degree 
of incorporation into feed markets (ERSA/plain) 
1954:468)—is better understood when seen as the result of different 
calculi. 
The E-Calculus and Its Link 
to a High Degree of Incorporation 
With increasing incorporation, the structure of the process of repro-
duction drastically changes from autonomous historically guaranteed 
reproduction to market-dependent reproduction. If in the former the 
production factors and non-factor inputs are more or less given, in the 
latter they are variable, even in the short run. If in the schema of 
autonomous historically guaranteed reproduction progress is primarily 
reached through raising technical efficiency, in market dependent re-
production it depends first and foremost on keeping a watchful eye on 
the relationship between monetary costs and benefits.8 That is the 
central tenet of the E-calculus, the logic upon which farmers who opt 
for scale enlargement and relative extensification base their arguments. 
The group of eighteen dairy farmers who formed the Parma sample 
were asked which situation they thought more desirable—self-sufficiency 
or market-dependency? The question was asked per production factor 
(and thus per supply market). With respect to the labor market, for 
example, they were asked which situation is more favorable—the farm 
on which three brothers work, or the farm where one entrepreneur and 
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two laborers work. The same was asked, with appropriate examples, 
for the other markets. There are clear differences in the choices of I-
and E-farmers. Only 32% of the former thought that in general incor-
poration was the most desirable, in clear contrast to the 51% of E-
farmers who thought incorporation desirable. The greatest differences, 
however, are to be found in relation to labor, feed and capital markets. 
Application of the method to the ERSA sample indicated that the 
differences encountered were statistically significant. In fact the differ-
ences are even greater than the statistics show. It became obvious 
during questioning that the real significance was not to be found in 
the statistics but in the reasons given for the choices. For example, 
86% of E-farmers and 78% of I-farmers said that they preferred incor-
poration into the market for long-term loans rather than relying purely 
on private saving. The following argument was used by 66% of the E-
farmers: 
"Naturally the farmer who borrows is much better off. He can then use 
his own savings to invest elsewhere where he will get better returns, in 
real estate or good shares." 
"It's always better to take an interest subsidy. If necessary you can steer 
it back into the bank and get a higher interest on it and pocket the 
difference." 
Only 11% of the I-farmers found such reasoning legitimate. Instead, 
they argued quite differently about the value of a certain degree of 
incorporation for long-term loans. 
"Say you have 50 million lire of your own saved, then it would be crazy 
to reject a loan of 30 million if you get it under reasonable conditions. 
It is better to invest 80 million than only 50." 
If you can increase impegno (and thus cura and produzione) then a 
long-term loan is attractive. Personal savings from the previous season 
are seen as a means to improve work and working conditions or to 
create la bell'azienda. Loans supplement personal savings. E-farmers, 
however, tend to see loans as a substitute for savings. One might go 
so far as to say that they perceive the use of personal savings, as it 
were, through the market. The word "shares" in one of the above 
quotes is interesting. Personal savings are projected into the sphere of 
circulation and judged by the exchange value they get there. Exchange 
value dominates over use value. An increasing incorporation changes 
the perception of the goods in question to quite a considerable degree: 
with such an increase, savings become indeed a commodity whose use 
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is governed by the logic of markets. Again it should be stressed that 
this is a differential phenomenon. It emerges with a high degree of 
incorporation and within the E-calculus. Quite a different view is 
present in I-farms: savings do not function as a commodity, nor are 
they seen as such. Savings are, in this case, just another means to 
develop the bell'azienda. This implies that savings do not go the way 
commodities go, i.e., towards the highest profit. 
The Parma farmers were also asked in which situation produzione 
would be the higher—on the farm which was highly market dependent, 
or on the farm that was self-sufficient. Or would there be no difference? 
Table 2.6 summarizes the answers. This table supports the hypothesis 
that a high level of market incorporation is not congruent with a calculus 
which gives high produzione a central place. I-farmers see incorporation 
or market-dependency as an obstacle and think production will espe-
cially fall with incorporation into markets for cattle feed and working 
capital. Their comments speak for themselves: 
"Look, the self-sufficient farmer is far better off. He doesn't suffer the 
ups and downs of the market. He is in a much better position to continue 
farming in a linear and stable way." 
And in relation to working capital: 
"With the majority of farmers I think the system which puts them most 
in the red, is the bank. It's no problem for the bank, they even encourage 
it, but it's a silly situation to get yourself into, financing your running 
costs with commercial loans at 24%. It's the same when you take short 
term credit with the Conzorcio. You can easily become unstuck through 
such credit. In theory you need a product that renders 24% and no 
product does that. And the worst is you can no longer raise your pro-
duction. You have to stay at a very modest level, because the high costs 
of loans are not economically viable and far too risky. It's different with 
the farmers who pay all their running costs themselves from the previous 
year's savings. They can keep their produzione up because they are 
beholden to nothing and no-one." 
Craftsmanship as a Specific Structuration 
of the Farm Labor Process 
The calculi outlined contain clear references to the operational mech-
anisms for achieving certain options or goals. I wish to discuss two of 
these mechanisms: craftsmanship and entrepreneurship. Craftsmanship 
refers to the practical capacity to optimize the productive results per 
labor object, both in the short and long term. Craftsmanship is ex-
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pressed in a particular organization of the relations between object of 
labor, means, and labor force as well as in a series of specific norms 
with which the organization is established, evaluated and further de-
veloped. It is by no means a subjective "residual factor."9 Craftsmanship 
is the outcome of a specific arrangement of farm labor, understood as 
the permanent interaction between intellectual and manual work. It is 
the operational mechanism with which I-farmers develop their farms, 
and it produces a particular style of farming. In the I-calculus we came 
across craftsmanship as cura. Its central place in the calculus serves to 
emphasize how important craftsmanship is in the I-logic. 
Entrepreneurship implies a willingness to permanently tune one's 
enterprise to external market and price relationships. Like craftsman-
ship, it also presupposes a certain arrangement of farm labor, in this 
case one which is functional to dominant market and price relations. 
The need to organize farm labor so that it relates to the market and 
prices depends on the degree to which commodity relations penetrate 
the farm. With a high level of incorporation they will penetrate to the 
heart of the labor process and will then condition it in a direct way. 
The willingness to attune one's enterprise permanently to these com-
modity relations requires a set of norms and a "goal" to which such 
tuning can be directed as well as a yardstick for judging the (ever 
changing) results of this process. These are provided by the two central 
tenets of the E-calculus—cost/benefit ratios and scale. In short, crafts-
manship is the vehicle of the I-calculus and entrepreneurship is the 
vehicle of the E-calculus. 
In the agricultural economics and agrarian sociology literature it is 
usually assumed that craftsmanship and entrepreneurship are aspects 
of one and the same thing. They are seen as extensions of each other. 
At times both may be present (in the good and modern farmer) and 
at others both absent. However, if we consider craftsmanship and 
entrepreneurship as different "operational mechanisms," and further, if 
we consider the relationship between specific options and operational 
mechanisms not as coincidental but as a consciously constructed rational 
link, then it emerges that the two may often stand in a negative 
relationship to each other. In this sense the empirical research provides 
an important test for one of the central assumptions of modern "ag-
ricultural management" theories. While in the current theories crafts-
manship and entrepreneurship are conceptualized as an expression of 
individual capabilities, and therefore as often being in line with each 
other, I will consider, in the rest of this chapter, both craftsmanship 
and entrepreneurship as specific structurations of the labor process in 
farming, each conditioned by specific social relations of production. 
Special attention will be given in this respect to interrelations between 
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the farming unit and markets and market agencies. Commoditization 
and institutionalization play a decisive role in structuring the farm 
labor process, and thus, they condition the qualities developed in this 
process. The differential impact of commoditization and institutional-
ization elucidates why craftsmanship and entrepreneurship are more 
often than not at odds with each other instead of being in line as is 
so often hypothesized in current theory. 
Three interconnecting threads can be discerned in the production 
process in dairy farming: 
1. breeding, 
2. fodder production and cattle feeding, and 
3. mechanization in both the fields and the cow shed. 
Together these tasks form the theater in which farm labor is acted out. 
Each thread can in turn be subdivided into a number of elements, each 
representing an important practical aspect of farm labor. Figure 2.10 
summarizes some of the most important elements. In the Parma re-
search each element was presented to the farmers interviewed in the 
form of a question, such as: How do you do that? Why do you do it 
that way? Have you always done it like that? Why is this better than 
that? 
By thus exploring, we learned that farmers who opt for intensification 
work differently from their counterparts on virtually all fronts. They 
feed, breed and select their animals differently. Mechanization inside 
and outside of the cow shed is such that there is more time available 
for each animal. Fodder production and conservation too are organized 
in quite a different way. Muck spreading is also different as is the 
period of time devoted to mowing and the choice of rotation scheme. 
In short, dozens of small contrasts taken together create a level of 
dissimilarity sufficient to warrant an assertion that I- and E-farmers 
work differently. 
The most productive method for each element was identified by a 
panel of technicians. Their opinion of fodder production and cattle 
feeding was reasonably homogeneous. However, with respect to mech-
anization such an agreement was not possible. (For a detailed descrip-
tion of the panel study, see van der Ploeg and Bolhuis, 1983.) Subse-
quently, the methods explored were coded in terms of the normative 
schema proposed by the panel: in this way each farmer was given a 
craftsmanship score. The simple adding of these scores resulted in a 
figure representing a farmer's craftsmanship in relation to questions of 
selection and feeding (including food production). It was not possible 
FEED AND FODDER 
PRODUCTION 
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harvesting 1 ha. 
of alfalfa 
. techniques for 
transport of 
feed and fodder 
. mechanization 
of tasks in the 
barn and stable 
. labor time per 
day in the stable 
. labor time per 
milking cow 
. labor time per 
adult animal 
. relation between 
applied technology 
and farm size 
. maintenance and 
repair 
SELECTION AND 
BREEDING 
. age of heifers 
when mated the 
first time 
. weight of heifers 
when mated the 
first time 
. feeding of 
heifers 
. use of AI 
. criteria used for 
selection of bull 
. ratio between 
heifers and 
milk cows 
. "closed circle" 
or buying of heifers 
and/or milk cows 
. caring for the 
calves 
. criteria for 
selection of calves 
. criteria for 
selection of 
heifers 
. criteria for 
replacement of 
milk cows 
PRODUCTIVE RESULTS 
. milk yield/milk cow 
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Figure 2.10 Work tasks in a dairy farm and some indices for productive results 
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Table 2.7. Indices of Craftsmanship for I- and E-Farmers (Parma/n-18) 
E-farmers (n-8) I-farmers (n-10) 
Craftsmanship in cattle selection and rearing 
Craftsmanship in cattle feeding 
Craftsmanship selection and feeding 
Milk yield/milk cow 
Rate of substitution 
Fertility 
to measure craftsmanship in terms of mechanization because of the 
lack of agreement among the panel. 
It appeared that there was indeed a high positive link between the 
calculated indices of craftsmanship and milk yield (considered as an 
indication of productive results per object of labor). Furthermore, and 
this is more interesting, it appeared that craftsmanship as here measured 
was not randomly distributed over the sample of eighteen dairy farmers. 
There are among these eighteen some who show a high level of crafts-
manship over the whole spectrum and others who show a low level on 
practically every count. This result highlights a fundamental point. 
Craftsmanship is not simply the art of performing separated tasks in 
a more genial way. Craftsmanship is also the capacity to coordinate 
and integrate in a coherent way all the many tasks to be carried out 
in the field and in the cow shed. Craftsmanship refers to farm labor 
as an integrated whole. It is not a residual attribute. 
If we finally relate indices of craftsmanship to the different I- and 
E-options, then the picture summarized in Table 2.7 emerges. Infor-
mation on craftsmanship as a specific way of structuring farm labor is 
also available for the ERSA sample. I will limit myself to two elements: 
to the time spent on each cow and to breeding and selection. Working 
well takes time. To milk restfully instead of rushing the animals through, 
to use individual or block feeding, instead of standardized or even 
uncontrolled feeding, to permit three instead of two feed rounds, to 
inspect regularly—these are all aspects of cura, of craftsmanship. The 
time factor on a farm is not, of course, just a matter of taking a few 
extra minutes over a job or of working slower. It is a question of 
whether the relationship between applied technology, size of herd and 
available labor is organized in such a way that there is indeed time to 
care properly for each animal. (The type of cow shed and the techniques 
it employs for transporting milk, fodder and manure are important 
here.) 
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Figure 2.11 Labor time per cow (ERSA/mountains/n=59) 
The ERSA questionnaire asked farmers how long they spent on 
milking and on feeding and cleaning out, and how much time was 
spent on young animals, etc. As the size and composition of the herd 
was known, work time per cow could be calculated for each farm. The 
time per cow varies considerably. It appears that by holding constant 
feed level and cow value (a rough indication of the genotype), labor 
time has a positive and significant influence on production per cow. 
Labor time also naturally depends on the type of cow shed (see Figure 
2.11). If we hold this factor constant, then it appears that labor time 
is dependent on the goals which normatize labor and on the degree of 
incorporation. If intensification is opted for, labor is organized so that 
there is more effective labor time per cow available. This approach 
results in "more productive results per object of labor," i.e., in a higher 
production per cow. On the other hand, a higher level of incorporation 
leads to "rushing," a farmer expression to indicate that labor time per 
cow is reduced as much as possible. 
A second highly fascinating part of craftsmanship-in-practice is cattle 
improvement. This is what one of the I-farmers from the Parma sample 
had to say about his selezzione, his efforts to selectively improve his 
stock: 
"In 1972 we decided to specialize entirely in dairying. Before that we 
had a lot of beets and tomatoes. In 1972 our average milk yield was 40 
ql per cow. That has now risen to 58-59 ql. We are of course proud of 
that. All the cura that we put into improving the herd has paid off. It is 
the crowning achievement of our work. We follow the system of the ciclo 
chiuso (closed circle). . . . We hold on to all the heifers (one- to two-
year-olds that have not yet calved). They will all be sired. We have our 
own bull though we sometimes use artificial insemination, especially if 
there are certain characteristics that must be corrected. If it appears that 
a heifer is not going to make the grade then she has to go, even before 
she has young, but that rarely happens. The remaining heifers join the 
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cow shed when they have calved so that we can get acquainted with the 
animal as a milk cow, with her milk yield, and with how that will 
develop. We are also in a position to know then what kind of calves she 
produces. This practice of holding on to heifers as long as possible is the 
basis of our selection. It's a relatively expensive system, you have a lot 
of cattle standing in the stalls which are not yet productive. But the 
advantage is that we can select the very best of the heifers to replace 
the older cows and those whose milk yield is falling." 
Milk cows have to be replaced after a number of years. The pro-
ductive period for a cow varies. Some can be milked for more than 
ten years and produce up to ten calves, while others are more or less 
finished after two years. The yardstick for such differences is the rate 
of replacement, i.e, the ratio between the number of cows that must be 
replaced and the total number of cows. If the replacement ratio is for 
example 0.20, then that means that in a herd of 100 cows, 20 will need 
to be replaced per year. It follows therefore that the average productive 
period for a milk cow is five years. If rate of replacement rises to 0.33, 
then the average productive life during which a cow can calve and be 
milked is three years. The replacement rate is not so much a result of 
the individual characteristics of the cows as it is the result of the cura 
practiced in the cow shed. Breeding and selection play an important 
role in this cura and give rise to quite complex relations. With good 
breeding and selection the productive life of a cow can be prolonged. 
The replacement rate will therefore be lower, and this, in turn, makes 
selection easier. Thus a self-reinforcing system develops. The practice 
of selection consists, among other things, in the organization of a specific 
relation between heifers and cows so that a material basis develops for 
allowing one to hang on to the best heifers and to sell off the others 
after calving and first milking. But as the farmer quoted above said, 
this is a relatively expensive system because it puts pressure on stall 
space; many calves and heifers have to be fed and the income gained 
from their sale has to be postponed. These are precisely the reasons 
why E-farmers reject the practice: 
"I sell as many calves as soon as possible, usually at one go. To have to 
continue feeding and managing them for a further two years is really too 
expensive and takes a lot of work. No I am better off buying a couple 
of heifers that are in calf if I have to replace cows. . . . No, I don't buy 
really good ones, with a certificate, because that is also very expensive." 
"Yes, I should maybe hold on to more heifers but that costs me too 
much. You can have a producing cow standing where you would have to 
put the heifer." 
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The I-farmer sees the system as relatively costly but nevertheless jus-
tifiable because it is the basis for high yields in the future. Such costs 
are not justifiable in the eyes of the E-farmer, to whom "expensive" 
means "too expensive." The explanation for the differences in their 
responses is that they judge the situation from two different perspectives, 
from two different calculi. 
Cattle improvement, however, entails many other factors. Again, the 
farmer previously quoted takes up the point: 
"First calving is very important. I allow my heifers to conceive for the 
first time when they are 36 months old. They are sired when they weigh 
about 400 kilos. It is not possible to be more precise than that, because 
naturally it depends on more than weight. You have to be able to judge 
the animal as a whole and that means knowing it well. Above all you 
need to know the animal's development. . . . I have experimented with 
bringing first calving forward but it was totally unsuccessful. It isn't good 
for the milk yield, you get a greater propensity to sickness, conception is 
more difficult, the calf is uglier." 
E-farmers think otherwise on this point: 
"On my farm I have the heifer mated to conceive when it's about two 
and a half years old. If you postpone that until it's about three, well I 
think you do get a heavier beast and a higher milk yield, but that's 
debatable. I have experimented for myself and there was a noticeable 
difference, but the test was also about costs and it is too expensive to 
wait so long, and meanwhile don't forget, you have to go on feeding, and 
that is feed with no financial offset. So I shall carry on with early 
mating." 
"I have brought forward the calving date from three to two years. I have 
also given up letting them conceive only in winter. Now they calve all 
year round. That is much wiser, as you have calves when the prices are 
high. But that aside, my heifers conceive at between 24 and 27 months 
old. They are milked for 200 days and are then allowed to conceive 
again. In this way I invest much less capital and have quicker returns." 
"Let the heifers mate at a later date? Well maybe that is better but it is 
ruled out because then you have to wait three years before you know 
whether its milk production is high or not. That is too expensive. Suppose 
it turns out to be no good? It's better to mate them as early as possible 
. . . and whether that produces a better calf or not . . . I don't know 
about that . . . but it doesn't interest me either." 
Again one sees the rejection of a particular practice because it is too 
expensive. It is combined with the assumption that the only returns 
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that make sense are the immediate ones. Costs must be covered by 
returns as quickly as possible. Time is judged differently in the I-
calculus, where the improvement of the herd, something that can take 
years, is also seen in terms of returns. 
A third important element, which has a direct bearing on the pre-
vious point, is the manner in which heifers are fed. This element is 
related to the question of earlier calving because the young animal 
develops better and more quickly if it is fed well. An evaluation of this 
theme, i.e., the feeding of heifers, leads to quite different solutions. 
". . . of course concentrates and a substantial portion of the best hay: 
the heifers must learn to eat so that their system develops in such a way 
as to quickly produce at a maximum." 
But reasoning according to the E-calculus, 
"No, that doesn't have to be so good, the heifers get what's left over 
from the cows. I am not going to make ridiculous costs." 
They know each other well of course, these I- and E-farmers. They 
are often neighbors. And E-farmers know precisely what practices are 
possible for herd improvement. But whether such practices are deemed 
faulty or not depends on their convictions. 
"Yes, even among the younger modern farmers there are those who remain 
stuck at lower levels of production. They can't be bothered with improve-
ment. They are people who live more by the day, who put in the minimum 
of work and think they have done well. We, on the other hand, are 
permanently busy with improving and getting ahead." 
"Yes, those others who never want to spend money on buying a good 
bull, who want to make fast and easy money, who want quickly produced 
calves, they damage their herds. But they are not farmers. I would never 
do such a thing." 
And an E-farmer has this to say about the intensive farmer: 
"I know them very well. They are the farmers who go to the cattle 
market with 3 million lire and come home with two cows. They throw 
their money around . . . they are obsessed with their cow shed, in love 
with their cows, and have a hole in their pockets." 
But his neighbor says: 
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"Quality comes first. That's worth paying extra for. I needed two cows. 
I bought good animals for one and a half million lire each. My colleague 
from next door, he needed four. Four bags of bone he bought, that 
together cost less than one of mine. Who is right? Time will tell, but I 
know it already." 
We have now spoken of three aspects of cattle improvement: 
• the relationship between heifers and replaceable cows, 
• judging the calving age for heifers, and 
• the manner in which heifers are fed. 
There are countless other aspects: bull choice, making the right choice 
of artificial insemination, the outer appearance of cows, the use of ciclo 
chiuso, and many others. The problem is, however, that such aspects 
are not always easy to measure, and in themselves they say little. They 
derive their meaning only in relation to the whole, and according to 
the Parma data, improvement as a whole is usually organized in such 
a way that most aspects are either geared to raising future production 
or to keeping down costs and bringing in immediate returns. It makes 
little sense to use a pedigree bull or artificial insemination on poorly 
fed cattle which are themselves the offspring of low-quality animals 
which are mated early. A bull which "jumps without problems" and is 
not expensive is good enough for that. Artificial insemination is also 
of little value in such a case, for it is primarily useful for various 
corrections and improvements. Certainly, if it is more expensive than 
"that cheap bull," then the value of it is quickly denigrated as tapibucchi 
("just filling holes"), and so on. 
However, an insight into the three elements mentioned above is 
sufficient to judge the state of affairs regarding cattle improvement. 
What is cardinal regarding the three elements is that they do not refer 
to a special talent of any one farmer, nor do they assume any special 
biological knowledge of the laws of inheritance: they refer, in a simple 
way, to a specific ordering of relations between means, objects of labor 
and direct producer. The amount of labor per heifer, feed, the length 
of time involved and the composition of the herd are not only all-
decisive for the quality of the herd (and thus for production) but are 
at the same time manipulable by the farmer. In principle a farmer can 
work in any manner, but in practice what he does will depend on what 
makes sense to him, and this will depend on the calculus that he works 
with. In the I-calculus, the logical way to do things is to organize the 
farm labor process in such a way that maximum production is obtained 
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Table 2.8. The Way in Which I- and E-Farmers Organize Cattle Improvement 
I-farmers (n-10) E-farmers (n-8) 
Feeding of heifers 
- as good as possible 
- with leftovers and 
industrial wastages 
Moment of calving 
- accelerated (24 months) 
- anticipated (25-30 months) 
- traditional (later than 30 months) 
Relation between heifers and 
cows that are to be replaced 
Closed circle (for the 
reproduction of stock) 
"A slow but self controlled 
selection is preferable to 
buying in a moment a completely 
new herd" 
63X 
37Ï 
12* 
50* 
38X 
1.96 
88X 
20X 
80X 
40X 
60X 
1.31 
OX 
Use of artificial insemination 
- for all mating 
- sometimes AI, sometimes the bull 
- mostly a bull, seldom AI 
- only bull 
50X 
38X 
12X 
--
--
20X 
40X 
40X 
100X yes OX 
both in the long and short term. Not so in the E-calculus. From this 
comparison we get the relations sketched in Table 2.8. 
A certain number of the variables mentioned above were taken up 
in the ERSA questionnaire, including the manner in which young 
animals were bred, the rate of replacement, the degree to which feed 
levels are stable or vary with the fluctuation in prices and the degree 
to which feeding a volonta or the clean manger is opted for. The rise 
in production expected over a five-year period and the degree to which 
fodder production per hectare was expected to rise were also included. 
We assumed that high expectations for future levels of productivity 
would principally be an outcome of craftsmanship and would therefore 
be an indicator of such. In retrospect, that assumption appears to be 
inaccurate. A high degree of craftsmanship results indeed in a modest 
expectation, but the lack of craftsmanship is linked to far greater 
expectations. The lower the craftsmanship the higher the expectations. 
A factor analysis of the six variables, applied to mountain and plains 
data (ERSA) is summarized in Table 2.9. 
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Table 2.9. Results of Factor Analysis Applied to Craftsmanship Variables 
(oblique) ERSA/Plain and Mountains/n-75 and n-59 
The rearing of 
heifers 
The substitution 
Stability of 
levels 
Norms applied in 
cattle feeding 
Expected rise in 
milk yield/cow 
Expected rise 
yield of fodder 
production 
rate 
feed 
in 
Variance explained 
Eigenvalues 
CRAFTpl 
.21 
+ .32 
-.21 
.72 
.33 
.74 
24X 
1.43 
Plain 
CRAFTp2 
.70 
.28 
-.21 
-.01 
-.81 
-.10 
21X 
1.27 
CRAFTp3 
-.01 
.61 
.79 
.16 
.06 
-.28 
17X 
1.01 
Mountains 
CRAFTml 
.00 
.76 
-.06 
.36 
.81 
-.13 
231 
1.41 
CRAFTm2 
.74 
-.15 
.00 
.41 
.05 
.71 
22X 
1.29 
CRAFTui3 
.15 
.19 
.89 
.34 
-.37 
-.25 
18Z 
1.09 
CRAFTp2 is a variable which refers to the plain and summarizes 
some aspects of craftsmanship, above all the careful rearing of young 
cattle. The variable "expected rise in milk yield/cow" over five years 
has typically a high negative loading on this factor. We have already 
discussed the OPTION factors which apply to the plain (see Table 2.3). 
Craftsmanship can therefore now be correlated with these goal factors. 
I limit myself to an illustration of the influence of goal factors on 
craftsmanship (CRAFTp2). The links are summarized in Figure 2.12. 
It shows that opting for intensification does indeed lead to craftsmanship 
and that opting for scale enlargement and relative extensification 
(OPTIONp2) blocks or impedes craftsmanship. 
What is happening with those farmers who opt for scale enlargement? 
We have already seen that they know how craftsmanship is practiced 
on the typical I-farm. However, this form of organizing farm labor is 
expressly rejected by them. Their main arguments are that: 
• it is too expensive, 
• it takes too much labor, and 
• it takes too long. 
This last point is interesting: it refers again to an unmistakable 
shortening of time horizons, at least in the sphere of production. It is 
as if the velocity of circulation of capital must be raised as much as 
possible. Such an approach contrasts with an agricultural practice that 
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OPTIONpl: 
Option for 
intensification 
+0.26 (0.007) 
OPTIONp2: 
Option for scale 
enlargement and 
relative extensification 
CRAFTp2: 
careful rearing 
of young cattle 
-0.37 (0.002) 
Figure 2.12 Correlation coefficients between options and craftsmanship in the field of 
animal breeding (ERSA/plain/n = 75) 
depends upon historically guaranteed autonomous reproduction, which 
not only produces a marketable surplus, but reproduces in each cycle 
some of the production factors used. When farmers speak of the 
importance of la bell'azienda, they are not just indulging in romanti-
cism. They are expressing la bell'azienda's relationship to autonomous 
historically guaranteed reproduction. "To build a fine farm" is, in an 
analytical sense, the same as reproducing and producing inputs for 
future cycles. The relevant time horizon of the I-calculus, in other 
words, encompasses la bell'azienda of the future.10 Increasing incorpor-
ation into feed, labor, and short-term loan markets implies that the 
costs incurred within a single cycle must be valorized. Thus future 
benefits are less relevant than immediate ones. Medium- and, to a 
lesser degree, long-term loans also lie within a very precise time span: 
the repayments and the yearly interest due require the realizing of 
immediate (monetary) returns, at least more than is the case for personal 
savings. The same applies to incorporation in land markets (via rent 
mechanisms): 
"The problem with rented land is that there is no certainty over the 
longer term. And that is a strong impediment. If, for example, you 
contemplate improving the herd, then you have to be able to think and 
plan long term, and that clashes with the rent contracts." 
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External prescriptions 
on investment 
decisions (TATE2) 
External prescription 
on craftsmanship (TATE3) 
Figure 2.13 
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-0.33 
Labor input 
per hectare 
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Craftsmanship and the Creation 
of a Frontier Function 
If a simple linear production function is calculated for the dairy 
farming sector (on the ERSA sample n=134) we find: prod/ha = —497 
+ 0.42 labor/ha + 1.58 capital/ha + 2.38 inputs/ha (r2 = 0.77). This 
result agrees with similar calculations made by others (Brugnoli et al., 
1976; Messori, 1981). A loglinear function leads to better results, with 
the explained variance rising to 90%: prod/ha = 1.01 + 0.26 labor/ha 
+ 0.07 capital/ha + 0.79 inputs/ha (r2 = 0.90). 
Incorporation has a twofold influence on the position of enterprises 
in the space defined by these functions. Incorporation has a substantial, 
negative and statistically significant effect on both the input of each 
separate production factor and the whole of the (summed) production 
factors." As incorporation into markets and/or external prescriptions 
rise, the input of production factors and non-factor inputs per unit of 
land drops. 
For the amount of labor input per hectare, for example, we find that 
a falling input of labor can make organizing labor as craftsmanship 
difficult (especially if labor input is reduced before technology can 
replace it) see Figure 2.13. This leaves little time "to farm well," in 
the words of local farmers. Take manure: Until recently this was left 
to heat for at least eight months and then spread the following spring. 
On farms where labor has been drastically cut back, however, this 
process is increasingly impossible to carry out. In the spring there is 
so much work to do that the carting and spreading of manure is mostly 
left undone. Its timing is therefore advanced to the winter months, 
which means that the heating process is foreshortened and the manure 
becomes increasingly a spreader of weeds. This compels the use of 
herbicides on the luzerne, which in turn shortens the vegetative cycle. 
In brief, labor reduction leads to a series of new problems and to 
negative effects on the quantity and particularly on the quality of fodder 
production. 
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Figure 2.14 Production functions of I- and E-farmers (Parma data, 1979/n=18) 
Craftsmanship, which is the structuring of labor leading to high 
production results per labor object, is thus made difficult and sometimes 
impossible. Thus we come from the input of production factors directly 
to their use. The degree to which production factors (once committed) 
are geared to obtaining high production results is measured with the 
help of the concept "technical efficiency." "A firm is considered more 
technically efficient than another if, given the same quantity of mea-
surable inputs, it consistently produces a larger output" (Yotopoulos 
1974:270). Timmer suggests that a firm is technically efficient "if the 
firm actually produces on the technical production function that yields 
the greatest output for any given set of inputs" (1970:99). In a graphic 
sense, one can imagine an increase in technical efficiency as the upward 
movement of the production function. Timmer expresses this as a 
"frontier function," that is, the production function of the most tech-
nically efficient firm. As craftsmanship is the means by which farmers 
achieve independent progress, then craftsmanship results in the creation 
of a frontier function. This is represented in a tentative way in Figure 
2.14, constructed from the Parma data. Farmers who opt for intensi-
fication and who structure their labor as craftsmanship create a pro-
duction function (given here as a linear link between totalled production 
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Craftsmanship 
Figure 2.15 
Incorporation in 
capital markets 
Area in hectares 
Figure 2.16 
0.26 
(p=0.002; 
Intensity of 
animal production 
-0.27 
0.23 
Technical efficiency F=3.31 p=0.04 
factors and production) which is higher than that of the E-farmers. The 
picture presented in Figure 2.14 highlights the meaning of craftsman-
ship. 
In the larger ERSA sample (n=134) the influence of craftsmanship 
can be statistically tested. If we sum the earlier discovered craftsman-
ship factors (see Table 2.9), we find the relationship shown in Figure 
2.15. If we formulate a production function to elucidate the gross value 
of production value per adult animal unit and give the labor per cow, 
feed-level and value of the cow as explanatory variables (see Figure 
2.11), then it appears that the production function does indeed move 
upwards when craftmanship is added. 
It can also be demonstrated statistically that with increasing com-
moditization and institutionalization, the E-calculus becomes dominant 
and that structuring labor as craftsmanship becomes increasingly dif-
ficult, if not impossible. If we combine the earlier production function 
(relating to the explanation of production/ha) with an index of incor-
poration,12 then we find that, for the mountain, the plain and the total 
sample, the degree of incorporation has a negative effect on technical 
efficiency. The regression coefficient (not standardized) for the influence 
of incorporation for the mountains is —41.06 (F=2.53); for the plain 
-106.05 (F=2.13); and for the total sample -75.90 (F=2.10). Increas-
ing incorporation makes the use of the I-calculus as a structuring 
principle of labor untenable; a downward movement of the production 
function (i.e., falling technical efficiency) is the consequence (see van 
der Ploeg and Bolhuis, 1983, for more details). 
An additional and somewhat rough approximation is to operationalize 
technical efficiency as the relation between production and the input 
of production factors and to relate this term directly to incorporation. 
It then appears that incorporation into the capital markets has a 
significant and negative effect on technical efficiency (see Figure 2.16). 
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Interestingly, the effect of size (expressed in hectares) is positive. I will 
return to this particular point in a later section. 
In synthesis, craftsmanship is a complex set of interdependent re-
lations between producer, labor objects, and means. It is, in other words 
a specific way of organizing farm labor. Both labor and the relations 
between production unit and structural environment are molded by a 
strong orientation towards objects of labor and the optimal use of their 
productive potential as a means of further development. 
Entrepreneurship as a Specific Structuration 
of the Farm Labor Process 
Entrepreneurship tends to be the opposite of craftsmanship. Again 
it is not merely a matter of individual attributes. Insofar as entrepre-
neurship is a personal characteristic, it will nevertheless be the outcome 
of a specific complex of relations which not only lead to entrepreneur-
ship but at the same time form the learning ground for it. If an 
orientation towards labor objects is crucial for the development of 
craftsmanship, then for entrepreneurship an orientation towards the 
market and market institutions is essential. Labor and production are 
organized around the relations, tendencies, expectations, prescriptions 
and recommendations operating in them. What is as often as possible 
outside of or even excluded from the framework of craftsmanship, is 
normative for entrepreneurship. However, a theoretical ordering of 
craftsmanship and entrepreneurship as an orientation to "production" 
and "markets," respectively, would be wrong. Craftsmanship would then 
be thought to relate merely to the "technical" talents of the farmer and 
entrepreneurship to the "economic" ones, and the coordination of both 
would then provide for a balanced complementarity. That, unfortu-
nately, is indeed the assumption on which most theories of agrarian 
sociology and economics are based. 
Of course, in craftsmanship, technical interrelations between pro-
ducer, objects of labor, and means, are a continuing source of concern. 
One might even go further and say that the organization and planning 
of labor and production are to an important degree based on what 
appear to be purely technical arguments (raising milk yields, improving 
the quality of feed, bringing cattle rearing to a higher level, etc.); that 
produzione is not only a guiding principle but is also, in many fields, 
applied practice. However, one should not ignore the fact that the 
interrelations between producer, objects of labor, and means are not 
purely technical; they are also economic and social by nature. Even 
strictly technical arguments, as important as they are for structuring 
farm labor, are also important for defining and structuring economic 
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and social relations. Cura and produzione reflect definite economic 
interests as the need for income, guadagno, and for an enterprise 
reproduced over time. Craftsmanship, therefore, contains the structuring 
of economic and social relations as well as technical relations and gives 
to economic and social relations a specific character. The same applies 
for entrepreneurship. Maybe entrepreneurship at first sight appears to 
concentrate simply on economics. However, the technical naturally be-
comes defined through the economic. If, for example, a herd of 50 cows 
per man is built up for economic reasons, then that has sweeping 
consequences on labor time, on the cura that can be given. If, for the 
same reasons, a farmer chooses to buy a combine harvester, then that 
will imply, often of necessity, a modification of plans in the technical 
sphere—making, for instance, the farmer more likely to pursue a mono-
culture of the crop for which the combine is appropriate. Only then 
can such a purchase be considered rational. One could go on at length 
with such examples. The main point is clear, however: with the defi-
nition of economic relations, technical relations in the labor process 
are also circumscribed, and vice versa. The economic and technical 
cannot be separated. 
Before going on to discuss the way entrepreneurship is conceptualized 
in this present study, I would like to go into three aspects of current 
theories on entrepreneurship. A critical discussion of these provides a 
foundation for understanding the way the term is operationalized here. 
1. In the first place, as Walters (1963:5) puts it, "there is no generally 
accepted cardinal measure of entrepreneurship," let alone, I would add, 
any valid theory on agrarian entrepreneurship (see also Hinken, 1974:27). 
No one can or will say what precisely entrepreneurship in agriculture 
is. As Benvenuti, Bussi and Satta (1983) maintain, it is a "phantom." 
But of course ghosts do have very important social functions. One 
could even argue that the very obscurity of the concept is one of the 
main prerequisites of entrepreneurship as social definition. Further on 
I will return to this point. Zachariasse, one of the foremost European 
scholars on entrepreneurship, gives an apparently clear definition when 
he writes that "the farmer must, if he follows purely economic prin-
ciples, try to reach as high a net surplus as possible within the given 
circumstances of his business . . . with due regard to specific prescrip-
tions for maintaining long-term profitability" (1972a). The problem, 
however, is that the crucial concept in this argumentation, i.e., net 
surplus, only recently emerged as a category in farming accountancy. 
Apart from that, the concept of net surplus represents, as we have 
demonstrated elsewhere (Frouws and van der Ploeg, 1973:105), more a 
specific interest than an objective, "universal" yardstick. Labor input 
and its remuneration, typically enough, fall outside the scope of this 
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particular concept. Thus Zachariasse's definition is very dependent on 
a specific location in time and space, to say the least. For Zachariasse, 
however, it is clear that the more the farmer strives for the highest 
possible net surplus, the more he demonstrates himself to be an entre-
preneur. The question that next comes to mind is, how does an entre-
preneur operate? What does he do that the non-entrepreneurial farmer 
neglects to do? Laboring goes with laborer, does then a business com-
ponent called "entrepreneuring" go with entrepreneur? From whence 
does that "entrepreneuring" come? How is this striving for profit 
maximization achieved? Such questions remain unanswered. 
The structure and mechanism of entrepreneurship—of entrepreneur-
ing as an activity—is neither described nor researched. Zachariasse 
limits himself in his study to a scrupulously careful description of the 
cultivation techniques used by farmers for potatoes, sugar beets and 
wheat. Data about sowing, number of kilos of nitrogen per hectare, soil 
humidity and fifty-one other variables are detailed. It then appears that 
special cultivation methods go with higher yields per hectare, which 
correlate, in turn, with a higher net surplus. What is missing, however, 
is the construction of a link between data on sowing for example and 
"the striving for profit maximization." Does a farmer actually structure 
his decisions in such terms? Perhaps, and perhaps not, but Zachariasse 
does not make it clear.13 For him, the personal experience, knowledge 
and insights of farmers do not count for much.14 "Nevertheless the 
good cultivators among the farmers apparently know . . . how to come 
to decisions that will bring them a higher physical level of crop per 
hectare" (1974a:3). Thinking through this particular argument of Za-
chariasse, let us now suppose that farmers who get high yields, thanks 
to a certain method of cultivation, are good craftsmen instead of "good" 
entrepreneurs. Doesn't the whole story about entrepreneurship again 
hang in the air? 
On reflection, there is little mystery attached to entrepreneuring as 
an activity. What does the farmer as entrepreneur actually do? He will 
manage his business in such a way (and this is a permanent process) 
that business organization and operation is congruent with market 
relations and tendencies. Zachariasse says the same in so many words: 
"the price of production factors, means and products will always be 
one of the most important guiding principles of his economic dealing" 
(1972a and 1974b). Without a continuing projection of market relations 
on the farm enterprise, such concepts as net surplus and profit are 
unthinkable, let alone quantifiable. Adjusting farm organization and 
operation to these relationships is a prerequisite for and a mechanism 
for achieving profit maximization. There-in lies the meaning of entre-
preneurship. 
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That this meaning of "entrepreneuring" is never or seldom made 
explicit is not because of the supposed complication of the concept or 
the "insusceptibility" of the activity itself. The problem is just that the 
continual reorganizing of farm relations to the swing of prevailing 
market relations is linked to the goal of profit maximization in an ex 
ante way. Only in retrospect is it possible to determine the extent to 
which a farmer has been successful as an entrepreneur. The structural 
turbulence in the economic environment of farmers, to which not only 
markets but also agri-business contribute (Benvenuti, Bolhuis, van der 
Ploeg, 1982), is such that the congruence between ex ante projections 
and ex post facto results is not only a very uncertain matter but is 
sometimes completely missing. In other words, the logical legitimation 
for acting as an entrepreneur, as homo economicus, is increasingly 
swept away. Science solves this problem by means of a classic turnabout: 
legitimation (i.e., profit maximization) is made absolute, and the practice 
of entrepreneuring, as a guiding activity, is masked and hidden from 
view. The farmer as entrepreneur is thereby, to a large extent, an 
ideology. Although farmers do not appear in the strict sense to be 
entrepreneurs (so it appears from the follow-up study of Zachariasse 
[1979]), "the striving" to make farmers "better entrepreneurs . . . is 
undiminished." Given the structural turbulence which disconnects ex 
ante calculations and ex post facto results, entrepreneurship must indeed 
be represented as intrinsically good. A legitimation in terms of ration-
alizing entrepreneuring as an activity would undermine itself, given the 
economic environment in which it is enacted. 
2. The second point I want to make is logically connected to the 
first. To the extent that current theories on agrarian entrepreneurship 
regard entrepreneuring as a social activity, individual attributes are 
given exclusive attention. An overview by Muggen (1969) discusses 
some seventy-three studies of "human factors and farm management." 
Muggen classifies the various facets of entrepreneurship derived from 
these studies using Nielson's model (1965), which is reproduced in 
Figure 2.17. 
Under the heading "capabilities," Muggen reviews twenty-five vari-
ables, from "spatial insight" through "memory" to "verbal capacity." 
Age and training, which fall under "biography," emerge as the most 
studied variables. But here again, "no clear picture emerges from the 
results." In some studies, these and other variables are linked positively 
with "farm management performance," and in others they are linked 
negatively. Achievement motivation (sometimes measured in patently 
absurd ways) and the degree to which a man is "scientifically oriented" 
are the key concepts in the category "drives and motivations." 
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Drives and 
Mot iva t ions 
Biography 
Process Managerial 
Behavior 
Outcome 
Managerial Success 
Capabilities 
Figure 2.17 Nielson's model of entrepreneurship 
The more interesting category for us might be "process managerial 
behavior." Muggen says that such studies are not yet very numerous. 
However, a closer inspection of the eleven studies noted makes it clear 
that attention is devoted again to the individual characteristics of the 
entrepreneur and not to the mechanisms of entrepreneuring. Muggen 
summarizes these characteristics as: "use of information sources, and 
use of the scientific method of decision making," and "decision-making 
ability." One is left to wonder what the underlying substance of such 
characteristics might be. Considered in this light, one might question 
what the difference would be between a secondary school pupil and a 
farmer, let alone what meaningful distinctions such criteria could make 
between the farmers themselves. 
"Plans for the future" is another such category. Cole and Wolf (1974) 
describe in detail how one of their respondents and his son drove every 
year to a distant village to lay in huge stocks of good wine. His son 
drove on the way back so that father was already free to taste the wine. 
The father is content. He has enough wine laid in to supply his needs 
for the coming year. Are these "plans for the future"? 
In synthesis, the current literature on agrarian entrepreneurship not 
only fails to tackle entrepreneuring as a conscious activity (as I made 
clear under point 1) but also obscures it behind a smoke screen of 
personal characteristics and attributes. These characteristics and attri-
butes are, in their turn, often so ambiguous or unclear that it is really 
no surprise that, as Muggen concludes, "the magnitude of the corre-
lations obtained (between attributes and characteristics, on the one 
hand, and outcomes, on the other) shows that our understanding of 
these factors is strictly limited."15 
3. The third problem I wish to highlight is that currently, agrarian 
entrepreneurship is defined as being located in a kind of tierra incognita. 
Even Robinson Crusoe, who certainly had "plans for the future," could 
thus be considered an entrepreneur. 
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Considered sociologically, the concept of entrepreneurship refers to 
a role (see also Hinken, 1974:26). However, a role can never be defined 
in an isolated sense. One can only speak of a father if there is a son 
or daughter. A role emerges only in relation to others; it is the reciprocal 
role expectations and definitions as such which make up the role. If 
"farmer as entrepreneur" is a role or role definition, then this evokes, 
among others, the following quite simple questions: Who defines this 
role? On the basis of what interests? And who readjusts the "entrepre-
neur's role" (Benvenuti, 1975a and b)? 
In short, the conscious activity of entrepreneuring (as defined under 
point 1 above) presupposes a social context (rather than a cluster of 
specific individual attributes, as discussed under point 2). In this context 
a network will be observable through which the farmer and other actors 
will negotiate and renegotiate the role enactment of the entrepreneur. 
Such a network will be discussed later in terms of the technological 
administrative task environment (TATE) of farming (Benvenuti, 1985b). 
A number of items can be derived from the foregoing discussion. 
Together they form the profile of agrarian entrepreneurship as a specific 
social activity. They are the following: 
1. The "farmer as entrepreneur" gives more importance to markets, 
to their development and interrelationships, than does his op-
posite, the craftsman, who is of the opinion that progress comes 
primarily from work. In the Parma data, indeed 86% of E-
farmers (as against only 33% of I-farmers) were of the opinion 
that "the farmer who is always to be found in the marketplace 
is a better farmer than the one who never leaves the farm." This 
item was also presented to the ERSA respondents, where 90% 
were of the opinion that in general the farmer who is always at 
the market is the better farmer. This higher score could be 
influenced by the special situation of the mountains, where the 
marketplace is regarded as a meeting place. Men go once a week 
to the piazza to talk and swap experiences, but of the piazza as 
a marketplace, as a place to trade, there remains only the mem-
ory. They were also asked which farmer they most resembled. 
Only 77% (out of the 90%) replied that they were like the farmer 
who was always to be found at the market.16 This difference 
between norm and behavior appears to be a good indication of 
the prescriptive power of "entrepreneurial ideology," "for a good 
entrepreneur goes to markets." 
2. In an extension of the previous item, respondents were asked 
which of two factors was especially determining for income— 
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"prices, or the manner in which you work." It was prices for 
71% of the E-farmers and 33% of the I-farmers. 
3. The "farmer as entrepreneur" will be more inclined to adapt 
enterprise operations to market and price relations and their 
changes. Newby et al. (1978b) observed that there exist great 
empirical differences in market sensitivity, differences which, or 
so it appeared from their research, could not be linked to farm 
size. Also, in Italy, it appears (see for example, the five-year 
empirical study of Angeli and Omodei, 1981) that some farmers 
react with undue alertness to price changes while others do not. 
In the ERSA data the following item was presented to the 
respondents: "There are many farmers who are very sensitive 
to market prices, as for example, when milk prices fall, they 
lower their milk production, and rely more on the meat. Others, 
on the other hand, always continue in the same way as before. 
Who are you most like?" In the ERSA sample 42% of the farmers 
likened themselves to the adaptive farmer. 
4. A precondition for all this is that the "farmer as entrepreneur" 
will, more than his hypothetical counterpart, perceive productive 
organization mostly in economic terms. The ratio of certain 
activities and relations lie not in their relation to produzione, 
but in their eventual correspondence with market relations. We 
asked, "Is it true that it is cheaper to feed a cow who produces 
40 ql than to feed one that produces 50 ql?" The intention was 
to see how far farmers projected price relations into cattle feeding 
and considered feed as a cost item. In the ERSA data, 52% 
replied that it was cheaper to feed the cow that produced 40 ql. 
5. The foregoing implies that the entrepreneur will be less likely 
to see the solutions to problems in terms of political intervention 
in the market ("price strife") but more likely to see them in 
terms of adjusting the individual enterprise to market relations 
(by a reorganization of the cost/benefit ratio). In the ERSA data, 
85% opted for price strife, 15% for cost reduction. In the Parma 
data, 57% of the E-farmers opted for reducing cost against 22% 
of the I-farmers. 
6. Originally we thought that the farmer as entrepreneur would be 
inclined to calculate each investment, each change, in terms of 
eventual profit improvement. We asked the following: "If you 
see a new machine which seems useful, what do you do then? 
Do you say, that machine will be useful to me and go and buy 
it, or do you calculate whether what the machine will save will 
come to more than the cost and depreciation?" Correlational 
analysis of various entrepreneurship items on the ERSA data 
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showed a high negative correlation between this item and all 
other items. The structure of "entrepreneurship factors," dis-
cussed later, also shows this. In retrospect, i.e., after re-reading 
the Parma interviews, that did not seem so surprising. What 
does an entrepreneur by nature say? 
"Look, if anything new comes onto the market, then you can be 
sure that the engineers and technicians have spent long enough 
brooding on it. After all they have to sell their products and that 
product will only go down well if the farmers wear it. They are 
smart enough about that, so with new products it is only a question 
of seeing it, and if you can get the credit for it well then, bang: you 
buy it." 
This is a remarkable example of institutionalization: independent 
calculations and, in a certain sense, planning are given up and 
get delegated to external institutions. Thus technology becomes, 
as it were, normative. The "technique emerges as a language," 
according to Benvenuti (1982b: 122). Insofar as a farmer still 
regards it as proper to calculate, the object of calculation shifts. 
It is no longer over technology, which has become the norm, but 
over the consequences of its applications. 
"For me a mechanized tomato harvester (he named the newest type) 
is without doubt the best. You have the lowest cost per hectare and 
you can harvest 70 hectares with it. But the problem for me is how 
I can arrive at extra land, to write the machine's costs off to make 
it pay for itself." 
Those who do carefully weigh up the benefits of purchasing 
machines do so from another point of view, namely, the desire 
to maintain "a well-balanced business." 
"That means for example that you don't have a heavier tractor than 
is necessary for your farm; it means also that feed production and 
stock should be more or less equal to each other; that your rotation 
system is suitable for your hectaragen." 
Only those who wished to keep a low level of incorporation gave 
serious thought to preventing technology (and the cost/benefit 
relations it entails) from becoming the factor which defined the 
scale and framework of their enterprise. In the ERSA data, 52% 
said you should "calculate carefully" while 48% said that it was 
not necessary to do so when buying new machinery. 
7. Knowing that the market environment carries with it a certain 
degree of turbulence and that an enterprise geared to such an 
economic environment will, to a large extent, be exposed to this 
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turbulence means that the "farmer as entrepreneur" will be 
relatively more inclined to consider taking risks as acceptable. 
In the Parma data 71% of the E-farmers were of the opinion 
that risk taking was acceptable, as against 33% of the I-farmers. 
8. The "farmer as entrepreneur" will assign more importance to 
investment relating to (future) income than to a continuing im-
provement of craftsmanship. This setting of priorities applies 
particularly if such investments bring about scale enlargement 
and/or cost reductions. Indeed, 86% of the E-farmers as against 
45% of I-farmers from the Parma sample agreed that substantial 
investment is crucial. 
9. Because heavy investment puts pressure on expendable income 
in the short term, the entrepreneur is more inclined to squeeze 
family income for the sake of investment. We asked respondents 
in the Parma sample, "if you have a net income of 10 million, 
what part do you spend on the family, what on the business?" 
The average family spending of the E-farmers was 3.6 million 
while that of the I-farmers 4.1 million. 
10. A consequence of the previous point is that the entrepreneur 
will hold future income (over, say, a five-year period) to be a 
more important reference point than present income. The short-
ening of the time period in the direct organization of production 
(illustrated previously) urges a lengthening of perspective when 
it comes to income improvement. Income will depend less on 
business operation and more on business organization (in the 
eyes of the entrepreneur, at least), and the latter is only manip-
ulable on a long-term basis. In the ERSA sample 52% thought 
"present income is more important than income over five years," 
2% found both categories equally important, and the remaining 
46% considered future income more important. 
The majority of the above items were used in the Parma sample. 
The most discriminatory and theoretically interesting items (1, 3, 4, 5, 
6 and 10) were taken up in the ERSA questionnaire. A factor analysis 
was applied to the material for both the plain and the mountains in 
order to be able to analyze some composite indices of entrepreneurship. 
Table 2.10 summarizes the results of this analysis. 
These factors will be used in the multiple regression analysis of the 
following section. The first factor (ENTREPpl) relates to future income, 
which, on the plain, is considered to be a more important parameter 
than present income. The degree to which a farmer calculates, on the 
contrary, has a high, negative loading on this same factor. A similar, 
though weaker, structure is encountered in the mountain sample. 
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Table 2.10. Results of Factor Analysis Applied to Items of Entrepreneurship 
ERSA/plain/n-75 and mountains, n-59 (oblique rotation) 
.06 
-.87 
-.08 
.28 
-.27 
.04 
.90 
.49 
.71 
-.18 
.07 
-.09 
-.13 
-.70 
-.08 
.02 
.65 
-.19 
.09 
.75 
-.31 
.35 
.86 
.20 
1.66 
28X 
1.14 
19X 
1.11 
19X 
1.42 
24X 
1.21 
20X 
.97 
16X 
Plain Mountains 
ENTREP ENTREP 
pi p2 p3 ml m2 m3 
Feeding at a 40 ql level is 
more economic than at a 50 ql 
level 
An entrepreneur ought to cal-
culate 
It is necessary to frequent 
the markets 
To adapt the farm continuously 
to the market is necessary 
A farmer ought to strive for 
cost reduction instead of 
engaging himself in price 
strive -.01 .22 .84 .81 -.17 .14 
Future income is a more 
important goal than present 
income .75 .12 -.20 .29 .44 .31 
Eigenvalues 
Variance explained 
ENTREPp2 speaks for itself: market visiting in combination with the 
adapting of business operation to changing prices. Finally, ENTREPp3 
represents entrepreneurship in "the immediate sense": operating is 
substantially in terms of perceived costs, and cost reduction is to a 
high degree normative over price-strife. One might suggest that 
ENTREPpl is above all related to farm organization (where technology 
appears to be the guideline) and that ENTREPp3 is primarily expressed 
at the level of the daily labor process. 
In the mountains something rather different arises, although the 
combinations are not different. ENTREPml combines cost reduction 
with the absence of any felt need for calculation. On first sight this 
may seem to be a rare combination, but it is not if one starts from 
the hypothesis which cropped up earlier around the normative working 
of the technology offered. ENTREPm2 applies to the conceptualization 
of feed as a cost, the impact of price changes, and future income as 
all being more important than present income. One sees that what were 
two different dimensions on the plain ("entrepreneurship over the long 
term," ENTREPpl, and "entrepreneurship in the immediate sense," 
ENTREPp3) begin here to converge to a certain degree. Finally, the 
structure of ENTREPm3 is typical for the mostly social function of 
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Table 2.11. Correlation Coefficients Between Option Factors and Factors 
for Entrepreneurship 
ENTREPpl ENTREPp2 ENTREPp3 ENTREPml ENTREPm2 ENTREPm3 
OPTIONpl -0.23 ns -0.34 OPTIONml +0.32 ns ns 
0PTI0Np2 ns ns ns 0PTI0Nm2 -0.27 ns ns 
0PTI0Np3 ns +0.31 ns 0PTI0Nm3 ns ns ns 
note: ns - not significant, with p - 0.05 
the market or piazza, as a meeting place. Only the first variable 
distinguishes itself by a high positive loading. The other loadings are 
weak and contradictory. 
Earlier we saw that craftsmanship was the operational mechanism 
for effecting the option for intensification. In the same way entrepre-
neurship is the means by which an E-option is realized. That link is 
not accidental; it is already entailed in the E-calculus. 
Table 2.11 gives the Pearson correlation coefficients for the direct 
links between OPTION factors (derived from Table 2.3 and 2.4), and 
entrepreneurship factors (derived from Table 2.10). The result shows 
that in the mountains the "explicit opting for extensification and the 
priority given to labor and cost reductions" (OPTIONml) relate posi-
tively and significantly with the first entrepreneurship factor ENTREPml. 
On the plain, opting for intensification (OPTIONpl) correlates nega-
tively and significantly with the first entrepreneurship factor 
(ENTREPpl). 
The construction of more meaning-loaded patterns makes the rela-
tions clearer. If we imagine, for example, that ENTREPRENEURSHIPp 
= ENTREPpl + ENTREPp2 + ENTREPp3, then this new combi-
nation expresses how high all the dimensions of entrepreneurship score. 
For the link between OPTIONpl (opting for intensification) and this 
new variable, which comprises all the aspects of entrepreneurship, we 
find r=-0 .43 (p=0.0001)! A specific combination of OPTION factors 
(E-OPTIONp = - OPTIONpl + OPTIONp2 + OPTIONp3) express-
ing the extent to which scale enlargement and relative extensification 
is thought to be normative and effectively translated into farm planning 
is likewise related in a significant and positive way with all separate 
entrepreneurship factors. Finally, correlation of this E-OPTIONp with 
ENTREPRENEURSHIPp underlines once more the importance of pat-
tern forming on both levels: r=0.30 (p=0.008). In short, entrepre-
neurship can indeed be considered as the concrete mechanism for the 
realization of the E-option. 
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Table 2.12. The Analysis of Farm Performance in a Typical E-Farm 
Industrial concentrates 35.2 kg 9.100 lire/ql milk ...25X 
Bought-in Feed 15 kg 3.880 lire/ql milk . . .11X 
Medicines, veterinarian 675 lire/ql milk ... 2X 
Milking time 70 minutes 
Various tasks in the stable 90 minutes 
On TATE: The Technological-Administrative 
Task Environment 
Although entrepreneurship contains a number of clear criteria on 
which to base activities in the cow shed and field, projecting market 
and price relations on these activities does not necessarily result in a 
specific design for organizing the labor process in practice. Market and 
price relations are abstract entities with respect to the labor process. 
They can be used—in the framework of entrepreneurship—to calculate 
the profitability of early as against late calving. The idea itself of early 
or late calving (or of using silage methods instead of hay drying 
techniques, etc.) cannot be derived from market and price relations. 
But once such alternatives are developed and recognized, then entre-
preneurship can indeed function as an adequate mechanism for choosing 
them. The designing of new alternatives in the development of farming 
seldom springs from entrepreneurship as such. 
This is particularly the case in highly developed agricultural systems, 
and above all in farms which have substantially enlarged their scale. 
Again—within the normative framework of entrepreneurship—a farmer 
can readily deduce from general price and market relationships that in 
order to increase the number of cows and the income per unit of labor, 
the labor input per cow must be minimized. Labor time per cow is 
then also one of the criteria for measuring enterprise progress for those 
farmers who define themselves as entrepreneurs. Table 2.12 records a 
small fragment of a self-styled bookkeeping system used by a typical 
E-farmer of the Parma sample. It gives us a glimpse of what the 
craftsmen among the farmers mean when they say "just look there, he 
doesn't take the trouble to care properly for his cows." It is only the 
time spent that counts. 
Notwithstanding the fact that many small adaptations in the daily 
operations of the farm are derived from this way of thinking,17 it is 
also clear that a major breakthrough in the organization of time is 
dependent on technological renewal. Milking machines and modern cow 
stalls with machines for automatically supplying concentrates and carry-
ing away the milk are innovations which at a stroke reduced labor time 
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from around 50 minutes per cow per day to less than 5 minutes. One 
can go further and say that such innovations make possible other 
adaptations, which taken together, can radically alter the way a farm 
operates. Letting a bull loose, for example, is unthinkable in a traditional 
cow shed but quite possible in a modern cow stall, where a "bull on 
the loose" can again save some time. Farmers who organize their labor 
within the normative framework of entrepreneurship will tend to be 
more receptive to the dominant technology offered.18 Technological 
development provides them with those elements crucial for farm de-
velopment that they cannot sufficiently develop themselves; namely, a 
continually changing gamut of techniques to be subsequently judged in 
terms of profitability. 
There is a clear line running from entrepreneurship to a certain 
dependence on new technology, especially since the propaganda that 
goes with new technology is often in terms of improved cost/benefit 
ratios. This leads to a situation where independent calculation becomes 
superfluous: "The technicians and engineers have been brooding over 
it for long enough, it must be good." 
In most agricultural systems a specific technological and administra-
tive task environment (TATE) can be discerned. This concept was 
developed by Benvenuti (1975a, 1982a, 1985b) to describe the network 
of market-agencies and associated institutions to which farmers are tied 
both economically and technically (agricultural industries, banks, trade 
consortia, extension services, etc.). It is from within such a network 
that the concrete organization of the farm labor process—sometimes 
directly, sometimes indirectly—is prescribed and eventually sanctioned. 
It is from TATE that the farmer obtains those elements which are 
necessary but which he cannot independently or fully develop himself. 
TATE therefore forms the embryo of a specific division of labor between 
head and hand (i.e., TATE expresses the separation of what in crafts-
manship, to a large extent, still forms a unified whole). A strong 
externalization of some of the tasks from the broad spectrum of farm 
labor leads not only to a substantial increase of the commodity relations 
in which the farm is involved, as already demonstrated, but also to 
the creation and reproduction of technicological-administrative relations. 
If milk cows are no longer reproduced within the enterprise but pur-
chased from specialized breeders and if concentrates are no longer 
grown, milled, mixed and enriched on the farm but instead come from 
industry, then the classic unity of past and present labor disappears as 
a guideline for carrying out tasks. The coordination of some tasks is 
partly synchronic but above all diachronic. The insights and experience 
gained from previous cycles form the detailed empirical knowledge 
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crucial for the next cycle. Perhaps that seems self-evident; but let one 
of the Parma respondents tell the story. 
"There lies the art . . . in all those thousand small things which the 
outsider does not see, and which earns us the name of dumb farmer. But 
if you don't know from what lot the feed came, how much humidity was 
in it, what the composition of the field was, or whether it has enough 
protein, enough roughage . . . then you also won't know why some cows 
crap badly, or drop behind in their milk yield. You will see them crap 
well or badly, but you won't know what it means. That is why you have 
to follow everything so closely and be forever trying to understand. Even 
if you're a modern farmer. The real art is in being able to get out of the 
situation what lies behind it, and make something fine of it. You don't 
get that from the technician or the market. Standard things, standard 
recipes, well you need to know them of course, but a good farmer goes 
a step further. That's why I speak of art." 
One can add little to this except to say that this art is so important 
that when it is ignored or excluded, new technological designs often 
fail. For instance, a complete automation of cattle feeding (both rough-
age and concentrates) seems impossible, despite all efforts to achieve 
it, simply because this unity of past and present labor cannot be 
integrated into the prevailing software. At least where an optimal 
intensification is pursued, time cannot be reduced to a discrete variable. 
However, when externalization is vigorously pursued, this unity of 
tasks—part synchronic, part diachronic—is eroded. When this breaks 
down, the "art of the specificity" has to be replaced by external 
"directions for use" (Benvenuti and Mommaas, 1985) or "mode d'em-
ploi" (Lacroix, 1981). Local knowledge then is increasingly substituted 
by a complete package of technical advice in which the how, when, 
why, where, and how much, the sequence and the required combina-
tions, must ail be specified. 
Such directions for use are naturally not limited to the examples 
given here. They arise on all sides—between farm and bank when it 
is a question of external financing, and between farm and industry 
when the latter has taken over specific tasks such as cheese- and salami-
making, slaughtering, etc. Farms must then meet the processing indus-
try's requirements for quality, delivery procedures, etc. In the case of 
contract farming, such prescriptions reach a high point. But external 
prescriptions and sanctions from a technological-administrative task 
environment (TATE) are not limited only to contract farming. They 
are much more widely distributed, as Benvenuti and Mommaas (1985) 
have thoroughly documented. 
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In Emilia Romagna a clearly denned network of industry, government 
institutions, extension services (also charged with effectuating supra-
national policy programmes such as those of the EEC), and banks can 
be identified. This network provides farmers with a huge range of 
technological artifacts, organizational schemes, with several specific "op-
portunities" and an overwhelming, though sometimes confusing, array 
of "directions for use." However, the same network, although relatively 
efficient, is distinguished by a poor level of centralization and a con-
comitant inability to explicitly sanction. 
The cheese-making factories (caseifici) are the most important insti-
tutional junctions with which every farmer has daily dealings. The milk 
he delivers has to be "good cheesemilk." The labor process in these 
cheese factories must therefore be coordinated with that on the farms. 
And the reverse is so to an even greater extent. Such coordination is 
channeled through technical and administrative rules. For many reasons 
these caseifici are very numerous and all of them quite small.19 Most 
of them rely on only about thirty farmers for their supply. In such a 
cheese factory only one cheese maker works, usually with the help of 
an assistant (Bussi and Rizzi, 1974; Brugnoli, 1980). These small ca-
seifici are all linked to a consortium. The influence of decisions made 
by this consortium are not difficult to trace on the farm. A part of the 
working practice is even explicitly prescribed. "The good farmer," they 
advise, "will limit himself to milking and leave breeding to the experts!" 
(Consorzio, 1980:17). The Regolamento per la Produzione del Latte 
(Consorzio, 1973) prescribes very precisely which feed elements are 
forbidden, the minimum and maximum amounts for other feed stuffs, 
and the qualitative and quantitative requirements for the composition 
of feed as a whole (see Figure 2.18). However, their ability to effectively 
sanction is almost nonexistent (Alvisi, 1980:16). The same holds true 
for subcontracting industries, firms that build cow sheds, and to a lesser 
extent the banks. There can be no question of monopolization or of 
high-level centralization, and even less of any categorical imposing of 
one-sided sanctions, which is often the case elsewhere in Europe and 
in Italy (Benvenuti, Bolhuis and van der Ploeg, 1982). If an external 
prescription is not to the farmer's liking, then he can switch to another 
institute or try one way or another to translate a particular prescription 
into its opposite. This does not mean that there is no institutionali-
zation, it simply implies that institutionalization cannot be seen in 
terms of fixed, formal and unilineal relations. Institutionalization in 
this situation must be measured much more in terms of dual relations: 
as the degree to which the farmer systematically does or does not go 
along with the external prescription, i.e., the degree to which the farmer 
adjusts his own "criteria for farming" with that which is implicitly or 
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explicitly prescribed. Thus I take the view that the more individual 
criteria for performance coincide with the "directions for use" as 
prescribed by TATE, the more a certain dependence on external insti-
tutions and markets is internalized by the farm (both in a material 
and symbolic sense). The farm becomes then so structured that a 
gradual appeal to external institutions will become necessary. 
In more theoretical terms this means that: (1) an analysis of TATE 
dependency cannot ignore the dialectic between external forces and 
internal responses, but that (2) once established such patterns of tech-
nical administrative dependency can dramatically change the balance 
between both. Long is right to criticize the "tendency to interpret the 
restructuring of agrarian systems and farming enterprise as resulting 
basically from the penetration of external forces. . . . All forms of 
external intervention necessarily enter the existing life worlds of the 
individuals and social groups affected and thus, as it were, pass through 
certain social and cultural filters. In this way, external forces are both 
mediated and transformed by internal structures" (Long, 1984:17). In-
deed the creation of technical administrative relations which link farms 
to a network of external agencies implies numerous actors who work 
from a variety of meaning systems. That is the reason why in this 
study the measure of external prescriptions is operationalized not by 
means of the formal prescriptions articulated by this network but by 
the degree to which farmers enter into and identify with these external 
criteria. The point is that the interrelation between "external forces" 
and "internal responses" is not to be analyzed in ontological terms 
which place "determinism" and "voluntarism" as opposites. As I have 
argued before "the question is basically a matter of social practice" 
(van der Ploeg, 1985:20). As Giddens states (1981:55), domination and 
power as structural properties of societal systems do not only entail 
sets of rules and their definition, but "also sets of resources and their 
allocation." In modern agriculture the development, allocation and con-
trol over resources become externalized quite rapidly. Related to this 
process is the emergence of a new type of "domination machinery" as 
shown by Benvenuti (1982a), Eizner (1985), Rambaud (1983) and many 
others. The E-logic then can be considered as the nexus of this process 
at the farm level. It is the vehicle by which the subordination of farming 
to outside agencies and conditions takes place. The result is a certain 
expropriation of the "design" dimension of farm labor. Although such 
a result cannot be considered as "necessary"—given the example of 
the I-farms—holly or partially "expropriated" farm labor undergoes a 
change of analytical status from being an independent or "explanatory 
factor" (as it is in the I-logic) to becoming increasingly a dependent or 
determined variable (as is the case in the E-logic). This means that 
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TATE, as a dual relation, can clearly result in a continual narrowing 
of space for the farmer to maneuvre in; i.e., "external forces" become 
a dominant guideline for the labor process of at least some farmers. 
Within the conceptualization of technical administrative relations as 
in essence dual, a daily stream of information can be observed from 
TATE agencies to the farmers. The forms are many: newspapers, radio 
courses, the agricultural press, the regular visit of extensionists and 
advisers to the various farms. This information flow relates only in 
part to recommended items as such. An innovation, be it a new cow 
shed, machine or medicine, only makes sense when used in a particular, 
prescribed way, as argued more generally by Latour (1983). And vice 
versa, it is that particular practice (often promoted by the information 
flow from TATE) that makes the new innovation, so to speak, necessary. 
The representative of a firm that delivers farming machinery described 
it to me at a fiera (market) as follows: 
"You are selling not so much a machine, you don't get anywhere by 
shouting about the few plus points of a new thing. You have to first 
introduce a new way of thinking and working, making it reasonable for 
farming to be organized in a new way. . . . When that works then these 
men will buy your machines . . . and without any problem. Then you 
will find adverts are superfluous for men decide for themselves that 
buying is necessary." 
Through such techniques agribusiness has a substantial and dyna-
mizing influence on farm enterprises. In a note from the Italian branch 
of Unilever (1978), the redesigning of farming using industrial criteria 
is unmistakable: 
It is simply necessary to make the cost structure of agriculture the main 
theme of our policy. . . . This requires a renewed approach, where the 
dynamizing role of industry is placed central for the lowering of agricul-
tural costs. . . . Industry must turn its sights to that field which is most 
her own, that of efficiency and of organizing production factors with the 
aim of accomplishing a minimalization of costs; a strong concern for 
agronomic themes is thus indispensable. Industry is in the best position 
to find the most adequate solutions, to provide agriculture with the 
necessary means, through technical extension in particular, so that pro-
duction will be more appropriate for industrial transformation and allo-
cation to the market. 
An OECD document (1979:91) concludes, with some justification, 
that the food industry (along with industry that produces production 
factors) definitely cannot be seen as a simple extension of agrarian 
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production, but rather "as a domineering pole." In relation to Italy, 
Galizzi observes that "the actions of the food processing industries 
have always been characterized by efforts to hold down the price of 
agrarian staples" (1980). Corazza (1980:1-14) argues that the regulation 
of quality and amount delivered, time for delivery, etc., are also in-
creasingly important in relations between the farm enterprise and the 
food industry; they become the object of detailed prescriptions and 
sanctions. With this and with the continual efforts to reduce the price 
of staples, the structuring of labor on the farm is naturally at stake 
(Benvenuti, 1980). One of the effects will be standardization. Autono-
mous control of the producer over production and reproduction, and 
the continual experimentation in order to further develop an enterprise, 
will be then less relevant than a uniform role-enactment conforming 
to general and centrally denned prescriptions. In that respect, it might 
be accepted that the E-calculus, in which conscious references to cura 
and autosuficienza are absent, will reasonably dovetail with an increas-
ing measure of external prescriptions and sanctions over farm labor. 
Naturally that applies a fortiori to those elements which are central to 
this calculus: the cost/benefit relation and the scale coincide at a micro-
level with the macro terms indicated above (price reductions in the 
primary agrarian sector and quantitative increase of output per enter-
prise). 
TATE1: Information 
The flow of information from TATE to farm enterprises is volumi-
nous and diffuse. This flow, which increasingly concerns, directly or 
indirectly, the organization of labor and production, can involve the 
following questions: to what extent is the farmer inclined to accept the 
content of information from TATE institutions as guidelines, and to 
what degree does the farmer try to counterbalance this information by 
turning to other information and experiences? This issue concerns 
acceptance versus counterbalance, TATE information taken as normative 
or approached critically. 
A number of items were taken up in the ERSA questionnaire to 
quantify this relation between farmer and TATE agencies: 
1. "If you have to build a new cow shed, do you then take one of 
the models offered by the firms specializing in them, or do you 
yourself make a number of changes in the models they introduce?" 
Of the total sample (n= 134) 24% said they would use the standard 
model while 76% said they would make alterations. 
114 Dairy Farming in Emilia Romagna, Italy 
2. The following item measured relations to the technology offered 
in general. Is the "newest" that is offered normative and direction 
giving of itself or should one appraise it critically? Of the sample, 
21% were of the definite opinion that "you can buy all new 
concerns with a quiet mind, because the technicians who develop 
them take care that they are alright"; 35% more or less agreed 
with this statement; while the remaining 44% disagreed. 
3. In relation to the bank: "Do you think that the bank . . . works 
with criteria which, generally speaking, are those used by the 
farmers, or is there in your opinion a certain discrepancy between 
the different criteria?" Results showed that 30% thought there was 
no discrepancy; 70% thought there was. 
4. The extent to which farmers were inclined to accept the advice 
of technicians from the consortia selling cattle feed or to approach 
it critically was also measured. "If the concentrate specialist 
. . . gives you advice, how often does this agree with what you 
had thought yourself?" The answers were as follows: 3% said 
"always"; 31% said "often"; 58% said "sometimes"; and we were 
not without the pigheaded 8% who said "never." 
5. Giving an example from fruit cultivation, we measured whether 
there was a willingness to delegate the decision-making concerning 
the labor process and development of production to external 
agencies in order to reach "better results": 44% said that in 
principle they were willing to do so. 
6. The last item measured opinions about the so-called libro ge-
nealogico, an important instrument of institutions which control 
trade in genetic material. 
The given items were summarized in a scale, TATE1, rating the 
degree to which TATE information is accepted or approached critically. 
TATE2: Investment Decisions 
Important investment decisions will fix the organization of labor and 
production on the farm for a long time period. A high degree of 
institutionalization is possible in these investment decisions, and in the 
context studied by us this was no exception. Cow sheds, techniques 
for manure conservation and transportation, and cattle density all had 
to comply with regional, national and supra-national planning regula-
tions. Plans for specialization and cropping had to correspond with 
regional development plans. Frequently a farm development plan or 
financial scheme will have to be drafted in such a way as to not only 
meet the advice of but often to receive the definitive approval of 
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Table 2.13. Importance Accredited to Advice from Varying Sources by Consider-
ing Investment Decisions ERSA/n-134 
Wife 
Members of family 
Successor 
Farming friends 
Very experienced farmers 
Technicians of the consortia 
Technicians of farmers' 
organizations 
The bank's consultant 
Agricultural press 
Without any 
importance 
8X 
3X 
40X 
17X 
5X 
29X 
15X 
43X 
41X 
Of minor 
importance 
7X 
11X 
11X 
40X 
25X 
27X 
18X 
21X 
26X 
Important 
35X 
30X 
17X 
34X 
43X 
30X 
41X 
29X 
25X 
Extremely 
important 
49X 
56X 
25X 
6X 
25X 
14X 
26X 
4X 
4X 
various experts from the different external institutions. The latter ap-
plies a fortiori if the level of dependence on banks, i.e., on capital 
markets, is high. 
With the help of a series of questions, it was possible to examine 
whose advice was sought about investment decisions, and what weight 
was given to such advice. Table 2.13 gives an overview of the answers. 
By dividing the total weight accredited to TATE by the weight given 
to wife, family members, etc., a scale was developed, TATE2, which 
gives the relative weight of TATE in investment decisions. 
TATE3: Learning the Craft 
Each farmer has his own specific way of organizing labor and pro-
duction, his own "system." If we project these various ways of working 
on our previous definition of craftsmanship (structuring labor in such 
a way that the productive potential of labor objects is used optimally 
and at the same time further developed), then it is possible to speak 
of "better" or "worse" craftsmanship. Each level of craftsmanship 
assumes a conscious learning process. Different actors, from the father 
figure to diverse TATE institutions, can play a role in this system. We 
asked the following question: "From whom or what have you learnt 
most in acquiring the craftsmanship you now possess?" Table 2.14 
summarizes the answers. The information, as summarized in this table, 
was again used to construct a scale, TATE3, which expresses the relative 
weighting of TATE instances in the development of personal crafts-
manship. 
At the request of regional farmer organizations, we investigated the 
relationship between the extent to which TATE information is simply 
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Table 2.14. The Weight Given to the Influence of Diverse "Agencies" in the 
Development of Personal Craftsmanship (ERSA/n-134) 
"Very much" 
Father S8X 
Own experience 96X 
Colleagues 16X 
TATE 
Agricultural school 11X 
Technical courses 21X 
Individual advice of technicians 25X 
Agricultural press 10X 
Table 2.15. TATE and Craftsmanship (ERSA/plaln/n 
"Little" 
33X 
2X 
73X 
16X 
33X 
37X 
37X 
-75) 
"Nothing" 
8X 
2X 
11X 
73X 
46X 
19X 
53X 
"Objective" level of Craftsmanship 
(CRAFTpl + 
low 
Uncritical acceptance of external 
Information and advice 
(TATEl - high) 57X 
Intermediary position 
(TATEl - medium) 19X 
Critical attitude towards external 
information and advice 
(TATEl - low) 27X 
Difference between acceptance and 
critical attitude +30X 
CHAFTp2 
medium 
13X 
38X 
27X 
-14X 
+ CRAFTp31 
high 
30X (n-26) 
43X (n-24) 
46X (n-25) 
-16X (n-75) 
accepted, or approached critically in the light of personal experience, 
and the extent to which farmers developed the capacity to independently 
optimize the productive potential of labor objects.20 The relations be-
tween TATE and craftsmanship appeared grosso modo to be negative, 
as shown in Table 2.15. As one of the leaders of the farmer organization 
exclaimed when confronted with these data: "It is indeed not TATE 
which makes the best farmers." 
Social Relations of Production 
and the Farm Labor Process 
The foregoing, mainly qualitative explorations suggested that the E-
logic becomes dominant in farming when high levels of market incor-
poration and institutionalization occur. Increasing commoditization 
shortens time horizons in the farm labor process, introduces new 
uncertainties concerning prices, increases the risks involved, and affects 
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0.23 (0 .04) Market i n c o r p o r a t i o n f o r 
s h o r t - and medium-term c a p i t a l E -Ca lcu lus 
Figure 2.19 
especially the quality of the means of production. Beyond that, it 
introduces a new logic for the organization and planning of the labor 
process: the E-calculus. All this leads in practice to a reorganization of 
the labor process to fit in with all-pervasive commodity relations. The 
E-calculus can be considered as the main vehicle for achieving this 
reorganization. In this respect the E-calculus represents a clear case of 
functional rationality; it subordinates the labor process to prevailing 
commodity relations. Apart from the empirical demonstration, it can 
also be assumed on theoretical grounds that this functional rationality 
will occur earlier and more widely where system-integration is highest 
(Gouldner, 1970:213-216). 
"Lö banca non scherza mica''' "the banks are not joking," said one 
of the Parma respondents, who wished to convey that taking credit is 
a serious matter and that the consequences have to be taken equally 
seriously. Within the ERSA sample, the E-calculus could be formulated 
as an unambiguous statistical variable, namely, as the synergic presence 
(in statistical terms: the interacting) of the E-option and a high degree 
of entrepreneurship. In short, if a farmer mainly considers himself as 
an entrepreneur and acts accordingly, and strives at the same time for 
scale enlargement instead of intensification, then it can be assumed 
that his thinking and behavior are structured by the E-calculus. So, if 
we now relate the degree to which a farmer is dependent on the bank21 
with the thus operationalized E-calculus, then we find that the ERSA/ 
plain sample follows the model shown in Figure 2.19. There is, at least 
for farmers, a basic difference between handling one's "own capital" 
and dealing with "credit." Credit implies, as every other commodity, 
a complex series of commodity relations as well as specific technical 
administrative (TATE) relations vis-à-vis the bank. One has to act in 
accordance with these different kinds of relations, simply because the 
"banks aren't joking." So the E-calculus emerges as a guideline for 
structuring the labor process, thus ensuring the necessary correspon-
dence between labor process and capital market incorporation. 
One could study in a similar way all the direct links between the 
E-calculus and incorporation factors on the one hand, and between that 
and scales of institutionalization on the other, but for an overall view, 
it is quicker and easier, and above all more interesting theoretically, to 
investigate the interactive effects of incorporation and institutionaliza-
tion on the E-calculus. The path diagram shown in Figure 2.2022 gives 
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such an overview of the direct and indirect effects of incorporation and 
institutionalization on the structuring of the labor process. It shows 
several positive and significant links. If all the aspects of incorporation 
and institutionalization in the model were to increase with a unity 
similar to their respective standard deviation, then the dependent vari-
able, i.e., the E-calculus, would rise +0.64. 
The model also offers a view of the relative weighting of each of 
the separate forms through which incorporation and institutionalization 
manifest themselves. Isolated from other independent variables, "ex-
ternal prescription of craftsmanship" (TATE3) exercises a negative effect 
on the E-calculus. Combined, however, with "an uncritical acceptance 
of external information and advice" (TATE1) and/or "incorporation 
into markets for machine services and long-term loans" (INC2), such 
strong indirect and positive effects occur that the total effect of TATE3 
becomes positive, 0.28, almost the same as the factor with the heaviest 
weighting, "incorporation into capital markets (INC1)," which has a 
positive effect of +0.29 on the E-calculus. 
This brings us to an exciting aspect of the model, the synergism or 
mutual strengthening of separate aspects of incorporation and institu-
tionalization. Incorporation into capital markets is one matter, external 
prescription of investment decisions (TATE2) is another. But it is their 
mutual interaction which forms the meaningful situation. One cannot 
discount the effect of one on the other; both are important, especially 
where they strengthen each other. It is not so much incorporation as 
such, but commoditization of increasing parts of the labor process 
together with the ongoing articulation of the "rules" that must be 
followed (TATE), which produces significant changes in farming.23 Other 
interaction moments also point to meaningful patterns. Incorporation 
into machine markets (INC2) implies that important parts of the labor 
process are sometimes contracted out. In general this can be extremely 
functional for lowering costs, but, on the other hand, it makes the 
optimizing of production potential difficult. Add to this a high level of 
"external prescription of craftsmanship," and the effect on the E-calculus 
is then positive. What is already potentially determined by the con-
tracting out of certain activities is completed by the diminishing rel-
evance of personal experience necessary in developing craftsmanship. 
The E-calculus, in which there is no place for craftsmanship, then 
becomes dominant. 
The same is true for "external prescription of craftsmanship" (TATE3) 
and the "uncritical acceptance of external information and advice" 
(TATE1). Alone they correlate negatively with the E-calculus, but to-
gether (TATE1 * TATE3) they have a strong positive effect. In short, 
it is the interaction, the coming together of different relations in a 
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systematic network in which each of the separate links is strengthened 
by the others, that the relevant whole of the E-calculus is formed. 
This principle implies that commodity relations as well as technical-
administrative relations (as symbolized by the different TATE scales) 
emerge as dominant social relations of production. As Poulantzas (1974, 
1976) would argue, they effectively "constitute" the farm labor process. 
They give the labor process a specific form and structure, as symbolized 
by the E-calculus. At the same time one must stress that this is in no 
way a universal phenomenon. Commodity relations and the technical 
administrative relations with which they interact only emerge as social 
relations of production in the context of high systems interweaving (see 
also Figure 1.4 in Chapter 1). It is not simply the market economy and 
its institutional superstructure as such which have this particular im-
pact. The logic of farming, the strategy consciously used and reproduced 
by the farmers concerned, is equally important. For, in this same setting 
of markets and market agencies, another empirical reality can be ob-
served, i.e., the reality that the farm labor process is not determined 
in the same unilinear way by commodity and TATE relations. 
The I-Calculus and Its Relation to 
Incorporation and Institutionalization 
Farm labor structured according to the I-calculus can also be defined 
in statistical terms. The key terms in the I-calculus, as mentioned 
before, are produzione and cura, which go hand in hand with inten-
sification and the practice of craftsmanship. Only when intensification 
and craftmanship are taken together does a meaningful pattern emerge. 
In other words, we can define the I-calculus in statistical terms as the 
interaction between opting for intensification and the structuring of 
farm labor as craftsmanship. 
The E-calculus emerges, as we saw, in a context characterized by a 
systematic interweaving of the farm and the farmer's thinking with 
markets and relevant institutions. However, for the I-calculus, it can 
be assumed that a certain level of functional autonomy (operationalized 
as a low level of incorporation and a low degree of institutionalization) 
is an essential prerequisite. Table 2.16 shows that, indeed, the E-calculus 
goes with a high degree of incorporation and institutionalization 
(1=1.04), and the I-calculus with a low level (1=0.06), taking average 
values for various aspects of incorporation and institutionalization. 
Identifiable differences occur with incorporation into capital markets 
(INC1), with incorporation into markets for machine services and long 
term loans (INC2) and with external prescription of craftsmanship 
(TATE3) (=0.69, 0.52 and 0.47, respectively). 
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Table 2.16. Mean values of Incorporation and Institutionalization When I- and 
E-calculi Are Respectively High 
INC1 INC2 INC3 TATE1 TATE2 TATE3 S 
High I-calculus (n-25) -0.21 -0.06 +0.15 +0.21 +0.05 -0.08 +0.06 
High E-calculus (n-16) +0.48 +0.46 +0.21 -0.37 -0.13 +0.39 +1.04 
Û +0.69 +0.52 +0.06 -0.58 -0.18 +0.47 
INC1 — Incorporation into capital markets (for short- and medium-term loans) 
INC2 - Incorporation into markets for machinery services and long-term loans 
INC3 - Incorporation into markets for labor, feed and fodder 
TATE1 - Uncritical acceptance of external information and advice 
TATE2 - External prescription of investment decisions 
TATE3 - External prescription of craftsmanship 
Figure 2.21 consists of a path diagram which summarizes the effects 
of incorporation and institutionalization on the I-calculus. Several re-
lations are demonstrable between farm labor structured according to 
the I-calculus and incorporation and institutionalization. Some are neg-
ative, some positive. It is remarkable, however, that these interrelations 
are so structured that the joint net effect of incorporation and institu-
tionalization on the I-calculus is virtually nil (-0.04). If all aspects of 
incorporation and institutionalization were increased by 1.00 (the SD), 
then the I-calculus still wouldn't alter much. They are not mutually 
reinforcing but have a counterbalancing effect on each other. Comparing 
Figure 2.20 (the effects on the E-calculus) with Figure 2.21 (the effects 
on the I-calculus) one detects a shift as one moves from high systems 
interweaving to functional autonomy. The sociological importance of 
the constellation in Figure 2.21 is that it highlights the fact that farm 
labor, typified by the I-calculus, does not exist by the grace of some 
Utopian economic autarky. Both forms of labor are "real" in the sense 
that they manifest and reproduce themselves in a market economy. 
Alvisi (1980:1,2), building on the work of others, argues that farming 
as an activity is characterized by two fundamental aspects: production 
and marketing. The first aspect assumes that the entrepreneur orientates 
everything he does towards maximum technical efficiency, and the 
second assumes that he "subordinates production choices to adapt 
. . . to price and cost relationships." He subsequently places both 
aspects in a certain chronology: "the production aspect was dominant 
up till the end of the second world war on account of the self provi-
sioning nature of agricultural enterprises and the promotion of this 
through agrarian policy." He argues that "subsequently economic de-
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velopment led to a rapid integration of agricultural practice into mar-
kets." With this, the second aspect then became dominant. Newby 
(1978a: 17) follows a similar reasoning. 
Although not per se incorrect, the suggested sequence is nevertheless 
deceptive since it suggests that an emphatic orientation to production 
(ref. the I-calculus) is to be seen as an anachronism, as a phenomenon 
that only goes with a stage already passed, i.e., that of economic self-
sufficiency. However, farm labor structured by the I-calculus is still an 
empirical reality within present day markets and market institutions, 
or so it appears from the path diagram. It assumes no autarky, no 
absence of links and relationships with the economic and institutional 
environment, but simply a field of activity that is actively controled by 
the farmer himself; a constellation in which relations with market and 
TATE are of a multifarious and mutually opposing nature. The char-
acteristic of systems interweaving so typical for the patterning in which 
the E-calculus functions is missing. It is much more a question of a 
certain degree of functional autonomy, a situation of opposing relations 
which assume that actors make conscious choices. 
The path diagrams, in which the impact of the economic and insti-
tutional environment on the specific structuring of farm labor were 
analyzed, point to diverse constellations which cannot be interpreted 
in a deterministic sense. A continuing interaction between the farmer 
and his environment forms the basis of both constellations. In the one 
case, this interaction tends towards a reproduction of systems inter-
weaving; in the other, to the maintenance of a certain level of functional 
autonomy. Elements of this interaction were touched upon several times 
in the earlier text. Thus, where farm labor is structured by the E-
calculus, the reliance on TATE, on external prescriptions for the carry-
ing out of various tasks, will often be necessary. An ongoing incorpor-
ation will then emerge quite often as a logical step. Also, as we have 
seen, where intensification is explicitly opted for, increasing incorpor-
ation is considered undesirable. 
A high level of system interweaving is both a condition for and a 
consequence of farm labor structured along E-calculus lines. With the 
advance of incorporation and institutionalization, a network of com-
modity and institutional relationships emerge which penetrate the farm 
at all levels. The ratios existing in and between markets (and their 
many explicit voicings by TATE agencies) function to increase and 
mutually reinforce each other. This implies for the individual farmer a 
certain reduction of space to make decisions; but, more important, it 
implies that this space is increasingly hemmed in by parameters which 
(a) are irreversible, (b) show a high degree of mutual correspondence, 
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and finally, (c) where no other decisions are possible except those that 
fit in with these parameters. 
Thus decision making becomes increasingly a question of applying 
a logic which lies embedded within an entirety of external parameters. 
The farmer loses his space to maneuver as well as his control over the 
labor process: consequently, labor undergoes a certain expropriation 
and tailorization. 
Mountain Farmers and Intensification 
So far the analysis has been based on dairy farming on the plain. 
The ERSA sample included a number of mountain dairy farmers 
(n=59). The differences between the samples are not purely ecological. 
Systematic differences occur also in the levels of incorporation and 
institutionalization. The mountains are characterized by a lower and 
much less consistent pattern of these indicators. Generally speaking, 
the differences boil down to differences in the norms and structures 
for organizing farm labor. Mountain farmers are more likely to opt for 
intensification than farmers on the plain. Scores for craftsmanship are 
correspondingly higher for the mountain farmer, while the average score 
for entrepreneurship is lower. Similar differences in the geographical 
distribution of the degree of incorporation, options, etc., have also been 
shown by the recent research of Sauda and Antonello (1983). 
The respondents in the mountains answered the same questionnaire 
as their colleagues on the plain, and the same analysis was applied to 
their answers on the various questions concerning goals, craftsmanship 
and entrepreneurship. The analysis confirms the relationship earlier 
observed on the plain, namely, that an increasing commoditization and 
institutionalization leads to a restructuring of the labor process; the I-
calculus gives way to the E-calculus as the structuring principle.24 But 
there are important differences as well. To begin with, incorporation 
and TATE indices in the mountains strongly reflect the nature of state 
interventions. Government and EEC programs for the mountains (con-
sidered as marginal areas that deserve special help) are primarily based 
on the provision of credit, which must be used to buy "productive" 
breeds of stock and to build "modern" cow sheds. The care of these 
new breeds, however, constitutes a noticeable break with current prac-
tices for local stock. Hence TATE information becomes necessary. 
Consequently statistical analysis shows the development of clear chains: 
incorporation into both capital and cattle markets and a high depen-
dency on TATE forming a clear interdependent cluster.25 
A second difference between mountain and plain is strongly tied to 
this finding. The distribution of farm enterprises along a continuum of 
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low to high systems interweaving is more bipolar. They are either 
strongly or only slightly interwoven with markets and market agencies. 
This difference is substantially related to the planned nature that various 
institutions try to give to the integration process, and it is this which 
entails that the boundary between "inclusion" and "exclusion" is much 
sharper. The manner and degree to which relations between farm 
enterprises and various markets and market agencies are created can 
be less circumscribed by the farmers themselves, since the creation of 
these relations are the goals of state intervention itself. 
This can be vividly illustrated by local events, which were much 
debated by the farmers themselves during the period of our research. 
Farmers in the mountains are often faced with lengthy and arduous 
tasks. Producing animal feed from steep hillsides is one such task, and 
many farmers (particularly female farmers) will gladly invest in tech-
niques which lighten or shorten their work load. At first sight the State 
seems to give substantial support and loans for this. However, the loans 
are each linked to a series of conditions. One of these is that after 
"modernization," the enterprise is expected to produce an income on 
a par with that of city workers. Meeting this requirement often entails 
a considerable expansion of the herd. To fulfill a second condition— 
namely that the density of cattle should not be too high—means buying 
extra land. In order to compensate for the financial burdens that this 
imposes, herds have to be further expanded. 
One of the most probable results then is that certain tasks are indeed 
lightened but that the total work time remains the same or is even 
lengthened. Thus, the planned nature of the integration process con-
fronts farmers with chains of consequences which in the end go against 
their interests. For farmers this means either making use of the available 
opportunities, following the prescriptions and accepting the conse-
quences, or remaining on the margin. There is little room for a middle 
way. And when farmers create their own solutions to problems, such 
solutions are usually perceived as being undesirable by the planning 
agencies and sometimes made impossible by the accompanying regu-
lations. 
A third striking difference between the mountains and the plain is 
that the explicit option for scale enlargement and extensification (the 
E-option) is less frequent (20% versus 43%). Mountain farmers reason 
that this difference is closely related to the ecological setting and to 
the social construction of time associated with it. One can well cultivate 
less intensively in the short term, and this can even be highly remu-
nerative, but to do so over the longer term leads to typical forms of 
soil erosion, such as the frana, to the uncontrollable growth of brush 
wood and weeds in the meadows, and to the rapid deterioration of the 
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quality of fodder. So in the long term, extensification of the labor 
process becomes strongly counterproductive. Thus the ecological setting, 
or more precisely, the tension between long- and short-term rationality, 
precludes as ready or as widespread an acceptance of the E-calculus in 
the mountains. 
Finally, let me broach a point that can be discerned both in the 
mountains and on the plain but which is seen much more clearly in 
the mountains—the conflicting relationship between craftsmanship and 
entrepreneurship. In the abstract, one might endorse the proposition of 
Newby et al. that "a conflict between the two does not necessarily need 
to exist" (1978b:181).26 However, in reality they each appear to take 
strategic positions in qualitatively different systems of logic, which 
makes the relationship between them problematic. The statistical anal-
ysis shows a negative correlation, — .25 (p=.05), between the I-calculus 
and entrepreneurship, and —.34 (p=.008) between the E-calculus and 
craftsmanship. This suggests that where craftsmanship is dominant, 
there is no "structural room" for entrepreneurship. And vice versa, 
where production is dominated by market and price relations, there 
remains little room for craftsmanship. The relationship between crafts-
manship and entrepreneurship on the one hand, and between crafts-
manship and TATE on the other, strengthens this suggestion. The 
correlation between TATE and craftsmanship is negative (r= —.29; 
p=0.02); the relations between TATE and entrepreneurship positive 
(r=.27; p=0.03). 
Styles of Farming as Social Constructions 
A first impression of heterogeneity in Emilian dairy farming was 
given in Chapter 1 (see especially Table 1.2). Here I wish to use 
statistical data of a larger number of farm characteristics27 to show that 
styles of farming can only be properly understood when viewed as 
social constructions. They cannot be understood when perceived as 
simple (or even complex) derivations of prevailing commodity relations, 
nor when seen as determined by technological or institutional factors. 
That is not to say that these factors are irrelevant, but that the impact 
of commodity and TATE relations is a differential one and that their 
influence is mediated by farmers as conscious actors operating with 
different logics of farming. 
One of the points I hope to establish in the following analysis is 
what in recent Italian debates on agriculture has been rightly called 
"the centrality of labor." A style of farming is the outcome of a 
particular labor process guided by certain options, structured in a 
specific way by a corresponding "logic," and conditioned by particular 
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social relations of production. Through the farm labor process both the 
social relations of production and the style of farming are reproduced. 
In the heterogeneity manifest in Emilian agriculture, clear patterns or 
"styles" are identifiable which are constructed by farmers. Factor anal-
ysis shows that more than 80% of the variation can be explained in 
terms of six factors. Three are directly related to intensity of production, 
a fourth describes scale and labor input, a fifth the density of cattle to 
land, and a sixth, capital input per hectare (see Table 2.17). 
Precisely the same factors appear from a similar analysis of the 
mountain material (summarized in Table 2.18). More recent research 
has shown that such factors are also evident elsewhere in Italy. The 
six factors can now be seen to be six dimensions within which each 
specific farm structure can be described. If we take an ideal typical 
example of an intensive dairy farm, it will be first characterized by a 
high score on the factor "intensity of animal production" (the produ-
zione of the I-calculus), and likewise a high score on "intensity of feed 
production." Land and animals are treated with "cura" resulting in a 
high yield of feed per hectare and a high yield per cow. Finally, to 
achieve such "cura," a high "impegno" is necessary (input of labor per 
labor object must be high). This means that the score on the "scale" 
dimension will be low. With such a high inset of labor a relatively 
large number of other resources is necessary: the input of capital does 
not so much substitute for labor in this model of intensive farming as 
complement it. Thus the score of "capital input" will also be high. 
A similar exercise is also possible for the typical opposite: for large 
scale, relatively extensive farm enterprises. Such an enterprise will be 
characterized by a high score on the scale and animal density dimen-
sions. "Intensity of fodder production" as also "intensity of animal 
production" will be characterized by low factor scores. 
Essential for the subsequent analysis is the assumption that, for 
individual enterprises, scores on the dimensions shown are the result 
of goal conscious activity and that the different options, as well as the 
operational mechanisms such as craftsmanship and entrepreneurship, 
play a decisive role in this activity. The farming enterprise, in other 
words, is a result of "the purposeful action of the farm operator" 
(Crouch, 1972). This first assumption leads to a second—that a whole 
profile of scores on several dimensions represents more meaning than 
one score on one isolated dimension.28 A high score on the scale 
dimension is naturally important, but it is only in combination with 
other scores that one can rightly speak of a large-scale, relatively 
extensive enterprise. This argument can be elucidated by a simple 
example. As we saw earlier, high incorporation into fodder markets 
clearly affects the organization of the production unit: yield per cow 
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I n c o r p o r a t i o n i n t o l a b o r 
and feed marke t s (INC3) 
Figure 2.22 
Incorporation into 
labor and fodder 
m a r k e t s (INC3) 
Figure 2.23 
0.35 (0 .002) Scale and cattle 
density 
0.43 (0.0001) Large-scale, 
relatively extensive 
style of farming 
drops and cattle density is raised. Likewise with the labor market: the 
more labor is mobilized on the market, the lower the input of labor 
per hectare and per cow. The regression coefficients of INC3—the factor 
which stands for incorporation into labor and feed markets—on cattle 
density and on scale confirm this relationship (r=0.25 [0.02] and 0.25 
[0.02], respectively). If we now combine "scale" and "cattle density" 
additively then we find the relationship shown in Figure 2.22. 
The explained variation rises: i.e., the combination of factors is more 
meaningful and highlights fundamental relationships better than do 
factors in isolation. One can, however, go a step further and broaden 
the definition to the combination of scale enlargement and relative 
extensification: "intensity of animal production" and "intensity of fod-
der production" together refer to an intensity applying over the whole 
range. The inverse of this term refers to a dairy farm with relatively 
extensive practices. We can thus define a large-scale, relatively extensive 
farm as: (cattle density) + (scale) — (intensity of animal production) 
— (intensity of fodder production). If we now relate this composite 
term to incorporation into the labor and fodder markets, then we find 
the relationship shown in Figure 2.23. The example points to the 
importance of an integral definition of farming "style." The equation 
also indicates the statistical relationship between high incorporation and 
the tendency for farming to become large scale and relatively extensive. 
However, in the following analysis we will take a different course. 
The direct relationship between incorporation and style of farming 
is less interesting than the indirect relationship which goes via farm 
labor. Instead of removing the farmer "from a system for which he has 
been responsible and within which farm practices are an integral part" 
(Crouch 1972), it is essential to place him at the center for the why's 
of a particular relationship to become clear. Why is there a regressive 
effect of incorporation and institutionalization on the style of farming? 
Why do scale enlargement and relative extensification become domi-
nant? The qualitative research suggested that the answers to such 
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0.23 (0.04) 
E-calculus 
Large-scale, relatively 
extensive style of farming 
Figure 2.24 
questions are to be found in the increasing development of an E-
calculus associated with incorporation and institutionalization. This 
hypothesis can now be tested with the help of the terms and techniques 
described. To begin with, we examine farm labor normalized and 
structured via the E-logic, the dominant logic of high systems integra-
tion. The direct link between it and a "large-scale, relatively extensive 
style of agricultural practice" is shown in Figure 2.24. 
Figure 2.25 shows the total effect (direct and via farm labor) of 
incorporation and institutionalization on the style of agricultural prac-
tice. With an increase of incorporation and institutionalization and the 
associated domination of the E-calculus, the farm becomes modeled 
along the lines of scale enlargement and relative extensification. 
It is worth emphasizing that the essential difference between intensive 
and large scale relatively extensive farms lies in their level of incor-
poration and institutionalization. Age and training of the farm head, 
family composition or whether an heir is available make no significant 
difference.29 Only the point of view of the head tends to make a 
difference: intensive farmers are more orientated to the rural world and 
their own families than are extensive farmers; intensive farmers are 
more often than their colleagues the sons of mezzadri, of sharecroppers 
who managed after the war to acquire their own farms through collec-
tive and individual effort and sacrifice. Their sons, as well as inheriting 
the farms, also inherit the emancipation aspirations of their fathers to 
farm better than had been "allowed." 
Whether a farm is large or small in terms of area, it can be 
extensively or intensively farmed. The average farm area of extensively 
operated farms is 24.1 ha, as against 11.0 for intensively operated 
farms, but the standard deviations are such (16.1 and 6.8, respectively) 
that the range overlaps. A large area is a favorable condition for raising 
the scale, but it is not essential. A large area likewise can be intensively 
farmed. The reason for the development of one or the other style is 
again the structure of the labor process and the corresponding degree 
of integration into the politicoeconomic system. 
Back to the Mountains 
While on the whole the patterns are again similar for the mountains, 
there are some differences which are of great importance. In Chapter 
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5 where the differences within and between Italy and Peru are discussed, 
I will explore these differences further. Limiting the discussion here to 
a comparison of the mountains and the plain in Emilia Romagna, two 
essential differences emerge. 
On the plain, increasing cattle density was seen to be a typical 
mechanism for scale enlargement. The greater the density, the lower 
the intensity of fodder production. More fodder was bought in, and 
the amount given per cow was less. Statistically there is a positive and 
significant relationship between the E-calculus and cattle density. In the 
mountains, however, increasing cattle density appears to go with the I-
calculus. Thus, cattle density appears there as part of a strategy oriented 
towards intensification. In the mountains, the raising of density coin-
cides with the raising of fodder production per hectare. Consequently 
the buying of supplementary feed is not needed. 
In a theoretical sense this means that no universal relationships 
between calculi and farm styles can be postulated. One must conclude 
therefore that the way in which the I- and E-logics take concrete form 
depends on the setting in which they are realized. Ecological, political, 
economic and historical circumstances may be essential to this process. 
A second important difference between the mountains and the plain 
concerns the intensity of animal production. As was constructed in 
Figure 2.25 for extensive farming, an explanatory model can also be 
constructed for intensity of animal production. For both mountain and 
plain, a positive and significant relationship emerges between an I-logic 
and the intensity of animal production. The reverse calculation also 
applies; a negative relationship exists between the E-logic and intensity. 
However, the relationship is much stronger in the mountains than on 
the plain. There are recognizable correcting mechanisms at work in the 
plain. In both the mountains and on the plain incorporation and 
institutionalization exercise a negative effect on the intensity of animal 
production. But the dequalification of craftsmanship, at least on the 
plain, can be partly compensated for by buying and using certain 
technological innovations and prescriptions. Indeed, incorporation and 
institutionalization accomplish by means of the emerging dominance of 
the E-calculus a certain stagnation in the development of productive 
forces; but where external TATE networks succeed in producing highly 
productive innovations—such as uni-feed systems, Holstein cattle, au-
tomated feeding, etc.—such stagnation can be broken, presumably to 
subsequently reappear at a higher level. The continual development and 
implementation of external innovations which raise production levels 
then replace farm labor (structured by the I-calculus) as the driving 
force of agrarian development. Intensification based on the continual 
improvement of quantity and quality (impegno and cura) of farm labor 
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is superseded by an intensification based on technological development. 
The "making" of intensity becomes externalized, and the phenomenon 
of an "intensification scientifique" as the French say, then becomes 
dominant (Capelle, 1986). However, apart from its potentially counter-
productive effects (Ullrich, 1979), such a new phenomenon implies 
another important effect; that is, its selectivity, or geographical bias. It 
often provokes a marginalization of production areas which are char-
acterized by conditions that do not fit with the premises of technological 
design. And that is exactly what is shown by the statistical interrelations 
already referred to. The negative effects of the E-logic on intensity can 
be remedied to a degree on the plain by specific technological devel-
opments. In the mountains, however, the applicability of such an in-
tensification technique is much lower or nonexistent. Anyway, when 
discussing another chain of mountains, the Peruvian Andes, in the next 
chapter, I will focus on this problem again. 
Concerning Scale and Social Relations of Production: 
A Supplementary Argument 
Although it cannot be reduced to pure tradition, the I-pattern rep-
resents, more than the E-pattern, a historical continuity. The language 
is sometimes literally that of the earlier insegnamenti—"teachings"— 
(circa 1700) (Spaggiari, 1964) and lezioni—"lessons"—(1771) (Barigazzi, 
1980). The "father figure" is less a subject of taboo, and the reference 
group is more rural than urban. And even where the I-pattern appears 
in a new guise—in some of the young, well-trained farmers who openly 
criticize the emergence of the E-logic and opt for an intensive way of 
farming—the ratio of thought and actions, structurally speaking, is the 
same as that which agricultural development has taken through the 
ages, which depends as far as is possible on an autonomous reproduction 
cycle. 
However, at the moment that, historically speaking, the conditions 
arose for a complete development of this ratio,30 a new rationality, the 
E-calculus, was introduced in agricultural practice through the advance 
of commoditization and institutionalization.31 Its rapid spread can be 
inferred from several studies relating to the 60s. At the beginning of 
the 1960s—when specialized dairy farms barely existed—the standard 
deviation (expressed as a percentage of the gross value of production 
per hectare) for mixed dairy farms fluctuated between 9% and 25% (for 
the grain-wine-dairy complex and for the wine-dairy complex, respec-
tively). The mean standard deviation was 17% (INEA, 1962). A similar 
index, calculated for fifty-five dairy farms seven years later, all located 
in Emilia Romagna—ten specialized, forty-five mixed, but all with 
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Figure 2.26 Increasing heterogeneity in Italian farming (1960-1980) 
dairying as the mainstay—showed that the standard deviation had risen 
to 27% (INEA, 1969). At the end of the 70s and beginning of the 80s, 
it had risen to 42% and practically all the farms were completely 
specialized dairy farms. This is an intriguing development. The shrink-
ing of the zones to which the data refer, from northern Italy via Emilia 
Romagna to the provinces of Reggio Emilia and Parma, the increasing 
specialization, and the rising random sample size should all lean to a 
falling standard deviation. But instead it more than doubled. Figure 
2.26 graphically illustrates this process. The variance sharply rose, 
which points to the rise and gradual spread of the E-pattern. Of course 
one cannot suppose that the growing divergence will continue to re-
produce itself. There might well emerge factors which block the repro-
duction of the I- or the E-pattern. For the period considered, however, 
the growing divergence, which contains the crystallization of the E-
pattern as a new phenomenon in agriculture, is an empirical fact. 
On the basis of Turbati's work (1971), it is possible to reconstruct 
the pattern of development for thirty-four partly specialized, partly 
mixed dairy farms for the five consecutive years from 1965 to 1969. 
The results can be compared with those of the Parma sample relating 
to the 1970s, which showed that alongside a continuing intensification, 
scale enlargement and relative extensification also led to a considerable 
rise in income. One looks in vain for such a pattern in the 1960s. 
Where there was falling production per hectare, this did not accompany 
rising incomes. The world was still simple: "bad" farming and "good" 
earnings were not yet associated. The detailed documentation clearly 
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Figure 2.27 Developmental patterns for size groups (derived from INEA, 1975, 
1976, 1977) 
shows that where a drop or stagnation of produzione occurred, this 
was usually due to hail; to sicknesses such as brucellosis; to frost on 
the vines, etc., and not to any conscious choice. The complete absence 
of scale enlargement and relative extensification as a valid pattern at 
the time, at least in the overview of Turbati, can again be interpreted 
as demonstrating the relatively recent nature of this E-pattern. 
INEA has published economic results ("risultati economici") for the 
years 1975, 1976, and 1977 based on a very large (though not constant) 
number of farms. All specializations are present. The farms are divided 
into broad bands. Analysis shows that the smaller farms (less than 10 
hectares) are distinguished by significant increases in "ground produc-
tivity" while labor productivity remains constant. For the large farms, 
the opposite—i.e., stagnating or falling hectare yields with a large rise 
in labor productivity—is the case (see Figure 2.27). There is, in short, 
a marked variation in farm development patterns, which in these studies 
primarily appears to be a function of farm size. Such figures, which 
seem to support the current hypothesis on "scale advantages," can also 
be constructed for the ERSA sample. The input of production factors 
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Figure 2.28 Intensity and size of stock in dairy farming: A cluster analysis (ERSA/ 
plain/n=75) 
per hectare is negatively correlated to the size of farm in hectares: 
r=—.43 on the plain, r= —.70 in the mountains. The GVP/ha also 
correlates negatively with area: —.19 and —.49, respectively. The level 
of incorporation, however, correlates positively with farm size: .35 and 
.47, respectively. 
And therein lies the problem. Is intensity a function of farm size? 
Or is such a relation a spurious one caused by a third variable, the 
level of incorporation? Although the question can already be answered 
in principle on the basis of the previous analysis, we will here take it 
up once more. For this it is necessary to make a strict distinction 
between the concepts of scale and size. In an absolute sense, area and/ 
or stock are indicators of size, and the relation between input of labor 
and area or stock is an indicator of scale. 
The range over the variables "size of stock" and "production per 
adult animal" in dairy farms on the plain is considerable. With a 
cluster analysis, three subgroups become discernable in this mosaic. A 
first group (see Figure 2.28) is composed of smaller farms (less than 
40 adult animals). There is a wide variation of production per adult 
animal in this subgroup and no direct relationship can be demonstrated 
between the number of adult animals and the GVP per adult animal. 
A second group comprises the larger farms (more than 40 adult ani-
mals), which achieve a low GVP per animal (less than 1.5 million lire 
per adult animal). Within this group an increase in livestock goes with 
a decrease in production per animal: GPV/adult animal = 1.13 — 0.36 
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* stock (r=.22). The most interesting is the third and numerically 
smallest cluster comprised of the larger farms which achieve a GVP of 
more than 1.5 million lire per adult animal. Within this cluster, an 
increase of livestock goes with rising productivity: GVP/adult animal 
= 1.33 + 5.98 livestock (r=.72). 
In other words high levels of intensity are possible with large farm 
size (in terms of livestock)32 if and only if labor is structured to achieve 
such a positive relationship. And that is exactly the difference between 
the second and third clusters (both of which are large-sized farms). 
Scale in the intensive group (i.e., the relationship between labor input 
and amount of stock) differs clearly from that of the second extensive 
cluster. Large farms do not need per se to be large scale. There are 
significant differences in incorporation levels also. For the large intensive 
farms, incorporation into the short-term loan market is nil. For the 
large extensive farms it is 9.2%. Incorporation into medium- and long-
term loan markets presents even greater differences: 2.8% versus 45.9%. 
Incorporation into the labor, fodder and cow markets also show signif-
icant differences. Thus, although a high level of intensity is quite 
possible for large farms, the high levels of incorporation often to be 
found in them precludes intensive production and extensive large-scale 
production becomes dominant. And to the extent that large intensive 
farms become exceptional and strongly incorporated relatively extensive 
farms become the rule, the commonsense notion that "large farms are 
just more extensive" appears empirically at least to be cogent. 
Scale: Capitalist and Cooperative Farms 
Besides family farms, one encounters in Emilia Romagna a number 
of very large farms that are either capitalist-organized or agrarian 
cooperatives. A farm area of 1,000 hectares and a herd of more than 
500 milk cows is more the rule than the exception in these categories. 
The differences in the organization of production and in production 
results are, however, astounding. The aims and structural conditions 
differ so greatly between the capitalistic and cooperative farms that the 
labor process (and thus, scale as the quantitative relation between labor 
object and direct producer) is structured in completely different ways. 
The cooperative Bracciantile, of Novellara, is one of the biggest 
production cooperatives of Emilia Romagna. It has 970 hectares of land 
and 250 workers/members, half of them men and half women. This 
fifty-fifty division does not actually coincide with marriage patterns. 
There are in fact only thirteen "couples" among the members. A striking 
number of workers are under forty years old, which is remarkable 
considering the aging population of the countryside. Agricultural plans 
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for 1979 and 1980 were very diversified. Each year more than ten crops 
were grown, besides dairy and beef cattle, pigs, etc. 
"We organize the agricultural cycle and other activities so that the labor 
peaks follow each other neatly. That is the reason for starting the pro-
duction of beet seeds again now. We are also thinking of using the 
transplanting technique again for tomato plants. That way the peak 
harvest time is more favorable to us and production per hectare is 
noticeably higher. Also that way the land is available earlier for a second 
crop. . . . We are continually busy experimenting, also with a variety of 
techniques." 
The level of mechanization is high—but not aimed at the substitution 
of labor. Raising the level of production is fundamental and continually 
kept under review. A high and specialized level of mechanization is 
one of the preconditions for this approach. The following anecdote 
about the purchase of the first tractor is typical: 
"We bought our first tractor in 1955. I remember it so well. To be able 
to buy it all the members put in a week's work with no pay, so they 
could earn the tractor. It was baptized with a feast." 
The gross value of production per hectare in 1977 was 2.56 million 
lire, significantly higher than the GVP of some thirteen similar capi-
talistic farms. These averaged in the same year 1.99 million lire per 
hectare (s=0.44). One is conscious of the noticeable differences in work 
opportunities created by the intensity of farming on the cooperative 
farm. 
"Capitalist agriculture regards us as mining, as practicing agricoltura di 
rapina [literally, rapist agriculture], that is harvest without sowing. Ob-
viously as a cooperative we have different aims: to produce and to work. 
We have to create as much work as possible and that can only be done 
through an intensive way of producing. That is our basic concept and 
that is why our production per hectare is so high. If this was a private 
concern there would not be 250 men and women working here but a 
meager 50. . . . There is a capitalist farm nearby here called La Fondiaria, 
and it is decidedly one of the better. It has about 300 hectares but there 
are only 25 men working it. Now and then you might see a lonely tractor 
in the fields but that is all. You know you can never farm well in that 
way. . . . To produce more and keep down cost is the way we work." 
But if I provide a suitable counterargument, then the answer comes in 
a routine way as if the problem had been thought through many times: 
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"You must view the economy in the right way. Feeding less and using 
less fertilizer is naturally out of the question. The produzione cannot be 
messed around with—that gets raised!" 
Along with production cooperatives Emilia Romagna has several 
cooperative dairies (stalle sociale). The form is interesting: small farmers 
join together in order to form a communal dairy and in this way their 
private land and labor are freed for other activities. Livestock in the 
communal stall is cared for by a group of workers, some of whom are 
also members. A typical cooperative dairy will have some 300 milk 
cows and an average of five or six permanent workers and about eight 
part-timers. The average gross product per adult animal lies above the 
average for the capitalistic farms, i.e., 1,507 million lire per adult animal 
as against 1,346 million (Spaan, 1982). 
Again we can conclude that farm size, in itself, bears no relationship 
to intensity of agricultural practice. Both capitalist and cooperative 
farms can rightly be called large. The production structure, however, 
is created from different goals and interests, and the concrete form of 
production factors is also very different. In capitalist farms, labor in 
itself is not the carrier of craftsmanship. In the above production 
cooperative of Novellara, just the opposite holds: 
"It is essential that everyone tries to work as well as possible, our internal 
organization stems from that. . . . Though it speaks for itself, it is actually 
in everyone's best interests!" 
Both the owners and working managers of capitalist-organized farms 
(of the BOLKAP-sample, n = 24)33 were interviewed in Emilia Romagna. 
Some essential concepts figured in their opinions—concepts which to-
gether form a specific kind of the E-calculus described earlier. Crafts-
manship as a decisive quality of labor was not only excluded; production 
was organized in such a way that it became superfluous. 
"Seeing the quality of my livestock, I can, without any anxiety, describe 
my milk yields as low. This low yield was a conscious choice which I 
have my reasons for. On a farm like this, with wage laborers, there is 
no structure for giving each cow an individual dose of feed. Between the 
best level of feed and the cow there is always the worker, and you know, 
it is risky to make the business too dependent on the workers. If I decided 
to give individual instead of standardized feeds to the cows then I would 
need far more workers. And apart from the fact that that would multiply 
the problems, it would be economically unsound." 
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Craftsmanship is being replaced by a rapid and wholesale adopting of 
externally developed innovations. 
"With beets, I harvest about 500 ql. per hectare. That is good, I mean 
look, ten years ago I was harvesting about the same, and since then there 
has not been a single innovation in beet cultivation." 
Another manager/owner said: 
"Not bloody likely, I buy craftsmanship when I need it—I don't give 
myself problems about that!" 
Craftsmanship has to do not only with direct production but also 
with the reproduction of production factors. An interesting comparison 
can be made about between a capitalist farm and an adjoining pro-
duction cooperative where both had to contend with similar land. The 
owner of the capitalist farm related how his low harvest yields were 
due to the soil type, saying "it is now such that the land here is very 
bad: it is terreno forte [heavy soil]." But the president of the production 
cooperative who has to cope with the same heavy soil said: 
"When we finally managed to acquire the land, it was not much more 
than pure misery. The land had been stripped to the bone, there was 
nothing decent to be gained from it. The latifundista [capitalist farmer] 
had sucked it completely dry and ruined it for us. . . . Ai, the work that 
that cost us. But we have succeeded, we have transformed the land. The 
cartloads of manure that it took to rescue it [the cooperative produces 
outstanding compost manure, while the capitalist farm has closed its 
sheds], and the number of workings over! . . . Don't ask me to set 
everything on the line for you because it would make me tired all over 
again. But we made it, and now just take a look at how our beet fields 
produce!" 
But say the capitalist farmers: 
"You can't compare the two, because on family farms and cooperatives, 
labor stands for income; while with us its pure cost." 
In capitalist farming enterprises there is no central place for the 
practice of craftsmanship in the structuring of the production process. 
The following factors are fundamentally against this: 
• high mobility of production factors, 
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Table 2.19. Differences in Productive Results Between Family 
Farms and Capitalist Farms (ERSA and BOLKAP/n-75 + 18) 
Family farms Capitalist farms 
GPV per adult animal 
in 1979 
GPV per adult animal 
in 1980 
I-Group 
1.60 
(0.18) 
1.67 
(0.25) 
E-Group 
1.33 
(0.12) 
1.31 
(0.27) 
1.12 
(0.20) 
1.35 
(0.53) 
• the planning and evaluation of the production cycle in terms of 
market and price relationships: in these capitalist farms entrepre-
neurship is given tout court as it were. The capitalist farmer is the 
agricultural entrepreneur par excellence, 
• a strong orientation towards profitability. 
Criteria such as produzione, so central to an I-logic, are explicitly 
absent. 
"Look, you don't need to make such hard work of aims and production 
and so on. All it is, is a question of keeping down costs and making 
sure there is a profit left over. That is why bookkeeping is so important 
for me. Your accounts will give you information that you will never get 
from a cow or a fruit tree; they will tell you whether things are going 
well or not. . . . Normally you tend to know only what comes in, what 
you receive in cash. The costs tend to slip through your fingers, and you 
forget them, and then you make false estimates. You have to be forever 
calculating." 
In short, a clear E-calculus can be seen in the reasoning of the 
managers and owners of capitalist-organized farms. From here, it can 
be proposed that the E-calculus, insofar as it is generalized in the family 
farm sector, introduces from the beginning and for structural reasons 
those guiding elements which have applied over time in capitalist-
organized farming: entrepreneurship tout court, a highly manipulable 
scale and a labor force from which craftsmanship is eliminated. In 
terms of production structure, those farms which are structured by the 
E-calculus veer strongly then towards those organized along capitalistic 
lines. Table 2.19 summarizes some comparisons. For 1979 they are 
based on the Parma and BOLKAP samples, and for 1980 they are 
based on the ERSA sample. 
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Increase in land/man ratio 
(over the 1971-1979 period) 
Figure 2.29 Developmental patterns for capitalist farms (K.) and family farms (divided 
into I- and E-farms) (Parma and BOLKAP/1971-1979/n=18+18/dairy farms) 
An analysis of farm development patterns over a ten-year period 
leads to the same conclusion (see Figure 2.29). Family farms organized 
according to the E-calculus, develop in a similar way to those farms 
organized along capitalistic lines, i.e., via a combination of scale en-
largement and relative extensification. The difference between intensive 
and extensive family farms is greater than between extensive family 
farms and extensive capitalist-organized farms. 
In the debate over the "agrarian question," the presence, absence or 
reappearance of the capitalist farm are questions rightly hedged with 
theoretical and political meaning. However, the reasoning developed 
above gives nuance to this debate because it demonstrates that the 
interaction between capitalist relations of production and agrarian pro-
duction cannot be reduced to a simple presence or absence of capitalist 
agricultural enterprises. Such a question can even less be resolved by 
resort to conceptualizations such as "structural dualism" (de Benedictis 
and Consenting 1979; Gorgoni, 1973, 1977; Koning, 1982).34 Relations 
of production which are structurally present in capitalist agricultural 
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enterprises are becoming increasingly real for a growing segment of 
family farms. Hence, the growing dominance of an E-calculus as the 
structuring principle of farm labor is a sign of the generalization of 
capitalistic relations in agriculture through the advance of incorporation, 
differential commoditization, and institutionalization. 
Notes 
1. In the ERSA data, different developmental patterns at farm level can be 
identified. If this data is trichotomized along the GVP/AA (per adult animal), 
three subgroups emerge. The first represents a growth in GVP/AA of only 2.5% 
over four years. Given the rate of inflation, this is an absolute drawback. The 
second group is characterized by a growth in GVP/AA of 25.8% over four 
years (which more or less equals inflation), while the third group shows a 
growth of 61.2%. The first two groups showed, on the other hand, a scale 
increase (adult animals per unit of labor force) of 21%, while in the third group 
this was only 7%. Income increased by 44% in both first and second groups 
as against 38% in the third group. So again two opposed growth strategies 
emerge at farm level: scale enlargement vs. intensification. 
2. Not only as far as the different patterns are concerned. Both sets of data 
are also quite appropriate for an analysis of mean trends, as shown in the 
work of Cantarelli and Salgetti (1983). Of course, there remains the question 
of the significance of these "mean" trends, when there is in fact such a difference 
behind the "mean" picture. 
3. This technique was developed and checked in an exploratory phase of 
the research, oriented to a better understanding of the elements and interre-
lations of the so-called "goal-function" of different farmers. The methodological 
inspiration was derived from an "actor oriented approach" (Long, 1977:117; 
and Galeski, 1972:12). It was especially important that no respondents defined 
the presented examples as being irrelevant or as being inadequate for symbol-
izing their own situation. Nor did any of them propose that scale and intensity 
ought to be combined in other modes (e.g. a farmer having 20 cows each 
producing 40 ql as symbolizing in some way a "marginal" farm, or 30 cows 
each producing 50 ql as being an indication of an "industrialized" farm). I am 
aware that this particular absence is due to the specific characteristics of the 
farming sector in Emilia Romagna that produces milk for cheese, where mar-
ginalization does not exist and industrialization is impossible (for a further 
discussion, see van der Ploeg, 1987). 
4. The same interrelation between types of farming and varying hectarage 
expansion was also found in Newby et al. (1978b: 185). We also registered the 
prices farmers were willing to pay (and actually paid) for land. Again there 
was a remarkable difference between I- and E-farmers, the latter being prepared 
to pay considerably higher prices. 
5. Deriving from the classical work of Bishop and Toussaint (1958:45). In 
more recent agro-economic literature the same exposition is encountered (de 
Benedictis and Consentino, 1979:211, and Cramer and Jensen, 1982:89). The 
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production function presented in Figure 2.6 can be interpreted in different 
ways, e.g., as representing relations between input and output per labor object, 
as well as representing the farm as a whole. In the text we follow the first 
interpretation. 
6. The validity of production functions based on the assumption of decreasing 
returns is increasingly questioned. Lipton (1968) discusses its use for peripheral 
agriculture, while de Benedictis (1984) does the same for "modern" agriculture. 
Theoretical agronomy now increasingly proposes that constant or even increas-
ing returns should replace the notion of "decreasing returns" (De Wit, 1976, 
1981 and Rabbinge, 1979:149). Their arguments are supported by historical 
research (Slicher van Bath, 1960; Ishikawa, 1981). 
7. A general discussion is to be found in Messori (1984). Marasi and Salghetti 
(1980) demonstrate the same relation for the Emilia Romagna mountains. For 
the ERSA data used in this study the same relation was also calculated. Thus 
"costs" were defined as all monetary expenses, "benefits" as all monetary 
income derived from sales. Then the cost/benefit ratio was calculated for each 
farm. This ratio then fits well the "folk concept" ('7a margine") as used by 
E-farmers. 
There is of course a positive and significant relation between "costs" as 
defined above and "benefits" (r=0.65, p=0.0001). However, the relation between 
"costs" and the "cost/benefit ratio" is negative (r=— 0.32, p=0.005), while the 
relation between "benefits" and the "cost/benefit ratio" (with a constant level 
of "costs") is insignificant. This implies that reduction of "costs" improves the 
"cost/benefit ratio." The same reduction of "costs" will produce an extensifi-
cation. 
I-farmers can also change the ratio between costs and benefits on their 
farms, but for them, such a change is never a goal in itself. Second, they follow 
a different strategy to get such a change, as spelled out earlier in the text. 
8. On an abstract level it could be argued that in the end there is no 
difference between economic and technical efficiency, or that when the cost/ 
benefit ratio is high technical efficiency is high and vice versa. On a conceptual 
level, however, it is useful to distinguish between input of production factors 
and technical efficiency. Only then can the position in the input-output space 
be adequately described. Timmer (1970:99) makes such a distinction when he 
discusses "allocative decisions" (regarding input levels) and "technical effi-
ciency." He adds that "only recently" have economists started to make this 
necessary distinction in their analysis. 
The cost/benefit ratio can be seen as the vector of two possible movements: 
both input and technical efficiency can change. Theoretically as well as empir-
ically (Messori, 1984) it is possible that a decrease in the input of some or all 
production factors combined with a related decrease in technical efficiency leads 
to an increase in the cost/benefit ratio. 
9. As can be derived, indirectly, from the fact that in industry it was strongly 
related to control over the process of production and therefore became an 
object of long struggles between management and labor (Braverman, 1974). 
10. With this notion a long time perspective and the necessity of sustaina-
bility are introduced. Hence, one of the essential functions of an I-calculus is 
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that all relevant practical activities are "assigned a time—i.e., a moment, a 
tempo, a duration—which is relatively independent of external necessities, of 
climate, technique or economy" (Bourdieu, 1982:162). 
11. The interaction of INC2 (see note 21 for a detailed description) and 
TATE2 has a negative effect on the input of capital per hectare (r=0.29). INC3 
and the interaction term INC1*INC2*INC3 have the following partial regression 
coefficients on use of non-factor inputs per ha: +.39 and —.90! 
If labor, capital and non-factor inputs per hectare are summed in an additive 
term, then this total input of production factors and non-factor inputs per 
hectare is negatively influenced by INC2 ( — .23) and TATE2TATE3 ( — .32). 
12. The Z-score used in the calculation is one of the composite indices for 
incorporation. Each partial degree of incorporation was standardized and then 
the eight Z-scores were summed up. There is a high correlation between this 
specific composite index and another one (represented as well in Table 1.4 of 
Chapter 1). The latter implied an addition of the monetary value (following 
current prices) of all the production factors and inputs mobilized through the 
markets. This total amount then was divided by the total value of all the 
factors of production and inputs used (including therefore the factors of pro-
duction and inputs reproduced within the farm). Graphically this is illustrated 
in Figure 1.5 of Chapter 1. Both operationalizations imply certain biases and 
problems. 
Apart from that, farmers have a certain room for maneuver vis-à-vis the 
different markets. They can choose, for instance, between dependency on capital 
markets for buying necessary machinery, or dependency on markets for machine 
services. For all these reasons the different dimensions of incorporation indicated 
by factor-analysis were used in the statistical analysis later in this chapter (see 
note 21). 
13. Neither theoretically nor analytically. The problem is that Zachariasse 
applied factor-analysis to the whole of the dependent and independent variables, 
deriving from the loading all kinds of conclusions regarding the causal relations 
and statistical correlation between variables. This is definitely wrong (Thurstone, 
1950; Brand-Koolen, 1972). 
14. The underlying problem is that Zachariasse ignored the importance and 
validity of 'Tart de la localité": "it is uncertain whether every farmer makes 
a correct evaluation of his own experience, it is questionable whether he is 
even capable of doing so" (1974b:67 and 3). 
15. The only solution then to this problem is to halt traditional research 
into attitudes (nearly all research on entrepreneurship belongs to this category) 
and start research on the actual structuration of the labor process (of which 
the management of external relations is an integral part) from an actor-oriented 
point of view. 
16. These and the following data are presented in the first place to give an 
impression of their variance; the intention is not to suggest whatever association. 
The interlinking of entrepreneurship variables with other factors will be dis-
cussed further on. 
17. This is not to deny all the minor adaptations for raising the cost/benefit 
ratio that are invented and implemented by the typical entrepreneurs themselves. 
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For the important breakthrough however, they remain dependent on external 
innovations. A good example might be the delegation of calf and heifer rearing 
to other farmers (who are then paid for their work) versus the externalization 
of the reproduction of cattle to specialized institutes which manipulate Holstein 
material. The former can and was effectively done by typical entrepreneurs on 
their own account (till the introduction of the milk quota system); the latter 
depends crucially on external technological and institutional developments. 
18. This aspect is spelled out in van der Ploeg and Bolhuis, 1983. 
19. These caseifici or cheese factories, remained small (and therefore widely 
distributed all over the Emilian countryside) for two reasons. The first is that 
making Parmesan cheese is a craft which until now has proved unsuited to 
any form of industrialization. Scale enlargement, standardization and division 
of labor are impossible. The second reason is of a political nature. Since cheese-
making implies a careful coordination between the caseificio and the farms 
delivering the milk, the cheese-maker can indeed exert a considerable influence 
on the farms and farmers concerned. Hence farmers prefer small, cooperative 
cheese factories which allow them to counterbalance this influence and to exert, 
in turn, some control over the cheese-maker. 
20. The craftsmanship index here is based on objective criteria regarding 
the organization of the labor process; that is, craftsmanship is here operation-
alized as an additive term of the CRAFTp factors presented earlier. 
21. The data on incorporation presented in Chapter 1 were submitted to 
factor analysis. The factors which emerged were then used in the calculations 
presented here and in the following path diagrams. Table 2.20 summarizes the 
results of the factor analysis applied to incorporation variables on the plain 
and mountains. 
22. This and the following path diagrams are constructed using the Gold-
berger approach (Goldberger, 1970). This method was later described by Duncan 
(1971:122) as a "path-analysis [that] amounts to a sequence of convential 
regression analyses." This applies if certain conditions such as recursiveness 
and closedness (Blalock and Blalock, 1968; Blalock, 1971) are fulfilled. This is 
the case. 
The "E-calculus" = (OPTIONp2 + OPTIONp3 - OPTIONpl) * (ENTREPpl 
+ ENTREPp2 + ENTREPp3). Several other combinations were tried out as 
well (for a detailed description and discussion of the results see Bolhuis and 
van der Ploeg, 1985, Chapter 3, note 76). Some of them generate much higher 
partial regression coefficients. However, I prefer to work here with the most 
composite and theoretically relevant operationalization. Additive instead of 
interactional models were also tried out for the operationalization of the E-
calculus (since interaction might disturb the requirement of a normal distri-
bution). Comparison, however, shows that the same results are generated in 
both cases (see Bolhuis and van der Ploeg, 1985, Chapter 3, note 73). 
Finally it must be added that in this and in the following path-analyses, 
INC4 (see note 21) has been omitted from the analysis because of its ambiguous 
character. 
23. Examining some of the debates (see among others Bernstein, 1986) one 
might well conclude that this crucial interaction between dimensions of incor-
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INCl INC2 INC3 INC4 
13: incorporation into 
short-term capital 
14: incorporation into 
medium-term capital 
15: incorporation into 
long-term capital 
12: incorporation into 
machinery services 
17: incorporation into 
feed and fodder 
II : incorporation into 
labor 
16: incorporation into 
land 
18: incorporation into 
genetic material 
Eigenvalues 
Variance explained 
market for 
market for 
market for 
market for 
markets for 
market for 
market for 
market for 
.93 
.90 
.03 
- . 05 
- . 0 9 
- . 0 4 
.02 
.70 
.84 
.04 
- . 06 .00 
- . 1 3 - . 0 5 
- . 2 2 .33 
- . 2 0 - . 0 2 
- . 0 9 - . 0 5 
- . 1 6 - . 1 1 
.19 
.84 
.70 
- . 0 5 
.15 
- . 26 
.17 
.01 
- . 8 4 
.58 
2.06 
26X 
1.43 1.10 1.05 
18X 14X 13X 
The same was done for the mountains : 
INCM1 INCM2 INCM3 INCM4 
Medium-term capital 
Genetic material 
Long-term capital 
Land 
Short-term capital 
Feed and fodder 
Labor 
Machinery services 
Eigenvalues 
Variance explained 
.90 1 
.94 | 
- . 0 4 
.11 
- . 0 9 
- . 08 
- . 0 4 
.05 
1.99 
25X 
.02 
.01 
1 :S| 
.11 
.04 
- . 0 4 
- . 5 0 
1.56 
19X 
.13 
.01 
- . 1 6 
.16 
1 78 1 -.74 
.08 
- . 1 1 
1.07 
13X 
- . 0 5 
- . 0 2 
.30 
- . 1 9 
- . 17 
- . 4 5 
1 .80 1 
.19 
.99 
12X 
poration (or commoditization) and dimensions of TATE, shows that there is 
little that is "intrinsic" to simple commodity production. Its essence lies time 
and again in the specific interaction between simple commodity production 
and its "environment" i.e., in the concrete social formation of capitalism as 
defined by time and space. Without that interaction, SCP is really unthinkable. 
There is no "intrinsic" nature to SCP outside time and space, i.e., outside its 
interaction (or articulation) with other modes of production. It is instead the 
interaction which might be interpreted as essential. The same argument is 
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developed by Mamdani (1986), who shows that what is really "intrinsic" for 
African simple commodity producers is their relations with the state, the 
political machinery and the economic circuits controlled through that machin-
ery. 
24. Readers interested in a complete statistical representation of all the 
material regarding the mountains are referred to van der Ploeg (1986, Chapters 
7 and 8). 
25. As can be derived from the data presented in note 21, the structure of 
incorporation factors in the mountains differs considerably from those on the 
plain. This mirrors state intervention in the mountains which is oriented to 
"development." 
26. In applied research, however, most authors, such as Zachariasse (1974a 
and 1974b) go a step further: they include craftsmanship as part of an all-
encompassing entrepreneurship. This is mainly done through the following two 
steps: (a) "entrepreneuring" is not analyzed as an activity, as a process, but 
essentially as an attitude (or set of attitudes) which by definition leads to and 
is associated with high profit levels; (b) craftsmanship is then operationalized 
within the same conceptual framework, i.e., as the capacity to produce a high 
net surplus per acre or per adult animal. This surplus is clearly associated with 
profits, so craftsmanship and entrepreneurship emerge in the end as being two 
sides of the same coin. However, this unilinear vision remains at odds with 
the overwhelming diversity and heterogeneity found in farming. Consequently, 
the image of "bad" entrepreneurs and "bad" craftsmanship as being something 
frequently found in the countryside is reproduced. 
27. These characteristics are strictly limited to the technical and productive 
features of the production process. This is not to suggest that other domains, 
aspects and interrelations of farming (see Chapter 1) such as the family, gender 
relations, etc., are not relevant. The intention behind the selection of these 
technical aspects (derived from the ERSA bookkeeping records, and mainly 
analyzed to calculate farm income and profit levels) is to relate the specific 
technical structure of the farm to the labor process, and hence, to relevant 
economic, institutional and social relations. 
28. The construction of these additive terms is theoretically grounded, since 
the farm labour process cannot be conceptualized, as was argued in Chapter 
1, as the execution of isolated and separated tasks. Farm labor, above all, 
consists of the careful coordination of all tasks, thus constructing a "meaningful 
pattern." 
29. The Italian version of this study (van der Ploeg, 1986, Chapter 9) 
includes an analysis which explores the similarities and differences in demo-
graphic structure, social reference groups, biographies, additional incomes, etc., 
between I- and E-farmers. No significant differences emerged. 
30. From the end of the second world war onwards, the mezzadria system 
(a kind of share cropping) largely disappeared, and the political power of labor 
unions in the countryside became strong. They imposed a law which fixed 
labor input per hectare to a very high and constant level. All this spurred 
intensification which reached a peak in the 1950s. The first wave of mechani-
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zation which then took place reinforced this process further, since it allowed 
farmers to dedicate more time (given because of the mechanization of burden-
some tasks) to the cura of their fields and animals. 
31. The market-oriented nature of farming was a constant feature. Far-
reaching commoditization and institutionalization are, however, relatively new 
processes (see Benvenuti, 1985a; and Chapter 5 of this study). 
32. It is the bigger herd that allows for better selection and improvement. 
However, whether such a possibility is put into practice depends primarily on 
the farmer's strategy. 
33. The BOLKAP sample consists of twenty-six capitalist farms on which 
there exists structural and economic data gathered by the University of Bologna 
over a ten-year period. In 1981 all the managers and owners of these farms 
were interviewed. A detailed analysis is contained in Bolhuis and van der 
Ploeg, 1982. 
34. This specific empirical constellation again highlights the stupidity of 
ascribing ahistorical, generic or intrinsic properties to simple commodity pro-
duction in order to juxtapose it with (as done in all dualistic theories) the 
capitalist mode of production. 
3 
Potato Production 
in the Peruvian Highlands 
In the southern highlands of Peru, 30 kilometers from Cuzco, in 
"the centre of the world," lies Anta Pampa. In earlier epochs it consisted 
of part morass and part lake, but it now forms a largely waterless plain 
some 3,000-3,500 meters above sea level. In the mountains which rise 
around it lie the comunidades indigenas "indigenous communities," or 
comunidades campesinas "peasant communities," as they are now called. 
During hacienda times the farmers of these communities were restricted 
to growing their crops on the rain-fed hillsides, often up to a height 
of 4,500 meters. However, during the turbulent years of the 1970s most 
of them also obtained plots of land on the pampa, where for the most 
part they grow potatoes and barley for the market and wheat, beans 
and maize for home consumption. Cattle raising is also important. 
In and around Anta Pampa a style of agriculture is practiced which 
is representative of small-scale production throughout highland Peru, 
and of its problems. Some 70% of the economically active population 
of the highlands work in agriculture. In 1972, they contributed almost 
42% of national agricultural production, mainly in the production of 
food crops. Unlike the rest of the country (coast and tropical lowlands), 
where about half of the cultivated area is devoted to industrial crops 
for export, agriculture in the highlands is almost 100% food production 
and is therefore of strategic importance for national food provision. 
Productivity in the highlands is low in comparison with that of other 
zones. On the coast, five times more is produced per unit of agricultural 
labor than in the highlands. Income levels are also low. As Caballero 
states (1981), "The farming population of the Peruvian sierra forms 
the largest component of the 'impoverished masses of Peru'; the average 
income of the sierra (between 130 and 160 dollars per capita in 1972) 
is comparable to that of the poorest Asian or African countries: the 
average farm income in the sierra amounts to about 50 dollars per 
capita." 
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This brief overview identifies a central theme of agrarian develop-
ment, namely the need to increase food production and at the same 
time improve the incomes of the agrarian population. Further hectarage 
expansion is mostly precluded by the dominant economic and ecological 
relations. That holds a fortiori for any absolute reduction of those 
practicing farming. In other words, agrarian development in the Pe-
ruvian highlands is only conceivable as a continuing intensification of 
agricultural production. For various reasons, this theme has been no-
ticeably absent from agrarian policy during recent decades, and tech-
nological and agronomic research has been minimal. However, the few 
studies that do exist on this problem highlight the great possibilities 
for intensifying agriculture in the highlands. Eguren (1977, 1978) has 
made a number of concrete suggestions for doing so. Caballero (1981) 
also emphasizes such possibilities and urges the need for rapid inten-
sification, though he is sceptical of its practicality "if the global param-
eters for agrarian development in the sierra are not changed." He points 
out that private interest on investments in the highlands is unattractive 
compared with other economic or geographical sectors. As an allocation 
mechanism, the market is simply incapable of dynamizing agricultural 
technology or of alleviating the poverty of the farming people (Cabal-
lero, 1980). 
Whatever the views as to the potential for intensification of highland 
agriculture, the trend in practice has been in the opposite direction. In 
an as yet unpublished study, Guillen has presented an historical analysis 
of agricultural production in the Department of Cuzco. On the basis 
of data from the Chamber of Commerce, he was able to estimate the 
gross value of production (GVP) for nine products for 1943 and also 
for the period 1950-1981. Of the nine products only three met the 
conditions for hectarage expansion: coffee, coca and cacao, cultivated 
on virgin land in the low-lying, semi-tropical zones (known as the ceja 
de la selva). The other six products are typical of the highland zone: 
potatoes, maize, beans, barley, wheat and wool. This distinction is 
significant because tropical and highland products manifest a completely 
different pattern of development. In Figure 3.1, the total gross value of 
production for the nine products is calculated using the 1960 value of 
the Peruvian currency, the sol. The abrupt fall in 1956, when production 
was halved, was due to the most serious drought of the century. The 
continuing fall in the 1960s was linked to the vehement and widespread 
peasant struggles taking place at the time in Valle de Convencion y 
Lares, a central area for the production of tropical crops (Fioravanti, 
1974). After 1969 (the beginning of the Velasco land reform) a new 
growth period occurred during which small-scale peasant agriculture 
was consolidated and expanded. Thus, in the years following 1968, the 
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Figure 3.1 Development of the annual gross production value for nine agricultural 
products, Department of Cuzco (at 1960 exchange rate) 
gross value of agricultural production for the Department of Cuzco 
grew by 4.9% per year. The average growth rate for the 1950-1981 
period was 1.73% per year and measured from 1943 the growth rate 
was only 0.52%. 
If, however, we compare the growth rates (1950-1981) for tropical 
and highland products, then the annual growth rate for tropical products 
is 2.83% as against a negative growth rate for highland products of 
-0.76%, and of -0.40% even after 1968. This decline was not equally 
distributed over all products. The GVP for potatoes fell annually by 
— 1.73%, and maize and wheat also had negative indices, but, in con-
trast, barley (grown for beer production) rose. For the highland agri-
cultural sector as a whole, however, in both the long and short term, 
only regression is to be observed. In fact output fell even more sharply 
than the figures imply, for over the same period, real prices rose by 
1.75%. The small price elasticity for highland products compared to 
those for tropical products is also worthy of note. Indices for maize, 
potatoes, wheat and barley amounted respectively to -0.08, 0.00, —0.37 
and -0.38; whereas for tropical products (coffee, cacao and coca) the 
figures were, respectively, 0.47, 0.30 and 0.27. 
Balancing these data to some degree against the proposition that 
marked price increases ought to be able to act as a lever for agricultural 
development, then the stagnant and negative growth patterns elucidated 
by Guillen naturally require separate explanation. Caballero, taking 
potatoes, wheat, barley and maize together, arrives at the figure of 
0.67% for average yearly growth in production (1964-1972), for the 
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highland as a whole. In the Peruvian literature, authors often confine 
themselves with references to land shortage, the possibly declining 
fertility of the soils, the scarcity of capital, and the high levels of risk. 
However, these factors, taken either separately or together, do not appear 
to offer a sufficient explanation. During recent decades, commoditization 
in the highlands has undoubtedly made significant strides. Caballero 
(1981) writes of a "commercial revolution," while others, such as Vil-
lasanta (1982) and Ccori (1982) write of increasing "commercialization." 
In the following discussion I examine the effects of this commodi-
tization process on agricultural practice. Using a comparative analysis 
we shall see that increasing commoditization leads to extensification. 
This extensification offsets the growth effects of other factors so that, 
at a macro level, the net effect is to be seen in the pattern of stagnation 
already identified. 
To investigate closely the relationship between commoditization and 
agricultural development one community out of the thirty or so com-
munities of Anta Pampa was selected for detailed study. Chacân, the 
community chosen, shows a degree of internal socio-economic differ-
entiation and has a relatively long experience of being integrated into 
markets, a view that is supported by peasants from the other com-
munities. Data were collected on fifty-two farm enterprises of Chacân 
by a team consisting of a sociologist, an agricultural economist and 
two comuneros, sons of farmers who after training in agriculture, had 
returned to work on their fathers' farms in the community. Through 
frequent interviews and at a later stage through questionnaires a large 
quantity of agronomic, economic and sociological data were gathered. 
These data, which contain a bias which will be discussed later, form 
the basis of the analysis which follows. Before proceeding with the 
actual theme, however, a number of key questions must be answered. 
Who are these farmers? How do they farm? How do they perceive their 
enterprises? Into what relationships do they enter with surrounding 
markets and institutions? And how does the commercialization men-
tioned by so many Peruvian authors work out in practice? 
The Farmers and Their Enterprises 
Let us look first at the extent to which a man can be considered a 
farmer. It is known from research (Figueroa, 1982; Long, 1979; Long 
and Roberts, 1984; De Janvry, 1981) that only a minority in the 
highlands are "real" farmers in the sense that they limit their labor to 
working only their own fields (and thus enjoy no income other than 
that derived from their own farm enterprise). The average situation is 
much more complex. As well as being a farmer, the individual is an 
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agricultural laborer, a wage laborer and a craftsman. Retail and whole-
sale trade and the possession of lorries for transport complicate the 
picture still further. Agricultural practice cannot be understood in 
isolation from these other activities. Occasionally agriculture is purely 
and only directed towards subsistence and monetary income is derived 
from other sources. This group of farmers in Chacân are described as 
"the poor." Then there are those involved in other activities in order 
to earn enough working capital to engage in market oriented agriculture. 
Agriculture and other activities cannot thus be separated. Secondary 
earnings are the cork on which agriculture floats. One also encounters 
examples of a certain complementarity: agricultural production is di-
rected towards the market and income is supplemented by the other 
activities. Within this framework various combinations are possible. 
Thus one can imagine that where the other activities are more numerous 
and lucrative, they will directly compete for labor devoted to farming. 
Farm labor then is subjected to market-derived relations: "Where will 
I earn the most? Where will my labor or money render most value?" 
(see Fernandez, 1977). 
In Chacân only a fraction of the farmers (9%) work solely on their 
own farms. A large group (45%) is involved in wage labor elsewhere, 
possibly combined with retail trading or weaving at home. This is the 
principal craft activity in Chacân where ponchos are woven for the 
tourist market in Cuzco. Twelve percent devote themselves entirely to 
this activity. There is a small group of chauffeurs—one owner-chauffeur 
and two who drive for the profit of others. Five farmers trade extensively 
(in potatoes and cattle). Finally, some 12% are involved in weaving and 
the retail trade (in running small shops). 
Are these differences relevant to agriculture? Figure 3.2 gives the 
number of man days per topo (1/3 of a hectare) in potato cultivation 
for the various occupational categories. As we shall see later, the number 
of man-days per topo is a reasonable indicator of the intensity of potato 
growing. Those involved as intermediaries in wholesale trade "invest" 
noticeably less labor in agriculture than others. Evidently the high 
return obtainable from these other economic activities is in this case 
a decisive criterion for on-farm decision making. These farmers finance 
potato growing with large loans from the Agrarian Bank while they 
invest their own financial means in trade. 
Caballero (1981) speaks of a despachamamamización in relation to 
the regression found in agricultural production in the highlands. Pacha 
mama is Quechua for "mother earth." The concept refers to the value 
that land has for the Indian population. Land must be "cared for" and 
"properly controlled." A clear relation between use and maintenance 
can be discerned in such a concept of land, which clashes with the 
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Figure 3.2 Relationship between man days/topo in potato cultivation and 
the nature and scope of secondary occupations 
notion of simply accrediting land a purely commercial value. The 
ecology of the highlands urges a careful maintenance of soil fertility 
through careful farm management. Neglecting to fight against erosion, 
for example, is perhaps easier in the short term but will exact a heavy 
price in the future. The notion of "pacha mama" is thus that of the 
guardian of the future interests of the generations to come. The present 
commercialization of agricultural production (Villasanta, 1982; Ccori, 
1982), and in particular the dependence of enterprise decisions on 
general market relations, leads to this "despachamamamización," and 
to the substitution of land as use value for land as exchange value. 
This is quite clearly the case for those heavily integrated into general 
economic circuits, such as wholesale trade. They not only use less labor 
per unit of land (i.e., they extensify), but when asked which crop they 
would most prefer to grow they all opted for barley, the crop which in 
their words "costs the least, needs little labor and which earns the 
most." 
A second observation concerns the high-flyers (see Figure 3.2), those 
who cultivate more intensively than is generally the case and who 
weave and engage in retail trading in addition to farming. They usually 
have at their disposal a small shop in the community. This combination 
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Figure 3.3 Distribution curve for the land available per farmer 
reflects a certain level of prosperity, since they do not need—as do the 
poor—to rely on wage labor as a supplementary source of income. 
However, unlike those involved in wholesale trade, they plough their 
earnings back into further intensification of agriculture. For them, 
weaving and retailing offer few opportunities in themselves for accu-
mulation or increasing investment. They invest therefore mainly in 
agriculture, and these investments result in a labor input per unit of 
land higher than for the other categories. 
The hectarage that the fifty-two Chacân farmers work or at least 
have at their disposal for eventual working (fallow land forms a nec-
essary part of the rotation system) again varies markedly. Figure 3.3 
gives a picture of the land available. The frequency distribution for the 
whole of Chacân is also shown. From this one can see that the data 
collected by the team were biased in that the small-scale farmers are 
under-represented and the middle and large-scale farmers are over-
represented. Despite this, land is clearly not a constant. Marriage and 
inheritance serve as mechanisms for the dividing and recombining of 
land, and then there are various mechanisms, partly based on the 
market, by which land can be mobilized. Although strictly speaking it 
is not possible, there is increasing talk of buying and selling land. Land 
can also be leased, and there is a compania mode of gaining access to 
land whereby a man works the land of another and divides the harvest 
in a manner previously agreed upon. In practice the rules for this type 
of arrangement can be extremely complex, as one farmer explained: 
"Next year I shall work in compania again. As you know there are lots 
of ways of doing that. Firstly, take barley, here in the village. The other 
man looks after the land, puts in the work and sees to the manure, and 
I pay for the insecticides, do the spraying and take care of the seeds. 
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Come harvest time we harvest half of the topo each: one half of the topo 
is for me, one half for him. It's again different for potatoes. We harvest 
them together and then we carefully weigh them and take exactly half 
each. Sometimes for potatoes it also works like this, I pay for example 
for the tractor to break up the land, get the land ready for planting and 
look after the seedlings. The other pays for the fertilizer. We do the 
sowing and fertilizing together; each does half of the work and the costs 
are divided honestly. Also with the spraying . . . and like I said, we then 
harvest together and go and weigh them. The seed potatoes we divide 
and those for selling are also honestly shared. Naturally it is sometimes 
done otherwise; you must always reach some agreement about these things. 
. . . It's a question of understanding each other well." 
The reciprocity stressed in this example can get lost in some patterns 
of cooperation. An asymmetrical relationship can arise which is expe-
rienced as a certain corrosion of the principle of reciprocity: 
"In compania the advantage quite often goes to the owner (of the land). 
Sometimes the land is the only thing they are willing to bring into it. 
You are expected to put in all the work and the harvest is then divided 
into two . . . imagine! . . . The problem these days is that many of the 
rich [i.e., those with much land and the capital to work it] are no longer 
willing to go along with the poor [in Spanish acompafiar, hence compania] 
. . . unless it's according to unfair rules." 
Despite this complaint, it is noteworthy that 70% of the farmers 
work, in addition to their own land, some land in compania. This 
pattern is encountered not only among the small-scale farmers but 
equally among the large-scale ones. In short, there is a network of 
compania relations that is mutually binding for farmers through which 
land and, according to our observations, also labor and tools are 
exchanged. Through these relationships farmers can mobilize a missing 
production factor or exchange it for another which they possess in 
sufficient measure. There are no abstract or general rules governing 
such exchanges; costs and benefits are worked out according to the 
individual case. Social relationships (e.g., kinship or symbolic kinship 
relations "compadrazgd") are often decisive for the exact conditions of 
the exchange. 
The effectively worked land area is also, of course, dependent on 
shifts in the cropping system (see Table 3.1 for the average land area 
as well as the average cropping system). By reducing the amount of 
fallow land, for example, one can increase the effective area. However, 
there are some specific communal rules governing this. 
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Table 3 . 1 . Average Area and Cropping System in Chacân (n=52) 
Land use Topos 
Potatoes 
Maize 
Beans 
Barley 
Wheat 
Fallow 
Total area 
2.72 
0.85 
0.97 
2.05 
0.35 
1.45 
8.39 
Farmers were asked how much land they would work during the 
coming season compared to the amount worked during the previous 
season. The results underline the extent to which the amount of land 
is a variable rather than a constant factor. Hardly any farmers planned 
hectarage similar to that of the previous season: 58% wanted to reduce 
hectarage, 37% to increase it. 
Finally it should be said that 44% thought they had enough land. 
Although, given the built-in bias in data collection, these data cannot 
be generalized, they are nevertheless interesting. They suggest that land 
expansion for the middle group and also for larger enterprises (note 
that the average farm consists of less than 3 hectares and the largest 
cultivates 6 hectares) is not the most crucial element for further de-
velopment. It is the ability to mobilize sufficient capital and labor that 
is seen by these farmers as the most important means of developing 
their farms. 
Labor 
The average household in Chacân has about five mouths to feed. 
Size is only partially related to the age of the household head, since 
parents and younger brothers often live with the young farmer and 
older farmers frequently have married children living with them. On 
average, only one family member is available to help the head of 
household with farm work. This arrangement produces a skewed re-
lationship, with a lot of mouths to feed and few hands to offset the 
amount of work this necessitates. The explanation for this problem lies 
in the high level of migration. Older children leave to earn cash 
elsewhere, and those who remain are too young to help much in the 
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fields. Only after the death or invalidity of the father do one or more 
of the older children return "to help mother" and later to take over. 
This means that the available labor per family is insufficient to do all 
the work in the fields. The peak nature of a number of activities makes 
the problem even more acute and means that outside labor has to be 
recruited in one way or another. Once again we encounter the market 
and other social mechanisms through which additional labor may be 
secured. 
The most important social mechanism for mobilizing labor is ayni, 
although in Chacân, where commoditization of labor is most advanced, 
this is less the case. Ayni in Chacân involves 70% of family production 
units, whereas in many communities it involves all such units (see also 
Hibon, 1981). Ayni is an exchange based on reciprocity; labor for labor, 
labor for traction, labor for other production factors (ploughs, saws, 
donkeys), and traction power for traction power. The form varies but 
the core concept remains that of reciprocity (Mayer and Zamalloa, 
1974; see also Long and Roberts, 1978). The reciprocity principle is 
strictly adhered to, and by preference the exchange was for similar 
services: "I work one day with oxen for you (or I lend you my oxen), 
you lend me in return a similar service." One day of harvesting requires 
considerably less effort than a day's work in the lampa (these particular 
cultivation tasks will be described later). Thus one day's help of this 
kind is by preference exchanged for one day's help of like kind. If this 
cannot be arranged, then it is one day in the lampa for two in the 
harvest. Further (though this differs from community to community 
and even within communities), one or two day's labor is exchanged for 
the loan of oxen for one day; the loan of a plough is worth a day's 
labor and oxen are exchanged for oxen. 
The system of ayni is closely interwoven with various social rela-
tionships operating within the community or family, friendship, com-
padrazgo, and co/ra^/a-membership (i.e., of the semisecret religious 
fraternities). It is within these relationships that an ayni arrangement 
is discussed and implemented. Hence ayni is one of the most important 
binding tissues of the social organization of the community, involving 
service and return service, gratitude and obligation. In short, it entails 
mutual dependency structured by a socially controlled reciprocity. It 
fulfills, in addition, other functions. To begin with, the way it works is 
closely related to the nature of the agricultural production process. 
Certain activities, such as sowing, must be carried out within a short 
space of time because the soil dries out. Thus, being able to summon 
a large body of workers at any time is of strategic significance. But it 
is more than this. The most important function of ayni, now as in 
former times, is that by means of it the unequal distribution of land, 
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tools, and traction are to some extent alleviated. It is through reciprocal 
exchange that missing resources can be mobilized. 
The interweaving of ayni with relationships of respect and social 
affection is indispensable for its adequate functioning as an exchange 
mechanism. If a team of oxen (yunta) are given to someone to use (in 
exchange for a day's work), then one must make sure that the oxen get 
enough to eat and drink, are given rest when they need it, and are not 
overdriven or beaten to the extent that the team will be unmanageable 
in the weeks that follow. These relationships of affection and respect 
govern even the simple exchange of a day's labor, since a day's labor 
will be exchanged by labor of a similar kind, and they are consolidated 
during ayni by eating and drinking together. From this practice stems 
the comment heard time and again in interviews: "With ayni you can 
rest assured that your people will come; someone who only comes for 
a day's pay can just as easily stay away." The working of ayni is then 
closely linked to the pattern of stratification in the community, just as 
it is tied to different "phases" of the demographic family cycle (Chay-
anov, 1966). 
Chacainos order themselves by reference to three concepts: ricos, 
medios and pobres; that is, rich and poor farmers and a group in 
between. The rich are those who have at their disposal a lot of land, 
their own working capital, and one or more pairs of oxen, but have 
problems of insufficient labor. The poor do not have sufficient land at 
their disposal, nor do they have the necessary means of traction. They 
do have, however, a surplus of labor power. For the group in between, 
the medios, these factors are in theory balanced, although the nature 
of the production process implies that at certain times they will suffer 
shortages and at others will have a surplus of labor, tools and traction. 
This uneven pattern seems to entail some need for an intensive system 
of mutual exchange. In this case this is structured through ayni. Figure 
3.4 provides a schematic representation of this. 
An essential function of the structure outlined is that general market 
and price relationships are excluded as organizing principles in agri-
cultural production. Tupayachi (1982) suggests that the following rule 
operated in the three communities in which he carried out detailed 
research: "one yunta for one day's labor." At local market rates, however, 
a day's labor was worth 250 soles a day as against 400 soles for hiring 
a team of oxen for a day. Could this then be described as "non-
economic behaviour?" Certainly not. The most one can conclude is 
that the mobilization and organization of production factors are regu-
lated by other relationships of scarcity and by a different mechanism 
of exchange from that operating in these "surrounding markets." In 
other words, ayni is a mechanism of exchange (which, in a manner of 
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Figure 3.4 Mutual exchange between different social strata 
speaking, creates a relatively autonomous market) that makes possible 
a high degree of adaptation to local conditions, needs, structures and 
relationships. Like compania described earlier, ayni keeps commoditi-
zation at bay, that is, it excludes a complete subordination of the 
agricultural labor process to general market relations. The regulating 
of exchange by social factors introduces boundaries which would grad-
ually disappear if a complete commercialization of exchange relation-
ships took place.1 Then general scarcity and power relationships would 
become dominant, thus excluding particular adaptations through ayni 
and compania. 
The subordination of local and relatively autonomous markets to 
national, supranational and even international markets, where the same 
price structure holds for ever greater geographical units, results in a 
"universal market," which Eisenstadt (1963) described as a market of 
"free floating resources not embedded within or committed beforehand 
to any primary ascriptive particularistic groups." Incorporation, or 
rather, "the direct attachment of local production, exchange and con-
sumption to the national market-system" (Pearse, 1968), is the main 
process from which the development of such a "universal market" 
springs. With the partial superseding of ayni by the labor market, 
which, as shown, is beginning to take place in Chacân, socially regulated 
mobilization of production factors (in this case labor) will give way to 
market determinism. New relations of production may arise and the 
sphere of economics may become decisive in the organization of pro-
duction. 
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In its first phases this process can exercise a noticeably unsettling 
effect on agricultural practice—certainly where there exists a strong 
discrepancy between locally operating exchange relationships, on the 
one hand, and the politico-economic relationships expressed in general 
market and price relationships, on the other. Polanyi (1957) argues that 
"Land and labour of course could not be transformed into commodities, 
as actually they were not produced for sale on the market. But as the 
organization of labour is only another word for the forms of life of the 
common people, this means that the development of the market system 
would be accompanied by a change in the organization of society itself. 
All along the line human society had become an accessory of the economic 
system. . . . But while production could theoretically be organized in this 
way, the commodity fiction disregarded the fact that leaving the fate of 
soil and people to the market would be tantamount to annihilating them." 
Oxen, Livestock, and Dung 
Practically all the farmers in our study had one team of oxen or 
yunta at their disposal. Only 15% had none, and 9% had the use of 
two. Under normal circumstances, 0.5 to 0.6 hectares of land can be 
worked in one day with one yunta. Thus, in terms of depending on ox 
teams, ayni is all but indispensable for agricultural practice, as the 
average hectarage in Chacân, as noted earlier, is about three hectares. 
As well as oxen, most farmers have some livestock, including a few 
cows and young steers, some sheep (often up to 20 or 30 head) and 
some pigs. Only 6% had no livestock. Apart from their value as a 
source of meat, milk and traction, livestock are also important for 
manure. Dung is carefully collected, dried, and stacked and later taken 
to the fields. Livestock are also important as a form of "security." 
After a bad year some animals can be sold to make it possible to 
purchase the necessary means of production for the following cycle. 
Capital 
The relative increase in various costs compared to prices, the im-
poverishment of the rural population, which often leads to the con-
sumption of some of the means of production (such as potato seedlings), 
technological development, which requires an increasing use of inputs 
manufactured elsewhere—all these factors have resulted in an increase 
in the need for working capital to finance each stage of the production 
cycle. Working capital is not only used to purchase relatively expensive 
inputs only available on the market, such as chemical fertilizer, but is 
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also increasingly used for obtaining labor, oxen and land. The ways in 
which capital is obtained and thus the relations it introduces into the 
labor process can differ markedly. One can distinguish three patterns, 
which at the same time reflect the social stratification of the community. 
Patterns of differential commoditization and the internal stratification 
of the peasantry seem here to be closely linked: the different mecha-
nisms for mobilizing capital are strongly associated with the social 
definitions of ricos, medios and pobres.2 Although from a theoretical 
point of view it may be surprising that mechanisms of economic 
accumulation define to such a degree the patterns of social stratification, 
the Chacân farmers themselves recognize this and use specific com-
moditization patterns to define social strata. They also use the argument 
in reverse when they explain a certain commoditization pattern by 
reference to a specific socio-economic position. 
One must bear in mind in the following discussion that the concepts 
used to define the different strata are sharply demarcated, whereas 
empirically the boundaries are much more fluid and liable to change. 
Los Pobres 
The production and reproduction schemes of los pobres are in essence 
very simple. The harvest is divided into seed potatoes for the coming 
year and the rest for family consumption. Production is not marketed 
and production factors seldom pass through markets. If the household 
is not self-sufficient in land, labor and traction, they are mobilized 
through ayni and compania. The only working capital they have is in 
the form of their standing crop or the seed potatoes preserved in the 
house. 
Agriculture as practiced by the poor does not interact with the 
market. This does not mean to say that the poor live a life of economic 
self-sufficiency. Far from it. Necessary cash income is earned in wage 
labor elsewhere and through the sale of home-produced craft products. 
The point is, however, that this form of earning cash is structurally 
separated from agricultural practice, and so agricultural practice is not 
commoditized. The president of the community at the time of the study 
summarized the position of the pobres as follows: 
"The poor farmers are those with very little land, a few topos, let's say 
less than two hectares. They are the ones who only plant for their own 
consumption, who harvest some ten bags of potatoes per topo, a poor 
harvest, and they eat from this, and you'll see no chemical fertilizer 
there. They are people who work elsewhere. . . . Actually they are laborers 
who grow their own food because it's cheaper than buying it. Moreover 
they don't earn every day . . . so they have to work their fields as well." 
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Following Figueroa (1982), Kervin (1982) argues that this stratum 
of the poor is unable to fulfill a meaningful role in any kind of agrarian 
development. Suppose for the sake of argument that the total income 
of such households is 100 soles and that the market value of the food 
grown for home consumption amounts to no more than 46% of total 
income (Figueroa, 1982), of which the potato share is no more than 
20% (Equiplan, 1979). If a part of the potatoes were sold (in a situation 
of surplus), then this would imply only about 3% of the total income. 
Now suppose that new varieties are introduced which double the potato 
yield per hectare. Leaving aside the fact that the purchase of such 
varieties and the additional inputs of fertilizer and pesticide hardly fit 
with the production and reproduction scheme sketched above, the fact 
remains that the effect of such a doubling of monetary earnings would 
be minimal—according to Kervin, 15% at most. None of the authors 
reject improvement in agricultural methods per se but they conclude 
that the results would be manifested primarily at the level of improved 
nutrition. There will be little impact on agricultural growth. Further-
more, they contend that improving the lot of this group could best be 
achieved through raising wages; the virtual absence of any commodi-
tization of agriculture as practiced by this group precludes their being 
manipulated by prices and market intervention. 
Los Ricos 
"Rich farmers," explained Chacân's president, 
"often have four or five hectares, or perhaps even more; sometimes of 
course less. And they don't need credit. They have their own capital and 
can buy what they need . . . just like that. . . . Mostly you see its the 
rich who buy most inputs, the most fertilizer, they also then produce the 
most, they till the land quite well. . . . Of course there are the traders 
too. They are also rich, but often they till the land badly. They borrow 
money from the bank even though they have enough money of their own. 
But we don't really consider the traders as members of the community, 
they are not comuneros, just folks who bring us down." 
It is neither the amount of capital at a man's disposal nor simply how 
much land a man has that forms the decisive criterion for a definition 
of el rico, but the combination of land and having "the money with 
which to work it." 
"A farmer who has a lot of land but has no money of his own to work 
it and has to borrow from the bank, that is decidedly not a rich farmer." 
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Figure 3.5 The calculus employed in Chacân 
And the reverse, a little land and a lot of money? 
"Such a person is also poor because he can't earn a sou with his money, 
he will use up his money on the market (for buying the things he can't 
grow) and so in the end all that remains to him is the small bit of land." 
Asked whether someone with a lot of land but without capital would 
be considered rich or poor, 58% answered that they would call him a 
pobre and 27% said that a fair description would be that he was a 
medio. This answer was motivated by the argument that in this situation 
credit could be obtained. Only 12% were of the opinion that a lot of 
land was sufficient to be considered a rico. 
The production and reproduction scheme of the ricos is of a "his-
torically guaranteed autonomous" nature. The pool of labor, work ob-
jects, and means are ensured by the preceding production cycles as 
well as by the cooperative links previously entered into (ayni, com-
pania). Some inputs, such as fertilizer, must be purchased on the 
market. Their purchase is likewise paid for from the harvest of the 
previous cycle. Thus reproduction remains historically guaranteed. "De 
la buena production vierte tu capital ("from good production comes 
one's capital"), say the people of Chacân. Good production (i.e., a good 
yield per hectare) forms the key, both for the maintenance and for the 
further development of production. "One's capital" is thereby seen not 
only as a result but at the same time as a prerequisite for being able 
to gain a good production. 
Such a process is clearly evident in the logic which the farmers of 
Chacân draw upon. This logic is schematically summarized, using folk 
concepts, in Figure 3.5. A benevolent "pacha mama," sufficient capital 
(sometimes also called la principal) and ayuda (literally meaning "help" 
but used here to mean additional labor input ensured by the mechanism 
of ayni) are held to be the essential prerequisites for "working properly." 
The latter is a strongly held normative principle in all respects. The 
carrying out of all the specific tasks was repeatedly accompanied by 
some amplification such as "to do it properly," or "to do it the proper 
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way." And asked which is better, "to do a good job," or "to get it done 
quickly," for the various tasks such as planting, weeding, and the like, 
virtually no one thought the second possibility a legitimate one. Working 
properly leads to a good harvest. The meaning of this cannot be simply 
reduced to the monetary value of the harvest when sold. A plentiful 
production of course results in the increase of one's capital, but it also 
increases the respect a person receives from the community. Such a 
person is seen as a capable, good farmer—an image which can be 
enhanced by giving small parts of the harvest as gifts or as help to 
others. This respect is in turn necessary for rallying ayni and compania 
relations in the following season. And finally, a good harvest will ensure 
for you a "grateful land." Because it is worked well, the land will 
provide a good beginning for the following season. "What you give to 
the land, the land gives you back. In like measure to which she is 
worked and cared for will the coming harvest be plentiful." 
Where, in practice, labor is structured through such logic, productive 
activity is strongly directed to ensuring the prerequisites for the fol-
lowing production cycle. In that sense, the logic or calculus can be 
considered a reflection of, and a consciously applied precondition for, 
the pattern of historically guaranteed autonomous reproduction men-
tioned earlier. An intriguing aspect of Chacân logic is the balance 
between the individual and the collective. The logic outlined refers to 
a world which can be overviewed and to some extent manipulated by 
the individual farming family, which allows him to adapt the degree 
to which labor is structured as "good work" to his own individual 
needs and capacities. At the same time the prerequisites and results 
refer to the community sphere: "Respect" is acquired within the com-
munity and in this community it is converted into "help." Both of 
these terms, and the interconnections between them, refer, in other 
words, to social networks in the community. This also applies to 
"capital": it is supplemented and reallocated through social networks. 
Finally, essentially the same holds true for "pacha mama." Specifying 
the precise manner in which the good mother earth must be worked 
in order to show respect for pacha mama is deeply anchored in com-
munity traditions. Even the rotation of individual fields covering various 
sections of community land was specified directly by the community. 
A second intriguing aspect of this calculus or logic is that it is 
supported and thought legitimate by just about everyone. Although 
clearly there are differences in the way work is carried out in practice, 
the tenet that one must "work properly" (i.e., respect pacha mama to 
produce a good harvest) is upheld by everyone. In contrast to other 
agricultural zones, such as the Italian Po valley region, the people of 
Chacân have developed no alternative to the calculus sketched here for 
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legitimizing any other way of working. Naturally the calculus outlined 
does not mean that what happens in the fields will be uniform. Insofar 
as a calculus displays itself in a particular style of farming, there are 
naturally within that framework a number of possible variations, such 
as Hofstee (1985) made clear. The prerequisites that farmers have at 
their disposal—i.e., the measure to which they can depend or draw 
upon social networks to mobilize ayuda, pacha mama, and, where 
necessary, capital—varies from farmer to farmer. Also, the measure to 
which a farmer thinks these networks ought to be mobilized will differ: 
in other words, within each household, the concept of "working prop-
erly" will take on its own specific form depending upon such factors 
as the availability of family labor, the relationship between family labor 
and the number of mouths there are to feed, and the time perspective 
held by the family. 
Thus, both the practical application of this calculus and the measure 
to which it can be achieved vary and allow for considerable flexibility 
in adapting farming to inter-household dynamics. Within this system 
there emerges an important degree of heterogeneity in the fields. Such 
a mechanism can also be discerned in Chacân itself. Asked who 
achieved the highest production levels (who gathered the best harvest), 
52% of the farmers replied that is was the rich who had sufficient 
capital, land and labor (either through their own family or through 
ayni or wage labor relations). External factors, however, can also occur 
which make adherence to the calculus impossible. In the following 
sections of this chapter I will investigate in this connection the extensive 
and often abrupt commoditization of agricultural practice in Chacân. 
In an ongoing process of commoditization, the notion of a "good 
harvest" is replaced by the notion of the current market value of crops. 
And "working properly" can, in the eyes of the farmer, become pri-
marily a cost measuring exercise where costs must be kept to a min-
imum. 
Although the process of commoditization is relatively advanced in 
Chacân (even compared to northwest European agricultural systems), 
Chacân has not yet developed a calculus that corresponds to this high 
level of commoditization—that is, one where the increasing relevance 
of market and price relations is understood and legitimized as a guiding 
principle for agricultural practice and where, as in the E-calculus de-
scribed for Italy, market and price relations are translated into the 
organization of labor and the development of production. There is, in 
Chacân, no such alternative to the prevailing calculus. That is striking. 
Recent research in the Netherlands, the Italian Mezzogiorno, and Ireland 
shows how diverse calculi are handled. Some of these respond to a 
high level of commoditization, while others are basically aimed at 
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maintaining a certain degree of autonomy (see Maso, 1986; Bolhuis 
and van der Ploeg, 1985, especially Chapter 4; Leeuwis, 1988; Long et 
al., 1986). Although it can only be speculated upon here, this phenom-
enon is understandable. A calculus in which institutional and economic 
preconditions are made the explicit and exclusive starting point for 
agricultural practice would be an exceedingly fragile construction, for 
the relevant institutions are very unstable. A change of government can 
result in a major shift in the credit requirements of the Agrarian Bank. 
Development projects financed from abroad come and go. The insta-
bility of agricultural markets speaks for itself. Adequate technologies 
through which rapid growth in scale could take place barely exist, and 
insofar as they are available, scarcely show any advantage over indig-
enous techniques. And, finally, the ecological dangers of an imaginary 
E-calculus are here great and can clearly be seen. The "neglect" of 
pacha mama, or the interrupting of rotation systems to allow the most 
profitable crops to dominate, can perhaps offer short-term financial 
reward but are in the longer term disastrous. 
Perhaps here lies an important part of the drama of the Andes. 
Confronted with an unmistakable undermining of their own specific 
rationality (as outlined in Figure 3.5) these farmers lack a changing 
conceptual scheme (a new calculus) within which the material changes 
occurring (such as rapid commoditization) can be interpreted as ratio-
nal. What remains is a feeling of inadequacy, which one might call, 
along with Levi Strauss, a certain "tristesse." They know how to work 
the land "properly" but feel themselves forced to "hasten." "Now it is 
impossible, the world has gone mad," is the lament of an evening at 
the edge of a field; "it doesn't work anymore, the world is crazy." "You 
still work hard, but proud is something you can't be anymore." The 
tension between the existing calculus and the increasingly adverse 
circumstances results in feelings of powerlessness and dismay, without 
the real causes being clearly identified. Notions of the past are coloring 
what they now miss: "Ay, there used to be pure gold planted in these 
fields!" And the growing incapacity to produce a "good" harvest is 
reified by characterizing the farmers in question as "drunkards . . . 
and the drunkards are increasing" (where a "drunkard," or borracho, 
is a man incapable of doing any good work). 
The pattern of relatively autonomous, historically guaranteed repro-
duction, described simply but graphically by the farmers in Chacân as 
"trabajar por cuenta propria" ("working for one's own account," for 
oneself), not only implies specific dynamics but specific vulnerabilities 
as well. Thus, as Bernstein (1977) argues, "The crucial moment in the 
penetration of [traditional agriculture] by capital is the breaking of its 
cycle of reproduction." A "squeeze" can arise not only on the level of 
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Table 3.2. "Can Those Who Work with Credit Become Rich? 
Had not borrowed in 
previous season 
Had borrowed in 
previous season 
Difference 
No 
31X 
53X 
+22 
Maybe 
19X 
12X 
-7 
Yes 
50X 
35X 
-15 
exchange relationships but also according to Bernstein, "by rural de-
velopment schemes which encourage or impose more expensive means 
of production (improved seeds, tools, more extensive use of fertilizers, 
pesticides, etc.) with no assurance that there will be increased returns 
to labor commensurate with the costs incurred." Finally, there is "the 
precariousness" of small-scale peasant production. Indeed production 
is so organized (through the use of different ecological levels, diversi-
fication and also by the application of livestock as reserve funds) that 
failed harvests are not able so easily to bring the whole reproduction 
of the enterprise and farm family into danger. However, an increasing 
shortfall in autonomous reproduction is naturally not ruled out, and 
this can encourage borrowing, which brings us to the next category, 
los medios. 
Los Medios 
This concept, which defines a particular category of farmers, is closely 
associated with that of acquiring credit. When asked "Who works with 
credit, the rich, poor or middle farmers?" 52% replied the medios, 24% 
said the poor, and no one thought that the rich would work with credit 
(24% did not respond). In answer to the question "Can those who work 
with credit become rich?" 42% thought not. The striking thing is that 
it is the farmers who borrow money who are the ones who think one 
cannot become rich through credit (see Table 3.2). They had not 
abandoned the possibility of becoming rich ("the hope of getting a bit 
ahead"), but their experience of credit had led to skepticism rather 
than optimism. 
With increasing incorporation into the capital market, a quite dif-
ferent pattern of production and reproduction emerges. Reproduction 
(and thus production too) becomes market- and future-dependent. Pe-
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ruvian researchers often speak in this connection of commercialization, 
or mercantilización (Ccori, 1982; Tupayachi, 1982; Villasanta, 1982). 
Bernstein talks of "commoditization" and Pearse (1976) defines the 
same process as "incorporation." The terms are different, but they all 
refer to the process by which market and price relationships penetrate 
the core of production. Thus means and objects of labor increasingly 
enter the process of production as commodities. In practice this scheme 
can emerge in many different ways—for example, through paying for 
labor with a part of the harvest in either cash or kind. However the 
most common mechanism through which this scheme becomes a reality 
is by financing the entire production cycle with short-term credit. And 
it is this that at some decisive point impedes the application of the 
calculus with which farmers used to structure their labor and produc-
tion. 
Two formal credit institutions were operating in Chacân: the Agrar-
ian Bank, oriented to the middle farmers with a relatively large amount 
of land, and the Proderm Program, which aimed at the upper layer of 
the poor and the bottom layer of the middle group (Madueno, 1980). 
Of the fifty-two farmers, 42% had worked without credit in the previous 
agricultural season; 41% had worked with credit from the bank; and 
the rest had worked with credit from Proderm. The situation is not a 
static one. Of the farmers who had not borrowed money in the 1982/ 
83 season, 77% had had some previous experience with formal credit 
mechanisms, and of the farmers who worked with credit during our 
research, 31% intended to work without borrowing the following year 
(i.e., they would work "for their own account"). 
Credit mechanisms have thus become an everyday part of life, in 
the sense that practically all farmers have experienced them. At the 
same time, the situation obviously fluctuates, in that periods of taking 
up credit are interchanged with periods of working for one's own account 
and vice versa. The fact that so many farmers have experience with 
credit, and that credit plays an increasingly large part in financing 
production costs, is linked to how its role within the global process of 
rural development is perceived. Up until the 1970s, agricultural econ-
omists generally held the view that the role of formal credit in the 
"capital formation" of small-scale farm enterprises was rather limited. 
Next to their own labor and savings, and the use of informal credit 
circuits (Firth, 1964:30), formal credit would amount to, at most, 20% 
of the "real resources allocated to capital formation" (AID, 1973:XX, 
5). Such observations coincided with or mirrored the northwest Eu-
ropean agricultural development experience. There emerged a general 
awareness of the fact that: (a) extensive substitution of the farmer's own 
resources by borrowed capital brings about substantial differences in 
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farm development, and (b) an evaluation of such differences would 
show largely negative consequences for those enterprises that were 
heavily indebted (see Dijkstra and van Riemsdijk, 1952). 
In the 1970s, however, two studies introduced a "new school of 
thought, which attributes to credit and financial markets an importance 
in economic development exceeding that usually recognized" (AID, 
1973). These studies (Williams and Miller, 1973; McKinnon, 1973) 
maintained that not only was 20% an underestimation but that credit 
should be seen as crucial for stimulating other contributions in capital 
formation, such as personal savings. Be that as it may, since the 1970s 
small farmer credit programs have become a substantial part of agrarian 
policy in most of the Third World. In Peru there has been a similar 
rapid expansion of credit. Haudry (1978:79) states that agricultural 
credit grew from 3,775 million soles in 1966 to 24,215 million in 1976. 
Measured in real terms, credit provided by the state-controlled Agrarian 
Bank doubled in this period—but it should be noted that this was only 
a fraction of the total amount of credit taken up. Salaverry (1981:14) 
concludes that it amounted to some 27% of the total. Commercial 
houses, transporters, and the like, provide another 49% and the re-
maining 24% originates from non-commercial sources, principally the 
family. The volume of credit provided by the Agrarian Bank is thus 
an underestimation of the size of total commercial credit. 
In 1966, the amount provided by the bank amounted to only 8.4% 
of the total value of production in agriculture. By 1976 it had risen to 
19.1%, and from 1976 to 1980 further expansion took place to as much 
as 41% of the total value of production (Ministerio, 1981:20,27). Pro-
duction for home consumption is included in the total value of pro-
duction. We are seeing, therefore, very rapid and substantial commod-
itization which goes much further than the case of Italy (Fabiani, 1979). 
The use of farmers' own savings is rapidly being replaced by the use 
of short-term credit. This process is partly related to inflation and is 
closely linked to the substitution of parts of the agricultural labor 
process by inputs manufactured elsewhere. The use of industrially 
produced cattle feed, veterinary products, chemical fertilizers, pesticides 
and "modern" seed is rising rapidly. The purchase of such non-factor 
inputs in 1970 was still only 8.9% of the total value of production, but 
by 1979 it constituted 16.7%. The use of these commodities often leads 
to the borrowing of credit—and thus to further commoditization. 
Credit mechanisms themselves often lead to further commoditization. 
The provision of short-term credit (and this is the biggest slice of the 
credit given by the Agrarian Bank) is based on a specific interpretation 
of the non-factor inputs per hectare to be applied. In practice credit 
operates in the following fashion: the bank opens an account in the 
Potato Production in the Peruvian Highlands 173 
name of the farmer or cooperative but allocates the credit to various 
commercial agencies. The borrower can then pick up the prescribed 
inputs at these agencies. After the sale of the harvest, however, he pays 
both interest and capital back to the bank. 
It needs no imagination to see that such a structure gives rise to a 
strong and often one-sided prescription for agriculture. Credit is espe-
cially orientated towards commercial crops. Credit mechanisms stim-
ulate the production of particular kinds of crops. Originally only a 
fraction of potato production was financed this way, the reason being 
that 41% of national potato production was consumed by the farming 
households themselves. Meanwhile, 29% was exchanged through non-
market mechanisms (treque), and only 30% of the total was handled 
by the market (Eguren, 1981:11). If credit mechanisms, for whatever 
reason, now penetrate this sector, this necessitates increased commer-
cialization. Thus, taking up credit—itself an essential element in the 
commoditization process—generates further commoditization. In this 
sense, the observation that "credit facilities are an integral part of the 
process of commercialization of the rural economy" is correct (World 
Bank, 1975a:5). 
Often there is a high degree of internationalization behind many of 
these credit facilities. For example, in 1983, 54.9% of all agrarian credit 
provided in the Department of Cuzco was financed by funds from the 
EC and the Netherlands (Haudry, 1984: part 2, annexo XIV, 1). One of 
the consequences is that the criteria operative in the international 
capital market also become operative in the fields of Chacân. Peruvian 
funds used within the framework of these programs must also satisfy 
the same criteria. The "universal market" of Eisenstadt (1963) is thus 
indeed created. 
This universal market is not complete, however, for besides the 
capital markets and credit agencies mentioned, capital may also be 
mobilized through social mechanisms. Compania is one such way. 
Capital is mobilized through temporarily cooperating through labor or 
land with someone able to contribute the capital. Ayni also functions 
to mobilize capital. As one medium farmer put it, 
"The rich are quite happy to lend, they earn well from it. They give you 
maybe 100,000 soles to buy fertilizer, and for that you have to go and 
work for him for ten days. Every month two days, by oneself or with 
your wife who helps in the kitchen, depending on the arrangement. The 
days that you work only take care of the interest. At the end of the 
season you have to pay the 100,000 soles back with what you earn from 
the harvest. And if that doesn't go well, ay, then you have to work for 
him another ten days the following season and still pay the money back." 
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Under this form of ayni, reciprocity has largely disappeared. It has 
become an asymmetrical relationship which carries an element of ex-
ploitation. Nevertheless, there remain striking differences between for-
mal credit lending and capital mobilization through informal mecha-
nisms. Compania entails the spreading of risks between both parties. 
With ayni there is, in principle, a more flexible time span than is the 
case with formal arrangements—a difference appreciated by one farmer 
when he said, 
"In order to get a new loan you always have to have the last one paid 
off, the bank is very strict about that. If you haven't settled then they 
send someone round with a lawyer and they take your livestock in 
payment. That's why many people have a deep mistrust of the bank. 
With Proderm it's a bit easier but even there you're well advised to 
think twice." 
Land, labor and capital can be linked to the different markets or 
mobilized through various social mechanisms. Table 3.3 provides an 
overview of these different mechanisms. The clear trend in the com-
munities in and around Anta Pampa of replacing socially regulated 
patterns of mobilization in favor of an increasing market dependency 
was already indicated in the foregoing discussion. I will now explore 
comparatively the effects of commoditization on the farm labor process. 
I will do so through a discussion of soil fertility, the reproduction of 
seed potatoes, and finally, by analyzing the process of production itself. 
Farm Labor: 
The Production of Soil Fertility 
The farmers of Chacân farm at different ecological levels, from the 
pampa to muy arriba (i.e., the high altitudes). The pampa is the lowest 
and most level land and is suitable for irrigation. From time imme-
morial these pampa lands belonged to the communities, although a 
long process of land encroachment led to the growth of the great 
haciendas. One peasant depicted the hacienda situation thus: 
"The hacendados worked the land badly. Here in the community at that 
time we were 600 families with at most 1,100 hectares of land for our 
use. Thus we went to the hacienda to work but there wasn't really much 
work and we were obliged to go to Cuzco or the Valle Sagrado to find 
work." 
175 
Table 3.3. A Summary of Mechanisms for the Mobilization of Factors of 
Production and Non Factor Inputs 
Production factors and 
non factor inputs 
"Traditional" or non-
market mechanisms 
"Modern" forms and 
mechanisms 
Land inheritance, marriage; 
communal decisions; 
compania; use of 
communal grazing lands ; 
collective or individual 
use of occupied land 
purchase/sale of land; 
renting and hiring (i.e. 
incorporation into land 
market) 
Capital compania; savings; 
family capital ; loans 
from friends; informal 
credit from shop 
keepers; earnings from 
work elsewhere; earnings 
from craftwork; etc. 
incorporation into capital 
markets (short- and medium-
term loans from Agrarian 
Bank and PRODERM develop-
ment program) 
Labor ayni; compania; faenas incorporation into labor 
market 
Traction ayni (oxen for labor incorporation into market 
following rules governing for machinery services 
reciprocity); use of (hire of tractor) or hire 
communal tractor of oxen 
Farm implements 
Fertilizer 
ayni and craft-made 
implements 
manure produced on the 
farm; guano obtained 
through exchange; inter-
change with other 
communities; communal 
planning and control of 
rotation schemes 
hire or purchase of needed 
implements 
purchase of fertilizer 
(often combined with 
incorporation into 
capital market) 
Seed 
Knowledge 
own production and purchase 
selection; exchange with 
compadres from other 
ecological zones (papa 
de regalo) 
craftsmanship and art de 
la localité gained 
through experience and 
embedded in community 
norms about good farming 
external prescriptions and 
control by market agencies, 
Agrarian Bank, rural 
extensionists and develop-
ment programs 
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Then at the beginning of the 1970s a large cooperative was established 
by officers of the land reform. It was a failure in all respects (Casaverde, 
1979; Egoavil, 1978; Matos Mar and Mejia, 1980). Finally the lands 
were "taken" by the peasant communities (Rocca et al., 1980; Cencicap-
Anta, 1980). 
"The cooperative worked just like the hacienda and that's why we oc-
cupied it and took it over. We have the titles and have studied them 
well: that land belongs to the communities. Finally we divided up the 
land taken. The rich farmer and the poor all got land. We are better off 
for that. We are now 1,000 families with 2,200 hectares of land. We have 
more grazing land, more animals. Men go less to Cuzco and Valle Sagrado 
for work. More children now go to school." 
In the pampa lie the maizales, plots of land on which maize and 
potatoes are grown in turn. Higher up lie the plots of land which 
cannot be irrigated and where cultivation is dependent on rainfall. 
These are called temporales. They are plots which necessitate a complex 
system of rotation. The farmers of Chacân are generally of the opinion 
that with careful working and the application of a good rotation system, 
these plots can bring a similar yield to those in the pampa. At very 
high altitudes the yields naturally fall. 
The rotation system is important for the production of soil fertility. 
At present the most frequently used system of rotation is to plant 
potatoes in the first year; barley, wheat or maize in the second; and in 
the third mostly beans, after which, where possible the land is left 
fallow for a year before beginning the cycle again with potatoes. 
There are many variations possible on this general pattern. Some 
farmers lengthen the fallow period; others eliminate it in order, for 
example, to extend the growing of barley and potatoes. However, grow-
ing more potatoes in this way has detrimental consequences for soil 
fertility. Chacân farmers say that when the period for growing potatoes 
is lengthened and the fallow period is decreased, the land becomes 
"colder" and "tired." Rotation and the frequency of potato growing 
influence the number of pests and disease that occur in the different 
plantings. The percentage of land lying fallow and the percentage under 
potato cultivation fluctuates considerably. An average farm with 8.4 
topos has 2.7 topos in use for potatoes (SD = 2.2) and 1.5 topos lying 
fallow (SD = 1.4). The percentage given to potatoes can vary from 9 
to 72%! And the percentage for land lying fallow can vary from 0 to 
33%. Of the fifty-two farmers in the sample, sixteen had no land resting. 
One of the most frequent topics of conversation in Chacân is the 
falling potato yields: 
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"Pucha! Fifteen years ago or so, the potato harvest still gave good returns. 
We used to be able to collect a lorry load from one topo, and that meant 
a lot in those days. Then you could still enjoy yourself. . . . After the 
harvest everyone bought his four crates of beer to get through the nights 
happily." 
It would seem obvious then to relate falling potato yields to increas-
ing pressure on land, a relationship which would proceed via the 
elimination of the fallow period from the rotation system. Comparison 
with earlier studies (Sabogal Wiesse, 1966) shows that the fallow period 
has indeed been noticeably reduced. However, this reasoning is not 
sufficient. To begin with, since the invasion of cooperative land there 
in fact has been less rather than more pressure on land. Furthermore, 
increasing pressure on land does not mean per se reducing fallow 
periods. Technically, it should also be possible to intensify and stick 
to the rotation scheme. Also, the reduction of fallow periods does not 
need to result in "tired land" and poorer yields. With better fertilization 
and rotation, one should be able to maintain or even improve the level 
of soil fertility. 
Naturally, fertilizing plays a large part in producing soil fertility, in 
"respecting pacha mama." Again one meets great variation. The appli-
cation of chemical fertilizer for potatoes varies from 0 to almost 600 
kg per topo. There are also noticeable differences regarding other crops 
which indirectly influence the results of potato cultivation. In addition 
to chemical fertilizer, different types and amounts of dung are used. 
Some swear by sheep dung; others prefer cow dung which is sometimes 
bought by the wagon load from neighboring communities. The use of 
chemical fertilizer dates from the mid-1960s, when a fertilizer factory 
was built nearby in Cachimayo. A development program directed by 
the University of North Carolina introduced a package for potato 
growing that included fertilizer and credit. Until then, island guano and 
urea were primarily used. For many farmers buying fertilizer and credit 
are closely bound together, both historically and practically. Expenditure 
on fertilizer can amount to a third of total costs. To fertilize one topo 
reasonably costs the same as fifty-five days' wages (Madueno, 1980). 
On what does such a difference in the degree of fertilizing depend? 
In Figure 3.6 the total sample of fifty-two farmers is divided into four 
categories. The rich are those who possess the means to produce well 
without needing to call on credit institutions. The second and third 
categories are composed of farmers who use credit from the Agrarian 
Bank and Proderm. The fourth group are the pobres, who grow only 
or primarily for their own consumption and use no chemical fertilizer. 
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Figure 3.6 Relationship between fertilizer use, amount, and origins of working capital, 
Chacân (n = 52) 
The amount of fertilizer applied bears a strong relationship to the 
category to which the farmer belongs. The ricos use the most chemical 
fertilizer, at 420 kg per topo. The variance within the group is relatively 
high (SD = 98). The amount applied by farmers who borrow from the 
bank is significantly lower, the average being 310 kg per topo. Here 
there was also a fair degree of variance (SD = 64). A closer analysis 
shows that this variance is related to the availability of private means 
with which to supplement the amount borrowed. 
Entering into loans is more than simply substituting private for 
market-related resources. Farmers who take credit apply substantially 
less fertilizer per unit of land than the rich farmers. Farmers who take 
part in the Proderm Program use an average of 295 kg per topo. The 
variance is minimal, partly because of the supervision of Proderm 
officials and partly because of the specific form credit arrangements 
take. Farmers do not receive the money itself but a specified amount 
of fertilizer. Finally, the poor, who have barely any private resources 
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and do not wish or are unable to take up credit, use no fertilizer or 
at most only one or two bags. 
Yet why do farmers who borrow money use less fertilizer per unit 
of land than the rich? To explain this one must take several factors 
into account: 
1. The bank deals with schemes in which the production costs and 
amounts loaned are specified, but the farmer can borrow the 
maximum amount and use it for purposes other than those in-
tended. (This is not ruled out by Proderm but is more difficult 
when credit is in kind.) Some farmers may borrow more money 
than that formally laid down for the scheme, particularly if they 
have the necessary security (land, livestock, or a lorry). However, 
farmers usually borrow less than the bank will in principle give 
them. 
2. During interviews and in the sample questionnaires farmers were 
asked whether the amounts borrowed were deemed sufficient. The 
majority (83%) said no but added that they had not wished to 
ask for more. 
"If I had enough money of my own then I would naturally buy more 
fertilizer; logical, then I would have a bigger harvest." 
Time and again it appeared that in the case of borrowed money 
farmers felt obliged to think or calculate in ways other than would 
be the case if they had sufficient private resources: 
"Look, what is asked from the bank depends ultimately on the person 
in question, on the view the farmer takes of the business. How many 
sacks of fertilizer you need for one topo, every farmer must decide 
for himself. But the truth of the matter is that for some farmers, their 
hearts sink when they are confronted with the high costs and all those 
problems with the bank. They think they'll never get their heads above 
water again and that makes you think in a different way. The farmer 
who uses 15 bags, he will gather a good harvest. And the one who 
uses eight, he thinks to himself that things might go amiss." 
This particular farmer borrowed half a million soles. And why 
not more? His reply was: 
"Thank God that I did not borrow more. You have to consider the 
possibility that things can go wrong and take the appropriate mea-
sures." 
Another farmer with credit said: 
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"When it's a question of taking credit you must think things over 
carefully. We think and observe each year, and so draw conclusions 
about the best way to work." 
3. The pattern for the rich can be described as follows. First, they 
purchase fertilizer when the harvest is sold and are thus able to 
buy much earlier than those who have to wait for a new loan. 
Sometimes the difference amounts to half a year, and with the 
high rates of inflation that can make a significant difference in 
the price. In the second place, the farmer with credit has to sell 
his harvest immediately in order to repay the loans as soon as 
possible. This implies that, more often than not, he has to be 
satisfied with lower prices than the rich farmer who can afford 
to wait for a more attractive market. Third, if the rich are 
confronted with a failed harvest, they can sell cattle in order to 
buy fertilizer and ensure a harvest, insofar as it is possible, for 
the next season. Thus, even with misfortune, the pattern of his-
torically guaranteed autonomous reproduction can be continued. 
A farmer with bank loans must also sell land or cattle after a 
bad harvest just to pay his debts, leaving him again without the 
resources to finance the following harvest. His reproduction re-
mains, in other words, market dependent. The rich can eat into 
their own capital, but for the farmer with loans, the enterprise 
itself is brought to a standstill. 
4. Finally, credit has its own price: an interest rate of 45% from the 
agricultural bank and 20% with Proderm in 1982. 
In brief, incorporation into credit markets introduces such changes 
in prices and costs and, above all, in the parameters within which 
these must be calculated (time span, risks) that a lower application of 
fertilizer per unit of land, and thus a certain extensification of produc-
tion, is the result. 
This extensification reaches beyond a simple drop in non-factor input 
use. Farmers who borrow from the Agrarian Bank also put less labor 
into potato production per topo than the ricos (22.4 as against 28 man-
days). Furthermore, it appears that taking credit is linked to a change 
in the cropping system: the percentage of land devoted to potatoes 
increases (see Table 3.4). in practice, a certain combination of scale 
enlargement and relative extensification occurs. 
There is an intriguing argument circulating in Chacân which throws 
light on and legitimizes the farmers' lower use of fertilizer: "It no 
longer has any force . . . the fertilizer has no power anymore (ya no 
tiene fuerza) . . . if you use too much then you throw it for nothing 
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Table 3.4. Effects on Taking up Credit on the Proportion of Potatoes in the 
Cropping System, Chacân. 
Total area % Potatoes % Fallow 
Ricos 10.0 topos 26 16 
BANK-farmers 11.1 topos 36 20 
PRODERM-farmers 4.9 topos 44 5 
on your field . . . it used to be much stronger." Such references to a 
lack of strength seem at first sight to be an irrational rejection of 
technological possibilities. The argument seems no more than an appeal 
to magico-religious belief. But this argument, held by some 65% of the 
farmers interviewed, nevertheless has a grain of truth in it. Taken by 
itself fertilizer is the same now as it was in the past. But related to 
changing farm practice, the argument contains an interesting reference. 
Those who subscribe to it—we kept systematic accounts of this— 
cultivate on average more extensively than those who say that fertilizer 
is what it always was: 23 man days per topo versus 28. Fertilizer will 
indeed "lose" its productive potential as the cultivation pattern becomes 
more extensive. A high percentage of land devoted to potatoes, a lower 
labor input, and a lower application of fertilizer per unit of land, taken 
together, form a coherent pattern. Manipulation of one factor, for 
example, amount of fertilizer, will (holding all other factors constant) 
bring about only minor or even counterproductive results. In this 
respect it is symbolic that the shortcomings of a new (more extensive) 
style of cultivation are related to the innovations which marked the 
destruction of the earlier, more intensive style of cultivation. Hence the 
validity of the lament "ya no tiene fuerza." 
The relationship sketched in Figure 3.6 can be illustrated through 
several biographies: "When my father was still working" said Pedro, 
"we used to strew 'guano de isla' and urea on the fields. We harvested 
more than now, 35-40 sacks (the sacks he refers to here are sacks which 
hold about 80-85 kilos). Later, but that was when we still worked with 
our own money and when fertilizer was much cheaper, we strewed about 
8 sacks on each topo. That was according to our own criterion of course, 
and we harvested about 32 sacks a topo." 
In brief this is how Pedro in his simple way depicted his former 
position of being a rico. Then he went on to describe a period of being 
medio: 
182 Potato Production in the Peruvian Highlands 
"After some setbacks I had to go and borrow. I have been up to my 
neck with Proderm. They gave us 6 sacks of fertilizer per topo, that 
wasn't so very much, a couple of sacks less than we had been using 
ourselves. But that's what they said, that we had to work two topos with 
that, which gave us a poor harvest, only twenty-four sacks, while normally 
we were getting thirty. And the second time the harvest failed because 
of the frost and la rancha [a potato blight]." 
Payment of interest and capital were thus impossible. Even after selling 
his cattle, Pedro still had an outstanding debt of 42,000 soles; a 
relatively small amount, but for a poor farmer this is equivalent to 100 
days working as a wage laborer. "How am I ever in the world going 
to pay it off?" he asked. 
"The harvest failed for several reasons, but it isn't my fault. We worked 
hard . . . and the worst thing is they won't give me a new loan, so I can 
no longer plant to earn and pay off the last debt. They won't lend me 
more because I still owe them money. We're really ruined. So what can 
I do now? I shall sow a few bags of potatoes for our own use, and for 
that I will use dung. Fertilizer is out of the question. I think that I can 
still harvest maybe ten bags of potatoes." 
So, Pedro's circumstances have been reduced from being a rico, to 
functioning as a "credit borrowing farmer," to the condition of being 
pobre. 
Of course moving in the opposite direction is also possible. It is one 
of the explicit aims of Proderm to loan money to subsistence farmers 
(the pobres) to allow them to produce "more and better." Isidoro had 
something to say about this: 
"The money that I can now borrow for two topos of potatoes is a real 
incentive to work. . . . That's common sense. Finally I have the chance 
to become a good farmer. You cannot otherwise buy fertilizer or pesticides 
or whatever. That is now possible and that's why I feel inspired to 
produce more." 
In short, the perception of credit mechanisms depends on previous 
experience and style of farming and on whether or not one has available 
sufficient personal resources. However, one might question how far the 
borrowing of credit for these smaller farmers provides a real basis for 
enterprise development. As we have already seen, credit introduces 
changes in crop rotation plans which in the long term appears to be 
untenable, not only because of soil fertility problems but also because 
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reduced diversity greatly increases market-induced risks. Falling potato 
prices increasingly threaten the continuity of the enterprise. 
From the point of view of los ricos credit is a step backwards, 
whereas from the condition in which the poor find themselves, it is a 
step forward, though of course not free of risks since it creates new 
ones. Both the data collected by ourselves and the project documentation 
of Proderm indicate a high "drop out" rate. After two or three years 
of borrowing credit the farmer ceases to do so and returns to the status 
of "pobre" (see also Haudry, 1984:28). Ignoring the subjective views 
of the farmers, one can state that credit is necessary insofar as it 
compensates for a reduction in personal resources. However, that com-
pensation is not able to neutralize the degradation (i.e., extensification 
of production) of agriculture. On the contrary, incorporation into capital 
markets becomes one of the structuring principles of this degradation. 
Should the provision of credit dry up, then the general slide from rich 
to poor (i.e., the pauperization of the rural population) would simply 
be speeded up. Credit provides a half-way house, that of the medios, 
or of the "poor with credit." To expect that credit would also be 
functional for agricultural development is illusory. As we have seen, 
the provision of credit introduces relationships into the organization of 
labor and production which preclude intensification. 
Farm Labor: The Reproduction of Seed Potatoes 
Looked at superficially, the reproduction of potatoes seem a simple 
enough task. From the total harvest a part is set aside annually to 
provide seed for the following harvest. The smallest potatoes are usually 
chosen for this, preferably those from the best and strongest plants. 
However, behind this deceptively simple appearance lie rather complex 
processes of selection, propagation, adaptation and improvement. In 
their turn these processes presuppose a spatial organization of the 
enterprise as well as the (non-monetary) exchange of seed within an 
extended social network. Finally, such a complex process of selection, 
propagation, adaptation and improvement is unthinkable without the 
farmer having a basic knowledge of taxonomy. With this knowledge— 
a crucial part of their art de la localité—farmers coordinate the process 
of seed reproduction in a way that harmonizes with other parts of the 
labor process, such as the production of soil fertility and the method 
of potato cultivation. 
Most farmers in Chacân use about thirty varieties of potato. Some 
of them are associated with the different ecological levels available to 
the farmer. Some plots (mostly the lower-lying fields) are planted uni-
formly with one or at the most two varieties. In contrast, other plots 
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show an impressive variety. Three to seven varieties per plot is the 
common pattern. Brush et al. (1981) noted likewise that "varietal 
heterogeneity of native potato fields is one of their most important 
attributes." This heterogeneity has been deliberately created with specific 
goals in mind, not only, as is commonly maintained, to minimize the 
biological and economic risks, but also to maintain the genetic stock 
which makes renewal or innovation possible. The small, often minuscule 
chacritas which a substantial number of farmers use are of vital im-
portance for this work. A reservoir of not directly used genotypical 
stock is maintained in them for possible further development. Brush 
and his colleagues give a fascinating picture of such chacritas, which 
they define as mixed fields (Brush et al., 1981:81, fig. 2). They maintain 
that such "laboratories" have a crucial function: "The crop evolution 
of the cultivated potato is closely linked to the mixture of species and 
genotypes which promote hybridization and crossing between ploidy 
levels and among clones" (1981:80). 
Apart from the varieties that farmers actually use, they generally 
know dozens more. They also know who grows which varieties, where 
and in what manner, under what conditions and with what results. As 
far as we were able to ascertain, the farmers of Chacân were able to 
provide a detailed picture for an area covering a radius of 15 to 20 
kilometers. They are able, when necessary, through the exchange of 
information, to obtain a sample of any other variety. In this connection 
they speak of papa de regalo (gift potatoes). Such gifts are first sown 
in the chacritas, subsequently planted out in the various fields, and 
then multiplied as needed in order to serve as seed potatoes for a 
substantial part of commercial production. This takes a cycle of several 
years, at least four, and often more. This specific organization of space, 
time and social networks guarantees, to quote Brush, "a) the mainte-
nance of numerous genotypes over space and time, b) the wide distri-
bution of particular genotypes, and c) the generation or amplification 
of new genotypes" (1981:73). Crucial to this is "a regular system of 
nomenclature, organized in a taxonomie manner" (1981:85). The selec-
tion of seed and also the mutual exchange that takes place within what 
are often widely dispersed networks, assume a capacity to recognize 
and put a name to the different varieties. Moreover there has to be a 
common language for the dissemination of this taxonomy between larger 
groups. 
After the pioneering work of Conklin (1955) on Hanunóo agriculture, 
numerous anthropologists and also biologists have mapped out similar 
"folk taxonomies" (see Brokensha et al, 1985, for a recent summary). 
However, even for researchers familiar with this literature, it is still a 
fascinating experience to listen to a farmer who has with him a basket 
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of seed potatoes. For us—researchers mostly trained in agronomy from 
an agricultural university—it appeared nothing more than yet another 
basket of amorphous potatoes, as amorphous as the peasantry must 
have been for Marx when he described them as a "sack of potatoes." 
But for the farmers this same container was a basket full of diversity. 
Endless varieties were picked out and reasoned over, sometimes the 
precise names for them being disputed. And with the name-giving 
(which is strongly associated with morphological characteristics) a great 
breadth of knowledge was activated—of where and at what height and 
under what conditions each variety could best be cultivated and with 
what results in terms of the harvest, taste and processing; who had 
had positive and who negative experiences with the variety and the 
reasons for this. In brief, this taxonomy, as a body of communally 
shared knowledge, is the pivotal point for the social reproduction of 
seed potatoes. 
Alongside this specific taxonomy with which farmers handle their 
genetic stock there is also a basic knowledge of the particular fields. 
The farmer accumulates this knowledge through the reproduction of 
soil fertility. What Mendras (1970:47) wrote of the French peasantry 
is equally valid in the Peruvian highlands: "The traditional peasant 
knew all the minutest details of his fields: the composition and depth 
of the arable layer which often varied from place to place; its rocks, 
humidity, exposure, relief and so on. The result of long years of 
apprenticeship, work and observation, this knowledge . . . was the basis 
of his skill as a farmer. . . . He felt as if he had "made" his field and 
knew it as the creator knows his creation, since this soil was the product 
of his constant care: ploughing, fertilizing, rotating crops." Taken to-
gether, this detailed knowledge of fields and seed variety (of phenotype 
and genotype) forms an essential dimension of the art de la localité, 
specific knowledge developed through labor. It is in this way that the 
high level of adaptation of potato varieties to very different ecological 
conditions is achieved. Knowledge of the different phenotypical condi-
tions on the one hand, and the genotypical variety on the other, is an 
essential precondition for this. Perhaps the term "adaptation" in this 
connection is somewhat misleading. It seems to suggest that the process 
is finite, that once adaptation is reached then a stationary state is 
entered upon. And that is indeed an argument which often lies behind 
the setting up of rural development projects which hinge on the intro-
duction of "improved" seed. As Oasa wrote on research on the internal 
discussions of one of the leading research institutes in this field (IRRI 
in the Philippines), "Yields, it was felt, were stagnant because traditional 
agriculture had reached its limits" (1981:202). However, such an as-
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Figure 3.7 A schematic overview of the dynamics of indigenous seed-potato reproduction 
in the Peruvian highlands 
sumption—which seen historically leans to a large extent on the "poor 
but efficient" thesis of Schultz (1964)—is in my opinion unjustified. 
Propagation, adaptation and improvement of seed material forms a 
unity within the system I have outlined. Let me now enlarge somewhat 
on the aspect of improvement, or what is technically known as "up-
grading." This concept forms the main thread of the schema presented 
Figure 3.7. 
A farmer knows and manipulates a large number of phenotypical 
conditions.3 At the same time he is able to draw upon a thorough 
knowledge of genotypical stock. For each field (for each set of specific 
phenotypical conditions) he selects a particular variety. Thus adaptation 
arises within the framework of the art de la localité (the specific and 
communally coordinated knowledge of fields and varieties). Trial and 
error and the insights thus gained imply that adaptation is continually 
being refined. However, phenotypical conditions should not be seen as 
static. They are the object of farm labor: drainage can be improved by 
improving the drainage system; leaching and the loss of nutrients it 
causes can best be prevented by the gradual terracing of the fields; 
through the building up of a herd more dung can be obtained and the 
structure and fertility of the soil are thus improved. In short, pheno-
typical conditions can be altered step by step and thus improved (though 
naturally the opposite is also possible). And it is precisely this change 
that prompts a renewed adaptation of the genotype. From the exchange 
of genetic stock within social networks, new cultivars are selected as 
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well as varieties which match with the improved phenotypical condi-
tions (which are mostly those genotypes known for their higher pro-
ductive capacities). And in turn, improved phenotypical conditions can 
be used to enlarge and improve genetic stock. 
Although this is only a rough sketch, I hope that three things are 
clear. To begin with, the dynamics of double adaptation (the mutually 
coordinated production of soil fertility and seed selection) bring about 
continuous improvement. In the second place, this improvement falls 
to a very large extent within the "domain" that can be understood, 
controlled, and manipulated by means of farm labor. This is not only 
a question of affording a degree of autonomy to this process, but also 
of how the specific forms of continuous improvement are geared to the 
possibilities, perspectives and limitations of individual farming families. 
Each phenotypical change takes place within this framework. If certain 
changes imply more labor than is available in the household, then they 
can be temporarily left undone. In other words, there is a considerable 
degree of flexibility. It is also important to stress the crucial role played 
by the art de la localité in this ongoing process of improvement. The 
continuous confrontation of a broad spectrum of genotypes with diverse 
phenotypical conditions offers the farmer some insight into promising 
phenotypical changes. 
Asked for the reasons behind a somewhat deviant use of a particular 
plot of land, one of our respondents said: 
"Look, I have noticed that this variety likes good quality ground, so I 
allow it to become quite dry, then I harrow again and make sure there 
is enough dung with plenty of straw in it dug into the ground, preferably 
to quite a depth. . . . But you have to take care because this potato 
doesn't like too much water once it has rooted well, and so I have taken 
this hill, and made enough channels to ensure that the rain drains off 
quickly. Yes, if the gods favor me then this will be a wonderful field." 
It is tempting to quote more such observations, but the core is 
always the same: through the interaction between plant and field, 
carefully observed, interpreted, manipulated and evaluated, the farmer 
develops a specific knowledge which can justifiably be described as "art 
de la localité." This knowledge, in turn, serves as a guideline for the 
continous improvement of labor, objects of labor, and means. In other 
words we are dealing here with a highly dynamic system. It is intriguing 
that such a dynamic system is more often than not substantially un-
dervalued by agricultural scientists today. As the celebrated biologist 
Prakken (1965:149) remarked, evolution in plant breeding has been 
taking place for thousands of years, an "evolution which happens under 
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two influences: through the selective working of the new milieu (as 
modified by new techniques of cultivation and harvesting) and through 
the more or less conscious selection by some cultivators, who will have 
removed the notably bad types and reserved the especially good ones 
for planting out." This double dynamic springing from the simultaneous 
improvement of phenotypical conditions and genotypical material can 
also be discerned today. On the basis of field research, Brush et al. 
(1981:80) are quite explicit about this: "Selection may be observed in 
fields, in the terminology for fields, in the technology applied to different 
fields, and in the farmer's objective in planting different fields." They 
conclude that "undoubtedly man's role as a selective agent is felt on 
all levels" (1981:73). However, such observations and conclusions have 
become marginalized in modern agricultural science, which views "tra-
ditional" agricultural systems, almost by definition, as stagnant. A 
dynamic process is ipso facto an exclusive function of scientific inno-
vations. Such a stance is nothing new. Referring to the disciples of the 
New Husbandry tradition (of the eighteenth century) Slicher van Bath 
(1960:263) writes "they were so greatly convinced of their own excel-
lence that they painted the 'old' in violent colours. They considered 
themselves too much as the bringers of light in the darkness of ignorance 
and backwardness to be able to see the situation as it really was." 
Of course in the "situation as it really is," endogenous potential for 
development (such as that sketched for seed potato improvement) can 
be blocked by politico-economic processes which generate chronic im-
poverishment. However to conclude on the basis of this that agriculture 
is intrinsically backward or "stagnant" is not only unjust but closes off 
all kinds of development possibilities. Clearly the pattern of seed potato 
improvement sketched here has undergone rapid changes in recent years. 
The reproduction of seed has become externalized under the control of 
specialized enterprises and limited to certain areas. Seed potatoes have 
therefore become a commodity. Closely linked with this commoditi-
zation process is the arrival of "modern varieties" that are more often 
than not developed in experimental stations. 
This process is clearly observable in Chacân. In the lower lying 
irrigated ground, only one variety, mostly an introduced variety, is 
sown. In the higher zones farmers still grow more varieties per plot, 
mostly varieties which they have propagated themselves (or have ob-
tained as "gift" potatoes). Fields worked with the credit and technical 
assistance of the Proderm Program are the exception. According to 
Proderm records, in these fields only one "modern" variety is grown. 
This accords with the overall aim of the Proderm Program which is 
"within three or four years to bring about a total renovation of potato 
plants" (Haudry, 1984:1:64). 
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This typical spacial distribution repeats itself at the national level. 
Within the national panorama, the Mantaro Valley predominates as the 
production area for seed potatoes. A whole new stratum of semilleristas 
(seed producers) has developed here specializing in the cultivation of 
seed potatoes. Next, there are areas of the coast which have developed 
as production areas for potatoes for consumption. The necessary seed 
is entirely purchased—sometimes from the Mantaro Valley, sometimes 
on the international market (Chile and the Netherlands are two im-
portant suppliers). In the Mantaro Valley the propagation of potatoes, 
at least those destined for sale, is concentrated in the hands of the 
large-scale farmers, who produce them in the lower areas of the valley. 
The commoditization of potato seed is a recent appearance. Specialized 
enterprises for their production have only existed for the past seven or 
eight years (Benavides, 1981:41; Franco and Horton, 1981:54). Typically 
enough it was not so much the farmers who seized this "market 
opportunity" but the traders and transporters; their specific market 
knowledge and the relationships built up by them in the potato market 
became very useful for setting up businesses for the propagation of 
potato seed. According to existing studies, semilleristas have at their 
disposal an average of 7.6 hectares, of which 4.3 hectares is on average 
sown with seed potatoes. This is many times greater than the average 
for other farm enterprises. Such enterprises are not only heavily geared 
to the production of commodities (the high proportion of land devoted 
to seed potatoes is a striking example) but are themselves highly 
commoditized. For instance, the land needed is mostly rented on a 
yearly basis. Of the total resources used in the cultivation of potatoes 
(i.e., labor, inputs, traction, etc.), 75% is mobilized through commodity 
relations. Personal resources reproduced within the enterprise itself thus 
make up only 25% of the total, whereas the figure is 31% for other 
farmers in the lower areas and 70 to 75% respectively for those from 
the higher and the very high altitude zones of the Mantaro area. This 
division seems also to apply to seed: the semilleristas buy 60% of their 
seed, as compared with the other categories of growers who buy 40, 
10 and 5% respectively. 
The earlier ecological specialization described by Mayer (1981) and 
discussed by Skar (1981) was kept in equilibrium through reciprocal 
exchange and a specific spatial ordering of individual farm enterprises 
over the several ecological "levels." This pattern is now giving way to 
a whole new ecological specialization linked to the degree of commod-
itization, which increases as one comes down the mountains to the 
economically more commercialized lower areas. It is here that com-
moditization is most advanced, as the example by Horton et al. (1980:25) 
in relation to seed potatoes shows. 
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It is worth noting that some of the semilleristas have become even 
more embedded in commodity relations by delegating a part of the 
seed propagation to farmers in the higher zones. Contracts are concluded 
in which the stock and working methods are closely stipulated (Franco 
et al, 1980:61). Some contract out phyto-sanitarian control which entails 
the diagnosis and control of plant diseases. As Franco et al. (1981:61) 
commented, "They contract qualified entomologists who prescribe the 
time and frequency of chemical treatment." 
As mentioned, improving seed potatoes has become a major focus 
of scientific research in the past ten to fifteen years. The CIP (Centro 
International de Papa) in Lima has become one of the cornerstones of 
an international network (CGIAR) for the scientific production of new 
varieties and strains. The CIP is a nursery which has given birth to 
many "modern" potato varieties. The pattern is conceivably this: the 
CIP designs and tests new varieties and brings them onto the market. 
Selected growers, such as the semilleristas from the Mantaro Valley, 
propagate the seed, and it is subsequently sold and transported to Anta 
Pampa. The Proderm Program then furnishes these "modern" varieties 
as credit in kind to the farmers of Chacân. In this way spatial links 
arise which in some ways are far more complex, and in other ways 
simpler, partly because the ingenious methods of regulating the balance 
between several ecological levels can be eliminated. Be that as it may, 
it is clear that the regulating principles and driving force of the new 
spatial and socioeconomic relationships differ markedly from those 
which earlier integrated production and reproduction in potato culti-
vation. 
The scientification of seed potato reproduction combines in complex 
ways with the process of commoditization. Scientification assumes a 
certain commoditization, but it also intensifies commoditization. The 
externalization of seed improvement to specialized propagating stations 
(such as the CIP) implies that seed, at least improved seed, becomes a 
commodity. Hence next to papa de regalo ("gift potato") is the term 
papa mejorada ("improved potato"). But the commoditization of seed 
is only the beginning of many complications. Scientific plant breeding 
begins with defining a so-called "ideal plant type" (see Oasa, 1981), i.e., 
a plant characterized by a certain conversion of energy measured in 
grams/growth per day or characterized by certain yield levels. To this 
ideal a new genotype is then created. From this genotype the phenotypical 
conditions are derived under which the ideal becomes feasible. Such 
conditions cover the amount and composition of the nutrients in the soil 
(i.e., fertilizing); the transport of nutrients which is closely related to 
the working of the soil; the availability of water during the growth cycle 
(i.e., kind of irrigation and drainage); and the elimination of growth-
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hindering factors which is closely tied to combatting weeds and plant 
disease. These phenotypical requirements are then tested in experimental 
plots where, by definition all phenotypical conditions are controllable 
and, according to common belief, manipulable. If one subsequently 
wishes to apply the "new genotype" on the farm, these phenotypical 
conditions will have to be copied as exactly as possible (see Figure 3.8). 
In order to employ the "improved" seed successfully, the assumed 
phenotypical conditions must serve as the blueprint to be realized on 
the farm. Hence, the farmer, whose own specific phenotypical conditions 
are his starting point, is now confronted with a blueprint of immediate 
and interdependent demands relating to necessary phenotypical changes. 
This leads directly to the question of whether such a blueprint of 
numerous interdependent changes is realistic. 
A second, more implicit consequence of this way of working is the 
need for an abrupt acceleration of the commoditization process. The 
scientific design of a new genotype and its phenotypical specifications 
rests on unambiguous definitions. Thus, the application of chemical 
fertilizer is seen as less equivocal, more standardizable and thus more 
easily controlled than the application of green manures or a change of 
cultivation technique (see van Noordwijk, 1985). That is to say, the 
specification of phenotypical conditions is mostly done in terms of 
standardized, industrially produced technology. So, the application of 
"improved" potato seed requires a major acceleration of the use of 
fertilizer, herbicides and pesticides because the "improved" varieties 
are constructed on the assumption of their synergic application. The 
financing of this entails the need for credit: thus, in addition to using 
the market for most inputs, it becomes necessary to enter the market 
for capital. Other phenotypical specifications may imply a heavier ex-
ploitation of the land and therefore the use of the market for machinery. 
High yield levels may also outstrip the limits for mobilizing labor under 
ayni and other social mechanisms, thus entailing integration into the 
labor market for the harvesting. 
In short, the use of "improved" varieties not only implies at enter-
prise level a commoditization of one of the most important labor objects 
(namely, potato seed), but it can also compel a much more far-reaching 
commoditization process. A part of the necessary labor and means 
become commodities in the production process. This can, as I explained 
earlier, clash with the specific calculus used by farmers for organizing 
their production and labor. 
Chains break at the weakest link. The implementing of a blueprint 
in the field is quite another matter to its realization within the narrow 
confines of scientific institutes. Moreover, the purchase and use of each 
new commodity in the field is not a neutral operation: it implies entering 
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into new and often antagonistic relationships with commercial houses, 
banks, intermediaries, and so on (Pearse, 1977). From Hardeman (1984) 
it appears that most farmers are able to achieve only a fraction of the 
prescribed packet, thus realizing only a fraction of all phenotypical 
demands. The overwhelming majority (about 80%) of farmers imple-
ment only a part. One consequence of this, in the case of potatoes, is 
rapid genetic deterioration, since application under sub-optimal condi-
tions brings about degradation, often within a period of three to four 
years. In this way, the mistrust of new technology is reproduced. The 
farmers also exclaim, ya no tiene fuerza (it no longer has force) to the 
"improved" potato seed introduced. But, in the meantime, they may 
have lost a considerable part of their own stock of genetic material, 
which means that new, "improved" varieties have to be found anyway. 
Farm Labor: 
The Process of Potato Production 
Potatoes are planted in temporales following a period of fallow. The 
ground then has to be broken up. This is called barbecho. The task is 
sometimes done by tractor which can be hired for seven thousand soles 
per hour. It can take from one to one and a half hours to open up 
one topo of land, depending on the terrain and the depth and number 
of furrows desired. Other cultivators continue to use ox ploughs for 
this task. When this has been accomplished the soil is broken down 
further (yondear), then again ploughed, harrowed and levelled, using 
one, but usually more than one team of oxen. Some farmers use as 
many as six teams. During this time the fields are buzzing with people 
and ox ploughs trekking after each other in ever-repeating patterns. 
The third phase is the actual sowing or sembrio. Here also many 
people are to be seen. At least one and usually two pairs of oxen are 
used for the "opening" and "closing" of the ground. If the task is to 
be really well done then an activity called golpear will follow the 
"opening," whereby, with simple tools, the remaining clods are broken 
down to form very fine soil. The women then drop the seed potatoes 
into this finer soil. After them the men follow applying a dose of 
fertilizer—a task that must be done with care in order to avoid "burn-
ing" the young seed by dropping it too close, or reducing its effectiveness 
in the early growth phase by dropping it too far away. Finally come 
the second pair of oxen to "close" the ground, and frequently a third 
team follows to compact the earth. This is done with what the farmers 
call "an aeroplane." Although a majority of farmers use two pairs of 
oxen per topo for working the land (a few are limited to one pair and 
quite a large number [30%] use three), the majority use only one team 
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of oxen for sowing. A farmer lacking ox teams can usually mobilize 
them through the ayni system, and they can be hired (for 1,500 soles 
a day plus food and drink for the ox drivers). In terms of labor, the 
difference between farmers is even greater. The labor needed to sow 
one topo in a single day varies from 4 to 11 people (the average being 
around eight: 7.8 with an SD of 1.7). Part of this labor is mobilized 
through ayni, part will be family labor, and some will be hired through 
the market. Opinions over the advantages and disadvantages of ayni 
as against the hiring of daily wage laborers (jornaleros) vary consid-
erably: 
"I prefer ayni because the people come early, about seven in the morning. 
It is the custom with wage laborers to begin much later. Also the costs 
of ayni are much lower. True, you have to take care of food and drink, 
but then later you also eat and drink at someone else's expense." 
"You never know with wage laborers if they will turn up. You can rest 
assured that those working with you in ayni will come. And what is more 
people work steadily on through the day and work much harder than 
wage laborers do. Naturally everybody knows they are being watched. 
Everybody knows precisely how he would like to see others working his 
own fields." 
"Ayni doesn't suit me. You always have to give a day's work back. So 
you are bound hand and foot and it is a pure waste of time having to 
sweat away in somebody else's fields." 
"If you consider it carefully, ayni is as expensive as wage labor. See what 
it costs on food and drink for all those people! And then you might well 
say that they work for nothing. But that's a mistake. You pay them back 
with a days' work. Ayni is actually much more expensive. The problem 
here is that some people are afraid of money, and those people look 
down on you if you don't want to work in ayni with them." 
"It is becoming very difficult to get together enough people in ayni. There 
are fewer people all the time who are willing to do it. That takes all the 
pleasure and usefulness out of it." 
One of the things which greatly complicates the development of ayni 
is the rapid rise in this part of Peru (particularly in the rural areas), 
of Protestant groups such as the Jehovah's Witnesses, derogatorily spo-
ken of by some as "sects." Followers of these groups must not drink 
alcohol, which makes it impossible for them to participate in ayni. 
Some observers who know the area well suggest that many farmers join 
these "sects" in order to have an excuse for backing out, in a socially 
acceptable way, of this network of obligations. 
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Be this as it may, an interesting link can be demonstrated between 
the use of ayni, wage labor, or a mixed form of both and the input of 
labor into sowing. Farmers who mobilize the necessary labor solely 
through ayni use 8.3 labor units per topo; those who only draw the 
extra labor needed via the labor market use 6.5 units per topo. Inter-
estingly, those who use a mixture of both use a slightly higher labor 
input (8.4) than those who use only ayni. Ayni, as indicated, has natural 
boundaries since one must have enough family labor to repay the 
obligations incurred. Thus, using ayni and labor through the market, 
makes a higher input of labor possible than using ayni alone. It is quite 
another story when hired labor is used to substitute entirely for ayni. 
A complete dependence on the labor market leads to a marked drop 
in the labor input in sowing. The same pertains to the lampa. 
The first lampa is a task carried out soon after the young shoots 
appear. Fertilizer is once more applied, the plants are mounded up, 
and the furrows between the plants are stirred somewhat in order to 
give the roots more air. Those who hurry this task are said to do it a 
la ligera (lightly). Others, who spend more time on the task, believe 
that in this growth phase proper care must be taken of the earth and 
the plants. The second lampa follows a number of weeks later. No more 
fertilizer is applied, but otherwise the activities are similar. The labor 
taken on to complete a lampa in one day varies from two to ten men 
per topo per day. On average, 10.9 labor units per topo are used for 
both lampas together. Here also, ayni and wage labor relations, or a 
combination of both, can be used for mobilizing the necessary labor. 
Those who work only in ayni take on 6 men/topo/day per lampa; for 
those who use both it is 6.1 men/topo/day; and for those who use only 
labor from the market 4.9 men/topo/day. 
Subsequently, weeding will be undertaken once or twice again. Some 
farmers perform this task hastily while others make a thorough job of 
it. In this case, the various weedings require up to 15 man/days per 
topo, the average being 5 (SD=3.2). 
After this the land is sprayed. Some farmers make do with one 
treatment; others spray as many as five times. The effectiveness of the 
treatment depends on having working capital and the material available 
at just the right moment, as well as on a correct recognition of the 
pests. 
Harvest is another time when the fields are alive with people. During 
this time of year the farmer mostly sleeps in his fields in order to 
guard against theft. The crop is harvested, transported and then sorted 
with the help of between five and twelve men. A part of the harvest 
is first selected as seed for the following year, mostly from second or 
third quality potatoes. The biggest potatoes, the first quality, are sold, 
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and the rest are kept for family consumption. Sometimes those who 
have helped with the harvest are paid with produce. 
In summary, the method of cultivation has six phases (barbecho, 
sembrio, first lampa, second lampa, weeding, and the application of 
chemicals). A noticeable variance can be seen in each phase. Together 
these differences, ranging from very intensive to extensive forms, make 
for considerable variety in potato cultivation (see also Franco et al., 
1981). 
Harvest Estimates and Per Hectare Yields 
Yields per hectare fluctuate significantly. Apart from the differences 
in soil fertility already described, rainfall, disease, early frosts and 
many other factors have a decided and capricious effect on yields. We 
measured yields per topo during our research, asking specifically about 
external circumstances beyond the farmer's control. The data given are 
for normal undisturbed harvests. The answers ranged quite widely, 
from 1,700 kg per topo to 4,500. Naturally a check on such answers 
is needed to establish their reliability. This was done in numerous ways. 
The amount of seed used was always registered. According to key 
informants, this is the most reliable datum a farmer can give. From 
this it is possible to calculate the yield. They were also asked how 
many men worked for how many days on one topo during the harvest. 
In this way the harvest per man/day could be calculated. They were 
then asked for their harvest figures from the previous year. The division 
of the harvest into seed potatoes, personal consumption, and that which 
was sold was also registered to provide further control on the internal 
consistency and reliability of harvest estimates "in good circumstances." 
Finally, an entirely different control was possible, namely, the harvest 
figures for other crops (grain, sorghum, maize and beans). We accept 
that a "good farmer"—i.e., one that structures his labor to reap the 
highest possible harvest—does not only work well with potatoes.4 He 
will work in a similar way with other crops, and there ought therefore 
to be some similarity between the yields. And this does seem to be 
the case. 
All this does not imply that the estimates given (and where necessary 
corrected) are reliable in an absolute sense. As we well know, farmers 
tend to overestimate their hectarage. When they talk about one topo 
the actual cultivable area amounts to no more than about 0.85 of a 
topo. This goes for practically all farmers. In a relative sense then, the 
harvest estimates given by the farmers, if they are to be judged rea-
sonably, are all about 15% to 20% too low. 
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Towards an Explanation of Heterogeneity 
in Farm Practices 
As noted above, yields in potato production vary widely. This is not 
due to chance. To a large extent it is dependent on the various ways 
in which farm labor is structured. It depends on the production of soil 
fertility, the reproduction of genetic stock, and the methods of culti-
vation during the actual process of production. In order to attempt a 
more quantitative analysis, a scale was constructed for each of these 
dimensions. For the production of soil fertility this was simple. For 
each of the elements already mentioned (amount of land lying fallow, 
amount under potatoes, quantity of dung, quantity of fertilizer), each 
farmer was allocated a score of one if he scored better than the average 
for the whole data sample and zero if the figure was lower than the 
group average. If these four scores are then totaled, they give a simple 
but useful total score for soil fertility.5 
Intensity of cultivation can also simply and adequately be quantified 
in a scale. For preparing the land, for sowing, for both lampas together 
and for weeding one point was accredited if the labor input for the 
particular task was higher than the average. A reasonable distribution 
emerged: 18% of the farmers scored zero on all tasks and 21% worked 
more intensively than the average over the complete range of tasks. 
A simple quantification of the reproduction of seed is much more 
difficult, not only in terms of measuring techniques but also for con-
ceptual reasons. To begin with, there is no undisputed yardstick which 
runs from "bad" to "good." Good potato seedlings are as good as they 
are used. Thus the use of such a variable in a general model can cause 
considerable problems of a multicolinearity type. 
The following analysis is therefore based on only two elements: 
"intensity of cultivation" and "production of soil fertility." If both of 
these aspects of farm labor occur simultaneously, then we can speak 
of farm labor structured as craftsmanship in every respect. Table 3.5 
gives the correlation coefficients of the links between the production of 
soil fertility (1), intensity of cultivation (2), and yield per hectare for 
potatoes (4). The interaction factor (1X2), i.e., "farm labor structured 
as craftsmanship" (3), is also added. 
One can see that the interaction factor has the highest correlation 
with harvest yield (r=.48). However, production of soil fertility and 
intensity of cultivation also correlate significantly with harvest yield. 
These results lead to the following question: do production of soil 
fertility and manner of cultivation, independently of each other, exercise 
an additive effect on hectare yields, or is the concept of craftsmanship 
(operationalized as the interaction of the two) necessary to explain 
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Table 3 . 5 . Cor re la t ion Coeff ic ien ts for the 
Rela t ionship Between Production of 
Soil F e r t i l i t y , Manner of Cu l t iva t ion 
and Yields per Hectare , Chacân (n=52) 
va r i ab le (2 ) (3) (4 ) 
1. Production of soil fertility 
2. Intensity of cultivation 
3. Farm labor structured as 
craftsmanship (3)-(2)x(l) 
4. Hectare yields 
.16 .33 
.22 
.33 
.41 
.48 
Production of 
soil fertility 
(1) 
+.16 
«-.16 
Intensity of 
cultivation 
(2) 
Labor structured 
as craftsmanship i_2Ë. 
(3Hl)'x3|2) 
Hectare 
yields 
(4) 
+.31 
Figure 3.9 Path diagram showing the effects of farm labor on yields, Chacân (n=52) 
yields. The calculations show that a greater part of the variance can 
be explained when using an interactional rather than an additive model. 
Figure 3.9 expresses this interactional model in the form of a path 
diagram. It shows that the effect of labor structured as craftsmanship 
is stronger than the direct effect of soil fertility and manner of culti-
vation taken separately. To a certain extent this result is self-evident, 
although not trivial. Where a high level of soil fertility is produced, 
along with an intensive form of cultivation, the yields are high. So 
"good farming" leads to "good results." Recent literature on agrarian 
development mostly stresses the introduction and diffusion of innova-
tion: the transfer of "high value input packages." The link between 
farm labor structured as craftsmanship and harvest yields highlighted 
above puts into perspective this one-sided emphasis on the adoption 
of chemical fertilizer, new varieties, and the like since it is primarily 
where labor is structured as craftsmanship that the introduction of 
innovations like fertilizer begins to bear fruit. A more detailed analysis 
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.49 
Labor structured 
as craftsmanship 
ID 
N. ~~ ~~ — -. - 0 9 
\ 4H ~~ — 
Amount of 
fertilizer 
(2) 
Craftsmanship 
and fertilizer 
(3) = (1) x (2) 
.60 Hectare yields 
W 
y.62 —- — 
/ _- — " " 03 
Figure 3.10 Path diagram showing the effects of farm labor and fertilizer on yields, 
Chacân (n=52) 
confirms this line of interpretation. If, for instance, we isolate the use 
of chemical fertilizer from the whole of farm labor, then the following 
relationship is revealed: Figure 3.10 shows in the form of a path diagram 
the interaction between labor structured as craftsmanship and the 
application of fertilizer. Fertilizer on its own has no significant direct 
effect on yields (p42=.03) nor does it have any significant effect when 
it is combined with "modern seed varieties." Hence, packages of modern 
inputs do not achieve much if divorced from the quality of labor. 
On what, then, does the structuring of farm labor depend? An answer 
has been partly provided earlier. Incorporation into capital markets (in 
this case mostly as credit from the Agrarian Bank or Proderm) has a 
negative effect on the level of fertilizer used and therefore on soil 
fertility. Incorporation into the labor market (i.e., the substitution of 
ayni by market mechanisms), certainly if it is "complete," has a negative 
effect on labor input and thus on the intensity of cultivation. A partial 
incorporation into the labor market has, on the contrary, a positive 
effect. It would also seem that taking credit leads to an increasing 
preference for wage labor as against labor exchange (ayni). The con-
nection between these aspects of incorporation and their interaction on 
labor structured as craftsmanship (the central term for explaining yield 
per hectare) is more closely analyzed in Figure 3.11. Incorporation into 
the market for capital exercises a direct and negative effect on labor 
structured as craftsmanship (p41 = — .21). The indirect effect is —.29. 
Thus the total effect on yields per hectare of incorporation into capital 
markets is overall highly negative. In other words, where the different 
elements of the labor process (such as labor force, seed and fertilizer) 
increasingly take the form of commodities, farm labor process becomes 
restructured. One result of this is falling yields. 
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In his comment on small farmer credit in the AID spring review, 
Mellor (1973:85) notes that "increased cropping intensity probably offers 
more direct benefits in the long run to the small farmer than the high 
yielding varieties and yet I find the attention much more towards high 
yielding varieties and the problems of credit for those than for increasing 
intensity." Indeed, through many credit and integrated rural develop-
ment programs, a simple but solid train of thought runs: with new 
technological packages, productivity, production and income can be 
raised.6 Since working capital is missing for the initiation of this 
springboard to growth, temporary credit is required. It is apparently 
as simple as saying "good morning." Thus, "Success in Small Farm 
Credit Programmes has generally been linked in the minds of men to 
the only readily available quantitative indicator, repayment rates" (AID, 
1973: XX, 14). 
However, credit is not just a "simple supplement" for working capital. 
It is an element in a historical process in which the gradually eroding 
personal resources of farmers give way to production factors and non-
factor inputs obtained via the market. New and more complex com-
moditization patterns arise which penetrate deeply into the labor pro-
cess. At the same time new production relations become dominant, 
which lead to a decidedly different application of the goods and services 
in question. Mellor suggests that "the capital requirements per acre of 
moving into intensive production may be so large that a farmer must 
think in terms of increasing his permanent working capital and may 
need at least insurance of a continuing line of credit and perhaps an 
increasing line of credit" (1973:89). The mechanism of credit as a 
relation of production, however, introduces the opposite of this: a short 
time horizon, high-risk insecurity, and an increasing rigidity as far as 
buying and selling in different markets are concerned, so that higher 
costs and lower benefits occur, requiring further extension of credit. In 
short, mechanisms of credit prompt extensification. 
The mold of integrated rural development, in which most actual 
programs are shaped (including Proderm) is double-edged: the intro-
duction of "modern," potentially more productive inputs (and the 
implementation of necessary infrastructure) is combined with "integra-
tion" into markets. "Rural development is concerned with the modern-
ization and monetization of rural society, and with its transition from 
traditional isolation to integration with the national economy" (World 
Bank, 1975b:3). Hence, incorporation into the capital market fulfills a 
strategic function: through credit, farmers are in a position to buy the 
"package" of modern inputs. The preceding analysis offers the grounds 
for judging the effect of such programs. Modern inputs provide, in 
principle, the possibility of substantial increases in production, provid-
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ing they are used within a framework of labor which remains structured 
as craftsmanship. However, it is precisely this specific structuration of 
the farm labor process, which is made difficult, though not totally 
impossible, by the effects generated by credit mechanisms. Thus, the 
possibility of intensification offered by improved technology is at the 
same time closed off. In this way a pattern of underdevelopment is 
reproduced which nevertheless does not eliminate the possibility of 
analyzing matters differently, as demonstrated above. Most development 
institutes interpret the failure of "real" development after implemen-
tation of particular programs as evidence of (a) the poor response of 
farmers (or environmental difficiencies), and (b) the need to carry out 
more such programs! 
Notes 
1. This is how specific "circuits of value exchange" (Barth, 1967) are created. 
Breaking through these specific circuits is quite often a specific feature of 
entrepreneurship; circuits which until a certain moment were separated are 
then combined (Long, 1977). This is often seen as a neglect of social conven-
tions. Moerman (1968:144) concluded that "those who use the market more 
efficiently than their neighbours are the villagers who, for these and other 
reasons, are criticized as being calculating, aggressive and selfish. Studies of 
village economies in India and Latin America support the observation that 
successful village entrepreneurs frequently fail to maintain the common peasant 
values of equanimity, generosity, loyalty to kinsmen and conspicuous piety. 
. . . To put it bluntly, it is not uncommon for villagers who are ambitious, 
enterprising or successful to be 'sons of bitches' in the eyes of their fellows." 
In Chacân, wholesale traders amongst the villagers are perceived in a similar 
way. It applies also to the ricos who no longer wish to participate in ayni and 
compania exchange. 
Indeed, should all ayni and compania arrangements disappear, the poor 
would especially be in an awkward situation, for they would then have to pay 
for the oxen, tools and sometimes money that they now mobilize through these 
mechanisms. They would then be obliged to sell some of their produce, used 
presently entirely for home consumption, or they would have to work elsewhere 
to invest in their plots. This too implies a further closing of opportunities for 
them. 
But the ricos too would suffer serious problems. With the disappearance of 
ayni they would have to contract more wage labor and would have to pay the 
full market price for this instead of the "shadow-price" now existing in Chacân. 
Thus costs would rise and flexibility decrease. This in turn would urge more 
extensive schemes of cultivation. 
2. Nemchinov (see Shanin, 1980) followed the same analytical approach: he 
conceptualized differential (intracommunity) levels of commoditization into a 
pattern of social stratification. Notwithstanding this similarity, I maintain that 
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in this case (the Chacân community) one cannot speak of class differences. 
They are relative differences between farmers within the same class. Beyond 
that, these differences are highly variable over time. 
3. Strictly speaking one should use here the term "environmental conditions" 
and consider the interaction of environment and genotype as phenotype: E * 
G = F. For practical reasons, however, I choose to talk here of phenotypical 
conditions, i.e., those environmental conditions that are of direct relevance for 
the emergence and reproduction of a specific phenotype. 
4. This assumption was checked and validated in the campania study 
included in Bolhuis and van der Ploeg, 1985. 
5. The validity of this score was then checked through its correlation with 
the seed/harvest ratio (ref. Slichter van Bath, 1960). There turned out to be a 
strong association (see Bolhuis and van der Ploeg, 1985: 311, table 6.14). 
6. Unless the total output raised provokes a decline in prices; low price 
elasticity of demand causes then a negative income-effect for rural producers 
(see Scobie and Posada, 1977). 

4 
Peasant Struggles, Unions, 
and Cooperatives 
This last case study focuses on cooperative farming in Alto Piura, 
an agricultural area lying in the foothills of the Andes in northern 
Peru. It is an area with a long militant history of peasant struggle (the 
beginning of which is well documented in Castro Pozo, 1973; and 
Albujar, 1969). Its roots are to be found in a pithy local saying, "Tierra 
sin brazos y brazos sin tierrcT ("land without hands and hands without 
land"), which captures the essence of the particular pattern of agrarian 
development that brought extensive agriculture and high unemployment 
into the area. The two phenomena, at least in the eyes of relevant local 
groups, are closely related. 
This chapter introduces two related dimensions: cooperative agri-
culture, and social struggle led by peasant unions whose aim was to 
intensify agriculture and at the same time raise the level of rural 
employment. Enormous potential is entailed in this struggle. As I shall 
argue later, production could be raised, in the short term, by at least 
50%. That would be twice the actual agrarian growth of the last twenty 
years (Alvarez, 1981). One of the prerequisites for this, however, is the 
attainment of the political and economic autonomy sought by the 
farmer's movement. That is to say that the external economic and 
institutional relationships which now condition the production process, 
must be substantially reduced. 
Luchadores del Dos de Enero 
"Combatants of the Second of January," Luchadores for short, is the 
name of the production cooperative at the center of the following case 
study. At the beginning of the 1980s it was a cooperative of 400 
members, had between 1,000 and 1,500 hectares of land under culti-
vation (depending on the rainfall) and had considerable livestock and 
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pastureland. Rice, maize, sorghum, cotton, bananas, citrus fruit and 
occasionally sunflowers were grown. It was once the domain of the 
Rospigliosi, a classic family of landowners (gamonales), but after a 
massive land invasion, carried out just after the New Year's celebrations 
of 1973 (hence the name), it fell, nominally speaking, into the hands 
of the workers. Nominally, because as shown by the long history of 
strife in the years to follow, effective control of production does not 
come per se with the setting up of a cooperative. The struggle carried 
out by Luchadores was militant and on a massive scale. I will discuss 
in some detail the content and form of the struggle since the current 
literature on peasant movements pays little attention to these new forms 
of strife, forms which are not so much geared to the redistribution of 
wealth as to the expansion of social wealth—and thus from the outset 
assume direct intervention in the realm of production. In some senses 
Luchadores is unique. That does not in any way reduce its relevance 
for socioeconomic research. With reference to Mondragon, a unique 
experience with production cooperatives in Spain, Thomas and Logan 
(1982) argue that it is precisely because such experiences are unique 
(in that there are no historical precedents) that they throw a whole new 
light on what until now has been regarded as more or less a rounded-
off field of study. In what sense is Luchadores unique, and what is the 
theoretical and practical meaning of this unique experience? 
As a unique microcosmos Luchadores presents an unusual combi-
nation of general patterns and specific responses. General in the sense 
that in Luchadores, as elsewhere, the consequences of a high level of 
incorporation and institutionalization can be seen to take their toll in 
the stagnation of agrarian development and the progressive cutting back 
of manpower, "tierra sin brazos y brazos sin terra." Atypical and thus 
unique is that, thanks to the unusual union structure and its accu-
mulated experience, workers have: 
1. successfully developed a reasonably well-defined plan for intensi-
fying production and raising employment; 
2. over time, and with some fluctuation, come to grips with the 
relations of production (in short, with the cooperative as an 
enterprise); and 
3. been able, with some degree of success, to achieve their plan to 
intensify and increase employment opportunities, which has gone 
some way towards stemming the stagnation, extensification, and 
reduced employment that is generally the case in the area. 
It is this plan and its partial realization that makes Luchadores 
unique—not because it would not be a repeatable experience somewhere 
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else, but because it shows the way that could be followed in many 
other places.' 
The History of Luchadores 
For a clear understanding of the history of Luchadores, a periodi-
zation is necessary because marked fluctuations in power relations have 
occurred over time between rural bourgeoisie, the farming class and 
the state. Important economic changes have also taken place. Other 
factors, such as the social composition of Luchadores, have remained 
more or less constant. The union was also a permanent factor during 
the research period. However, the interaction between these changing 
relationships and constant factors is such that several aspects of devel-
opment are influenced in ways that are also constantly changing. It is 
useful, therefore, from the beginning, to start by looking at these very 
different periods during which development has taken place. They are 
the following: 
1. The hacienda period (up to 1968). 
2. The period of the parceleros: in 1968 the great hacienda was 
divided up into smaller parcels or areas of land and sold to the 
"rich from the city." This maneuver served both to avoid the 
consequences of the land reform and also to liquidate the union 
of the time. It lasted until January 1973, when the people of what 
is now Luchadores invaded all these areas and demanded the 
formation of a cooperative. 
3. The cooperative was established in 1973. It was managed by a 
Special Committee, which was set up and run by government 
officers. 
4. From 1974 to 1976 Luchadores functioned for the first time as a 
self-administered cooperative. 
5. Then began a two-year period characterized by increasingly pen-
etrating military intervention. The enterprise during this period 
was administered by a Junta Interventora, whose aim was to 
eliminate farmer control over production in order to make the 
enterprise "economically healthy." 
6. At the end of 1977 a massive strike broke out aimed at getting 
rid of the Junta Interventora and returning control to the farmers. 
From that year on, Luchadores again functioned as a cooperative. 
During this period new problems arose which made the union 
decide to go further than just defend employment, wages and 
better working conditions; the union decided to place itself at the 
head of the cooperative. 
208 Peasant Struggles, Unions, and Cooperatives 
7. Thus in 1982 began a new period, a period in which the union, 
under the slogan, "Let us work and fight," tried to alter the course 
of the enterprise. The year 1982 was also a time of severe drought 
which clearly affected the union's project and led to all sorts of 
drastic adjustments. 
The periodization outlined will be used to describe several aspects 
of development in Luchadores which at first sight appear to be purely 
technical, such as the area planted, employment, yields per hectare, 
profits and losses, etc. This less customary way of writing history allows 
one to show not only the factors and problems related to these technical 
indices but also, and more importantly, that employment, production, 
yields, etc., are not enacted outside the class struggles of the countryside 
but rather follow, as compass needles, the power relations and devel-
opment of that social struggle. 
The Development of Employment 
The graph in Figure 4.1 shows employment over time in Luchadores. 
We shall comment on its fluctuation and relate it to the periodization 
already set out. 
1) The Hacienda Period. The period up to 1968, the time of the 
"patron," is characterized by a level of employment which is relatively 
low when viewed in the light of later developments. Furthermore, 
between 1960 and 1968 employment followed a downward trend. At 
the beginning of 1960 there were still 400 permanent workers, whereas 
in 1968 there were 250. Although these figures may not be completely 
accurate, they do reflect the normal trend of employment figures in 
capitalist organized farming. With production geared to profit and the 
use of mechanization to substitute for labor, employment took a gradual 
and sometimes a brusque turn downward. Theoretically speaking, the 
reduction can be compensated for by new investment which creates 
other employment opportunities, but in a situation where agriculture 
is subordinated to other economic sectors such investment seldom 
appears profitable. The margin of profit is generally higher and less 
risky in trade, industry, and speculation circuits. The words of Ros-
pigliosi, one-time patron of the hacienda, illustrate the point: "Ha," he 
said, "this whole hacienda here is nothing more than a stable for my 
horses." Rospigliosi visited his "stable" by plane once every three 
months. His words also illustrates how small and subordinate agriculture 
was when considering the economic activities of this entrepreneur as 
a whole. The profits were creamed off and invested elsewhere. A low 
and falling level of employment was and still is the consequence. A 
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Figure 4.1 The development of stable employment in Luchadores 
second consequence was that labor was reduced to its cheapest form: 
that of "temporary" labor with its lack of security and benefits. Even 
though a worker might be employed on a permanent basis, his legal 
position could be virtually reduced to that of "temporary" laborer. It 
was in the context of this widespread practice that the union arose. As 
Leonides Palacios, the union's secretary general, said, 
"Don't be taken in: the fact that we once had 400 permanent workers 
here was the result of our efforts. Before that, before we had a union, 
the hacienda kept on at most only 100 permanent workers. They were 
people who fell in with the wishes of the patron and who also occupied 
key positions, the irrigators, the ox drivers, the livestock men and of 
course the officials. Thus one arrived at about 100 paid faithfuls. For the 
rest there was no security. Then the idea of a union slowly matured, 
which has cost us a lot of strife. You see, the Rospigliosi, the owners of 
the business, sat in Lima and could reckon on every political support 
there . . . and so recognition of the union was held up for a long time, 
but we fought and we got our union. We demanded the status of per-
manent worker for all those who worked full time so we no longer had 
to walk the streets on account of some caprice of the boss, or the market, 
or the weather. We also demanded the correct payment for overtime, and 
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for a bonus so that you can give your children a little something at 
Christmas. To cut a long story short, we demanded that the law be 
adhered to." 
The situation that developed as union efforts made progress led to 
problems at enterprise level. The first losses occurred—something which 
is still talked about: 
"This led to the boss declaring the business bankrupt. They said there 
was a loss of 8 million in 1968. Ha, now we are a cooperative and even 
with a loss of 80 million we are still in business and ticking over. In our 
opinion it was a bogus argument, the losses were a pretext, the bosses 
have always been able to obtain enough money. The fact was that the 
union was not in their interests and so they were looking for excuses to 
eliminate it." 
And indeed bankruptcy appeared to be nothing but a prelude to a 
second phase: the carving up of the hacienda into smaller plots. 
2) The Parcelero Period. On October 18, 1968, the Rospigliosi family 
divided the hacienda into twenty-eight smaller plots, which were prin-
cipally bought by the rich of Piura, the provincial capital lying some 
80 kilometers from the hacienda. Owners of commercial firms, agron-
omists and bankers bought plots of between 80 and 120 hectares each. 
The Rospigliosi family got out of farming. "With the liquidation of 
the large enterprise," said one of the members of Luchadores, 
"200 workers were dismissed. Most of us suddenly found ourselves 
without work. The owners of the new plots maintained only a very small 
number of workers in permanent employment, forty-five in total. The 
rest of the work was carried out by people who were brought in from 
far away. Humble people. And you know the whole splitting up of the 
farm took place long before the land reform was announced. Yes, it was 
a means of breaking the union." 
Thus, on the land of the earlier hacienda, "middle-sized" properties 
developed, administered in an efficient way by the upper middle class 
of Piura. The level of mechanization was heavily increased, infrastruc-
ture improved (above all boreholes and pumps), the most profitable 
monoculture, rice, was opted for, and the permanent workforce was 
frozen at an extremely low level of around forty-five workers. 
3) The Invasion. After substantial preparations, the land of all twenty-
eight middle-sized properties was invaded, or "taken" according to the 
literal Spanish expression (see also Luna Vargas, 1973). 
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"They had not destroyed the union. That remained alive through links 
with the forty-five permanent workers and above all as a dream, as a 
memory, and as a demand by all those who had been thrown out of 
work. We saw the land which needed more labor, we saw how people 
were brought from afar to work here for a pittance, we saw how our 
children sometimes fainted from hunger at school. So a group arose who 
talked further and got to work studying all the measures needed. We had 
the help of comrade Andres Luna, the support of comrade Dr. Ruffo 
Carcamo, of the schoolmaster from the village and of all the others who 
identified themselves with us. We all decided to unite and 'take' the 
enterprise. We occupied all the gates, the women to the fore . . . then 
the police couldn't shoot, and our women wanted to be out in front, 
because they were even more left than us men; they saw the hunger in 
the house much more than we did. That was the 2nd January 1973. 
Everyone helped, workers, non-workers, with more than 2,000 we threw 
the white-heads from Piura out; we chased them high into the moun-
tains—everything in the struggle for the recovery of the right to work." 
Two key elements are to be noted here for an understanding of the 
history of Luchadores: 
1. The social base of the union was broadly denned. Neither the 
objectives nor the social base of the union were to be limited to 
the permanent workers of the enterprise but, in the last resort, 
included the whole population of the district. 
2. From the start the union began the struggle with a programmatic 
focus: the plots would be taken with "the right to work for all" 
in mind. What is articulated in this demand clashes unequivocally 
with the dynamics of bureaucratically controlled land reforms and 
cooperatives. With this kind of program at the outset the basis 
was laid for permanent contradiction. 
Why this last demand? Let Leonides Palacios, present secretary 
general of the union who was involved in the takeover, tell us: 
"With the land alone you could do nothing, certainly if you took it over 
in accordance with the land reform regulations then in operation. Officials 
came to tell us that there was only room, at the most, for 250 people 
and maybe at the outside 300. So the union once more took the reins in 
hand, because say what you like, the union stood iron firm during and 
after the takeover, and said that they in no way accepted that, that 
everyone in need must qualify as a member and be able to work. And 
that was about 700 at that time." 
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Intensive preparation preceded the land reform in Peru (DL 17716 
was decreed in October 1969 and in the following years supplemented 
with various rules). Calculation of the so-called "economic holding" 
played a key role in this preparation. "Economic holding" is a concept 
that indicates the number of hectares (taking into account ecological 
and economic conditions) that can be worked by one man (or family) 
in order to give him a reasonable income. These calculations were put 
together by the Iowa-Mission of the USA (Figueroa, 1975). By applying 
this rule to a greater area, manpower levels {cabida in Spanish) for a 
cooperative, for example, can be calculated. In calculating an economic 
holding the following elements are crucial: 
1. whether to keep the level of agricultural development constant or 
to change it (for example to intensify); 
2. the level of technology (in principal also changeable); 
3. the current or changing nature of price relations; 
4. town-countryside relations (on what terms should agricultural 
wealth provide for other economic sectors, how much, and in 
what way?) (see also Quijano, 1973:423). 
The Iowa-Mission excelled by holding the first three factors constant 
and by raising in an immediate sense "the exploitation of the country-
side by the town" with the introduction of a "savings quota"2 of 25% 
(Convenio, 1970a and 1970b). Applied to the total agricultural area of 
Peru, the economic holding so calculated resulted in productive work 
for 149,538 families (van der Ploeg, 1977:236-240; and 1982:218-219). 
That means plus or minus 10% of the economically active population 
of the Peruvian countryside. Projecting national and international price 
relations on the post-reform situation in order to deduce future man-
power levels is not only a vehicle of underdevelopment; it is also an 
instrument for the continuing marginalization of large parts of the 
agricultural population from the production process. It is how the 
misery of land reforms is born. Manpower levels are frozen at levels 
generally lower than previously. Practically speaking, this means that 
intensification of agricultural production (and thus agrarian growth) is 
already doomed in advance; there is insufficient manpower available. 
In Luchadores the misery of the reforms rivalled the misery of the 
rural poor because when the economic holding rule was applied to the 
land they had newly occupied (calculated for the Peruvian coast at 6.7 
hectares per man) this led to a cabida (an employment level) of 250 
men. The union demanded work for all, and this meant for 700 men. 
Why? 
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"For us it was as clear as day. We saw clearly that the enterprise had 
enough potential, enough resources. There were possibilities for creating 
more work. We knew all those fields you see, like the back of our hands, 
and we knew what could and couldn't be done . . . the fruit of the 
algorroba which is now wasted, and the pastureland which is not used, 
an excellent centre for the fattening of cattle could be made, there are 
outstanding plots for planting fruit, and then there are all the simple but 
very important things like the removal of field boundaries through the 
better use of water, and the improvement of production itself, because 
make no mistake, where for the sake of argument 100 can be produced, 
with better cared for production you can obtain 200 per hectare. But for 
that, everything must be better worked. For that you need more labor. 
For us it's as simple as that." 
And Augusto Cruz, who was very much in the forefront during the 
occupation, made the following argument: 
"Then we knew very well that by fully planting all the land here there 
would be work for.everyone. You must make the land bloom to have 
work for all. . . . All that talk of 250. In the hacienda, for instance, they 
never planted a between harvest (camparla chica), a second crop after 
the rice harvest. That in itself increases work opportunities enormously 
and it also means that work is then more evenly distributed throughout 
the year. But our arguments, the language of the fields, fell on deaf ears." 
In summary, by intensifying and diversifying production, as well as 
by enlarging the production base (the removing of boundaries) there 
could be work for everyone. "And since then," Cruz added, "we have 
demonstrated clearly enough in practice that is indeed the case." How-
ever, what was such an evident project in the eyes of Luchadores not 
only clashed head on with the objectives of the land reform at the time 
but also with the economic policies of today's regimes. 
In general terms, one can argue that intensification, diversification 
and expansion (a) demands substantial investment in the countryside, 
and (b) implies that a greater share of the wealth generated should 
remain in the countryside. Neither the one nor the other has coincided 
with economic policy either then or since (Fitzgerald, 1981). Does that 
make the project a Utopia? Before going more closely into the theoretical 
arguments on this question, it seems to me desirable to follow first the 
actual history. Luchadores managed to push their ideas through. The 
ministry, however, with its formal rules, still tried to chip away at the 
initial list of 700. Thus the "handbooks" mentioned that only family 
heads could be members of the cooperative that was to be formed—a 
somewhat problematical rule for young men who did not know how to 
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turn their engagements into marriage quickly enough. Be that as it 
may, when the cooperative began there were 614 members, more than 
double the number possible according to the economic holding formula. 
4) The Fourth Phase. This is the period in which the cooperative as 
such gets going, although in the first year (1973) it was still under the 
control of a Special Committee composed of government officials. They 
started work with the 614 member-workers. The area planted rose 
substantially, and for the first time a "between harvest" was sown. By 
introducing new varieties, in rice cultivation among others, yields rose. 
But new problems began to surface. The Agrarian Bank turned out to 
be one of the decisive factors, expressed by one informant: 
"To the degree that the bank makes money available, you can plant more 
and work better; and to the degree that the bank turns off the credit tap 
you are sentenced to less and poorer quality work." 
Although I will not elaborate here on this specific problem, it must 
be noted that the cooperative is highly dependent on the bank. This is 
so because before and during the land reform a gigantic decapitalization 
occurred which the farmers could do nothing to prevent, and because 
cost/benefit relations were such that internal saving was not possible. 
Such costs, however, are viewed in various ways. During those years 
numerous studies were carried out by the bank and other state appa-
ratuses. In one of them it is concluded that "the cooperatives (and with 
them Luchadores) absorb more labor than is justified by the carrying 
capacity of these enterprises, so that an excessive increase in costs is 
generated, which is an obstacle to good economic results" (SINAMOS, 
1975). 
So the years came and went, until in 1976 latent conflict burst into 
the open. The bank refused further credit. Suddenly payment of wages 
was impossible. However, the people of Luchadores decided to go on 
working. 
"Then it was hunger in the belly and scouring the river banks in the 
evenings for those forgotten beans . . . because to let the business get 
ruined . . . that never . . . we thought then." 
For twenty-one weeks people worked without pay. Some of the problems 
that resulted could be compensated for by the women. They were 
engaged in a whole number of economic activities that generally come 
under the name of "informal economy" which help to tide families 
over a temporary loss of income; cultivating of food crops, engaging 
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in retail trade, running small chicherias (beer shops), and selling local 
dishes in food stalls. 
Next, the cooperative decided to share a part of the harvest (mainly 
rice) among the members. That, however, led to direct intervention. 
The state closed the mill. The "twenty-one weeks" constituted an event 
that was later often referred to. But it should be emphasized that this 
episode did nothing to diminish the will to build the cooperative, even 
though it bit deep. 
However, to work for so long without wages finally forced some 
families to consider alternatives. Need forced a number of members 
"to seek their living elsewhere, even it was only to haul cargo in the 
town." One member reflected, 
"I don't know, perhaps it was only the machos, the plucky ones who 
cleared off. But it could also be the other way round, that the plucky 
stayed and the skivers went. Who can say." 
The cause of all this was the bank's unwillingness to provide further 
credit, or to be more precise, the bank's demand that Luchadores should 
effect a rotation of personnel—fourteen days work, fourteen days off 
for each person. This would have meant a halving of the effective wage 
bill and also employment. At the same time the scheme allowed the 
bank to cut credit by 50%. The demand for such a rotation would be 
repeated more than once. But Luchadores rejected this demand, as they 
did later, since it implied the surrendering of one of their principal 
gains, work for 600 people. It was this that made the men decide to 
work on, all of them, without pay. But the gradual desertion taught 
them that this response was less than adequate. "You only burn yourself 
once," said Norberto Cruz. 
"There was plenty of work at that time, only the money was missing. 
The bank would not part with another cent. They wanted a rotation from 
us, but no one wanted it. Must you let your stomach also rotate? So we 
continued working, also so as not to let the farm deteriorate, what else 
could you do when the fields were full of crops? We also wanted to put 
the bank under pressure. . . . Ha, they still owe us for those twenty-one 
weeks. However, we say here that you only burn yourself once. No one 
wanted that again, to work another twenty-one weeks for nothing." 
Plenty of work but no money describes the conflict in a nutshell. 
When the members of Luchadores say there is plenty of work they are 
referring to intensive agriculture. For them it is a norm which in 
innumerable ways permeates their thought and speech. "You must take 
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good care of your crops," "make the land bloom," are expressions which 
all point to a felt need to practice an intensive kind of agriculture. The 
bank, however, calculates the amount of credit and thus the weekly 
wage bill in terms of extensive farming.3 In the eyes of Luchadores 
this results in "no money to work." 
5) The Junta Interventora. In January 1977 the state intervened in 
all eleven cooperatives of Alto Piura, which from then on were obliged 
to work under the control of a Junta Interventora. This Junta repre-
sented the most direct effort of the state to reorganize internal rela-
tionships in the cooperatives in such a way that they conformed better 
to extensive, large-scale agriculture. The core of the Junta's action 
program was the imposing and implementing of rotation of personnel, 
which amounted in effect to a 50% reduction in employment (see Figure 
4.1). At the same time the area under cultivation was reduced, even 
though there was enough water. The council chosen by the farmers was 
dismissed and the daily administration came into the hands of the 
Junta. A fourth line of action was a systematic reduction of the labor 
employed per hectare per crop, referred to as "economizing on labor." 
A fifth measure was to increase mechanization, for which a call was 
made on external contractors in the hands of former landowners. 
Let us look more closely at one of these measures—the economizing 
of labor. In banana cultivation, as for that matter in cultivating other 
crops, production rises by the degree to which one puts in more and 
better work. In a sensitive crop like bananas, where the "care" with 
which you work is very important, this holds a fortiori. From the 
specific planillas (specified wage bills) one can deduce that up until 
then, on average, 140 man/days per hectare per year had been allocated 
to bananas. The Junta reorganized the work so that a bare 117 man 
days per hectare per year were worked. Because of this cost reduction, 
according to Luchadores, the land "was a deal worse worked. . . . There 
wasn't enough manpower to do the work properly." The consequence 
was deteriorating plants, sharply falling production and damage that 
would last for years. Another consequence of imposed rotation was the 
continued desertion of members. As Augusto Cruz said: 
"we were darned well getting thinner. We got more and more fed up 
until the moment came when the union, in a peaceful way, was obliged 
to make its point of view clear again, that rotation had to come to an 
end and that the social rights that had been denied us for more than 
fifteen months should be honored. But the Junta would have nothing to 
do with it. They never once listened. We began increasingly to see that 
all of this was a way of making people so fed up that they would migrate, 
so that the land would be left empty, and then the great landowners, the 
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gamonales would be able to return again. . . . After taking experienced 
advice a strike was called for the 8th August 1978 with no limits set. 
Phew, that was quite something, that went directly against the military, 
against their whole system . . . it was not easy but after a real struggle, 
which went hard, they finally buckled. That was on the 8th September. 
There were other conclusions to be drawn from this strike, as 
Palacios, explained: 
"Within three days of striking, the military were here. They demanded 
that our leaders and advisers, like Ruffo, should come to Piura to 
'negotiate.' But the union told them categorically that the problems were 
solved in the fields, not in the city. After thirteen days it became really 
tense; some began to say that they no longer believed in saints you could 
not see. . . . Finally a senior military delegation came here to us. We 
had created a lot of pressure, there were other cooperatives on strike. To 
begin with they paid us all the dues which we had not received for fifteen 
months. They paid here in the fields. . . . So you see, suddenly there 
was money, after years of repeating that there wasn't any. But we had 
other demands. . . . After an impressive march on Piura they again gave 
way. The Junta was removed, and rotation scrapped. So we resecured 
the right to work. You can't imagine it, how joyfully we went to work, 
with our own people and more than 500 temporary workers. There was 
work enough, and the damage had to be repaired . . . and then there is 
something else. The Junta was supposed to make the business econom-
ically sound, but imagine, they left the business with more debts than 
when they started." 
6) A Cooperative Again. At the beginning of 1979, Luchadores began 
to work once more as a cooperative. The permanent workforce recovered 
to a level of 420 workers—higher than during the period of intervention 
but not as high as the 470 there had been previously. The difference 
can be explained by the desertions. During 1979 Luchadores achieved 
in practice what the Junta Interventora had always hoped to achieve. 
As Oyala put it: 
"We happily got cracking, even with more than 500 temporary workers 
. . . in a manner that was more disciplined than ever. The strike had 
been a hard school. Indeed we worked very hard in 1979 and made a 
profit of 79 million." 
Again the years came and went. The years 1979-1981 saw a slight 
drop in permanent employment, from 420 to 400. This was the result 
of a legal problem for which Luchadores could never find an adequate 
answer. When a member retired, he had no rights other than his 
pension,4 something which caused increasing criticism: 
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"You work your whole life, your sweat remains on the land you love, but 
the lot you are left with is the rubbish heap. What we must move towards 
is that one of our children automatically becomes a member." 
In this period, new problems began to manifest themselves, which 
were largely related to internal control, the commitment with which 
one worked, the role of the engineer, and the degree of mechanization 
desirable. These questions are treated in more detail later. 
7) The Drought of 1982. Then began 1982, the year in which the 
union placed itself at the head of the cooperative, among other things, 
as Tonga explained, in order 
"to push the enterprise forward in a way that would enable it to create 
more work for others who badly needed it. . . . The land was worked 
with a lot of energy and enjoyment, the seed-beds were full to overflowing 
. . . and then, aay, we were struck again with the cursed drought." 
During the four previous years drought had manifested itself in 
different ways but at the beginning of 1982 it was acute (Vela Suarez, 
1982). The level of employment projected for 1982, around 550 per-
manent workers, was thus impossible. The bank again demanded ro-
tation and in the meantime halved its credit. But instead of dropping 
to a level of 200 men, they shared the work between all 400 and the 
union, now at the head of the enterprise, managed to maintain per-
manent status for all of them. 
An analysis of employment in Luchadores cannot be ended without 
discussing the temporary workers and small farmers (here called chac-
reros). Only by including them can total employment and its devel-
opment be assessed. The relevant developments are treated briefly here, 
as the central elements will crop up again elsewhere. To begin with, at 
the boundaries of the cooperative an important development was taking 
place. The number of chacreros was continually increasing, going from 
less than 50 in 1968 to around 400 in 1982. Bit by bit, cooperative 
land which was not yet in use was "taken," partly in an organized way 
by the surrounding communities and partly as a spontaneous movement. 
As far as land itself was concerned there was still no problem, but 
there was and is a problem regarding water. Water bears an important 
relationship to employment in Luchadores. On other cooperatives even 
land being used was frequently invaded, but this did not happen to 
Luchadores—maybe because of the high level of employment but maybe 
also because of the relationship between Luchadores as a cooperative 
and the landless: 
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Figure 4.2 Cultivated area in hectares over time 
"Never in their living days have we put the police on to them, as was 
common in the days of the patron. They are poor farmers like ourselves, 
in a manner of speaking they could be your uncle or your brother. . . . 
No, that would be a step backwards, to be knocking our heads together." 
The fluctuation in the number of temporary workers over time has 
been extremely erratic. In the period of the parceleros, 1968-1973, there 
appears a clear complementarity—fewer permanent workers and more 
temporary workers. With the cooperative the case is mostly reversed; 
many of the full-time "temporary" workers were given "permanent" 
status. During the Junta Interventora permanent employment was laid 
aside and the number of temporary workers dwindled almost to nil. 
The reduction of total employment was then consistently implemented. 
In the later years of the cooperative, from 1979 on, development was 
not so much a question of complementarity, but of another phenomenon. 
The number of permanent workers remained stable, and the number 
of temporary workers fluctuated according to the vagaries of nature 
and the bank. 
The Development of Area Under Cultivation 
The development of the area sown annually is summarized in Figure 
4.2. Three phenomena become apparent: 
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• the huge increase in cultivated area with the transfer from hacienda 
and parceleros to cooperative; 
• the grosso modo negative tendency ever since; and finally 
• erratic yearly fluctuations. 
The water supply from year to year and in the long term is an 
uncertain factor. "And that is not only the fault of Holy Joseph," 
explained Tonga, during a procession in which San Jose was asked for 
water, "there used to be more water." All Luchadores would agree. The 
volume of the river that flows to and through the fields of Luchadores 
did not drop only because of decreasing precipitation in the sierra. An 
important factor was that chacreros and comuneros higher up the river 
had taken over much of the pastureland and had sown rice, yuca, and 
maize—often three harvests a year. This drew off a large volume of 
water. The increase in the number of chacreros meant that the distri-
bution of available water gradually moved from a ratio of 60/40 to 
50/50, to the disadvantage of the cooperative. This would have been 
unthinkable when the patron still formed the epicentre and raison d'être 
of the whole system of water distribution. No one dared point a finger 
at "the water of the patron." With the land reform, however, this 
system, already in a state of breakdown, quickly disintegrated. It is 
true that the state played an important part, yet control over water 
rights shifted to the cooperatives (at least in part). Endless and often 
bloody "conflicts between brothers" were the sad result. Luchadores 
refused, for the reasons mentioned, to take such a role. But there is 
much more to it than this. At various times the cooperative has invested 
substantially (part in capital, part in labor) in cleaning out wells and 
in buying and repairing pumps and motors. The water holding layers 
(with depths ranging from 3 to 35 meters) form a substantial natural 
resource which at least can tide farmers over short periods of drought 
(after droughts of four or five years even these water supplies dry up). 
A complete use of this resource, however, is prevented by numerous 
factors. 
First, there is the oligopolistic nature of the commercial firms in 
Piura, the only ones that can do certain repairs and sell new material. 
Repairs to pumps, etc., entail very high costs and endless delays. Often 
the most valuable parts of equipment are pilfered and replaced with 
almost obsolete parts. Last but not least, machinery can be returned 
"repaired" but still not function. Luchadores added an error to this. 
Their own workshop for maintenance and repairs had from time to 
time been neglected in the previous years in their desire to prevent 
unproductive expenditure. A second factor, which rules out the increas-
ing use of subterranean water, is the very high and rising price of 
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diesel oil. Unlike many other countries Peru does not subsidize the use 
of diesel for agricultural purposes. Finally, if acute drought occurs, the 
bank recalculates the credit given in terms of the reduced water supply. 
In this way drought is not only a natural catastrophe but becomes a 
definitive economic one as well. The moment that working capital for 
pumps, diesel and repairs is at its most urgent, there is suddenly not 
a cent available. This might be logical in terms of risk avoidance as 
defined by the bank, but for agricultural production subjected to the 
vagaries of nature it is a catastrophe. 
There were two feasible solutions which had been talked of for the 
past eighty years. A partial solution would be to build reservoirs. The 
definitive solution would be to tap off part of the water of the river 
Huancabamba and divert it to the rivers which flow to Alto Piura. At 
the moment, all this water is lost in the immense Amazon tributaries. 
There were in fact plans for a diversion. However, this was not to Alto 
Piura, which lies close by, but to the unpopulated pampas of Olmos, 
many hundreds of kilometers away. It is there that the Belaunde regime 
thought it could more easily achieve its economic and political objectives 
for agriculture (a "competitive agricultural sector" and "the stimulation 
of middle-sized farms"). In the thickly populated Alto Piura region, 
cooperatives and communities would undoubtedly present their own 
demands. Tonga was indeed right when he said that Holy Joseph was 
not the only one to blame for the drought. 
On the July 21 there were several road blockades in Alto Piura. 
Thousands of cooperative members and chacreros were involved. The 
central demands were to divert the Huancabamba river to Alto Piura 
and to extend short-term credit to fight the drought. The second half 
of 1982 saw a period of escalating strife. Initially it was even amusing. 
The national press wrote that Belaunde was moved to tears by his visit 
to Alto Piura. Angry voices contended that he wept from the tear gas 
which the riot police used to keep the 10,000 demonstrators at bay. 
The demonstrators had marched on foot (across 80 kilometers of desert) 
from Alto Piura to the regional capital Piura. Then, at the end of 1982, 
fell the first dead. The year 1982 was dramatic in other respects as 
well. The drought, which for several years had been biting deeper, had 
become acute. The rivers had a minimum supply, and the bank there-
fore soon halved the amount of credit they had already promised and 
again tried to impose rotation on the cooperatives. Nine of the ten 
cooperatives in Alto Piura finally capitulated. 
Luchadores continued to stand firm. Increasing pressure from the 
base and a short strike made it clear to the administration that rotation 
would not be contemplated. With men and might the wells and pumps 
were patched up. Fast growing food plants were sown to fatten livestock, 
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and 15 hectares were given over to market-gardening in an attempt to 
both rationalize the use of scarce water and to provide a cheaper food 
supply in the area where hunger was beginning to bite. Part of the 
livestock was "half-illegally sold off," along with other mechanisms, in 
order to ensure the payment of wages. Part of the rice and sorghum 
harvests were saved, and the "surplus" labor was used for the large-
scale recovery of the banana plants and the irrigation system. A number 
of typical incidents took place. Engineers from the bank came to inspect 
and encountered workers repairing fences around the sorghum fields. 
They complained about such unproductive work for which payment 
could not be permitted. Things almost exploded when one of the big 
firms arrived—first with a bailiff and later with a detachment of riot 
police—to reclaim ploughs and other machinery. The obligatory repay-
ment for 1982 had not been made "because the bank didn't lend us 
anything," said the people of Luchadores. It is a typical occurrence. 
Bank and commercial companies mutually control an important part 
of the rolling stock of the cooperatives. The risks are practically one-
sidedly off-loaded onto the cooperatives. The year 1983 indeed showed 
that Satan has two faces: the drought was suddenly broken, but villages 
and crops were carried away by the heavy downpours. However, Lu-
chadores again set to work, almost in despair. A thousand day workers 
in addition to the regulars were set on because in such conditions it 
was impossible to use tractors. In spite of, or maybe because of the 
extremely unfavorable conditions, their efforts succeeded and the coop-
erative achieved a resounding profit for the first time. 
Development of Yields 
Hectare yields in Luchadores (given in Figure 4.3) show some notable 
developments, which deserve comment. Average hectare yields are a 
little higher, though not much, than in the hacienda period. In order 
to understand the significance of this, two other developments need to 
be taken into account: first, the situation in other cooperatives, and 
second, the decapitalization at the transfer from hacienda to cooperative. 
In practically all cooperatives, at both national and regional levels, 
hectare yields dropped during the land reform. Ever since there has 
been talk of progressive extensification.5 This process can be verified 
in neighboring cooperatives. In Carrasco the cotton harvest dropped 
from 20 to 18 carga per hectare; in Alvaro Castillo and in Morropon 
and Franco it was even more. This makes the slight rise in Luchadores 
quite remarkable, particularly as Luchadores was so decapitalized dur-
ing the formation period of the cooperative. Lamented Augusto Cruz, 
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Figure 4.3 The development of hectare yields in Luchadores 
"Earlier in the hacienda, ay, there were machines everywhere, everything 
there was, from bulldozers to airplanes. While now we must wait endlessly 
. . . and by that time the plants have already suffered heavy damage." 
Don Jaramillo added, 
"There used to be beautiful harvests. But it was also much easier, because 
the bosses had it easy, they had everything ready at hand. They had 
tractors, motors, credit, everything. . . . Everything was their own. That 
was very different from the way things are today. The cooperative hasn't 
even its own tractor; we have to hire everything and that's why the rest 
move ahead with their millions." 
To these factors, which highlight how much more difficult for them 
circumstances are (their slight increase thus all the more an achieve-
ment), one can add still others, such as the deteriorating exchange 
relations, so often mentioned. They are keenly aware of the conse-
quences of all this as several quotations indicate: 
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"Look, if we had our own machines, and could carry out the necessary 
activities on time, and I'm not yet even talking about better leveling so 
that you could irrigate more carefully, then naturally production would 
sharply rise." 
"With other prices and costs, you could really help your plants." 
"Because with the present price of fertilizer one is all too likely to fertilize 
less." 
"Thus they have impoverished our land and deprived us of power. That 
shows that the gamonales are most decidedly not gone and slavery has 
not disappeared. Those from above are still sitting there cutting us out." 
In short, taking changing circumstances into account, extensification 
would have been the logical thing to do. One sees it with most coop-
eratives in their dropping hectare yields. That this has not been the 
case in Luchadores shows that there are indeed forces at work which 
actively promote intensification. 
Although one can characterize production in Luchadores as relatively 
intensive—i.e., in relation to global tendencies elsewhere in the coun-
tryside—one should not lose sight of the fact that production could be 
even more intensively carried out. Figure 4.3 also indicates the hectare 
yields that could be achieved in the short term. 
Development of Total Production 
Total production, in principle, is nothing more than the multiple of 
area sown by yields per hectare. Figure 4.4 gives the development of 
total production over time in Luchadores. Between the first and the 
second periods (i.e., from the hacienda period to that of the parceleros), 
a substantial increase occurred. A second mill was installed, as the 
capacity of the old mill was insufficient to cope with the greatly 
increased rice supply. 
There is again a slight rise in total production under the Special 
Committee. That was in 1974, when the cooperative functioned for the 
first time as such. Total output reached was higher than it had ever 
been. In the year following (1975), production dropped somewhat. 
Generally speaking, sharp rises and falls in total production are likely 
to remain a characteristic, primarily because of the irregular water 
supply. However, the graph in Figure 4.4 also indicates another, equally 
important, factor behind the erratic progress of production: power 
relations between farmers and the state apparatus. For example, in 1977 
and 1978, there was sufficient water, yet total production in Luchadores 
reached the lowest point in its history. Those were the years in which 
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Figure 4.4 Development of total production in Luchadores (in soles of 1973) 
control was taken from Luchadores and placed in the hands of the 
Junta Interventora. 
When the direct producers again recovered some control of the 
production process after the strike of 1978, production rose once more 
in a significant way: 1979 is de facto the year known for the highest 
production. Thus, Figure 4.4 highlights an essential relationship: that 
control by the direct producers of the production process is a prereq-
uisite for progressive agrarian development. Maybe this relationship 
appears all too evident, but it has certainly not lost its relevance, 
especially at a time when progressive incorporation and institutionali-
zation is undermining this control. 
Profit and Loss: A Historical Analysis 
From an analysis of economic results through time (see Figure 4.5) 
four phenomena emerge: 
• the cooperative is characterized by a chronic state of insolvency; 
• the losses are in marked contrast to the situation current during 
hacienda days; 
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Figure 4.5 Losses and "profits" per year (in soles of 1973) 
• the Junta Interventora also did not manage, even with the impo-
sition of personnel rotation, to overcome this tendency; 
• and finally, in the years 1979, 1980 and 1981, we have a curious 
phenomenon to contend with: real losses continue, but in the 
accounts, "profits" appear for the first time. 
To begin with, to what are these continual losses attributable? Of 
course deterioration in exchange relationships makes it more difficult 
to obtain positive business results. But there is more to it than this. 
There are, after all, cooperatives that do make a profit. One might 
possibly hypothesize that this is precisely because they adapt themselves 
to prevailing price relationships (through among other things, extensi-
fying production and reducing labor).6 In Luchadores such an adaptation 
was ruled out, both because of the high employment level and because 
the social base continues to demand that "the land be properly worked." 
The price of maintaining such an intensive manner of production, 
which is inconsistent with the "economic context," appears to be the 
occurrence of persistent losses, losses which in their turn lead once 
more to strong decapitalization. Luchadores has not managed to keep 
the machine workshop in working order, let alone renew the machinery. 
A second consequence of incessant loss is progressive indebtedness. In 
the short term this often takes the following form: the costs for year t 
are paid off with the loans for year t+1, where inputs are financed 
with a bridging loan from the buyers that then again must be redeemed 
with the loan of year t+2. This leads to the question, up to what point 
is the cooperative doomed to take a loss in defense of its (relatively) 
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intensive form of agricultural practice? Profit and loss then might not 
be the most adequate yardstick for evaluating the enterprise's economic 
efficiency—though it is clear that the institutional environment uses 
such a yardstick, and sooner or later the enterprise can go bankrupt 
from continual loss. 
Another point that must be taken up here is the "double line" in 
the years 1979 to 1981: profits on the one side, losses on the other. 
While the cooperative actually continued to take a loss, a profit ap-
peared in the annual report in the form of profit sharing. This was 
30,000 soles for each member in 1979, 40,000 in 1980, and 50,000 in 
1981. The misrepresentation of loss to profit rests on current accounting 
techniques. The specific position of the engineer-administrator of the 
time was crucial here. Not only did he teach the "office" and the 
accountant how to manipulate the figures, but he had an ulterior motive 
in doing so. As is practically everywhere the case, the engineer-admin-
istrator of a cooperative is awarded a hefty proportion of any profits. 
Alongside this is a second and maybe more significant "interest." The 
engineer occupied an important position in the cooperative, initially 
with the support of the administration. He presented himself as the 
person "who would from then on help the cooperative." At this ideo-
logical juncture the showing of "profits" naturally takes on strategic 
significance. The "profits" showed de facto that the enterprise was 
thriving—thanks to the engineer. It was how things were then perceived. 
In the introduction of the annual report of 1980 the administration 
wrote: 
These then brothers are the general themes; more detailed information 
will be furnished by our administrator, engineer Chiroque, who is directly 
and primarily responsible for our enterprise and whom we thank for all 
the help he has given us to enable us to carry out all our duties as well 
as possible. Again we thank our engineer for a good result in these 
difficult times. (Cooperativa, 1981:3) 
The negative consequences of these (temporary) internal relationships 
and the corresponding "double bookkeeping" cannot be left unstated. 
In the first place, they obscure the real situation of the enterprise and 
the destructive effects of agrarian policy: profits as opium for the people. 
At the same time they encourage the development of the idea that an 
intensive form of production rests on an individual instead of on 
collective labor. 
"Let's face it, an enterprise such as ours needs a good agronomist, 
although he is not indispensable. Make no mistake, we are not impressed 
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by the engineer who comes playing the tough guy, who suggests that 
production is thriving only thanks to him. There is healthy production 
in proportion to things being properly done. That must each one do, as 
befits also the engineer. But then for that he needs to darn well get out 
of his jeep." (Sergeant Vilchez) 
In 1981, the specific position of the engineer came under scrutiny. 
He had again spoken of profits. The bank, however, had sequestered 
300 head of cattle. The two did not seem to match, even though the 
harvests in 1981 were good. 
"It appeared a lie: in 1981 we produced well, good quality and a lot. 
And nevertheless we made a loss." 
By chance, the rising discontent concerning the engineer-administrator 
coincided with a change in the law which specified that from then on 
each cooperative must appoint a manager whose role would go far beyond 
that allowed the former administrative officers and engineers. Thus 
confronted with a further expansion of the role of engineer-administrator, 
already considered problematic, Luchadores decided, not without fierce 
internal conflict, to elect one of their own members to the manager's 
job. They appointed Cuevita, a young man and a farm laborer like the 
others. He had followed an agricultural training program at the coop-
erative's expense. But, of course, this did not solve the problem of how 
to clarify the day-to-day running of the cooperative as an enterprise. 
This problem is made more complex by the fact that an important part 
of it is played out in Piura—often directly between the bank and 
commercial establishments with hardly a minimum of participation by 
cooperative members and administrators. 
Trabajemos y Luchemos ("Let Us Work and Fight"): 
Towards a Progressive Intensification of Production 
In the previous section we typified agricultural practice in Luchadores 
as relatively intensive. It is intensive in comparison to neighboring 
cooperatives, and also intensive in comparison to what was practiced 
in the earlier hacienda. The social struggle to enlarge and defend work 
opportunities was acknowledged to be the driving force behind this 
relatively intensive manner of producing. However, we describe it as 
"relatively" intensive because hectare yields are still far from what 
could, in practice, be achieved. This is the theme of this section: the 
possibility of raising employment and intensifying production a step 
further. The first link between employment and production in cooper-
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ative agricultural enterprises is, of course, formed through the goals to 
which production is geared. Santiago Rocca, in a recent study (1982b) 
of Peruvian sugar cooperatives, gives a clear theoretical overview of 
this: 
Theoretically, and assuming an identical allotment of nonhuman resources, 
"twin" enterprises facing the same market will employ different levels of 
labor if they have different objectives and goals. The enterprise that 
maximizes profits will not contract units of labor force unless the marginal 
product is equal to its price. . . . The enterprise that maximizes net 
income per worker—net income is understood as the residue left after 
paying the costs of non-labor factors—will employ workers up to the 
point where the marginal productivity of the last member does not 
increase net product or income per man further. The enterprise that 
maximizes the level of employment subject to a minimum level of attained 
income will hire labor up to the point where the costs of non-labor inputs 
or factors of production plus the total income accepted by its workers 
are at least equal to the value of production itself. 
He illustrates this argument as follows: 
To allow a quick and simple comparison let L denote the number of 
workers; W the wage or income per worker; X the production function; 
P the competitive price of X; K the quantities of land, capital, and 
depreciation allowances; Pk the average weighted price of those payments 
and the subscripts a, c, and e refer to the net income per worker, profit 
and employment. 
Figure 4.6 shows that the profit maximizer enterprise will produce 
at Xc and employ Lc workers, the net income per worker maximizer, 
Xa and La, and the employment maximizer Xe and Le. Assumed are 
(1) labor homogeneity, (2) perfect competitive factor markets, and (3) 
perfect competitive product markets. It is also assumed that social 
capital remains constant through time, that is, enterprises neither grow 
nor contract. The equilibrium of the employment maximizer enterprise 
has been drawn considering We as the minimum income per man 
accepted by the workforce. 
Arrus (1974) uses linear programming to show how different goals, 
such as those put together above by Rocca, indeed lead to different 
production levels. Implicit in this whole discussion is the assumption 
of a constant function of production. The position taken up on this 
function shifts with a change in goal. Alongside this, a second dimension 
can be added to the problem: the "shift" of the production function 
itself as a consequence of explicitly orienting praxis towards it, or as 
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they say in Luchadores, "through more and better work." One of the 
necessary conditions for this is a lowering of the degree of incorporation 
and the often constrictive external prescriptions and sanctions over the 
way work must be done. This point will be explained in more detail 
in the following pages. However, even a consciously implemented struc-
turing of labor that results de facto in intensive production levels is 
not something that is created from one day to the next—certainly not 
given the complex division of labor in a large organization such as 
Luchadores. In Luchadores, "social strife" means lowering the degree 
of dependence on external markets and institutions and structuring 
labor in such a way that an optimal use of productive potential becomes 
a reality. As Palacios explained: 
"If I say that we still have a long fight on our hands to be able to work 
more and work better, then I mean that as well as having a battle on 
our hands within the cooperative against sloppy example and working 
mindlessly. . . . I also mean that we must continue our fight with the 
bank and the commercial establishments for better prices. We need to 
fight for both, without the one the other makes no sense." 
If we put the possibility of raising technical efficiency (through the 
progressive increase of collective craftsmanship) into the schema of 
Rocca, it is clear that: 
1. hypothetically speaking, a substantially greater rise in employment 
is possible (L), from Le to Le3, without needing to lower wage 
levels, and 
2. the struggle for employment shifts from being primarily a redis-
tributive problem to a question that in essence arises out of how 
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to organize production and how to manage its development: it is 
not the distribution but the production of social wealth, repre-
sented in Figure 4.7 as a "shift" of the "function of production," 
that becomes the center of attention, debate and struggle. 
Again, Leonides Palacios, secretary general of the union, formulated 
the problem of progressive intensification ("to work more and work 
better") in the following terms, 
"For us it is beyond dispute that you can work better with more labor. 
That we know from our own experience. In the rice fields, for example, 
you see it clear as day. Earlier when ox drivers still chased their teams 
through the mud, ah yes, then the land was outstandingly well worked. 
First a group with a deep biting plough went in, followed by others with 
the so-called 'flying machine' which leveled the ground superbly. Then 
came groups of workers who made the pozas [miniature dikes for precise 
regulation of water]. In this way you got ground that was really well-
worked and you had no more trouble from weeds and obtained a high 
level of production. In the time of the parceleros we saw the same. Some 
applied the economy to their fields; others, on the contrary, worked the 
land as well as it was possible. Among those parceleros was a gringo, 
Soloman Whiskey or something, he may have been called something else, 
but that's what we called him. Ay, but that Whiskey knew how to set 
men to work, he let them 'chew and digest' the land until it was truly 
ripe. [Machacar is the local term for the first irrigation that makes the 
land soft for the plough]. Then it was ploughed and then 'crossed' [an 
expression which refers to a second ploughing directly at right angles to 
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the first], then came the harrow and then the 'equalizer' [for fine levelling] 
so that you got really well-prepared ground. 
And although Whiskey practiced direct sowing [here concerned with 
rice, where generally transplanting is the method applied] he obtained a 
very healthy production, as high as 60 fanegas, simply because of such 
good ground work. You see, high production, simply because more work 
was put in. 
In the cooperative you see similar examples. In 'the bath' [a section 
of Luchadores' land], 60 hectares were sown directly, but it went wrong 
because we were short of labor, the ground was not well worked, and 
everything is now overgrown. And that could have been avoided if more 
labor had been set on. You must give the land her due. If you work her 
badly then you get a persistently bad harvest. You can in a manner of 
speaking set ten men on a hectare and it will give you 45 fanegas. But 
you can also tackle the job with 15 men, and with five extra men you 
can work the land well and the production repays that. Then you harvest, 
through better work, 55-60 fanegas. More work gives higher production— 
if that wasn't so what would we then be on about. And more production 
is more income." 
"More and better work" leads to a good harvest, which gives a higher 
collective income. The terms are different but the structure of the 
argument is virtually identical to that of the I-calculus which we laid 
out in totally different circumstances. In the same way, giving the land 
her due is seen as a prerequisite for working in such a way that a 
good harvest is achieved (impegno). Such a coincidence ought not to 
be surprising: it reflects the degree to which intensification, which 
depends on craftsmanship, embodies the ratio of farm labor. 
In the course of 1981, the union decided to place itself at the head 
of the cooperative. One of the principles that union intervention made 
normative can be generally described in their slogan "Let us work and 
fight." Palacios had this to say: 
"That principle was one of the most important decisions of the general 
meeting. And for us that combination of work and struggle is very logical. 
Without the inspiration of work and production you can't fight. We must 
also be able to see the results of our fight in more work and production. 
If that wasn't so, why would we still go on with the struggle? Yes, with 
all the comrades here, all these 'coconuts,' that principle has really caught 
on. It is widely discussed and there has been a marvelous upsurge of 
energy to be seen in the fields. . . . 
"Working well in itself is a form of fighting, because it means that we 
achieve what the patron never managed and what the state, the new 
patron will never manage: to make the land bloom, so that there is work 
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and food. That is the way it is. And to be able to work well the fight 
must be extended." 
The way mapped out by the union "to work and fight" was not the 
result of just talking and then underwriting together an abstract prin-
ciple. On the contrary, there were fierce discussions. But through such 
conflicts the union was able to develop its arguments further: 
"Also here there were many who said that 'working well' was absolutely 
not to the advantage of the campesinado [farming class], that it served 
only the interests of the state, the new patron. The more we produce the 
more of our wealth the state will claim, the more exploit us. So why? 
We recognize that up till now it is largely the government that has 
controlled production, but suppose that we produce more in order to be 
able to demand more of our rights and have a better standard of living? 
Now, demands must be founded on something, you can't just arrive with 
nonsense. You must base your demands on production and returns. We 
can't go on producing at a loss, because how can you ask for a greater 
share of the profits if there is no profit! You have to have arguments; if 
there is nothing how can you claim more? And you know there is 
something else going on behind all this. The workers themselves lose 
their pride and their preparedness for action if there is no production 
and thus nothing to demand. If we have water, money, and the fields are 
well fertilized, yet we, through shortchanging ourselves as workers, lose 
. . . well, then is it clear that you are not in a position to argue." 
From the gradual intensification achieved in Luchadores in the past 
ten years it was possible to make some future predictions. A certain 
phasing could be distinguished as feasible in the union's plan. In the 
first place, short-term hectare yields for the various crops could be 
substantially increased: working from data to be presented later, pro-
duction could be raised by 30% and employment by 20%. Next, a 
between harvest could again be implemented, which would raise the 
intensity of land use another 30%. This system was practiced earlier 
in the cooperative but the decrease in membership led to its abandon-
ment. If the water supply could be improved and membership could 
again be raised, this "second campafia" could be reinstated. Finally, 
with a permanently improved water supply it should be possible to 
substantially extend the area under cultivation as well as introduce 
more intensive crops and diversify production. 
In the following analysis of the degree to which intensification is 
possible in practice, I limit myself to the first phase: the short term 
raising of hectare yields. The first "step" assumes: 
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Table 4.1. Present and Potential Hectare Yields 
Present level Potential level 
Cotton 16 cargas/ha 
Rice (by 
transplanting) 50 fanegas/ha 
Bananas 7,000 units/ha/month 
Sorghum 5,000 kg/ha 
20 cargas/ha 
60 fanegas/ha 
25,000 units/ha/month 
7,000 kg/ha 
25X 
30X 
250% 
40X 
1. The availability of more resources with which to work. 
2. Increasing control over and improvement of water distribution. 
3. An effective raising of employment. 
4. And, as they say in Luchadores, "a better will to work," by which 
they mean that the organization, implementation and evaluation 
of (collective) work must be explicitly geared to higher productive 
results. 
The interrelations between these four elements speak for themselves: 
of course, without the necessary resources and better water control, 
increasing employment is senseless. And vice versa, if better water 
control and availability of more resources is not accompanied by an 
increase in employment, there can be no talk of intensification. The 
given style would simply be reproduced in more favorable circumstances 
so that profits would rise. Production, however, would remain on a 
similar level. Improved water control and greater availability of re-
sources with which to work do not transform themselves automatically 
into intensification, let alone into the raising of employment. Social 
forces must consciously intervene in the production process before 
improved conditions actually result in the raising of employment and 
the intensification of production. 
The question of hectare yields was discussed in detail with section 
heads and workers. Table 4.1 summarizes these discussions: it gives an 
estimate of the present yields (under normal conditions) and of attain-
able yields. The problems most mentioned as standing in the way of 
achieving potential yields turned understandably around water man-
agement, and especially around the scarcity (!) of labor and the shortage 
of working capital. Organization and motivation of "labor" were also 
problems which frequently came to the fore. Let us take rice cultivation 
as an example. 
Elauterio, a young worker, is section head of "the bath," where rice 
is usually planted. In contrast to some, mostly the older heads of 
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sections, he only became section head after the cooperative was in 
effect. 
"On the grounds of our experience we know that we can harvest 70 even 
80 fanegas of unpeeled rice on the better pieces of land. However, because 
of careless and rough handling of the seed beds, and frequently through 
errors in transplanting, through not weeding and fertilizing on time, 
production turns out to be substantially lower. Usually we have to cope 
with one or more of these problems at the same time. . . . Sometimes 
we have to draw the water off the rice, because you know the water 
problem is not only a question of how much, but of coordination and of 
how accurate the irrigating is, and that can all count in production. If 
you must then still fertilize you burn a proportion of the plants. . . . 
"Sometimes also there are problems because there are not sufficient 
workers. All too often the bank does not give enough money on time, 
and so the best time to weed slips through our fingers. If you plant a 
lot of rice in the cooperative and you then have to weed with the couple 
of members that we have here, of course you are never finished. Then 
you begin in April and in May and the end is never in sight. At such 
times we need temporary workers, hundreds, but if the bank sits tight 
on the cents, then there is not much you can do except watch the crop 
wither. Look if it takes you one and a half months to weed instead of 
one then it means you are fifteen days behind schedule and those fifteen 
days wreak their havoc through the whole cycle. You fertilize fifteen days 
late, so develops a total delay, plants degenerate, they don't grow as they 
should. . . . If you have the means to work properly then plants get 
cared for, and at the most appropriate time. As farmers we must attune 
our work to the rhythm of the plants." 
Rice cultivation is characterized by a virtually endless series of 
alternatives in the matter of applied technology, work methods, and 
costing, with each combination known for its specific consequences for 
production and employment (Angladette, 1966; Grillenzoni, 1974; Spijk-
ers, 1983). One of the differences relevant to Luchadores is between 
direct sowing and transplanting by hand. Intensity can be noticeably 
different for each sowing system, but on the whole transplanting needs 
more labor and results in higher hectare yields. In Luchadores trans-
planting is usually opted for, although the ideal cannot always be 
realized. Elauterio said: 
"Theoretically everyone can and should transplant, at least when more 
labor is available in the enterprise. But in practice there are two prohib-
itive factors, the bank and water. We have already spoken about the 
bank. With regards to water, the seed beds must be made ready before 
the rains in the sierra begin, because once the water begins to flow down, 
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every minute counts. The transplanting must be done then, and therefore 
the seedlings must be ready. If the rains are late then you set the first 
wells full by pumping up water. And there the story begins again—diesel 
oil, the upkeep of wells and pumps, it all costs money. Expensive diesel 
and no credit. We do what we can with our own energy and sacrifice, 
but you know what I mean when I say they are a fine bunch of youngsters, 
those who run Peru . . . because we get upset if we have to use direct 
sowing again, in order to avoid such problems." 
The problems sketched by Elauterio can be illustrated and deepened 
with the use of recent research. Figure 4.8 compares "transplanting" 
with direct sowing. Within transplanting, three grades of intensification 
are distinguished. The data are based on empirical research of the 
Ministry of Agriculture (MAA, 1978). The most intensive pattern is 
encountered among the small, unincorporated farms. Next are data 
concerning the middle-sized farms, where alongside family labor, wage 
labor plays an important role. Finally, there is the cooperative sector, 
where alongside transplanting (extensively done), direct planting also 
frequently occurs. The research cited is representative in the sense that 
the most typical small- and middle-sized farms and cooperatives were 
chosen. 
Of course, this does not mean to say that the sequence given in 
Figure 4.8, which goes from intensive to extensive, coincides per se 
with the given organizational division. In principle a cooperative could 
realize yields similar to those of the minifundia section. Luchadores 
illustrates that possibility. It must be further emphasized that the image 
presented in Figure 4.8 is comparative in nature, thus not to be 
interpreted as the rendering of a historical process, for growth of harvest 
yields are possible even at the lowest levels of intensity. That will 
primarily be a "bought" growth, that is, a growth dependent on high-
yielding varieties, new fertilizer combinations, and other techniques 
which result in an improved cost/benefit ratio. The most intensive 
production level, which rests on a high labor input, will experience a 
qualitatively different growth dynamic: growth will be produced in and 
through labor. Nevertheless, in terms of impact and outcomes, the 
sequence presented can be used to analyze decisions concerning rice 
cultivation and the conditions under which those decisions must be 
made. 
First, it shows that with an increase in labor input per hectare, 
production also increases, and vice versa. Next, it shows that the costs 
of inputs and machinery rise by the degree to which labor input is 
lowered. Thus the question is one of a labor-substituting technology 
aimed primarily at cost reduction. Finally, it shows that transfer to 
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direct sowing is the logical completion of this process: costs per hectare 
are further reduced. However, this cost reduction is not neutral; it 
brings about a reduction in production. We can speak here of regressive 
substitution. 
In practice such a substitution takes many forms: herbicides may 
have to be used because there is insufficient labor for weeding. This 
usually requires the use of aircraft, which can also be used to spread 
fertilizer, and even the sowing can be achieved this way. The same 
happens when the land is less adequately prepared or with direct sowing, 
as there is certainly more weed growth with direct sowing and the 
weeds get a headstart on the rice. That leads almost inevitably to the 
application of herbicides. With more weeds plant diseases develop and 
quickly propagate (which almost never occurs with transplanting) and 
this again leads to intervention. In summary, substitution of labor 
represents a vicious cycle with one step forcing the next: technology 
creates its own problems and subsequently requires its own solutions, 
which again create new problems (van der Ploeg, 1983). The same cycle 
is related to another significant element. Costs are not only lowered, 
but changes occur regarding structure: dependency on external markets 
and institutions increases. If one now starts from a scale of alternatives 
concerning rice cultivation, as illustrated in Figure 4.8, one might ask 
in what way the relevant aspects of relations "between town and 
countryside" condition and direct the way of farming. 
To begin with, one must again point to the freezing or even reduction 
of permanent employment in large agrarian enterprises such as those 
created by the land reform. The available labor (the number of per-
manent workers) is usually only sufficient for extensive land use. The 
sequence given in Figure 4.8, localizes the effect of credit limits and 
risk avoidance—two characteristics of the agricultural bank's policy. 
Practically from the beginning credit is limited to the most extensive 
schemes, and only after "inspection" will the bank grant extended credit. 
If farmers want to intensify further then it is at their own risk. The 
risk is smallest with an extensive form of cultivation. Costs are low, 
the cost/benefit ratio relatively high. 
The continuous deterioration of exchange relations (stagnating harvest 
prices, rising costs) will also work in favor of extensification, certainly 
if, through high incorporation, prices and costs penetrate to the heart 
of production. 
It is not possible here to give a detailed description of banana, 
sorghum and cotton cultivation, but the conclusion remains the same, 
even though the practical problems of each crop are always different: 
yields can be significantly raised. The problems which prevent this are 
clearly recognized and have been defined in a way which points to 
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their solution. The common denominator of the solutions presented can 
be described as a reduction of the level of incorporation and institu-
tionalization; in short, the increasing of autonomy. Although in the 
quotations cited the emphasis lies primarily upon the capital market 
and agricultural bank, it should not be overlooked that, in principle, 
similar problems prevail in other markets and institutions—such as in 
the market for machine services and the "pools" that operate there; in 
the cattle market and with the traders; in the markets for seed, fertilizer 
and other inputs and technology; and with the commercial companies. 
However, in Luchadores people are acutely aware that merely chang-
ing the relations between an enterprise and the external markets and 
institutions is not in itself sufficient. The social contradictions within 
an enterprise as a whole are also of great importance. Internal rela-
tionships and factors may transform and strengthen the working of 
external factors (i.e., make them a reality within the enterprise), or 
they may hinder just such a transformation. 
"One has to spend" versus "One has to apply economics" are two 
criteria which frequently clash in the field. "Applying the economy" is 
the norm reflecting bank policy. As far as the cooperative is concerned, 
it refers to the need to lower costs (to adjust the way one produces to 
the scarce availability of "means") and pursue an extensive form of 
land use. The opposite norm, generally symbolized in the expression 
"It is right to spend," leans towards an intensive form of agriculture. 
The situation in Luchadores is such that the two norms frequently 
clash. They are the basis of arguments used by different groups to 
criticize each other and even fight. 
Such internal strife occurs on a number of levels. Production is 
organized in sections, each with a chief. He decides—within certain 
limits—how the work will be done. There are not only differences of 
opinion between chiefs, but these are constantly discussed and debated. 
In turn the chiefs are in direct contact with the executive and the 
managers. The latter form the communication channel with the bank. 
So it is understandable that between chiefs and executives (plus man-
ager) debates and conflicts also often occur. Finally, there are the 
workers. If in the fields they don't agree with the decision of the chiefs, 
then it can get rough. The frequent general meetings are another 
platform for airing views. 
On all these levels the criteria stated play an important role in the 
daily "game." Let us take a closer look at some typical episodes. An 
older chief, Don Jaramillo, said, 
"For me it's much better to aim for a somewhat lower production and 
make the costs lower, for the profits are the same or maybe higher. So I 
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think you should control costs, you can't step outside the economy. If a 
certain activity is normally done with six men to the hectare, and I can 
do it with four men, then I have saved two days wages. That's why I 
say the chief should apply the economy." 
One sees that the argument turns largely on profit. The relation of that 
opinion with the past is clear. Lazaro said, 
"If I was the boss here, then I know what I would do. I would plough 
under all the rice and sow maize. You can't produce just to keep all the 
workers on, certainly not if you are losing money by it." 
By no means, however, does everyone see "application of the econ-
omy" as a convincing norm. That depends on whether the notion of 
"better work" has a place as an argument in the formal schema to 
which "application of the economy" refers. "More work," in a quan-
titative sense—or increased labor input—is an indispensable precon-
dition for "better work" (in a qualitative sense), as we shall demonstrate 
later. If one separates "more work" from the notion of "better work" 
then it quickly seems absurd. 
The question is also about the applicability of similar reasoning to, 
say, a cooperative in which wage costs from the beginning are per-
manent costs, or to a still strongly artisanal agricultural production 
process where indeed more work is often the precondition for better 
work. However, production cooperatives function in a structure and 
culture which together can be described as a capitalist environment. 
The repeating of norms which reflect a specific capitalist ratio is also 
then to some extent unavoidable. In the diffusion of such norms, the 
administrator-engineers play an important role: 
"His concepts [those of the last engineer] on how to produce did not 
seem right to us. He said, same as all the other engineers we've had 
here, that working properly is a luxury, something that we shouldn't 
allow." (Norberto Cruz) 
But the same problem partly repeats itself for the present manager 
chosen by the union, Cuevita. Whoever walks with him through the 
fields hears a hundred times a day from workers and section heads, 
"Hey Cuevita old chap, in God's name send me more men, send me 
the caterpillar and not only with the harrow but with the plough, damn 
it, it's time to get this land here well in hand and see that she recuperates 
strength." "Cuevita, see to it that we get cassava stalks, and send me 
ten Christians along with them, this is no way to work." The general 
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opinion is that section heads have to demand with "their fists on the 
table," because they are also under pressure. They know that they are 
judged by the production of their section: 
"Yes, if production is beautiful then you're a good chief, but if it's 
overgrown, miserable and badly cared for then you get short shrift from 
these fellows here. Then it's impossible to tell a team of workers anything, 
quite rightly you hear that you understand nothing, the fields say it all. 
That's why a section head has to make demands, otherwise they tell you 
your brains are growing tired." 
Thus the social base in Luchadores exerts pressure for intensification 
in all ways—which forces executives and manager into continual con-
flicts with the bank and other institutions to find the "means" wherever 
possible. 
Let us now look at the opposing norm, "that one must spend": 
"When it's a matter of the best way of working, you are always left with 
the same situation, that with low expenditure you end up with low 
production and with high expenditure you get higher production. Every 
system has its own justifications. But for me it's clear that we must aim 
here for the highest production and so we need to spend. . . . In that 
way you get high employment and that is what most interests us. Creating 
work for the community is one of our most important tasks." (Elauterio) 
Work is not just considered a cost. Creating employment is an 
"important task." But deviation from the current capitalist perception 
of production and labor goes further: 
"With sufficient men you can work properly, and if you work better 
you're surer of production; the risks are smaller. With transplanting it is 
rare to get plagues, but with direct planting the danger is great. It's just 
the same with weeding. With well-cared-for plants it's impossible to lose." 
It is important to point out that those who opt for spending do not 
reject the notion of "watching the cents." The concept is put into 
practice, however, in an entirely different way. It is sought not in a 
reduction of labor input, but primarily by taking a stand against various 
sorts of "pillage": 
"Last year we had a fine rice harvest, but because our mill has been 
closed by the state, it had to be transported to Piura to the Vegas mill. 
Can you imagine it, instead of opening our own mill or going to Pabur 
(a neighboring cooperative), they give it to a gamonal. . . . The sorghum 
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was beautiful but the misery is that the threshing machines of the private 
owners—just for threshing—appropriated the biggest part of the wealth. 
Look lets be careful of their 'economy'. Why is there no effort devoted 
to doing up old threshing machines, or why no deal closed with a friendly 
cooperative." (Tonder, former president) 
Discussions about such norms are not the only ones which are chewed 
over and circulated in Luchadores. Equally important is the debate over 
how one should work: with voluntad (with a will), or by skiving? The 
content of both concepts is no mystery: "the skivers, that's common 
sense, they are the ones who don't work properly" (Palacios). 
In describing how men should work, the word "voluntad" (literally, 
"to consciously want something") constantly crops up. 
"Work must be done with voluntad, that is it must be done with dedication 
and carefully. Otherwise you lose the plants in the fields." (Don Jaramillo) 
"To work properly, say with voluntad, you need experience, you need to 
understand and know everything, and above all feel the responsibility. 
That applies as much to workers as to chiefs. If experience, knowledge 
and understanding are missing then work cannot be done with voluntad. 
But there's something else as well. You must feel affection for the plants; 
there has to be an interest, an importance given to well-cared-for pro-
duction. If a withered plant gives you no pain, how can you then speak 
of voluntad." (Renteria, Velasquez, Octavio) 
"Look, it is very simple. If you wander now through Bejucal [a section 
at that moment covered with sorghum], then all too often you see focos 
[patches of poor growth, clearly visible among sorghum by a difference 
in color and height]. Well if you see a foco you know that place was not 
worked with voluntad." (Mamberto Farfan, ox driver and former president 
of the cooperative) 
Thus in Luchadores one sees that working with voluntad means 
"working properly," an activity orientated to intensive production. 
Working with voluntad, however, is also important at the individual 
level: a worker must put his back into it and not skimp or neglect, but 
also he must not werk "roughly." In part this is a question of labor 
organization: 
"A job must not be such that a worker is forced to rush it. With weeding 
you cannot expect more from a man than 4 pozas per person per day. 
And then it should be lower if the place is full of weeds; otherwise the 
poor results are irrevocable, and we can't have that." 
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For this some form of check or control is necessary: 
"If a well-regulated task is still messed about with, I mean if there is 
plenty of time for the work but someone hasn't the voluntad to do it 
properly, then the union is informed and that behavior is criticized and 
sanctioned." (Velasquez) 
Another issue implied in the notion of working with voluntad is the 
length of the working day. By law this is limited to eight hours, but— 
as in other cooperatives—a workering day is often shorter than that. 
"Yes, now we have tasks lasting five hours. Because of the food situation 
in the fields, there is no way you could work for eight hours at a stretch. 
. . . You can't go beyond one in the afternoon, because if you make the 
working day longer then God makes you pay." 
In comparison with hacienda days, the length and rhythm of the 
working day has dropped. Then there was the threat of immediate 
dismissal: 
"You had to work, even if you broke your back, because you were 
permanently watched and if anything was lacking or not to the liking of 
the patron you didn't get a cent, or you were promptly out." (Augusto 
Cruz) 
And it is better that things are now as they are. It is better to work 
on the basis of voluntad and not be driven by threats of immediate 
loss of earnings, physical punishment or dismissal. And I repeat the 
general opinion of Luchadores "that if work is done with voluntad then 
in five hours a good deal of work is accomplished." The problem lies 
elsewhere—when the hours put in are not done with voluntad but are 
performed with disinterest, even neglect. The problem exists, and has 
manifested itself in the course of Luchadores' long history in diverse 
ways. It is closely linked with people's feelings of well-being. In hacienda 
days a client system dominated. With sickness, and also at feast times, 
the patron always lent a little something. Nowadays, in a cooperative 
almost entirely decapitalized, with chronic financial problems, with a 
system of "public health" which "only makes you sicker," and with 
mutual relief funds which time and again fall short because of rampant 
inflation, such "social assistance" is almost non-existent. The conse-
quences of this lack are clearly felt. As one worker Roque, an irrigator, 
lamented: 
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"They say the cooperative is in crisis. There were no problems earlier— 
the cooperative would always lend you something if you were in trouble— 
but now there is no money, not a cent. Thus the helping hand when you 
need it is no longer there. People get bitter, and then voluntad flies to 
the winds." 
Voluntad is also closely linked to how internal relations and other 
matters are run. The year 1981 played an important role in this respect. 
It was a year of healthy production and yet the cooperative still took 
a loss. Suspicions immediately arose that something was amiss some-
where, that corruption existed, or that sections other than one's own 
were being neglectful. The loss must come from somewhere. If there is 
no clear awareness of the economic problems and the manner in which 
state agrarian policy influences events in the cooperative, then mistrust 
is likely to mount: "There must be a team of skivers here." More 
serious still, as one worker described it, 
'if you once think that, then your own voluntad declines, you ask yourself, 
why should I go to with such a will, when others benefit by skiving?" 
This problem is to be found in every production cooperative. There 
is no immediate or visible relation between individual input, on the 
one hand, and the sharing of the benefits of such effort, on the other. 
In the small-scale farmer sector, a direct relationship between effort 
and reward does exist (to a certain degree by the nature of things), but 
there can be no question of such a direct relationship in the coopera-
tives. 
There are a number of conditions which demonstrably effect moti-
vation. One is control, which should be two-sided. Not only must 
workers sanction indifference through their own mechanisms of con-
trol—at present via the union structure—but the workers' control of 
all aspects of the enterprise itself needs to be raised. There is too often 
a shortage of information and insight—factors which escalate conflicts 
needlessly. That was at work, for example, in the course of 1982, when 
the bank suddenly cut back on credit because of the drought. Searching 
for other funds took time and led to several weeks delay in payment, 
which led Oyala to confide that, 
"At this moment the problem is again rather urgent. There are at present 
workers who are saying to the others, fellows, why work so hard, you're 
working for nothing, free, they are not paying you, why wear yourself 
out. . . . You see, they don't fully understand the calamitous problems 
that the bank has again brought down on our backs. That's why it rankles 
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in the fields. When I hear something like that, I am furious. Although 
my mother taught me otherwise, I thunder it straight out. Damn it what 
are you doing here then man? Stay at home, or rather go carry firewood 
for your wife, if you think you're working for nothing. Clear out instead 
of infecting others." 
However, in order to be able to inform others, an overall picture is 
necessary, but from the beginning one is up against the triangle of 
bank, commercial institutions, and the administration of the coopera-
tive—a triangle within which many essential decisions are made, but 
which at the same time forms a labyrinth in which every form of 
corruption is rampant and, of course, clandestine. A second problem 
relating to control and having an overview is simply that a complex 
organization of 400 men does not easily lend itself to operable social 
control. 
In 1982 two suggestions were put forward for overcoming this prob-
lem. One of them in fact came close to splitting the cooperative into 
smaller sections with each working on its own account. For each section 
a group of around forty to fifty permanent workers was envisaged, an 
overseeable whole where better social control could be practiced. The 
second suggestion, which came from the union, was to work in smaller 
brigades but to keep the enterprise as a whole intact. At the same time 
to improve the union's system of control, "there should be more mutual 
criticism," said the union bulletin. It is not appropriate here to go into 
the technical aspects of both propositions. What is important is that 
"skiving" and lack of motivation for work were seen as a serious but 
resolvable problem. 
The importance of these internal discussions and conflicts can be 
seen in relation to the mechanization issue, for if there is no voluntad 
in the work, a regressive process begins in which mechanization plays 
a typical role. The engineer Chiroque's view was that "If people won't 
work then we set machines on." And that's what happened. 
Machinery could be used at numerous points in the production 
process, and the more this was obvious the worse became the quality 
of work (the more voluntad disappeared, according to the people of 
Luchadores). 
"In fertilizing cotton, a donkey would first be used to open up a furrow 
between the plants, then we spread the stuff and a second donkey was 
used to close the furrow. If that was well done then no cotton plants 
would be damaged by it, that is so much better than when you go through 
with a machine. It is also much cheaper. But if it's not done carefully 
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then a tractor is more attractive. Then at least everything is done in a 
uniform way." 
The artisanal nature of the process of agrarian production implies 
that through careful work satisfactory productive results are achieved. 
If the conscious will for this is absent then industrialization of the 
production process is inevitable, maybe even preferable, but the pos-
sibilities for development contained in craftsmanship are lost. 
The Luchadores Plan 
As mentioned, the union decided in 1981 to place itself at the head 
of the cooperative. When this was put into effect at the end of 1981, 
a plan was formulated for enterprise development which committed 
itself to the interests and needs of the rural poor. "We decided," said 
Palacios, 
"that from then on, we in the union would not limit ourselves to a purely 
defensive position, but would become active in guiding and leading the 
cooperative. We wanted to go further than just defend wages and con-
ditions. It had to be done in ways other than just placing our men in 
administrative posts—such posts are likely to disappear before you know 
it. We needed a clear work plan that translated our principles into lines 
of practical action and permanent discussion and coordination between 
the union and cooperative executives." 
Practically all the problems discussed above came to play a role in 
one way or another in the emergence of this decision. One could say 
that a high level of incorporation and marked institutionalization as 
well as internal "reflections" had carried the cooperative as an enter-
prise further from what appeared to be desirable: raising and defending 
employment and intensifying production. The union plan was a way 
of redressing the balance. It can be summarized in a few words as a 
meticulous, step-by-step description of how different crops can be in-
tensified. It is at the same time a detailed interpretation of how oper-
ational costs can be lowered. This meticulousness is linked, I believe 
to one of the aspects of Luchadores which continues to fascinate me— 
the degree to which not only the workers but also the administrators 
behaviour remained, in a certain sense, that of small farmers: very 
precise, with an almost microscopic way of looking at matters combined 
with stubbornness and risk avoidance. Such a stand can have its 
disadvantages, but it can also lead to an extremely realistic and therefore 
powerful disposition. The plan reflects deeply this spirit. Past and 
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present running of affairs were, as it were, put under the microscope, 
and the possibility of making small shifts which together could have a 
meaningful impact was carefully scrutinized. Let me illustrate this 
approach by describing the plan to reduce costs, not only because it 
shows in practice the possibilities for intensification, but also because 
the intended reduction was conceptualized as a way to increase their 
autonomy. The plan discusses the cooperative's dependency on machine 
pools and believes the answer to lie in rebuilding the workshops (started 
in 1982), in extending technical in-service training for mechanics, in 
repairing existing machinery, and in devising a carefully thought-out 
policy regarding the purchase of new machinery. Likewise, dependency 
on dealers who monopolize the circulation and fattening of cattle could 
be reduced by developing their own fattening centre and a production 
plant for milk. With regard to the commercial companies, one of the 
first steps to be taken was to work with other cooperatives and seek 
out independent agronomic advice. 
Dependency on the bank was a much more difficult matter. The core 
of the solution here was thought to be the resuscitation of the banana 
and citrus groves. Banana production could reasonably quickly supply 
a regular cash-flow of between 2 and 8 million soles a month. That 
was not only an important part of the monthly wage bill, but it was 
money that was completely controlled by the cooperative. The supple-
menting of short-falls in bank credit or the financing of projects falling 
outside bank criteria would then be possible. The problem was naturally 
how to get started. Banks do not lend money for such projects. As the 
investment is principally one of labor, extra "sacrifice" seemed to be 
the only approach to the problem. The list could be substantially 
lengthened, but the illustrations chosen are sufficient to show that the 
common denominator of the plan was to reduce the degree of incor-
poration and institutionalization in order to limit costs and make it 
possible to work and produce more. In economic terms that would lead 
to higher incomes and relatively lower costs. Employment would rise 
and agrarian production would be intensified. The driving power behind 
it all was the desire for progress that would be felt in the fields, for: 
"Only the poor of the fields can achieve that, neither the gamonales nor 
the new patron, the state, have ever been able to get the fields to bloom." 
The feasibility of the union plan was researched in a separate study 
by Bolhuis (1982). His analysis showed that holding all other variables 
constant, positive results could be attained through the proposed in-
tensification and specific reductions. From a loss of 80.4 million soles 
in 1980 they could have made a slight profit of 4 million soles. In 1981 
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the shift would have been greater, the net surplus could have risen to 
30 million soles (see Bolhuis and van der Ploeg, 1985:378-379, for a 
summary). One could argue that recalculating in retrospect is all too 
easy and naturally does not form conclusive proof. But as Thomas and 
Logan rightly assert, cooperative experiences must be seen and under-
stood not so much as a static model but as praxis. That applies also 
to Luchadores. In 1980 and 1981 no positive results were obtained 
despite the favorable circumstances. That and the conviction that it 
could have been possible (as Bolhuis's 1982 study suggests) led to radical 
changes: the union placed itself at the head of the cooperative. The 
plan for gradual intensification and for restructuring costs was formu-
lated in terms of greater autonomy from markets and market agencies. 
New conditions were thus created for getting better results, and in 1983 
and 1984, which fall outside the scope of this study, Luchadores suc-
ceeded in making a profit. 
If we now consider the experience of Luchadores as praxis, as a 
process where problems and prospects can be consciously anticipated 
and responded to (the plan is in the last analysis an indication par 
excellence of this), then it seems to me that the discussion concerning 
the ultimate viability of the plan hangs on two questions: is progressive 
intensification possible under the adverse conditions previously out-
lined? And is a production cooperative an adequate structure for this? 
Why not? would be my answer to the first question. Why should positive 
results not be obtainable with intensification? The argument usually 
used against this is "the law of diminishing returns." Maybe as a 
didactic principle it is useful, but as starting point for enterprise and 
sector planning this "law" is entirely inadequate. The assumption on 
which the construction of a production function rests (i.e., the variation 
of one or two inputs by holding constant the rest) is entirely strange 
to agricultural development as a process. Lenin once said—in reply to 
criticisms on Kautsky's book "Agrarfrage"—"thus the 'law of dimin-
ishing returns' does not at all apply to cases in which technology is 
progressing and methods of production are changing; it has only an 
extremely relative and restricted application to conditions in which 
technology remains unchanged. . . . Indeed, the very term 'additional 
investments of labor'. . . presupposes changes in the methods of pro-
duction, reforms in technique" (Lenin, vol. 5:109, 110). 
Recent developments in theoretical agronomy (De Wit, 1981; Rab-
binge, 1979:149, and van Heemst et al, 1983) have definitively buried 
the law of diminishing returns. It is precisely the opposite that is now 
most frequently discussed, i.e., "the law of increasing returns" (also 
termed the "Liebig-function"). This phenomenon occurs if all the growth 
factors are changed at the same time in a well-coordinated way: then 
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increasing returns emerge. The many practical forms and dimensions 
that Luchadores gives to the concept "working better" is an outstanding 
example of this principle. 
In agro-economic research such as that of Ishikawa (1981), the pos-
sibility of increasing returns is advanced as a real option. Surprisingly 
enough, the law of diminishing returns is still echoing around socio-
logical studies of agricultural development.7 But that aside, in the first 
instance the prospect for further intensification is a theoretical one. 
Specific social relations (at whatever level) can effectively stimulate but 
also block such possibilities. A certain incompatibility can arise between 
further intensification and the relations under which it has to be real-
ized. The question then arises as to whether intensification and its 
interaction with existing economic and institutional relations can be so 
structured that any incompatibility that arises can be remedied. 
That leads to the second question: is the cooperative an adequate 
organizational structure for progressive intensification? Farm labor in 
Luchadores is mainly artisan labor. High productivity and economic 
efficiency are only reached if the many tasks which constitute agrarian 
production are conscientiously coordinated and expertly carried out. 
This, according to Nove (1983:88), "calls for flexibility, adaptability and 
initiative, at the grass roots. . . . Commitment of the peasantry to their 
work is essential." From his critical review of the Russian, Polish and 
the more positive Hungarian experiences, Nove points out the following 
conditions for achieving such a commitment. First, individual incentives 
are essential "to stimulate peasant interest in the outcome of the work 
they do" (1983:90). That is not a simple matter. If once "the peasant 
love of the land," so narrowly written off by de Janvry (1981) as a petty 
bourgeois obsession, is eliminated, then other material incentives often 
seem counterproductive. Second, Nove touches upon the community 
level: "Remedies, to be effective, must surely enlarge the decision-making 
functions of those on the spot, both farm management and the sub-units 
within the farm" (1983:132, 90). And this leads to a third level, that of 
the interrelations between the enterprise and the economic-institutional 
environment. "Operational autonomy of farms," that is to say, "the 
freedom to chose what to produce and what to sell, the freedom to 
purchase inputs and a much greater flexibility in internal organization 
and in organizing the work of peasant members is necessary" (1983:132, 
90). Reviewing the Luchadores experience, it can be said that a "com-
mitment at grass roots" is possible but that at the same time a number 
of strategic limitations operate. The practical possibility of commitment, 
of voluntad, must be primarily sought in the interweaving of social and 
economic spheres, in the overlapping of enterprise and community. The 
enterprise is not isolated from the rest of life for the people of Luchadores. 
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The problem of commitment cannot therefore be resolved solely within 
the economic sphere as Fais Borda (1970), and Galjart (1981), among 
others, all too often assume. The social sphere and the economic sphere 
are reflections of each other, at least in a cooperative setting such as 
Luchadores. A skiver might obtain advantages from a wage that remains 
the same, but the price that he inevitably pays for this is diminished 
prestige in the social sphere, not only within the enterprise, but in the 
village, in the bar, maybe in his own family and in his many chance 
encounters. In moments when he needs help he will be seen as a skiver 
and treated accordingly. In synthesis, if we define the relations between 
work input and expected wage as a social relation of exchange, then the 
definition of benefits and costs encompasses both the economic and the 
social sphere. And that gives the problem other contours than a purely 
economic analysis would suggest, certainly if voluntad prevails as an 
important value. 
Thus a first sociological limitation for achieving higher commitment 
is indicated: "working well" as a value must be shared by a majority 
in the community, and at the same time, the social networks which 
bind the community must be solid enough for social control to be 
effective. Further, and presumably more essential, there needs to be a 
visible link between input and benefits, not only at an individual level 
but in general. The fluctuation of voluntad, or commitment, over the 
years in Luchadores, highlights the importance of such a visible link— 
and of open administration and management practices both within the 
internal and external relations of the enterprise. 
The argument of whether the cooperative is a valid form can be 
taken a step further by asking what meaning the development of an 
intensive form of agriculture, geared to high employment, has for the 
cooperative. Fanfani has done exciting, though as yet unpublished, 
research in Italy on an agricultural cooperative in Ravenna. The initial 
aim was to plan production for the coming years using linear program-
ming. Naturally that required specifying the goal function. It appeared 
in subsequent meetings that the members wanted to maximize em-
ployment, but the leader and technicians wanted primarily to raise 
profits for investment in future development. Fanfani and his team 
used linear programming to calculate the effects of these opposing 
opinions and of several gradations in between. The result showed that 
with a 10% reduction in profits, employment could be doubled. Similar 
studies were carried out in Peru (Arrus, 1974). Dropping the technical 
details and complications of such studies, we want here to stress that 
they especially demonstrate that the productive structure of an enter-
prise is not a simple derivative of prevailing economic relations. Within 
similar relations there are always many solutions possible in interaction 
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with the economic-institutional environment: the "goals" which nor-
matize the setting up and organization of production are decisive. There 
is a second point: the pressure to raise employment (and thus the need 
to further intensify) is almost always found among the rank and file of 
the cooperatives. In an empirical study (Ochoa, 1980) of eighty-seven 
cooperatives, it appears that also in Peru there is a significant difference 
between members and leaders on the question of goals. The workers 
are usually of the opinion "that there are too few members in the 
cooperative" and "that there are too many" managers. 
If we consider cooperative experience as praxis, then the social forces 
which determine its forms and development are crucially important. 
Hence, where the fight for employment is experienced as urgent by a 
large part of the marginalized rural population, a cooperative form of 
organization can be a valid mechanism for the development of agri-
culture as well as for the integration of economic and political power. 
The principle of self-management as a link between the fight for em-
ployment and development of the enterprise can result in an intensive 
style of agriculture geared to a high and rising input of labor. 
In the theory of self-management great significance is attributed to 
aspects of employment and to mechanisms which substitute for the 
traditional labor market. With respect to Mondragon, Thomas and 
Logan conclude that "in the contract of association the 'open door' 
principle—the preparedness to create employment—is very important." 
Two matters should be stressed here. In industrial production such as 
that found in Mondragon, expansion of employment is first possible 
after making (relatively sizeable) investments in new capital goods. 
Savings or loans are thus necessary. Agrarian production tends to be 
different, especially where it is artisanal. The intensification perspective 
creates the possibility of directly raising employment. Of course in-
vestments are needed, but they are mostly lower than in industry and 
are largely a question of investments in labor. 
A second matter of essential importance is how and in what way 
the "boundaries" of the cooperative are to be defined. If these bound-
aries are closed, i.e., if the numbers are to be limited to members of 
the original group, further intensification geared to the raising of em-
ployment is not very likely. Then, expansion according to extensification, 
the E-pattern, is the most opportune and evident choice. This means 
again that the formal cooperative model is not as important for un-
derstanding actual developments as are the nature and dynamics of the 
social forces on which the cooperative depends, as well as the "oper-
ational autonomy" (Nove) which the cooperative manages to weave in 
relation to external economic and institutional forces. 
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Social Struggle and Autonomy as Prerequisites 
for Intensification: A Comparative Analysis 
In the previous sections, two factors emerged as decisive for intensity 
of soil use in the cooperative context: social struggle and autonomy. 
We define here social struggle as the effort to defend and raise em-
ployment in the fields, which necessarily assumes an intensification of 
the production process. The ideological pivot of this social effort is the 
collective conviction (a collectively carried I-option) that the lands can 
and should be better worked and that the returns will increase. For 
this to materialize, ideas and collective convictions need a social base 
which fights for their realization: that is precisely where the strategic 
importance of the union in Luchadores is rooted. This union has never 
limited the scope of its action or its horizons to the permanent workers 
of the enterprise. It encompasses, rather, "the whole of the rural poor"— 
a whole which is maybe not always exactly definable but which never-
theless prevails in the fields as reality. The history of the union provides 
an outstanding illustration. Take, for example, the invasion of January 
2, 1973, in which everyone, workers and non-workers, took part. In 
1981 the union led a strike of temporary workers who at that time 
were working on the cotton harvest—thus a strike against their own 
cooperative. A shock for the administrator-enguieer of the day, but for 
the permanent workers a normal affair: 
"They are poor farmers after all, just like us, perhaps even more wronged 
than us. . . . If they have longings, then they have a right to fight for 
them. The blame lies simply with the opposing party. They shouldn't be 
so stubborn." 
The "communal land" founded in 1982 through pressure from the 
union is a similar illustration of its broad identity.8 The importance of 
this broad social base cannot be stressed enough: encompassing a set 
of interests broader than that defined by the cooperative structure as 
such meant a breakthrough in the segmentation of the rural people as 
a political block that had been achieved by the land reform. 
Next in importance after social struggle in determining the style of 
agriculture practiced is the degree of autonomy from markets and 
institutions (i.e., the inverse of degree of incorporation and institution-
alization). Just as the degree of social strife can differ from cooperative 
to cooperative, so can the degree of autonomy. Diverse causes play a 
role here: 
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1. some cooperatives escaped the decapitalization which took place 
before and during the reform; 
2. some cooperatives have a regular income which cannot be con-
trolled by the bank or state, possibly from the sale of bananas or 
vegetables, etc., which can supply permanent economic surplus 
for autonomous use; 
3. some cooperatives have such a favorable man/land ratio that their 
costs are low enough to produce continual profits which allow a 
high degree of self-financing. 
If cooperatives differ in terms of degree of social strife as well as 
degree of autonomy, then the effects of both factors on the intensity of 
agricultural practice can be examined through comparative research. 
This we have done by taking four cooperatives—Luchadores, Carrasco, 
Morropon and Franco, and Alvaro Castillo. The global position of these 
four cooperatives in terms of social conflict and autonomy is represented 
in Figure 4.9. The distribution of the cooperatives over the dimensions 
discussed follows mainly qualitative arguments, although it is possible 
to specify "autonomy" quantitatively. I will highlight here the case of 
Carrasco, which contrasts most markedly with Luchadores (no social 
conflict and a high degree of autonomy). The autonomy of Carrasco is 
significantly greater than that of the other cooperatives for the following 
reasons: 
1. Of the cultivated area (643 ha) more than a third (243 ha) is 
devoted to banana cultivation, which in mid-1982 gave an income 
of around 2 million soles a week and paid between 60 and 80% 
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cooperative 
of the total wage bill. This implies that problems with the bank, 
although not absent, were nevertheless significantly reduced. 
2. The cooperative was formed in 1975, and thus escaped the de-
capitalization that had occurred in other cooperatives. 
3. Finally, the man/land ratio of four and a half hectares of cultivated 
area per man was the lowest in the area. This made high mech-
anization possible and kept wage costs relatively low. 
These factors ensured that Carrasco produced permanent profits. In 
1981 this was 15 million soles, part of which was distributed and part 
reinvested. However, the relative autonomy enjoyed by Carrasco was 
not used to intensify production further. Carrasco lacked the social 
basis to push for such an intensification. There was no talk of social 
struggle in Carrasco. As far as there was struggle, it was simply about 
the defending of particular interests, interests which the workers of 
Carrasco did not associate with but saw as rather separate from the 
other rural poor. 
Intensity of agriculture can be ascertained by two indicators: intensity 
of the cropping pattern and intensity of the form of production. With 
regards to cropping pattern, the highest percentage intensively cultivated 
is in Luchadores, and the highest extensive cultivation is in Carrasco. 
The greatest and most interesting differences emerge when hectare yields 
are compared. If we convert the differences in cropping patterns and 
yields into indices and we subsequently calculate the average per coop-
erative, then the picture given in Figure 4.10 emerges. Although no 
further statistical meaning can be attributed to this picture, the inter-
relations in the graph bear out the hypothesis that social struggle and 
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autonomy are indeed important forces behind intensity of agriculture 
in the cooperative sector. What is absent in the graph is the combination 
of autonomy and strife. And this is where we again encounter the 
relevance of the Luchadores plan: both elements are central as action 
lines for practice, action lines which must both result in continuous 
intensification. Translated in graphic terms, we find the relationships 
shown in Figure 4.11. One can see here the meaning of the plan as it 
developed in the course of 1981 and 1982. Putting the plan "to fight 
and work" into practice as a farming response could mean a break-
through in agrarian stagnation. Where the dynamics of agrarian capi-
talism results in "brazos sin tierra and tierra sin brazos" Luchadores 
is aiming for the opposite: "work for all and fields that bloom." 
Notes 
1. In the community of Catacaos, in the neighboring valley of Bajo Piura, 
a similar process of social struggle was observable in the 1960s and 1970s, 
aimed at intensification through an increase of employment and workers' control 
over production (see van der Ploeg, 1976 and 1977, and Comunidad, 1974). 
2. A savings quota is that part of estimated future GVP that farmers are 
supposed to save (i.e., allocate to the bank). In practice it refers to the margins 
that are to be taxed away from the countryside, to stimulate "national devel-
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opment." The remaining part of estimated GVP is for the costs of production 
and wages. 
3. To illustrate the hold the bank has on the planning and organization of 
production, I will describe some elements of loan SAEA-A1-02/81 which 
Luchadores contracted with the bank for the '82 campaign. In the first place, 
the funds allocated were administered (as is mostly the case) under an agreement 
between the Bank and the BID (Banco Interamericano de Desarollo, Agreement 
322-SF-PE of 27-6-1972). This agreement grants both the bank and BID the 
right "to visit and investigate all properties, goods, works and constructions of 
the cooperative." Second, the cooperative is obliged "to carry out all recom-
mendations of the Ministry of Agriculture" as well as "to supply the bank 
with all information." Further it is forbidden to interchange machinery, etc., 
with other cooperatives and communities, since "the cooperative is obliged to 
use the financed goods and services strictly and exclusively for its own fields." 
The bank and BID maintain the right to cancel the loan at any moment they 
consider appropriate. 
As to the specific loan, it contains a detailed description of the rotation 
scheme to be used and the varieties to be sown. For each variety the expected 
yield is specified. Sixty-five percent of total production costs are to be financed 
with the loan. The plan de entregas specifies how much money will be received 
each month and how it must be spent. For cotton, for example, 211 million 
soles may be borrowed, of which 137.5 million must be dedicated to acquiring 
industrial inputs. This money is to be paid directly to the trading companies. 
Then there is a plan de reembolsos, that is, a plan for the payment of interest 
and for repayment of the loan. From a certain moment on, the two plans 
become interrelated: the money will only continue to flow if repayment is 
effectuated. Loans of different years are also thus interlinked: "the transfer of 
January (for payment of salaries, as foreseen by loan A1-02/81) will only be 
effectuated if loan SAEA 1/80 [of the previous year] is completely repaid." On 
24 March 1982, loan A1-02/81 was "modified" since "the hydrological situation 
in the valley is worsening." The total loan was reduced from 550 million to 
291.5 million soles. On 31 March 1982 the part referring to cotton cultivation 
was "definitely eliminated," notwithstanding that the seed and most inputs had 
already been bought. At the beginning of April the part concerning the culti-
vation of sorghum was "restructured" to 32 million for payment of salaries in 
the cooperative and 68 million to the trading companies. However, the payment 
of the 32 million was then made dependent on (a) "the inspection of the fields," 
and (b) "the repayment of loan SAEA A1-1/80." At the same time the bank 
organizes police checks around the cooperative to see whether there are "illegal 
sellings." Several lorries remain in police custody. 
4. The land reform laws governing cooperatives contain no adequate rules 
for "succession" of an old member by his son or daughter. In practice the 
same laws exhibit a strong bias against women's membership. Theoretically the 
assembly of a cooperative could adapt specific rules, but if they do so they 
will then run counter to the bank, the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of 
Agriculture. 
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5. Alvarez (1981:80) gives the distribution of crops over the organizational 
subsectors in agriculture. Sugarcane is exclusively cultivated in cooperatives; 
68% of cotton is cultivated in cooperatives and the rest by medium and small-
scale farmers. Sorghum is cultivated mainly (87.4%) in cooperatives, but only 
10% of rice is from cooperatives. For all other crops the percentage for 
cooperatives is below 10%. 
In the 1970s there was an evident extensification in sugarcane production. 
Yields fell from 169.9 ton/ha at the beginning to 131.4 ton/ha at the end of 
the decade. Cotton also showed decreasing yields and likewise sorghum. It is 
the typical crops grown by small-scale farmers (such as beans, coffee and, to 
a lesser degree, cereals) which showed an increase in yields throughout the 
decade. A specific analysis of yield differences between the subsectors is to be 
found in Bolhuis and van der Ploeg, 1985, Chapter 5. 
6. One might test this hypothesis using the study of farming accountancy 
in 1,200 enterprises (MAA, 1978). It becomes clear from the analysis that there 
is a positive relation between a low labor input and increased "profitability" 
(see Bolhuis and van der Ploeg, 1985, Chapter 7, note 19). 
7. A typical example of the "backwardness" of social scientists is to be 
found in Warman (1976). Following Geertz's notion of agricultural involution, 
Warman describes agrarian development in Morelos, Mexico. Between 1930 
and 1960 there was a considerable increase in the economically active population 
in agriculture. The area under cultivation also increased. However, agricultural 
production saw a more marked expansion. According to Warman: "increases 
in cultivated area, in capital used and in the labour input explain more or less 
50% of the real increase in production" (1976:282); this seems to imply that 
the technical efficiency of agricultural production rose considerably. Yet Warman 
offers a different explanation, namely, that the increase in "total factor produc-
tivity" results ("if not completely, then to a large degree") from a more lengthy 
working day and a heavier labor load. He attempts to support this remarkable 
interpretation by referring to Sahlin's concept of "primitive barbarians" in 
Stone Age Economics] 
The crucial point, however, is that agrarian incomes, notwithstanding the 
considerable rise in production and efficiency, did not rise. This leads Warman 
to conclude (as so many other researchers of agrarian development have) that 
"the intensification of agriculture entails a decrease in labour productivity" 
(1976:303). He asserts this to be a "constant relation": "more intensive pro-
duction corresponds to an increase in production and a decrease in labor 
productivity" (1976:299). This is simply nonsense: In the first place, because 
physical interrelations established within strict limits of time and space (as in 
experimental stations) cannot be used to understand broad historical processes 
in which labor as a "factor of production" is itself an active subject creating 
all kinds of changes—i.e., processes in which the relations between technology, 
craftsmanship, and political and economic dimensions can and do change. 
Second, the argumentation itself seems faulty. Incomes did indeed decrease, 
but was this through the "constant relation" assumed by Warman or through 
the increased exploitation of farmers' labor? During the period analyzed (1930-
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1960) there was an almost continuous and strong squeeze on agriculture in 
Morelos and the terms of trade got worse (see also Warman, 1976:232-235). 
Imagine what might have happened if no intensification had taken place among 
farmers: what would have happened to incomes and to "labor productivity"? 
Associated with this rough and illogical reasoning is a neglect of heteroge-
neity. For some types of farms and for some crops commoditization increased 
considerably in Morelos. As Warman states: "markets grew, the circulation of 
money increased. Morelos became 'civilized' through increased contact with the 
surrounding capitalist world." Social mechanisms for the mobilization of land, 
labor and working capita) disintegrated rapidly and indebtedness became chronic. 
So "notwithstanding the introduction of fertilizer, hectare yields of maize 
decreased from 25 to 40%" (1976:228). Even with such data Warman is not 
capable of distinguishing meaningful patterns in the significant heterogeneity, 
nor of linking in an adequate way the different changes. He sees only "constant 
relations." 
8. Communal land was a piece of land on which horticultural products were 
grown to supply the surrounding villages with cheap food during periods of 
extreme drought (and hunger). 
5 
Commoditization and 
the Social Relations of Production 
Heterogeneity is neither accidental nor a secondary characteristic of 
agricultural systems. It is the structural result of the fact that farm 
labour, as a goal-oriented and conscious activity, takes place under 
increasingly diverse relations of production. In this respect the rela-
tionship between commodity and non-commodity forms and circuits 
often plays a decisive role. Heterogeneity is not a traditional leftover, 
nor a simple derivative of earlier, but still surviving structures, as 
Mellor (1968:260) and Lipton (1968:note 19) assume when they relate 
substantial variation in agricultural practice to low levels of develop-
ment. "The less developed an agricultural community, the greater is 
the inter-farm coefficient of variability of output per acre in the normal 
year" writes Lipton. Mellor starts from the same hypothesis and relates 
the phenomenon to the imperfection of the market, arguing that "vari-
ation in labour and capital cost may be greater [in traditional agricul-
ture] than in the high-income nation where resources may be more 
freely mobile. As a result, greater variability in farm organization and 
operation may occur in traditional as compared to modern agriculture." 
Variation and heterogeneity are not limited to peripheral agricultural 
systems. They are increasingly reproduced in modern, "highly devel-
oped" systems. The most significant example of this is perhaps the 
Northeast Polder of the Netherlands. It is an area of land which was 
drained in the 1940s from what was formerly the Zuiderzee. In the 
1950s the fertile land of the polder was divided into equal plots and 
handed over to farmers. Farmers from the "old lands" who wanted to 
migrate to this new land were carefully selected by government officials. 
Only the "best producers" were considered. A very homogeneous farm 
structure arose in this way, with farms of equal size, uniform buildings 
and stalls, and a population of "young and dynamic" farmers. 
However, within a decade there were noticeable differences in agri-
cultural practice (Constandse, 1964; Zachariasse, 1974). The average 
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production per hectare amounted to 10,000 kg/ha grain-equivalents, but 
around this mean considerable variation emerged (SD=4,000 or 40%). 
Research showed that such differences in intensity were remarkably 
stable from year to year. Only taken over longer periods did some 
farms show any variation (Zachariasse, 1979). Figure 5.1 gives the 
average production of grain-equivalents per hectare for a series of 
agricultural areas. 
In comparative research of the kind undertaken by Hayami and 
Ruttan (1971) and de Wit and van Heemst (1976), production of grain-
equivalents is taken as the unit for judging the level of development 
in different agricultural systems. Hectare yields per agricultural area is 
given on the y-axis. The standard deviation is expressed as a percentage 
of the average level of production and is represented on the x-axis. 
Results indicate that diversity is to be found in each agricultural system. 
Marked variation in hectare yields is not limited to peripheral agri-
cultural systems, as is generally suggested in modernization theories, 
but also occur in systems which are part of "high-income nations." 
The Northeast Polder, and dairying in the north of the Netherlands 
and on the Po plain of Italy, are well documented examples of this. 
However, the obduracy with which such variety is dismissed in the 
field of policy and theory is as remarkable as the frequency with which 
such differences crop up, even in highly developed systems. The back-
ground of this myopia is undoubtedly the neoclassical postulate that 
farmers should be considered entrepreneurs for whom, without excep-
tion, "profit maximization" is the rule. The notion that different strat-
egies can be followed to develop an enterprise and that consequently 
different optimums emerge is basically missing. With the help of such 
neoclassical models one optimum is defined, which is determined by 
given market and price relations. Empirical diversity is then seen as 
an expression of varying degrees of successful or unsuccessful entre-
preneurship. That is precisely the conclusion of one of the most im-
portant studies dedicated to the variety in the Northeast Polder. Dif-
ferences in intensity were, in the last analysis, seen as an expression 
of differences in entrepreneurship. And because entrepreneurship is 
conceived of as a unilinear dimension which progresses from "bad" to 
"good," only one conclusion was possible—namely, "that it appears 
reasonable to continue giving maximum support to farmers to strive 
to become better entrepreneurs" (Zachariasse, 1979:13). More entrepre-
neurship then, to be achieved through state intervention, is desirable 
in order to eliminate diversity and the differences in profitability which 
go along with this. 
In such a view heterogeneity is seen as a characteristic of a not-yet-
completed reality, as the result of temporary set backs or obstacles that 
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can be eliminated. In the neoclassic model employed in current theories 
of agrarian and development economics, questions concerning how far 
agricultural practice is incorporated are irrelevant. Whether market and 
price relations penetrate the production process, i.e., whether labor 
objects, means, and labor do or do not appear as commodities has no 
part in their paradigm because homo economicus (or the "agricultural 
entrepreneur") ought to calculate and plan as if all markets and market 
relations were indeed real; as if the indicators which determine farm 
operation and development were formed in a unilinear and unmani-
pulable manner by these market relations. 
Theoretically speaking, the agricultural systems researched in this 
book form an integral part of "generalized commodity economies." In 
Italy, as in Peru, we came across farms which are tied to markets, 
both on the selling and supply side. There is no question of a "natural 
economy." But to conclude on the basis of this that there is only one 
degree of commoditization, namely, a "complete commoditization," as 
Gibbon and Neocosmos (1985) and recently Bernstein (1986) do, is a 
serious mistake—in the first place, because micro- and macro-levels are 
blurred; in the second, because ideal-typical constructions take the place 
of a theoretical reconstruction of complex and contradictory realities; 
and third, because the agrarian sector is conceptualized as a uniform 
category in which diversity can only be a phenomenon of secondary 
significance. 
Value and Commoditization as a Differential Process 
In the earlier chapters commoditization was conceptualized as a 
differential process. It is also an extremely complex process that is 
multiform and changing, embracing many facets and interrelations. As 
a historical process, it is characterized not only by an enormous geo-
graphical diversity but has displayed through the course of time an 
often deeply contradictory nature as well as differing drives and incen-
tives. Although at a conceptual level commoditization may perhaps be 
seen as an unambiguous, "historically completed" process (Bernstein, 
1986), empirically it often represents the opposite. 
In the case studies, commoditization of the agrarian production 
process was analyzed in terms of its multiple incorporation into various 
markets. Incorporation of a farm enterprise into a market—whatever 
market—implies exchange: goods or services acquired through monitary 
exchange appear then as commodities in the labor process. The more 
a farm enterprise is incorporated, i.e., the more the resources used 
appear as commodities, the more the labor and development process 
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(production and reproduction) has to be organized in direct correspon-
dence with current market and price relationships. 
Hence, "the logic of markets" (Friedmann, 1980:167) is not an 
imperative for all farm enterprises which might fall under the general 
category of simple commodity production. Markets only become a 
structuring principle when a high level of incorporation has been 
reached and commodity relations become a reality within the labor 
process itself, since it is then and only then that labor objects, means, 
and (a part of) the labor employed appear de facto as commodities. 
As I have shown, commoditization leads to a restructuring of the farm 
labor process. The cognitive schema (calculi) through which relation-
ships between farm, markets and the labor process are interpreted, 
structured and reproduced undergo a significant change with increasing 
incorporation. Thus heterogeneity in styles of agricultural practice and 
variation in agrarian development patterns also depends, though not 
exclusively, on the degree of incorporation and consequent commodi-
tization. 
The case studies and this conclusion start, analytically, from the 
premise that one can only speak of commoditization and commodities 
if there is indeed exchange (i.e., actual incorporation into markets). As 
Marx (1974:111,328) says, "It is commerce which here turns products 
into commodities." Consequently those goods and services produced 
and reproduced within the farm enterprise itself, or mobilized through 
socially regulated exchange, should not to be considered as commodities. 
They have use value and are the result of concrete labor. That is, they 
represent a specific value for those who create and use them. This 
specific social value would be lost if they were commercialized. Chev-
alier, among others, follows a different line of reasoning on this. He 
argues that "by commodity is meant not those material values that are 
actually purchased or sold but, more generally, all those that are ex-
changeable for money and that contain a definite quantity of value" 
(1982:118, italics added). From such a starting point it is easy to 
overlook the central place that the concrete labor process should have 
in research on the social relations of production. Such a starting point 
also dispenses with the need to research the complex unity of produc-
tion and reproduction within specific forms of the division of labor. 
Chevalier argues that the concept of commodity implies "exchangea-
bility," and not actual exchange. He concludes by classifying those 
goods and services which are not exchanged (e.g., part of the harvest, 
land, labor etc.) as being "subsistence commodities." "They never enter 
the sphere of circulation, not because they are not exchangeable but 
rather because their 'abstract' value can be best realized through direct 
consumption by the producers themselves" (1982:118-9). Exchange 
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calculations are thus seen to be crucial even when certain "commod-
ities" are not sold. 
On the basis of the case studies such an argument must be disputed. 
Let us begin again with cows. Whatever the possible sale value is, a 
typical I-farmer from Emilia Romagna will not sell his "good cow." Of 
course such a cow is, theoretically speaking, exchangeable—the owner 
will happily even boast about her value, at least in the local bar. But 
he would not boast of her value in the market, because he would not 
sell her, except perhaps at the appropriate time. That time would be 
determined by the farmer himself when he knows for certain that he 
has a sufficient number of "good" offspring from the cow. In a theo-
retical exercise of the Chevalier type, the sale of a "good cow," can be 
presented as an activity in itself, but in reality, i.e., in farming practice, 
it is an activity which cannot possibly stand in isolation. It has to be 
coordinated with other activities, must be a logical and consistent part 
of a general goal-directed strategy. "Exchangeability" would mean that 
cows of the following generation would not be produced with the help 
of this good cow but would likewise be purchased via exchange. Pre-
cisely because of this, farmers who work with a consistent strategy of 
autonomous intensification will quickly dismiss any such notion of 
exchangeability, especially as they are convinced that, like themselves, 
"other farmers would never sell their best young cattle." In such a case 
the exchangeability constructed by Chevalier is a farce, and so is his 
notion of "value." The value of a good cow, in this context, is that it 
delivers a valuable male or female offspring. Its value arises also from 
the fact that the farmer knows this good cow intimately and, therefore, 
also has at his fingertips the basis of an intimate knowledge of the 
offspring. This specific value or use rules out any possibility of applying 
some general notion of exchangeability. A good cow represents a specific 
use value precisely because she is not sold. The specific use value 
carried by the good cow is that it is one of the means by which the 
farmer acquires and enlarges his control over the production process. If 
he should reduce this good cow through exchangeability to mere "ab-
stract value," then he would (a) partly be giving up his control over 
the processes of production and reproduction, and (b) would, in a 
stroke, undo all the labor previously given to the very creation of such 
a cow. The "good cow" represents a specific use value. Of course 
exchange value can be dreamed about but the realization of that value 
nullifies its specific use value. 
In short, the exchangeability and value which Chevalier postulates, 
are totally unreal categories in farming practice. The same applies to 
feed and to so many other use value items that are strategic in the 
farm labor process. Of course feed can be bought anytime and anywhere, 
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but again, self-produced feed represents more than an abstract value. 
Roughage and concentrates produced on the farm represent again a 
specific use value, which is real and central to certain styles of farming. 
Its use value can only be produced, maintained and utilized if it is 
not bought and sold. The specific use value exists thanks to its non-
exchangeability. Self-produced feed is knowledge in material form— 
precisely because it is a product of real, not abstract, labor. Hence the 
value of such feed is not abstract but specific. It is a socially defined 
value. The farmer knows this feed, knows the fields it comes from, 
under what meteorological conditions it was harvested, knows its quality 
and grade, and knows how his cows have reacted to it in the past and 
will react to it in the future. Self-produced feed is also to be seen as 
independence in material form. The use value of such feed is that the 
farmer can apply his own insights, unhindered by buyers and sellers 
and unconditioned by market and price relationships. In short, pro-
ducing one's own feed (feed as a "subsistence commodity" as Chevalier 
would presumably call it) just as producing one's own cows, gives the 
direct producer control over the labor process. It relates to earlier 
attempts to enlarge this control as well as to the principle of non-
exchangeability. Hence, use value emerges as a dominant category. 
Chevalier rightly states that "production for household consumption 
may have nothing to do with the preservation of a 'natural economy.' 
On the contrary, it may result from the need . . . to obtain the greatest 
value" (1982:119). Again the essential question is what must be under-
stood by "value." By ignoring the strategic meaning implied in having 
control of one's own labor process, the question concerning the "prac-
tical and positive meaning of usevalue logic" remains unanswered 
(1982:114). 
In the farming styles explored in the previous chapters, use values 
represented a "practical and positive" meaning precisely because they 
make it possible to create a certain room to maneuver. By withdrawing 
at strategic points from the immediate influence of market and price 
relations, the farmer can organize the labor process more in tune with 
his own insights and interests. By creating and maintaining a certain 
self-sufficiency, "you are conditioned by nothing and no one in your 
work," says an Italian farmer. In short, by bringing the necessary labor 
objects, means, and labor to rest as far as possible on historically 
guaranteed reproduction farmers create social relations of production 
which maximize their own control over the labor process and permit 
the direct producer as great a share as possible of the wealth produced. 
The concept of "farming freedom" has, according to Slicher van 
Bath (1948), a double meaning. It is "freedom from" and "freedom 
to"; freedom from ties that bind (among which commodity relations 
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are explicitly understood) and freedom to choose those forms of labor 
organization and production which optimally fall in with one's own 
perspectives and interests. This twofold notion of farming freedom is 
crucial for understanding not only the relations between farm and 
markets—relations which are constantly changing—but the farmer's 
conscious role in the organization of these particular interrelations. 
The relations between farms and markets often appear to be inter-
nally contradictory, but seen from the perspective of the dual "farming 
freedom" mentioned, they contain an unmistakable, socially denned 
logic. As van den Akker (1967:139), an old farmer from Friesland, 
wrote, "the whole farm was organized in such a way that one could 
help oneself as much as possible and yet spend as little as possible." 
After a detailed description of the mechanisms for achieving this, he 
concludes that "in the old farms self-sufficiency was practiced to such 
perfection that the cleverest statesman [or I might add, academic] could 
well take a lesson from it" (1947:140). At the same time, however, as 
van den Akker tells us, these farmers were "like wasps round the honey 
pot" if there was a new opportunity to make money, "for there was 
always a hunger for cash." 
Certain commodity relations were entered into, but others were, as 
far as possible, placed beyond bounds. Thus exchange and exchangea-
bility are not universal, as the insights of the old Frisian farmer 
illustrates, nor everywhere and always applicable in simple commodity 
production. They are carefully and consciously regulated, for they are 
related to "farming freedom," to control over the labor process, and to 
the distribution of wealth. 
Chevalier reduces the practical question of why certain goods and 
services are "subsistence commodities" and others "actual commodi-
ties" to a question of savings, and thereby to a mainly conjuntural 
phenomenon. Because land, labor and certain products are not mobi-
lized by the market (via actual exchange) the farm household achieves 
"measurable savings in the family budget" (1982:120). Research such 
as Gudeman's (1978) attempts to give quantitative support to such a 
thesis. Again, however, such deductive reasoning does not stand up to 
a careful analysis of empirical constellations. If we look again at the 
situations highlighted in the earlier chapters, measurable savings do not 
appear to be crucial. Feed offered in the market can be so cheap that 
the production of roughage and concentrates on the farm itself produces 
the opposite of "measurable savings." But the farmers in question 
continue with the practice. By deriving decisions from a long-term 
perspective short-term fluctuations on the market appear as irrelevant 
or may even appear as threatening and dangerous. The same can be 
said of farmers in Ireland. Leeuwis (1988), in a beautiful case study, 
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describes how a great number of farmers rejected subsidized loans to 
build new stalls, behaving in a manner which again opposes the notion 
of "measurable savings." Instead they took upon themselves the extra 
costs in order to be able to build the stall according to their own 
insights and means. Likewise, a good cow, whether it stands in a stall 
in Peru, Italy, Friesland or Ireland, is not sold just at the moment 
when "measurable savings" could be at their highest. 
A certain subjectivity cannot be omitted from the "exchange cal-
culations" farmers make: the time scale used, whether they value their 
independence, and many other considerations are crucial to the final 
outcome of exchange calculations, and vital in any decision concerning 
whether to sell or not. This can easily be shown to be the case even 
in the examples from Pachitea, on which Chevalier bases his reasoning. 
I am not referring here to voluntaristic or atomistic interpretations. 
On the contrary, it is through the significance of subjectivity in exchange 
calculations that social relations of production are expressed, and it is 
through this subjectivity that farmers manage to create room for ma-
neuver with respect to market and price relations. 
Markets are arenas. Of course farmers are not the only actors 
operating in such arenas, let alone the only ones who are interested in 
the relationship between agriculture and various economic circuits. The 
confrontation between capital and peasantry revolves to a large extent 
around this theme, as Bernstein rightly argues (1977). An increasing 
incorporation into markets and a consequent commoditization and 
institutionalization of the labor process are practically always the result, 
even if not the direct intention, of intervention by state and agribusiness 
in the agricultural sector. A typical example is the fact that the design 
of new agrarian technologies (the green revolution packet is a good 
example) is nearly always based on the assumption of increasing exter-
nalization of particular agricultural tasks to industry. This results in 
further incorporation and commoditization and in an abrupt redistri-
bution of produced wealth. 
Commodity relationships are not neutral givens. They form an in-
trinsic part of the arena in which farmers find themselves face to face 
with state, traders, agribusiness and their advocates. In a political and 
ideological respect, therefore, it appears to me that theories which on 
a priori grounds ignore the contradictions and room for maneuver of 
farmers in these arenas are seriously inadequate. Then strategies such 
as "the seeking of maximum autonomy" (Fraslin and Simier, 1983), 
the "resistance paysanne" (Pernet 1982), the movement of young farmers 
in Italy to create maximum distance from agribusiness, or the reverse— 
the active pursuit of commoditization—become totally incomprehensi-
ble. Anta Pampa is in this respect an outstanding illustrative micro-
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cosmos. Commoditization proceeds here through programs such as 
those fashionable in international circuits of development aid. Incor-
poration into the capital market in turn brings with it (according to 
the modus operandi of the Proderm Program) incorporation into the 
market for "improved" genetic material. That leads to a dependency 
relationship with markets for fertilizers, herbicides and pesticides, to 
dependency on labor markets, markets for machine services, and mar-
kets for "professional knowledge." It also leads, as described earlier, to 
a deepening dependency on potato markets because the farmer is no 
longer able to choose when he will market his harvest. The time 
schedule is then denned by the institution that lends the credit. And 
added to all this is a certain reduction in soil fertility and degradation 
of the farmer's own genetic stock; dependency relationships, in other 
words, become lasting phenomena. 
This whole pattern of dependency and its associated market-induced 
risks appear in the eyes of the farmers of Anta Pampa to be a trap; a 
trap to be avoided. Those who can avoid it, i.e., the rich, do so, despite 
the "measurable savings" they might achieve. In reality it is the poor 
who out of necessity participate in planned market incorporation. But 
in doing so, poverty remains their lot. 
The Impact of Commoditization 
The relationship between use and exchange values in the labor process 
and the specific interaction between commodity and non-commodity 
circuits appears to have a great impact on the organization and devel-
opment of the labor and production process in agriculture. Different 
incorporation patterns are concomitant with different styles of agricultural 
practice. If the labor process is largely based on the "total circulation 
of commodities" (Marx, 1974:111,328) (i.e., if production is in essence 
market-dependent), then scale enlargement and relative extensification 
becomes dominant, not only in capitalist-organized agriculture as current 
dualistic theories contend, but in the sphere of family farming as well. 
Family farms and cooperatives, obliged by a high degree of incorporation 
to use an E-logic to define the farm's development, develop in the same 
way as capitalist agricultural enterprises. "Tierra sin brazos" and "brazos 
sin tierra" or, as they say in Italy, "agricoltura di rapina," then become 
appropriate interpretations of the development of the sector which 
apparantly is controlled by farmers. That is to say that under the 
misleading guise of independence formal subsumption is achieved. Such 
subsumption or subordination will result from an increasing dependence 
on markets and from commoditization of the elements and interrelations 
of the labor process that goes with this. 
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On the basis of the case studies from Peru and Italy, the connection 
between commoditization and the growing dominance of scale enlarge-
ment and relative extensification,1 can be outlined as follows: 
1. The notion of benefits and costs is redefined, in the sense that 
with progressive incorporation, labor, labor objects, and means appear 
increasingly as direct costs. In the family farm this represents a struc-
tural change. Such costs, and their level of input, either separately or 
together become the object of continual deliberations. The "mobility" 
of labor, means, etc., is far higher than in historically guaranteed 
autonomous production, and the production factors made "mobile" are 
incorporated into a general strategy of cost reduction. The mobility of 
production factors so heavily emphasized by Friedmann (1980) in her 
characterization of simple commodity production is thus in no way a 
universal characteristic independent of time and place. This very mo-
bility is a continually changing given that accurately reflects the degree 
of commoditization. 
Alongside this, and again because of the high level of incorporation, 
these production factors and non-factor inputs, which now appear as 
"costs," have to be used in such a way that valorization is assured 
over a shorter term than before. That means that economic efficiency 
as defined by prevailing commodity relations becomes dominant over 
the striving for technical efficiency.2 It means also that benefits which 
are immediately realizable become decisive and future benefits become 
less relevant. The "good cow" effectively leaves the stage. 
2. With progressive commercialization the time span conceived and 
planned for becomes considerably shorter. To an increasing degree each 
cycle must be made to pay, must be set up and organized in such a 
way that it is in tune with actual price and market relations of the 
day. Plans and investments which might cover a number of cycles 
become increasingly subjected to the time limits set by loans, as well 
as to trends predicted in other relevant markets. This contrasts markedly 
with the opposite situation, where historically guaranteed autonomous 
production permits a substantially longer time horizon, symbolized on 
the one hand in the idea of "the good farm" and on the other in 
reproduction and acquisition over generations (that is to say, on the 
family as a relation of production). The father farmed on inherited 
land and worked so that his sons, sometimes daughters, could take 
over a "good" or even better farm. 
3. Both of these previous developments imply that the fragility of 
the agrarian sector substantially increases and brings with it changing 
ideas concerning risk. In the past, risk referred mainly to the unpre-
dictability of nature, but with a sharp rise in commoditization, economic 
risk becomes central. Market-induced risk (Huysman, 1986) emerges 
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and becomes general with the advance of the incorporation process. 
Risk-avoidance as a strategy, as I have shown, thus acquires a wholly 
different form. 
4. If we begin now from the simplest position—namely, with a 
production function, as an unambiguous, curvilinear link between in-
puts and outputs—then a rising level of incorporation will result in a 
different optimum. With a change in the definition of benefits and costs 
and a change in the concept of risk, the slope of the price line alters 
and the "equalizing point" will come to lie lower on the production 
function. The costs, as a consequence of incorporation, will be estimated 
as far higher. With a readjusted definition of benefits, "future benefits" 
(such as higher soil fertility, improved feedstuffs, well-maintained ir-
rigation systems, etc.) will fall outside the shortened time span which 
the process of incorporation introduces into the sphere of production. 
Economic risk avoidance, finally, implies that where prices fluctuate, 
and production factors and non-factor inputs appear (are interpreted) 
as direct costs, farmers will by and large calculate along the "bottom 
line." 
The results include a lower input of production factors and non-
factor inputs and a lower production per labor object is the result. 
5. Even more fundamental is the fact that with an increasing degree 
of incorporation, labor undergoes a change in quality. In the framework 
of artisanal production (and agrarian production is artisanal to a 
considerable degree), quality can be defined as a specific relation be-
tween producer and labor object. 
Quality is essential where labor is geared to an optimal use and 
development of the productive potential of labor objects. Quality ap-
peared frequently in earlier chapters in concrete form as craftmanship, 
and the difference between "good" and "bad" farming was discussed 
on several occasions. In irrigation, for example, labor can be so orga-
nized that it is of high or poor quality. It is the same in the cow shed 
where quality of labor can be distinguished in numerous ways. As 
Moerman (1968) rightly argues: "If we are to understand a productive 
system and its potential for growth, we cannot regard . . . labor as a 
disembodied, explanatory variable." Potentially labor may carry im-
pressive qualities. But quality demands time. Good irrigation assumes 
a labor input of 1 man per 40 litre/sec in sorghum cultivation. One 
can irrigate with less input but the work will not be well done. A well-
cared-for potato field in Chacân demands 37 man/days per topo. Those 
who have other matters in their head (literally and figuratively) make 
do with 16 man days per topo. The differences can be clearly seen in 
the harvests. With a similar type of cow shed (legato modernd) an 
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intensive farmer spends on average 25 minutes with each cow, while 
his colleague might spend only 10 minutes. 
As already indicated, the way the production process is perceived is 
changed by the process of incorporation. Production factors and non-
factor inputs do appear as direct costs. Labor is no exception; it is 
also seen increasingly as a cost. It is seen as an item like any other 
item for which a cost reduction becomes the norm: thus less labor will 
be have to be employed per labor object. In other words, labor also 
becomes a function of market and price relations. Thus, time as a 
precondition for quality becomes an absurdity because only the quan-
titative aspect of production remains. 
The gradual elimination of quality in farm labor and the disappear-
ance of specific use values (such as the "good cow," "own feed," "a 
job well done") which go with this imply a second substantial shift of 
the "equalizing point." 
6. Changing conceptions of costs, benefits, and risks, and the gradual 
elimination of craftmanship as a specific relationship between producer 
and labor object, affect the parameters within which the farmer makes 
his decisions. As Pearse (1968) states, "new conditions are laid down 
in which peasants make their decisions." But these new conditions are 
only the tip of the iceberg. Not only are the external parameters of 
decision making changing, but the decision-making process itself is 
drastically altered. The process of incorporation leads, as we have 
shown, to an adaptation of the calculus. 
We defined and researched a calculus as the structure within which 
a farmer specifies goals and means and their mutual relations and with 
which the labor process as well as the interrelations between farm and 
environment are regulated. A calculus is constructed and reproduced 
through the repeated process of observation, interpretation, understand-
ing, and adaptation. Thus a calculus symbolizes a particular structuring 
of farm labor. 
In Emilia Romagna we explored the I-calculus, the model that guides 
decisions and normatizes labor in situations which could be classified 
as grounded in historically guaranteed reproduction. Alongside it, a 
clear E-calculus could be distinguished, a model which carries a func-
tional rationality and is characteristic of situations in which the level 
of incorporation is high. It was demonstrated that even when similar 
external parameters are assumed, this E-calculus leads to a different 
optimum than the I-calculus. 
7. Thus, when assuming a given production function, it can be 
demonstrated that on account of changing parameters (benefits, costs, 
time perspectives, risk, quality) and changing calculi, not one but a 
whole gamut of "points on the production surface" (Yotopoulos, 1974) 
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are to be observed. The spread is not coincidental, but rather it is 
structurally determined by differences in the level of incorporation. 
However, the assumption of one given production function (although 
didactically useful) is not real. From the various case studies there 
appear to be a number of production functions (within one and the 
same group of farms operating under the same set of ecological and 
technical conditions). The nature of these functions are strongly asso-
ciated with the level of incorporation. 
The technical efficiency of farm labor structured as craftsmanship 
tends to be relatively high. Labor structured as craftsmanship results 
in the creation of "frontier functions" (Timmer, 1970). Craftsmanship 
assumes not only quality and time, but as a particular organization of 
labor (with its own specific knowledge, experience and norms) it also 
assumes both an "overview of and insight into the relevant whole" and 
a certain measure of "functional autonomy." The "externalization" of 
an increasing part of the reproduction and production process entailed 
in the process of incorporation, and the growing dominance of market 
and price relations as a regulating principle, reduces this "relevant 
whole" and eliminates "functional autonomy." A commoditization of 
the elements used within the labor process as well as an external 
prescription of farm tasks become fundamental characteristics which 
bring with them increasing entrepreneurship and a simultaneous un-
dermining of the basis and ratio of craftsmanship. Incorporation into 
markets and institutionalization by market agencies hinge precisely on 
that point. Thus farm labor loses its role of generating renewal and 
progress in production. Adoption of externally developed innovations 
becomes the key word. It is in this way that alienation of farm labor 
and its formal subsumption to capital are accomplished. 
Similarities and Differences 
Most contributions to the commoditization debate relate either to 
peripheral agricultural systems or to the history of agricultural systems 
of the center. Chevalier's work, for instance, symbolizes the former 
whilst the work of Friedmann, which focuses primarily on North 
American grain farmers in the 1880s and the 1930s is to be seen as 
an eloquent example of the latter. However, the contemporary reality 
of central agricultural systems is seldom the object of research, let 
alone of comparative research that relates to both center and periphery. 
Empirical research of a comparative nature, is as it were, replaced by 
a series of assumptions which under scrutiny appear more fiction than 
reality. These assumptions then refer to a "fully commoditized" agrarian 
sector in which the commoditization process is historically "complete" 
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and in which the mobility of production factors is understood to be 
unlimited. With such assumptions empirical research of commoditi-
zation in "highly developed" agricultural systems obviously becomes 
superfluous. 
The assumption that West European and North American agriculture 
represents full commoditization leads in turn to a strong bias in the 
analysis of peripheral systems, where partial commoditization thus 
emerges as a central characteristic of underdevelopment, closely bound 
to the notion of the "intrinsic backwardness" of these systems (Bern-
stein, 1979). In that respect, Bernstein's position distressingly resembles 
the thesis of "uncapturedness" of which Hyden (1980) is an exponent: 
both relate the low level of commoditization of peasant agriculture in 
one way or another to underdevelopment and stagnation. The coinci-
dence is not surprising. Both theoretical perspectives combine a second 
assumption, that development procèdes in a unilinear manner from a 
"natural economy" to complete commoditization (for a critique of this 
point of view see Long, 1984; Long et al., 1986). This complete com-
moditization, or full market integration, would therefore be typical for 
agricultural systems of the center. 
The way in which Friedmann relates the concepts of simple com-
modity production and petty commodity production is a pregnant 
expression of the tendency to equate development with the "historical 
completion" of the commoditization process. "The end point of com-
moditization is simple commodity production," according to Friemann, 
(1980:163). Petty commodity production is characterized in Friedmann's 
conceptualization by a not-yet-complete integration in markets, i.e., the 
allocation and remuneration of production factors take place partly 
outside the market and do not respond to the "logic of the market." 
"Commodity relations are limited in their ability to penetrate the cycle 
of production" (Friedmann, 1980:163). Simple commodity production, 
on the other hand, would represent "full market integration"; in other 
words, in simple commodity production, the logic of the market rules. 
Agriculture is then "controlled by definite and precise forms of capitalist 
regulation," according to Gibbon and Neocosmos (1985:165). Bernstein 
completes this view by presenting petty commodity production as a 
transitional category which relates to a few not-yet-completed realities. 
"The passage from 'household production' to simple commodity pro-
duction is charted through full market integration" states Bernstein in. 
summarizing Friedmann's work (1986:15). Simple commodity produc-
tion, on the other hand, would be the key for understanding European, 
American, and "modernized" Third World agriculture (Bernstein, 1986). 
This unilinear perspective points to an astonishing convergence be-
tween commoditization theory and neoclassical development economics 
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(Vandergeest, 1988; Long and van der Ploeg, 1988). The latter tradition 
takes the position that "rural development is concerned with the mod-
ernization and monetization of rural society and its transition from 
traditional isolation to integration with the national economy" (World 
Bank, 1975b:3). The view that one of the main obstacles to modern-
ization is the incapacity or unwillingness to organize production on the 
basis of current market relations (Rogers, 1969) is wholly in agreement 
with this. 
Thus far we have discussed in general the convergence between at 
least some of the contributions to the commoditization debate and 
modernization theory. Now if we look at the results of the research on 
Italian and Peruvian agriculture we are obliged to conclude that simple 
commodity production, understood as "complete" market integration, 
no more exists than do farmers who are wholly "homo economicus." 
Even in such highly developed agricultural areas as the Italian Po plain, 
there is no such thing as complete mobilization of production factors, 
or of a way of farming which reflects unequivocally and unilinearly 
"the logic of the market." So the fictitious "end point" of Friedmann 
is not reached. 
If one were to use one of the above-mentioned concepts, then iron-
ically enough it would be petty commodity production, for Italian 
farmers are as much petty commodity producers as their Peruvian 
counterparts. A partial market integration for them is no historical 
accident, let alone a phenomenon that they relate to assumed back-
wardness in the development of their farm enterprises. Those who 
structure their farm labor according to an I-calculus or logic consciously 
strive for only partial market integration. And even E-farmers achieve 
less than complete market integration, even though it is what they strive 
for, because in that striving they come up against a number of contra-
dictions peculiar to capitalist formations: banks will never finance farms 
100%; they even demand a non-mobility of various production factors.3 
A complete integration into labor and land markets is equally impos-
sible. Prevailing market relations and the ratios between prices and 
costs which they entail simply prohibit that. One can even go a step 
further. If one examines the available data on commoditization patterns 
in Italian and Peruvian agriculture, one is obliged to conclude that in 
some respects Peruvian agriculture is more commoditized than Italian 
agriculture. 
Table 5.1 presents the relevant data. Besides the data on Emilia 
Romagna on the Po plain of Italy, Anta pampa in southern Peru, and 
Luchadores, the cooperative in northern Peru, new data relating to 
Campania, an agricultural area in the south of Italy, and to dairy 
farming in the Netherlands are provided to fill out the picture. For 
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Table 5.1. Differential Incorporation in the Netherlands, I ta ly and Peru 
Incorporation Netherlands Emili 
into markets dairying 
for: 
Labor 
Land 
Short-term loans 
Medium-term 
loans 
Long-term loans 
Machine services 
Genetic material 
Main inputs 
Composite index 
6.6X 
NA 
1.9X 
] 
17.8X 
J 
20.5X 
13.7X 
NA 
NA 
s Romagna Campania 
dairying mixed farming 
Plain 
9. IX 
28.7X 
4.6X 
11.IX 
2.4X 
30.7X 
7.2X 
43.8X 
26X 
Mountains (S. Italy) 
0.1X 
20.2X 
1.9X 
3.4X 
2.4X 
10X J 
7.6X 
37.8X 
15X 
13X 
8X 
23.2X 
14X 
8X 
26. 3X 
NA 
Peru 
Coop. Potato 
agrlc. cultiv 
coastal Andes 
plain 
100X 
100X 
65X 
50X 
70X 
65X 
85X 
NA 
25X 
21X 
27X 
OX 
60X 
43X 
35X 
NA 
those countries where more regional data are available, i.e., in Italy 
and Peru, one might still conclude that central agricultural areas are 
more incorporated than peripheral areas. The explanation for this is 
obvious. Peripheral or marginal areas such as the sierra in Peru and 
the mountains in Italy form—because of their meager volume of pro-
duction, and poor infrastructure or ecological complications—less in-
teresting "objects" for the agencies which constitute the driving forces 
of incorporation. To this must be added the fact that technological 
models which are based on a strong externalization of the various tasks 
of farm labor and which both assume and encourage a high level of 
incorporation, are not applicable, or are at least less so, in the more 
marginal areas. 
Crossing land frontiers, a different pattern, however, is observable. 
European agriculture (represented in the table by the Netherlands and 
Italy) is, generally speaking, less incorporated into various markets than 
Peruvian agriculture. If we take Peru as being indicative of peripheral 
agricultural systems on a world scale, one may conclude that, in general, 
agriculture of the periphery is more commoditized, more based on a 
"complete circulation of commodities," than systems of the center. 
However improbable it might at first glance seem, the foregoing 
interpretation- is supported by a number of arguments. They partly 
relate to the "driving forces" behind the incorporation and commodi-
tization process; they are also partly derived from a careful analysis of 
various social relations of production which lie behind the data sum-
marized in the table. 
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Peripheral economies are characterized as disarticulated (de Janvry, 
1981). The agrarian sector is primarily of importance insofar as it 
supplies cheap labor and food. If this is primarily produced for the 
internal market and the producers are small farmers, then disarticu-
lation applies a fortiori. Such a situation constrasts sharply with econ-
omies in which economic sectors are interlinked by more symmetrical 
dependency patterns through which a balanced articulation of sectors 
is maintained. That occurs, for example, when the agricultural sector 
is also an important consumer market for industrially manufactured 
inputs and means of production. Then, for obvious politico-economic 
reasons, it is important that farmers get good prices for their products 
in order to maintain their buying power. 
Be that as it may, a large section of agriculture in disarticulated 
economies forms a simple "hinterland" for growth poles with which 
they are linked through several politico economic mechanisms (Quijano, 
1977). Low farm prices and chronic inflation of costs define the struc-
tural conditions under which production must take place. Export poles 
in the agricultural sector are usually no exception. Instability, the long-
term fall in prices, and sharply rising costs, are also found in typical 
export enclaves because of the international trade situation and tech-
nological dependence. This implies that it is not so much a question 
of a one-off "reproduction squeeze" (Bernstein, 1977), but of a constant 
drain of resources. Autonomous, historically guaranteed reproduction is 
being continuously eroded and increasingly substituted by market-
dependent reproduction. The result is a rapid, forced, and all-embracing 
incorporation of one part of the agrarian sector and a rapid margin-
alization of the other. 
Fitzgerald (1981) provides a convincing description of the disarti-
culated structure of the Peruvian economy and documents in detail the 
ever-worsening terms of trade with which the agricultural sector is 
confronted. Webb (1972) shows the same for Peru in the 1950s and 
1960s and Billone et al. (1982) for the decade of the 1970s. The role 
played by Peruvian agricultural policy in this disarticulation has also 
been analyzed (Caballero, 1980). The general conclusion of these studies 
is simple: there is a permanent and continuously deepening "repro-
duction squeeze" in the Peruvian countryside. 
The logical accompaniment of this is very rapid incorporation spurred 
on by political motives.4 In the 1970s short-term credit allocated to 
agriculture in Peru rose from 13.8% of the GVP to 29.2%. Comparative 
figures for Italian agriculture show that at the beginning of the 1970s 
the total amount of short-term credit given was 12.4% of the GVP, less 
therefore, than in Peru. But more important, available figures show 
that during the 1970s the proportion of short-term credit in Italian 
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agriculture remained constant while, as we saw, in Peruvian agriculture 
it more than doubled (data derived from INEA, 1977; Fabiani, 1979; 
Haudry, 1978; and Ministerio, 1981). Farmers respond to the permanent 
production squeeze by continually substituting the resources controlled 
and owned by themselves by resources which have to be mobilized in 
the various markets. The sanction for not doing so is marginalization. 
And because of this, the level of incorporation rises faster in disarti-
culated peripheral economies than in central agricultural systems which 
form a part of more articulated economies. That is why the level of 
commoditization is usually higher in agricultural systems of the Third 
World than in systems where some theorists assume commoditization 
is already "complete." 
There are other driving forces discernable which together cause a 
more abrupt movement of and often a more penetrating form of com-
moditization, especially in peripheral agricultural systems. These forces 
are to be seen in the power arenas in which agricultural policy arises, 
in the influence of farmer organizations and cooperatives as counter-
vailing powers, in the impact of culture and "farming pride" (Hofstee, 
1983; Einaudi, 1975). However, glancing back at the table in which 
incorporation patterns in the Netherlands, Italy and Peru were com-
pared, what appears to me most interesting is that the comparisons 
naturally bear a certain ambiguity. Dependence on markets for machine 
services in Italy, for example, is not identical and in certain respects 
not even comparable to a similar dependence in Peru. Behind what 
appear to be identical categories (which indeed bring out important 
quantitative differences), there lie hidden completely different social 
relations of production. That does not need to be a problem for the 
interpretation of the data because the drama becomes even clearer when 
differences in the social relations of production are taken into account. 
Commoditization and the 
Social Relations of Production 
Different degrees of commoditization represent differences in the 
social relations of production. Hence the dynamics, contradictions and 
problems of simple commodity production are not to be found in its 
"intrinsic" nature. As Marx (1974:111, 638-639) argued: "No producer, 
whether industrial or agricultural, when considered by himself alone, 
produces value or commodities. His product becomes a value and a 
commodity only in the context of definite social interrelations." Social 
relations of production are, as Poulantzas (1974) pointed out, that whole 
set of specific relations that constitutes the labor and production process 
(i.e., that gives the labor process its concrete form) and that defines 
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the distribution of produced wealth. Given this conceptualization of 
the social relations of production, it is evident that levels of commod-
itization must be understood as an integral part of it. And this is 
exactly what various researchers, such as Nemchinov and others, have 
done.5 Relations between farm enterprises, markets and market agencies 
shape the labor process to an important degree, either because they 
allow farmers "freedom" to exercise control over labor objects and the 
means of production, or because they directly condition, prescribe and 
sanction the organization of labor and production. 
The distribution of produced wealth is closely related to the level 
of incorporation. Levels of incorporation not only denote the various 
actors and institutions related to the production process (each with a 
specific position in the social division of labor) but they also quantify 
that relation. In this way they dictate what part of farm generated 
wealth will fall to the banks, to landowners, to those who monopolize 
the supply of machine services, and to agribusiness. An average degree 
of incorporation in capital markets of 17.8 and 1.9% = 19.7% (see 
Table 5.1) means that 20-30% of the gross income of the average Dutch 
dairy farm flows to the bank. And then we are speaking of averages. 
There are farms in the Netherlands where incorporation into capital 
markets is substantially higher and where banks appropriate a far 
greater part of annual earned income.6 
Differential degrees of commoditization form an important part of 
the relevant social relations of production. But social relations of pro-
duction are not exhaustively defined by incorporation level alone. This 
point of view is especially important in comparative research into 
agricultural systems located in markedly differing politico-economic 
settings. 
Markets are arenas, and although such arenas are reasonably uniform 
within a given country, they differ markedly between countries. On the 
basis of this observation, the data brought together in Table 5.1 should 
be critically reappraised. 
Let us first look at the market for important non-factor inputs. In 
the Netherlands and Italy (at least in Emilia Romagna) these markets 
are characterized by stable prices—in contrast to Peru where marked 
price fluctuations, rising inflation, and uncertainty over the quality of 
the relevant inputs is part of everyday experience. In the center, farmers' 
cooperatives often constitute important price correcting mechanisms 
that are able, to some extent, to limit the impact of agribusiness. Such 
strong cooperatives are mostly absent on the periphery. In the center, 
government research stations and farmer organizations exercise constant 
quality control over inputs such as concentrates and fertilizer. In the 
Third World, where this countervailing power is lacking, it is easy to 
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think that such products "no longer have any power"; such is often 
actually the case. 
A similar difference operates in the market for genetic materials. In 
Peru it is the multinationals who control the market, and it regularly 
happens that cooperatives such as Luchadores are supplied with seed 
that has insufficient germination power. Such a thing is unthinkable in 
the Netherlands or Emilia Romagna, and if it should happen, then 
Dutch and Italian farmers are able to fall back on several mechanisms 
to recover their loss. In Peru, bringing a lawsuit against a multinational 
such as DeKalb would be a fruitless undertaking. Seed potatoes in the 
sierra, at least the so-called "improved varieties," degenerate within 
four or five years, as we saw in Chapter 3. Again, that is difficult to 
imagine in West European agriculture where a closely knit network for 
adaptive agricultural research exists. The arenas thus differ markedly. 
That means also that level of incorporation—in a comparative anal-
ysis—refers to different things. If a heavy dependence on markets for 
non-factor inputs and genetic material is already problematic for many 
European farmers, it must be more so in the typical arena formed by 
peripheral markets. There, the countervailing powers present in Euro-
pean arenas are weak or sometimes even totally absent. In other words, 
in order to be able to judge incorporation in terms of the social relations 
of production, an analysis of the relevant arenas as a whole is necessary, 
certainly when making comparisons. The market for machine services 
in Italy, for example, is highly competitive. The greater part of supply 
stems from the small-scale farmer sector and all kinds of social links 
condition actual transactions. In Peru, however, machine pools are 
mostly controlled by former landowners. Cooperatives and small farmers 
have few, sometimes none, of the necessary machines at their disposal, 
nor do they have the means to purchase them. Relations in the market 
for machine services then become highly asymmetrical. It is a similar 
story in the capital market. 
Without wanting to idealize European agricultural banks, it must be 
said that they are still, because of their cooperative origins, to a certain 
degree decentralized. Farmers usually have direct access to their ad-
ministration, which is local. In addition the state has created a number 
of correcting mechanisms such as interest subsidies, security funds, and 
"safety nets," so that a bad harvest does not lead directly to bankruptcy. 
The relation between banks and farmers in peripheral agricultural 
systems is illustrated by the Colombian farmers who call themselves 
patasucias vis-à-vis the bank. "Patasucias" means muddy feet. The 
farmers are thus saying that they have too much mud on their feet 
even to step on the marble floors, let alone be able to arrange private 
terms with the manager. Not being able to repay loans on time fre-
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quently leads to bankruptcy. The criteria and parameters and relation-
ships at work in such markets thus penetrate far deeper into the heart 
of farm operations than they do in Italy or in the Netherlands, and 
the need to adapt the farm is immediate and cannot be ignored. An 
oustanding example is to be found in land and labor markets. What is 
so conspicuous in cooperative agriculture of the Peruvian coast (see 
Table 5.1) is a complete incorporation into the land market. Friedmann's 
criterium for a full market integration appears here to have been 
achieved. During the period of expropriation and the subsequent form-
ing of cooperatives, the state bought the land from the landowners. The 
state then tried to off-load the financial obligations attendent upon this 
onto the newly formed cooperatives. Thus arose the "agrarian debt." 
Only when the debt was fully repaid would the cooperatives acquire 
dominion and control over the land. 
This agrarian debt (and the idea behind it that land is a commodity 
and should be bought) was so vehemently and radically opposed by 
farmer organizations that the government finally canceled it. However 
because of this the status of land has never been clearly regularized. 
For the government and the agrarian bank the land is still a commodity, 
i.e., a completely mobile production factor (which can serve as collateral 
for loans and can thus also be sequestered). For the cooperatives, the 
same land is held to be an inalienable labor object, whose control, use 
and access cannot be regulated by market relations. Here then we have 
an interesting interface: farmer organizations and the state define the 
land in decidedly different terms. In the end, it is mutual power relations 
that are crucial in determining the degree to which land does or does 
not appear as a commodity. The same is true for Italy. The land market 
there was also the object of fierce farmer struggle, both before and after 
the fascist period. Thanks to this struggle a tenancy law arose (which 
includes legal protection for tenants) that critically altered relations in 
the land market—to the advantage of the tenants. Social struggle is 
likewise an essential element for interpreting the degree of incorporation 
into the labor market. Formally speaking, cooperative agriculture on 
the Peruvian coast is fully incorporated. Those working maintain a 
wage-labor relation with "their" enterprise. Government agencies which 
in some ways view the management of cooperatives as one of their 
tasks (and often effectively take this role upon themselves) also directly 
apply "the logic of the market" to the workers. The chapter on Lu-
chadores provided several examples of this: government services con-
tinually estimated that a part of the workforce was superfluous. They 
wanted to finance only half the wage bill, wished to impose rotation, 
etc. However, social struggle and the unwillingness to consider their 
own work place as a variable, as a mere derivative of changing markets, 
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acted as a counterbalance to such tendencies. Work was considered an 
acquired right and defended as such, and creating employment (by 
means of the union's control over the cooperative enterprise) was also 
considered to be a value worth fighting for. 
In summary, if taken at face value, the data concerning differential 
commoditization patterns, summarized in Table 5.1, are not strictly 
comparable. Because they refer to different arenas of social contradic-
tions and different degrees of social struggle, they refer to social relations 
of production which are significantly different in practice. However, 
taking such differences into account, one is led to conclude not only 
that the degree of commoditization in peripheral agricultural systems 
is often higher than those of the center but also that the process of 
commoditization on the periphery subordinates farm labor to social 
relations of production that are far less favourable than those at the 
center. Hence, the consequences of the commoditization process in 
these typical peripheral situations are often extremely disruptive. 
Commoditization and the Reproduction 
of the Agrarian Question 
Raising the real level of commoditization creates a drastic change 
in the pattern of agrarian development. Progressive intensification (al-
though sometimes blocked) gives way to increasing enlargement of scale 
and relative extensification. This is a general process, demonstrable in 
agricultural sectors of both periphery and center. It is equally a general 
process in that it is an aspect of the capitalist transformation of the 
social relations of production. Non-commodity circuits and the interests, 
insights and perspectives of the direct producers that they encompass 
are substituted by commodity relations as the guiding mechanism. In 
this way then, the "logic of the market" becomes indeed dominant. 
The labor process is subsumed to the same relations which form the 
rationale for capitalist-organized agriculture. 
In peripheral agricultural systems this change is expressed as a 
deepening of agrarian underdevelopment. Although the link between a 
sharp increase in commoditization and the increasing dominance of 
scale enlargement and relative extensification is structural and therefore 
general, its effects differ widely. 
In the first place, this is because the process of commoditization is 
more rapid and more far-reaching on the periphery than in the center. 
We also showed unmistakable differences in the social relations of 
production formed by particular market arenas. In addition to this, 
market relations, which through commoditization become dominant as 
social relations of production, represent an often gigantic gap between 
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local realities and general market relations, especially in peripheral 
agriculture. All this means that in the Third World the effects of 
commoditization will be far more disruptive than in Western agricul-
ture. In synthesis, it is not the often supposed "uncapturedness" of 
farmers (their being outside of commodity circuits) nor their supposed 
submission to the "laws of capital" which constitutes the core of the 
agrarian question. Central to the agrarian question, to themes of under-
development, rural exodus, etc., is the concrete historical process through 
which the interlinking of markets and farming is established and re-
negotiated. And as far as the Third World is concerned, one might 
sustain that it is above all the abrupt, massive and centrally propelled 
commoditization that gives rise to the "agrarian question" so omni-
present nowadays. 
In the second place, we can point to technological development. 
Present-day agrarian technology offers to a certain, though strongly 
differentiated, degree the possibility of correcting at least some of the 
regressive effects of the commoditization process in Western agricultural 
systems. It is, after all, designed on behalf of these systems. In periph-
eral agriculture this is only possible as the exception. In Anta Pampa 
we were confronted with a concrete case of commoditization and 
simultaneous technological development in which the regressive effects 
of the one dominate the potentially moderating effects of the other. 
This makes for a second important characteristic of the "agrarian 
question," that is, the almost exclusive orientation of technological 
research and development towards interests other than, and often op-
posed to, those of Third World farmers. Central to this "bias" is the 
assumption of an increasing commoditization, an assumption made true 
through the very application of new technological models in "integrated 
rural development programs." 
In the third place, there is the simple fact that peripheral economies, 
through their place in the international division of labor, became net 
importers of food, which is partly related to the fact that Europe and 
the United States shift their particular "agrarian question" (i.e., over-
production) to the Third World. Given a food dependency, a stagnation 
in agricultural growth as provoked by a rapid commoditization is far 
more negative than would be the case in areas with overproduction. 
However, there is a real possibility of self-sufficiency, with its obvious 
politico-economic importance. Rapid and continuous self-sustained ag-
ricultural growth which depends on raising the quantity and quality of 
farm labor (and with it rural employment and income-generating op-
portunities), appears as a first priority within this framework. However, 
the abrupt and wholesale commoditization of the labor process pro-
moted by present integrated rural development programs achieves the 
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opposite. They result in the reproduction of agrarian underdevelopment, 
in the slowing down of agrarian growth, in an acceleration of the rural 
exodus, and in the increasing subsumption of agriculture to (interna-
tional) capitalist groups who control the various markets. 
Hayami and Ruttan relate the direction, nature and tempo of agrarian 
development to relative factor prices and the degree to which primary 
producers and various institutions (banks, agricultural research stations, 
extension) manage to translate the inherent logic of relative factor prices 
into consistent patterns of action. 
A double critique can now be formulated against such a position. 
To begin with, it is not so much the relative factor prices as such that 
determine the nature and direction of agrarian development. The com-
moditization process is equally decisive. It is only through commodi-
tization that relative factor prices (and other market relations) do or 
do not become reality at the core of agricultural production, i.e., in the 
labor process. Consequently institutional reforms oriented towards a 
better correspondence between institutional action and the "logic of the 
markets" can easily become a disastrous strategy in Third World coun-
tries. A deepening of agrarian underdevelopment will be the inescapable 
result. 
There are, however, other perspectives to be found. They may be 
found in forms of peasant-managed agricultural growth, which explicitly 
seek to protect the labor and development process from the dominance 
of prevailing commodity relations. Development of agriculture is often 
in opposition to prevailing market and price relations. This is accepted 
as self-evident by agrarian science and politics in the European context 
(de Wit, 1988) while at the same time the opposite is being advocated 
for Third World agriculture. A relative autonomy of agriculture vis-à-
vis the prevailing market relations does not imply that farmers are to 
seek an illusory way out in autarkic practices. It means that the social 
struggle must embrace, in an explicit way, the domains of both pro-
duction and circulation. The real possibility for such a perspective is 
highlighted in the vital practices, as we have seen, of farmers in Peru 
and Italy. But then, the recognition of such possibilities and perspectives 
implies that the "agrarian question" is to be redefined; it will have to 
include farmers and peasants as active actors, capable of making history, 
instead of defining them as passive victims or perennial losers. 
Notes 
1. I am fully aware of the fact that although the negative interrelations 
between scale and intensity was, until one and a half, maybe two decades ago, 
virtually a universal one (Jacob, 1971; Feder, 1973) this relation is now changing— 
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in a limited number of localities—into a positive one. Recently, in the northwest 
areas of the European Community, it has been possible to identify a segment 
of farm enterprises that combines scale enlargement and intensification in a 
positive and systematic way. This gives rise to what the French call les grands 
intensifs (Perraud, 1983). This phenomenon (described and analyzed for the 
Netherlands in van der Ploeg, 1987), is strongly related to scientification of the 
labor process in agriculture as well as to an increased division of labor between 
industry and agriculture. It is mostly limited to cattle breeding and dairy 
farming (Hairy, 1983; Fraslin and Simier, 1983). In agriculture as such it 
remains impossible (Crisenoy, 1983; Reboul, 1983). A similar pattern has been 
analyzed for US agriculture by Gregor (1982) as the "industrialization" of 
agriculture. 
The same pattern emerged in areas where the Green Revolution proved 
successful. In those areas the initially negative relation between scale and 
intensity was replaced by a so-called U-curve. 
In the agricultural areas studied in this book the negative relation between 
scale and intensity still forms an empirical reality: scale enlargement and relative 
extensification dominate as one of the important agricultural development 
patterns. Whether this phenomenon is to be understood as a temporary one 
or as a structural feature merits specific analysis. In view of the analysis 
represented in Chapter 3, which indirectly regards the introduction of "improved 
varieties" as an attempt at "scientification" of potato cultivation in the Andes, 
one might conclude that an attempt towards scientification of agricultural 
development in the Third World will often be in vain. 
The same conclusion was drawn from a systematic comparison of techno-
logical developments in Dutch and Italian dairy farming (van der Ploeg, 1987). 
Through its interaction with politico-economic processes (and the specific hier-
archization of space and the reorganization of time that it embraces), the 
"scientification" and hence the emergence of "grands intensifs" or "vanguard 
farms" will be limited to the most favoured areas ecologically, economically 
and institutionally. And these remain, on a world-scale, rather exceptional. The 
spatial distribution of "scientification" or industrialization as a development 
pattern in European agriculture is given in Meeus et al. 1988. 
2. For an empirial study of negative interrelation between economic and 
technical efficiency, see Messori (1984). A theoretical exposition is to be found 
in Yotopoulos (1974). 
3. Dutch agricultural banks quite often forbid the farmer's wife to give up 
her job outside the farm, so as to ensure at least some stable income. A more 
general illustration is the stipulation that land is not to be sold or given in 
tenancy without the bank's approval. 
4. Bates (1981) and Mamdani (1986) give a clear analysis of this phenomenon. 
5. At the local level commodity relations often imply relations between 
different categories (or classes) of farmers (Shanin, 1980). 
6. This is especially the case in the so-called "vanguard farms" (van der 
Ploeg, 1987). This high dependency on external financing urges, in turn, a 
continuous growth, a fuite en avant (Hairy, 1983). 
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family domain and, 29-30 
of fodder, 81, 82(fig.) 
heterogeneity and, 6-7 
in Luchadores del Dos de Enero, 222-
25, 223(fig.), 225(fig.) 
of soil fertility, 174-83, 197-99, 
198(table) 
time horizons for, 90-92 
unity of reproduction and, 13, 14 
See also Optimum/optima, production; 
Social relations of production 
Production functions, 270 
of I- and E-farmers, 93-94, 93(fig.) 
validity of, 145(n6) 
Produzione, 52-54, 61, 62, 67, 68, 70, 95, 
96, 120, 127 
in capitalist-organized farms, 142 
cura and, 56-57 
income and, 55-56 
incorporation and, 78, 79(table) 
Profit maximization, 97-98, 260 
Profit maximizer enterprise, 229-30, 
230(fig.) 
"Progress," farmers' striving for, 31-32 
Progressive intensification, 228-46 
collective craftsmanship and, 230-32 
cooperative structure and, 249-51 
extensification and, 281 
hectare yields and, 233-38 
law of diminishing returns and, 248-49 
Luchadores plan for, 246-51 
production goals and, 229-30, 230(fig.) 
scale enlargement and, 281 
"spending" vs. "application of 
economics" argument and, 239-42 
voluntad vs. skiving argument and, 
242-46 
water management and, 234-35 
worker commitment and, 249-50 
work-struggle relationship and, 232-33 
Protestant groups, 194 
Quality of labor, 270-71. See also 
Craftsmanship 
Rationality 
forms of, 12 
substantive, 60-61 
Ravenna cooperative, 250 
Reciprocal relationships, 157-58, 160-61, 
162(fig.) 
Regolamento per la Produzione del Latte 
(Consorzio), 109, 110(ng.) 
Regressive substitution, 238 
Relatively autonomous, historically 
guaranteed reproduction, 13-17, 
14(fig.), 180, 276 
la bell'azienda concept and, 91 
I-calculus and, 67 
incorporation and, 76 
market as outlet in, 14-15, 18 
los ricos and, 166, 169-70 
Rented land, 91 
Reproduction, 12-26 
community domain and, 30 
development patterns and, 12 
domain of, 28, 29, 30-31 
externalization of, 18-21 
of labor, 13, 24, 32, 35(nl7) 
of seed potatoes, 183-93, 186(fig.), 197 
of soil fertility, 19-20, 185 
unity of production and, 13, 14 
See also Market-dependent 
reproduction; Relatively autonomous, 
historically guaranteed reproduction 
Resource allocation, externalization of, 
111 
Rice cultivation, 234-38, 237(fig.) 
Ricos, los, 161, 162(fig.), 165-70, 181-82, 
183, 202(nl) 
relatively autonomous, historically 
guaranteed reproduction scheme of, 
166, 169-70 
Risk 
commoditization and incorporation and, 
269-70 
entrepreneurship and, 102-3 
heterogeneity /diversity due to, 5 
market dependency and, 65 
Rospigliosi family, 206, 208, 209, 210 
Rotation system 
credit and, 181-83 
soil fertility and, 176-77 
Roughage, 265 
Rural development, integrated, 201 
Savings, measurable, 266-67 
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Savings quota, 255(n2) 
Scale, 127, 128(table), 129(table) 
E-calculus and, 68, 69, 71-73, 80, 131, 
131(fig.) 
income and, 55, 56, 69 
incorporation and, 130 
intensity and, 283(nl) 
size vs., 137-38 
social relations of production and, 134-
38 
Scale enlargement, 268 
cattle density and, 133 
commoditization and, 269-72 
E-calculus and, 131, 131(fig.) 
forms of, 72-73 
neoclassical model of, 6-7 
progressive intensification and, 281 
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thin and fat cows phenomenon and, 
73-76 
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Schema, cognitive. See Calculi 
Scientification 
commoditization and, 190-91 
credit and, 191 
of labor process, 283(nl) 
of seed potato breeding, 188-93, 
192(fig.) 
Seed potatoes 
"improved varieties" of, 279 
reproduction of, 183-93, 186(fig.), 
192(fig.), 197 
Self-management, 251. See also 
Luchadores del Dos de Enero 
Self-provisioning, 24 
Self-sufficiency, 282-83 
feed input per cow and, 73-74 
I-calculus and, 59-60, 61, 66 
Sembrio, 193 
Semilleristas, 189-90 
Simple commodity production, 273, 274 
Size of farm, 136-38 
Skiving, 242-46 
Small farmers, 218-19, 279 
Social relations of production 
capitalism and, 281 
commodity relations as, 120, 277-81 
denned, 277-78 
heterogeneity and, 259-60 
labor and, 278 
scale and, 134-38 
TATE as, 120 
See also Incorporation; 
Institutionalization 
Social scientists, "backwardness" of, 
257(n7) 
Soil fertility. See Fertility, soil 
Soil use. See Styles of farming 
Specialization, 72-73 
ecological, 189 
"Spending" vs. "application of 
economics" argument, 239-42 
Standardization, 113 
Strategies, farming, ix. See also Farming 
logic 
Struggle, social 
autonomy and, 255, 255(fig.) 
denned, 252 
incorporation and, 280 
as prerequisite for intensification, 252-
55 
work and, 232-33 
See also Luchadores del Dos de Enero; 
Peasant struggles 
Styles of farming 
denned, 11-12 
factor analysis of, 127-30, 128(table), 
129(table) 
farm labor distinguished from, 12 
hectare yields for different, 2-3, 2(table) 
incorporation and, 130-31, 132(fig.), 268 
institutionalization and, 130-31, 
132(fig.) 
as social constructions, 126-31 
use values and, 265 
See also E-calculus; Extensification; I-
calculus; Intensification 
"Subsistence commodities," 263, 266 
Substitution, regressive, 238 
Sugar cooperatives, 229 
Surplus, 14, 96 
Task(s) 
coordination of, 32 
external prescription of, 111, 119, 123, 
272 
TATE and unity of, 107-8 
TATE. See Technical administrative task 
environment 
Taxonomies, folk, 184-85 
Technical administrative task environment 
(TATE), 30, 106-16, 133 
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craftsmanship and, 115-16, 116(table) 
as dominant social relation of 
production, 120 
external forces-internal responses 
dynamic and, 111-12 
externalization and, 107-8 
farmer's decision-making and 
maneuvering spaces and, 111-12, 
123-24 
incorporation/commoditization and, 
119, 147(n23) 
influence of, 50-52 
information flow from, 112, 113-14 
institutionalization and, 109-11 
investment decisions and, 114-15, 
115(table) 
of mountain dairy farmers, 124 
styles of farming and, 126 
unity of tasks and, 107-8 
Technical efficiency, 1, 33(nl, n2), 93, 
145(n8), 230-31 
craftsmanship and, 272 
economic efficiency vs., 269 
Technical management, social 
coordination of, 28 
Technological change, induced, 7 
Technology 
commoditization and, 282 
entrepreneurship and, 95-96, 102 
intensification based on, 134 
Temporales, 176 
Temporary workers, 218-19 
Thin and fat cows phenomenon, 73-76 
Thin and fat years, cycle of, 16-17 
Time perspective, 65-66 
commercialization and, 269 
of I-farmers, 66, 91 
incorporation and, 90-92 
"Uncapturedness" thesis, 273, 282 
Unilever, 112 
Unions. See Peasant unions 
Upgrading, 186, 186(fig.) 
Use values, 66, 263, 264-65 
exchange values and, 268 
styles of farming and, 265 
Valle de Convencion y Lares, 152 
Value as differential process, 262-68 
Value exchange, circuits of, 202(nl) 
Variability. See Heterogeneity; Styles of 
farming 
Voluntad (with a will) concept, 242-46, 
249, 250 
Wage labor, 194-95 
Water management, 234-35 
Wealth, distribution of, 277-78 
Weeding, 195 
Work 
control and, 244-45 
struggle and, 232-33 
voluntad vs. skiving, 242-46 
See also Labor 
Working capital, 78 
Yields, variation in, 10-11, 33(n5) 
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